Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

P. v. Montesinos CA4/2

Filed 10/22/26 P. v. Montesinos CA4/2
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/22/26 P. v. Montesinos CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E087555

v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV22001651)

ASHLEY MONTESINOS, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Enrique Guerrero,

Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Martin Lijtmaer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Mulford and Joshua

Trinh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Ashley Montesinos, a lawful permanent resident, is an

El Salvadorian citizen who entered the United States in 2010 with her brother when she

was 12 years old. In 2022, she pled guilty to second degree robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211).

In return, the remaining charges and enhancement allegations were dismissed, and she

was sentenced to two years in state prison. Defendant was placed on parole in August

2023. In April 2025, while she was on parole, immigration authorities detained defendant

and an immigration judge ordered her removal to El Salvador. In August 2025, she

moved to vacate her 2022 conviction under section 1473.7, claiming that she did not

understand the immigration consequences of her plea. The trial court denied the motion,

finding defendant had not met her burden to show a reasonable probability she would

have made a different decision at the time of the plea. On appeal, defendant contends the

trial court erred in finding her misunderstanding regarding immigration consequences did

not constitute prejudicial error. Based on the totality of circumstances, we reverse the

judgment and remand this case to the trial court to enter an order granting defendant’s

section 1473.7 motion and vacate her conviction.

1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

A. Underlying Facts

On May 13, 2022, around 4:00 a.m., defendant and an accomplice knocked on the

motel door of their Victim 1. The accomplice struck Victim 1 with a pistol and when

Victim 1 tried to flee, defendant gave chase while punching her in the head. Victim 1

sought refuge from her friends’ room, Victim 2 and Victim 3, but received no response

and ran to a neighboring motel room where the occupant responded.

Defendant and her accomplice then turned their attention to Victim 2 and

Victim 3’s room. Victim 2 awoke to loud banging on the door. Defendant stated, “ ‘open

the door; I want my shit.’ ” Victim 2 told her to go away and defendant responded,

“ ‘fuck that’ ” and broke the glass window. Victim 2 ran into the bathroom upon hearing

a gunshot. Victim 1 overheard defendant say, “ ‘Shoot them or give me the gun I’ll shoot

them.’ ” Victim 1 heard two gunshots as she ran to the front office and asked the clerk to

call 911.

Another witness reported that he saw a female shooting into Victim 2 and

Victim 3’s room and an officer later observed a bullet hole under the door handle.

Another witness saw defendant approach Victim 1’s vehicle, shoot into the front

passenger window, reach into the car, and grab a suitcase. Surveillance footage captured

defendant fleeing with Victim 1’s suitcase. Defendant yelled, “ ‘Dumbass bitch, I got

2 The factual background is taken from the police report.

3
you, I know where you live bitch, watch watch bitch, I am gonna shoot you bitch watch.

You gon come out watch bitch.’ ”

B. Procedural Background

On May 17, 2022, a felony complaint was filed charging defendant with assault

with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)); count 1), assault by means likely to produce great

bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)); count 2), shooting at an inhabited dwelling or

occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 3), criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 4), first

degree robbery (§ 211; count 5). The felony complaint also alleged that as to counts 1, 3,

4, and 5, the offenses were serious felonies (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)) and that count 5 was a

violent felony (§ 667.5, subd. (c)).

On May 23, 2022, the People added count 6, second degree robbery (§ 211).

Thereafter, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pled guilty to second degree

robbery (count 6). In return, defendant was sentenced to a stipulated term of two years in

prison and the remaining charges and allegations were dismissed.

Prior to pleading guilty, defendant signed and initialed a plea form. In relevant

part, defendant initialed the statement, “I understand that if I am not a citizen of the

United States, deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, and denial of

naturalization may, and for certain offenses will, result from a conviction of the offense(s)

to which I plead guilty/no contest.” Defendant also initialed the statement, “I have had

sufficient time to consult with my attorney concerning my intent to plead guilty . . . My

lawyer has explained everything on this Declaration to me, and I have had sufficient time

4
to consider the meaning of each statement. I have personally placed my initials on

certain boxes on this declaration to signify that I fully understand and adopt as my own

each of the statements which correspond to those boxes.” Defense counsel signed a

declaration stating, “I personally read and explained the contents of the above

Declaration to the Defendant.”

During the change of plea hearing, defendant acknowledged that she had initialed

and signed her plea form and that she understood the rights she was giving up and the

consequences of her plea. Neither the court nor defendant’s counsel personally explained

to defendant the immigration consequences of her plea.

The trial court signed a statement that stated (1) the defendant had read and

understood the plea form; (2) the defendant understood the nature of the crime charged

against him and the consequences of his guilty plea; (3) the defendant understandingly

and intelligently waives his/her constitutional rights; (4) the defendant had personally and

orally entered his plea of guilty/no contest; and (5) the plea of guilty was free and

voluntary.

C. Motion to Vacate Pursuant to Section 1473.7

Defendant was released on parole in August 2023. While on parole, she

participated in a comprehensive rehabilitation program and secured employment cleaning

houses. She was making significant progress in her rehabilitation and towards reunifying

with her young daughter when immigration authorities detained her in April 2025 while

5
she was on her way to work.3 Defendant was denied bond and has remained detained at

the Eloy Detention Center in Arizona. In September 2025, an immigration judge ordered

defendant removed to El Salvador. The immigration case is currently on appeal.

On August 27, 2025, defendant filed a motion to vacate her 2022 robbery

conviction pursuant to section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) (section 1473.7(a)(1)). She

argued that “she did not discuss immigration consequences with plea counsel and did not

understand that accepting the plea would jeopardize her long-held lawful permanent

resident . . . status.” She further claimed, “Had she understood the true ramifications, she

would not have accepted the plea and would have pursued an immigration-safe

disposition, sought mental-health diversion . . . or continued litigating the case.”

On October 1, 2025, defendant filed supporting points and authorities,

declarations, and exhibits. In her supporting declaration, defendant described her

longstanding residence in the United States, her family ties here, her understanding at the

time of the plea, and her childhood trauma and substance abuse history. She stated that

had she understood the plea would lead to deportation and separation from her daughter,

she would have rejected it and would have asked her counsel to attempt to negotiate a

disposition protecting her immigration status, including offering “residential burglary,”

and that if a status-protective disposition could not be obtained she would have continued

3 A section 211 robbery conviction with a sentence of 365 days or more is treated
in immigration proceedings as an “aggravated felony,” which renders a noncitizen
deportable, bars nearly all forms of discretionary relief (including asylum, voluntary
departure, and cancellation of removal), and subjects the individual to mandatory
immigration detention without bond.

6
fighting the case even at the risk of a longer sentence. She also declared that all of her

family was in the United States, that she had no ties to El Salvador, and that she had built

a life in the United States. She further declared that at the time of the plea she

“considered [herself] American,” and that her status as a “permanent resident” was “not

on [her] mind.” She also stated that she accepted the plea on one of the first court dates

while overwhelmed, exhausted, and suffering withdrawal from her drug addiction, and

felt pressure to resolve quickly because she was desperate to return to her daughter as

soon as possible. Defendant further claimed that since completing her sentence, she had

entered a residential substance abuse program and had completed an inpatient program,

secured employment and enrolled and completed numerous programs.

The People filed their opposition to defendant’s motion to vacate on October 10,

2025. The People argued that defendant had failed to show prejudicial error due to her

inability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or

potential adverse immigration consequences of her guilty plea. The People pointed out

that defendant’s goal was to get the shortest sentence possible so she could return to her

daughter.

On December 17, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

At the outset, the court found defendant had made a prima facie showing and proceeded

to an evidentiary hearing. The court then heard testimony from Attorney Shane Mathias,

defendant and Deputy District Attorney (DDA) Anil Kaushal.

7
Attorney Mathias testified he was defendant’s plea counsel and had 13 years of

experience as a deputy public defender. He stated he generally does not read the plea

forms word-for-word but summarizes them and emphasizes those parts that are more

important and relevant for the particular client he is representing. He testified that if he

believed a client was a U.S. citizen, he would not read the immigration advisement

verbatim, but would generally indicate that a plea may result in deportation or denial of

naturalization. In defendant’s case, he did not emphasize immigration consequences

because he believed she was a U.S. citizen, instead focusing on the consequences of a

strike offense. At the time of the plea, he believed defendant was a U.S. citizen, and that

his file included a contemporaneous notation reflecting a drop-down selection indicating

“U.S. citizen.” Attorney Mathias had no notes suggesting otherwise and that her fluency

in English reinforced his belief. He acknowledged he had no independent memory of the

exact exchange leading to that notation, and testified it was possible he asked “where are

you from” and she responded she was “from L.A.” He learned she was not a U.S. citizen

only after being contacted by her current counsel several months before the hearing.

Attorney Mathias acknowledged defendant initialed the immigration advisement

statement and signed the plea form acknowledging she reviewed it with him and

understood its contents. When he learns a client is not a citizen, he explains the

complexity of immigration consequences and generally seeks a continuance to consult

immigration specialists. Had he known defendant was a lawful permanent resident, he

would have advised continuing the case to consult an immigration specialist and would

8
have sought to have the offer held open while assessing immigration consequences and

alternatives. He would have explored alternative dispositions, including mental health

diversion. He confirmed the plea was taken at the pre-preliminary hearing and it was the

first time he had a chance to talk to defendant. There was no pressing need to proceed to

a preliminary hearing given the early stage, and that, because she was in custody, it was

more likely the People would agree to a continuance while alternatives were explored.

Attorney Mathias conceded that the two-year sentence was “a ‘good deal’ ” from a

criminal law perspective but stated “there’s always probably something more you can do

on a case.” However, had he known defendant was a legal permanent resident, he would

have sought a different resolution, such as a plea to residential burglary because he

understood that charge to be immigration-safe, and it’s “apples to apples” in that first-

degree residential burglary is a strike offense. He noted it even carried a higher

maximum than robbery in the second degree. He would have offered the section 459

burglary even if defendant demanded to resolve her case that day. But these negotiations

never occurred because Attorney Mathias was unaware, she was a legal permanent

resident rather than a U.S. citizen.

Defendant testified remotely from the Eloy Detention Center in Arizona. She is a

lawful permanent resident and was placed in removal proceedings based on the 2022

robbery conviction in this case. She affirmed under oath that everything in the

declaration she signed in support of the motion was true and correct to the best of her

knowledge. She testified that she came to the United States at age 12 and has lived in

9
Los Angeles for most of her life. Los Angeles was her home, and her family members

live in Los Angeles and the Valley area. She has an eight-year-old daughter who is “very

important” to her. She has no family in El Salvador and no home, job, or support there

and her whole life has been in the United States.

Defendant testified that she knew she was a green card holder and believed it

meant she had legal status “to be here” and thought that her legal status was “permanent.”

She did not think she would have immigration consequences because, as a minor in a

prior case, immigration consequences had been mentioned before but “nothing ever

happened,” so she believed she was safe. When she met her attorney for the first time,

her mindset was to start her time so she could get home to her daughter and believed she

would go to prison and then come home.

Defendant also testified that if she had realized the conviction carried serious

immigration consequences she would have asked for a “better solution,” would have been

willing to remain in custody while counsel assessed immigration consequences, and

would have asked counsel to try to obtain a disposition preserving her status even if it

was a “long shot.” She did not remember hearing the immigration advisal at the time,

and no one explained mandatory immigration detention, loss of her lawful permanent

resident status, the concept of an aggravated felony, or that the plea could affect her

ability to fight deportation. Had she understood those consequences, she “would have

been patient,” and “would have asked [her] public defender to help [her] to protect [her]

10
status even if [she] had to wait longer or served a longer sentence, [she] would have

waited just to protect [her]self from deportation.”

DDA Kaushal testified as the sole witness for the People. He stated he had

worked for the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office for approximately

24 and a half years and was the prosecuting attorney in defendant’s case and signed the

plea agreement. He verified the case was resolved by a plea to second degree robbery

with a two-year sentence. DDA Kaushal reviewed the police reports to refresh his

recollection regarding the underlying facts. Based on that review, he believed probation

was not available given aggravating factors, and that the low term was the lowest prison

commitment he could offer.

DDA Kaushal explained that he would not have considered a plea to residential

burglary with probation and 364 days as a condition of probation because the case

involved use of a weapon and violence. He acknowledged he had no independent

recollection of the plea negotiations in defendant’s case, and that his testimony was based

on his general practices, review of the file, and notes. He conceded that plea negotiations

can change over time based on changing information, and that prosecutors consider

mitigating information and immigration consequences. He noted that even in serious

cases, the resolution is “never fixed,” and that unless an “extreme factor” forces him to

proceed, he “most of the time” will agree to a continuance so the defense can provide

mitigating factors or other information, and he will maintain the offer—“leave the offer

open”—often on the record.

11
Following arguments, the trial court noted it had reviewed the moving and

opposition papers, heard the testimony, taken judicial notice of the court file, and

reviewed the exhibits received at the hearing, while not considering certain investigative

reports, such as the police report, and character letters submitted with the moving papers.

The court noted it was proceeding under section 1473.7(a)(1), applying a preponderance-

of-the-evidence standard and considering the totality of the circumstances. The court

found defendant is a noncitizen and was a lawful permanent resident at the time of the

change of plea, that her lawful permanent resident status was not disclosed to plea

counsel at the time of the plea, and that the conviction was currently causing her removal

or the denial of an application for immigration benefits, lawful status, or naturalization.

Based on defendant’s testimony and the contemporaneous notes from plea counsel stating

she is a U.S. citizen, the court found defendant did not meaningfully understand the

immigration consequences of the plea.

Turning to prejudice, the court stated that this was “where the crux of everything is

coming into play,” and that it was applying the factors pursuant to People v. Vivar (2021)

11 Cal.5th 510 (Vivar), a reasonable probability standard, and the totality of the

circumstances to determine what defendant would have done at the time of the plea. In

applying those factors, the court found that “at least at the time of the change of plea,

there was not a major focus placed on avoiding deportation.” The court found that,

instead, defendant’s emphasis was doing “as little amount of time as possible so she can

get out of custody and get back to her daughter,” and that “[a]t least at the time of the

12
change of plea that’s where her priorities were placed.” The court also considered the

seriousness of the charges and the testimony of both plea counsel and the prosecutor

concerning the disposition reached—two years state prison for a violent felony. The

court then considered whether there was any reason to believe an immigration-neutral

disposition had been possible, stating that this “wasn’t particularly considered in detail at

the time of the change of plea” because plea counsel believed defendant was a U.S.

citizen and, as a result, immigration consequences and immigration-safe dispositions

were not a focus of plea negotiations.

The court explained: “So in terms of any potential negotiations for something that

was immigration neutral, it doesn’t sound like there was a lot of consideration in terms of

that manner of negotiations because it looks like the overall feeling at the time was that it

wasn’t something that was necessarily applicable here.” The court also noted that it

considered whether a better outcome was possible. In doing so, the court credited the

testimony of both plea attorneys finding that “nothing is fixed” and “everything is

negotiable.” The court also credited the testimony of both these witnesses that the two-

year offer would remain open pending further investigation into immigration

consequences and presentation of mitigating factors. The court observed that these

negotiations “did not happen because of the representation Ms. Montesinos made to her

attorney,” which the court took to mean she was a U.S. citizen.

After laying out this analysis, the court stated that “ultimately” it focused on

defendant’s testimony that she had heard the immigration advisements in prior matters

13
and nothing had ever happened to her as a result. The court stated: “Ultimately, where

the Court is focused on, and I come back to that question as to what would

Ms. Montesinos have done at the time of her change of plea had she known the potential

immigration consequences in this matter, I cannot ignore her testimony that she indicated

she has had prior convictions prior to this one, both it sounded to the Court as a juvenile

and also as an adult, and I have looked at the RAP sheet that’s marked as Exhibit

Number 6 that does reflect that Ms. Montesinos had at least one adult felony conviction

prior to the conviction on this matter. Where that is of significance to the Court in terms

of assessing what Ms. Montesinos would have done at the time of change of plea is her

statements that she’s heard the immigration advisals before. She has accepted

dispositions or plea bargainings or outcomes before on her matters when she’s received

that admonishment or advisal and nothing has ever come of it in terms of any kind of

immigration or deportation consequences.”

The court further explained: “Whenever she’s considered or been given that

advisal, it's been her experience that nothing bad has come of it. When I take that into

consideration with what she did here, in terms of her priorities and trying to get as the

least amount of time possible so she can get out to her daughter, it appears to the Court

that, ultimately, Ms. Montesinos’ priorities were on the shortest amount of time as

possible in custody so she can get out of the custody as soon as possible and she can get

back to her child”

14
The court briefly noted defendant’s ties to the community, that her child is a U.S.

citizen, and that she had lived in the U.S. since age 12 or 13. However, the court

concluded that the prior-advisal testimony was decisive, stating: “But when I come back

to her representation that she’s heard this advisal before, more than once, and nothing bad

has ever come of it, . . . I have to think or conclude by a preponderance of the evidence

that Ms. Montesinos has not met her burden of proof as to that prong of whether she

would have done anything different than what she did at the time of the change of plea on

this matter.” The court concluded by stating: “I do find by a totality of the circumstances

and by a reasonable probability standard, given all the factors that are outlined, placing

significance to her representations more than once that she’s heard the advisal before.

Nothing bad has ever come of it. That, ultimately, at the time of her change in plea that

that would have been a determinative factor in terms of her resolution or decision to take

the offer, which was the—ultimately, the charge that she pled to the 211 for two-years

state prison.” The court found defendant had not met her burden to show a reasonable

probability she would have made a different decision at the time of the plea, and denied

the motion.

Defendant timely appealed.

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III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her section 1473.7 motion

because she had shown her misunderstanding of the immigration consequences caused

prejudicial error. For the reasons explained below, we agree.

A. Section 1473.7 Generally and Standard of Review

Section 1473.7(a)(1) provides that “[a] person who is no longer in criminal

custody may file a motion to vacate a conviction” if the conviction is “legally invalid due

to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand,

defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration

consequences of a conviction or sentence.”

To prevail, the moving party must show three things. (§ 1473.7, subds. (a)(1),

(e)(1).) First, they must show that they did not meaningfully understand the immigration

consequences of their plea. (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319 (Espinoza).)

Second, they must show that their “misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error.”

(Ibid.) And third, they must show that the conviction or sentence being challenged

currently is causing “or has the potential to cause removal or the denial of an application

for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (f)(1).) The

moving party bears the burden of establishing entitlement to relief by a preponderance of

the evidence. (Ibid.)

16
To show prejudicial error under subdivision (e)(1) of section 1473.7, the moving

defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that the defendant would have

rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential

immigration consequences.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529; Espinoza, supra,

14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) “Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the

defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding

deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the

defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was

possible.” (Vivar, at pp. 529-530; Espinoza, at p. 320.) “Also relevant are the

defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome if he [or she] had rejected

the plea, as well as the difference between the bargained-for term and the likely term if he

[or she] were convicted at trial.” (Espinoza, at p. 320.)

“A defendant must provide ‘ “ ‘objective evidence’ ” ’ to corroborate factual

assertions.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) “Objective evidence includes facts

provided by declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s

immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence of the charges the

defendant faced.” (Ibid.; People v. Bravo (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1074 (Bravo).)

“However, ‘a defendant’s self-serving statement—after trial, conviction, and sentence—

that with competent advice he or she would have accepted [or rejected] a proffered plea

bargain, is insufficient in and of itself to sustain the defendant’s burden of proof as to

17
prejudice, and must be corroborated independently by objective evidence.” (Bravo, at

p. 1074, italics omitted.)

We independently review whether a movant has demonstrated entitlement to relief

under section 1473.7(a)(1). (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 524.) In this context,

independent review does not mean de novo review. (People v. Coca (2023)

96 Cal.App.5th 451, 458 (Coca).) “We exercise ‘ “independent judgment to determine

whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” ’ ” (Ibid.) We weigh and consider all relevant

circumstances, with no single factor being dispositive. (Ibid.) We are in the same

position as the trial court “ ‘in interpreting written declarations’ when reviewing a cold

record in a section 1473.7 proceeding.” (Vivar, at p. 528.) We “may not simply second-

guess factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own observations.” (Id. at

p. 527.) We “afford ‘particular deference to factual findings based on the trial court’s

personal observations of witnesses.’ ” (Coca at p. 458.)

“But we do not defer to those findings that are based on written materials, since

we are similarly situated to the trial court when interpreting a ‘cold record.’ [Citation.]

And we may ‘ “ ‘reach a different conclusion [from the trial court] on an independent

examination of the evidence . . . even where the evidence is conflicting’ ” ’ and the trial

court’s conclusions are based in part on its assessment of ‘ “ ‘the credibility of witnesses

[it] heard and observed.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Ultimately, it is for us to decide, exercising our

independent judgment, whether the evidence, taken as a whole, establishes ‘prejudicial

error’ damaging [defendant’s] ability to meaningfully understand the immigration

18
consequences of the charges to which she pled, or her ability to defend against those

consequences or to knowingly accept them. [Citations.]” (People v. Hernandez (2026)

20 Cal.5th 598 (Hernandez).)

Recently, the California Supreme Court explained that “in determining whether a

defendant has established error for purposes of section 1473.7(a)(1), we focus on the

defendant’s subjective understanding at the time they entered their guilty plea. [Citation.]

We ask whether the defendant has shown that they were unable to ‘meaningfully

understand’ the immigration consequences of their plea, or that their ability to ‘defend

against’ or ‘knowingly accept’ those consequences was impaired. [Citations.] ‘[T]he key

is the mindset of the defendant and not what an objectively reasonable person would have

understood under the circumstances.” [Citation.]” (Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at

p. 614.)

“Because the error inquiry focuses on the defendant’s subjective understanding,

courts evaluating section 1473.7(a)(1) motions must look beyond the record of the plea

and consider the totality of the circumstances bearing on the inquiry. [Citations.]”

(Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 615, citing People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353,

361 [going “beyond the courtroom colloquy” and examining the “totality of

circumstances” to evaluate whether plea was knowing and voluntary]; People v.

Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 898-899 [in deciding whether to permit withdrawal of

guilty plea under section 1018 based on defendant’s mistake or ignorance courts consider

“ ‘all factors necessary to bring about a just result’ ”].)

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C. Analysis

Here, the trial court correctly found that defendant is a noncitizen and was a lawful

permanent resident at the time of the plea, that her lawful permanent resident status was

not disclosed to plea counsel at the time of the plea, that the conviction is causing adverse

immigration consequences, and that she did not meaningfully understand the immigration

consequences of the plea. These findings are supported by the record. Attorney Mathias

testified that he did not emphasize immigration consequences in defendant’s case because

he believed she was a U.S. citizen. He stated his file included a contemporaneous

notation reflecting his belief she was a “U.S. citizen,” and he had no notes suggesting

otherwise. He further testified he learned she was not a citizen only after being contacted

by her current counsel months before the evidentiary hearing. Defendant likewise

testified that she did not understand the severe immigration consequences associated with

a conviction of second-degree robbery. She explained that no one explained to her that a

conviction for this offense would result in mandatory immigration detention and the loss

of lawful permanent resident status. The trial court therefore correctly found defendant

did not meaningfully understand the consequences of her plea.

The trial court, however, concluded defendant failed to show prejudicial error.

After acknowledging defendant’s strong ties to the United States and noting negotiations

were not “fixed,” “everything is negotiable,” and the offer could remain open while

further information was developed, the court denied relief because defendant had

20
previously heard generic advisals and “nothing bad” had happened in the past, and she

would have accepted the plea anyway as she wanted to return to her daughter.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding she had not met her burden of

showing prejudicial error under Vivar and the totality of the circumstances. Specifically,

defendant asserts the generic “may” advisal did not convey the severe immigration

consequences at stake here and the timing of her plea at the initial pre-preliminary

hearing and her first appearance with counsel supports a finding of prejudice. She further

argues Attorney Mathias would have continued the case to consult an immigration expert

and pursued immigration-informed negotiation had he known defendant was a lawful

permanent resident and DDA Kaushal testified that offers are not “fixed,” continuances

are common, and he would generally have kept an offer open while mitigation or other

information is developed. Finally, defendant claims the totality of the circumstances

under Vivar strongly supports prejudice and the court misapplied Vivar by treating prior

generic advisals and “nothing bad happened” as determinative, rather than answering the

required counterfactual question.

The People respond defendant did not meet her burden of establishing that any

error prejudiced her because she prioritized a shorter sentence, the prosecutor would not

have offered an immigration-neutral plea, and the likelihood of succeeding at trial was

low.

A defendant establishes prejudice by showing that there is a “reasonable

probability” that they would not have entered the plea if they had “correctly understood

21
its actual or potential immigration consequences” and their options for defending against

those consequences. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) “A reasonable probability does

not mean more likely than not. [Citation.] Instead, it means merely a reasonable chance,

which is more than an abstract possibility. [Citation.] In other words, a reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (People

v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 (Carrillo).) Because immigration consequences

may be more important to a noncitizen defendant than any term of incarceration, the

focus of this inquiry is on “ ‘what the defendant would have done, not whether the

defendant’s decision would have led to a more favorable result.’ ” (Vivar, at pp. 528-

529.)

As previously noted, in determining whether there is a reasonable probability that

defendant would not have entered the plea, we consider the “totality of the

circumstances.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529; accord, Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th

at p. 615.) A defendant’s assertion that they would not have entered the plea had they

meaningfully understood its immigration consequences or their options for defending

against those consequences must be corroborated by objective evidence. (Id. at p. 530.)

Objective evidence may be presented through a defendant’s declaration or testimony,

declarations or testimony of others, or documentary evidence, including the record of the

underlying criminal proceedings. (Id. at pp. 530-531.) It includes evidence of “the

defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding

deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the

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defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was

possible.” (Id. at p. 530.) Also relevant is “the defendant’s probability of obtaining a

more favorable outcome if [they] had rejected the plea,” and “the difference between the

bargained-for term and the likely term if [they] were convicted at trial.” (Espinoza,

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.) “These factors are not exhaustive” and “no single type of

evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Id. at p. 321.) “Evidence relevant to the error

inquiry will often also be relevant to the prejudice inquiry.” (Hernandez, supra,

20 Cal.5th at p. 627.)

Considering the totality of the circumstances, defendant has established a

reasonable probability that, had she meaningfully understood that her plea would result in

deportation to El Salvador, she would have attempted to negotiate an immigration-neutral

plea or taken her case to trial. Defendant testified that if she had realized the conviction

carried serious immigration consequences she would have asked for a “better solution,”

would have been willing to remain in custody while counsel assessed immigration

consequences, and would have asked counsel to try to obtain a disposition preserving her

status even if it was a “long shot.” She also stated had she understood the immigration

consequences, she “would have been patient,” and “would have asked [her] public

defender to help [her] to protect [her] status even if [she] had to wait longer or served a

longer sentence, [she] would have waited just to protect [her]self from deportation.”

Defendant’s testimony and declaration was corroborated by evidence of defendant’s

strong ties to the United States, which “provide compelling evidence in support of a

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finding of prejudicial error.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 322.) The trial court

noted defendant has lived in the United States since age 12 or 13, has a U.S. citizen child,

and has community ties in this country. Defendant declared and testified that she had no

ties to her birth country of El Salvador. Defendant’s declaration and testimony

concerning her deep and longstanding ties to the United States is “objective evidence”

that corroborates her testimony and declaration that she would not have taken the plea

had she been aware of the immigration consequences of doing so. (Espinoza, at p. 322.)

Defendant need not establish that an immigration-neutral plea was available because she

demonstrated that she would have rejected the plea and gone to trial if necessary. (Bravo,

supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1073-1074.)

Defendant’s assertion is further corroborated by evidence of her behavior three

years later, when she was apprehended by immigration authorities while going to work in

April 2025 and placed in removal proceedings. Defendant was denied bond and has

remained detained at the Eloy Detention Center in Arizona. In September 2025, an

immigration judge ordered defendant removed to El Salvador. The immigration case is

currently on appeal. Rather than assenting to her removal from the United States,

defendant contested her case in immigration court and sought to withdraw her guilty plea

in state court.

Defendant also has shown some reason to believe an immigration-neutral

disposition of her charges was possible or she would have taken her case to trial.

(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 323.) Although she has a prior criminal record, in

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which she suffered no immigration consequences, the plea occurred at the pre-

preliminary-hearing stage, before immigration consequences were investigated and

before immigration-informed negotiation occurred. Attorney Mathais testified that, had

he known defendant was a lawful permanent resident, he would have sought a

continuance, consulted immigration resources, and pursued a disposition designed to

avoid or reduce immigration harm. He explained that when he learns a client is a

noncitizen, he typically continues the case to consult immigration specialists before

finalizing a plea. DDA Kaushal acknowledged—and the trial court credited—that

negotiations were not fixed, that everything was negotiable, and that offers are commonly

left open while mitigation or other information is developed. He explained that unless an

“extreme factor” requires him to proceed, he “most of the time” will agree to continue a

case so the defense can provide mitigation or other information, and he will maintain the

offer—often placing that on the record. Attorney Mathias testified that the plea occurred

at the first meaningful meeting, early in the process, before the development of mitigation

and negotiation that often occurs in serious cases. Continuing the case to investigate

immigration consequences, consult an immigration expert, and present mitigation was

plausible, not speculative. (People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 719.) The

prejudice inquiry is not limited to whether the prosecution would in fact have offered a

different bargain. The question is whether there was evidence that would have led

defendant to expect that immigration-informed negotiation could be pursued before she

entered an immigration-dispositive plea. (Ibid.)

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The trial court acknowledged immigration-informed negotiation “wasn’t

particularly considered in detail at the time” because Attorney Mathais believed

defendant was a U.S. citizen and immigration consequences were therefore not a focus.

The court also credited testimony that negotiations were flexible—“nothing is fixed” and

“everything is negotiable”—and that a continuance and further negotiation were

realistically available while additional information, including immigration consequences

and mitigation, was developed. This is objective evidence. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at

p. 530.)

The court found that, “at least at the time of the change of plea, there was not a

major focus placed on avoiding deportation,” and that defendant’s priority was to obtain

the shortest custody time so she could return to her daughter. However, Vivar requires

asking what defendant would have done if she had meaningfully understood the

immigration consequences. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 528-530.)

The court also considered the seriousness of the allegations and the two-year

prison disposition for a violent felony. Serious exposure can make a plea attractive, but it

does not defeat prejudice where the plea also carries severe—even fatal—immigration

consequences for a long-term lawful permanent resident with deep ties to the United

States. Although defendant faced serious consequences and desired to get the shortest

possible sentence, based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant has shown there

is a “reasonable probability” that she would not have entered the plea if she had

“correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences” and her options

26
for defending against those consequences. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) “A

reasonable probability does not mean more likely than not. [Citation.] Instead, it means

merely a reasonable chance, which is more than an abstract possibility. [Citation.] In

other words, a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome.” (Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 19.)

In sum, reviewing the record independently, we conclude that defendant has

established “prejudicial error damaging [her] ability to meaningfully understand, defend

against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of

a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) She has shown that she did not meaningfully

understand that by pleading guilty, she was subjecting herself to mandatory deportation

from the United States and triggering a bar to reentering the country, and that she did not

receive the advice necessary to either meaningfully defend against or knowingly accept

those consequences. She has further shown that, were it not for these errors, there is a

reasonable probability that she would have rejected the plea offer and either attempted to

negotiate a plea with less dire immigration consequences or taken her case to trial.

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IV.

DISPOSITION

We reverse the judgment and remand this case to the trial court to enter an order

granting defendant’s section 1473.7 motion and vacate her conviction.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

FIELDS
J.

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