Filed 10/22/26 P. v. Montesinos CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E087555
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV22001651)
ASHLEY MONTESINOS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Enrique Guerrero,
Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Martin Lijtmaer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Mulford and Joshua
Trinh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Ashley Montesinos, a lawful permanent resident, is an
El Salvadorian citizen who entered the United States in 2010 with her brother when she
was 12 years old. In 2022, she pled guilty to second degree robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211).
In return, the remaining charges and enhancement allegations were dismissed, and she
was sentenced to two years in state prison. Defendant was placed on parole in August
2023. In April 2025, while she was on parole, immigration authorities detained defendant
and an immigration judge ordered her removal to El Salvador. In August 2025, she
moved to vacate her 2022 conviction under section 1473.7, claiming that she did not
understand the immigration consequences of her plea. The trial court denied the motion,
finding defendant had not met her burden to show a reasonable probability she would
have made a different decision at the time of the plea. On appeal, defendant contends the
trial court erred in finding her misunderstanding regarding immigration consequences did
not constitute prejudicial error. Based on the totality of circumstances, we reverse the
judgment and remand this case to the trial court to enter an order granting defendant’s
section 1473.7 motion and vacate her conviction.
1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Underlying Facts
On May 13, 2022, around 4:00 a.m., defendant and an accomplice knocked on the
motel door of their Victim 1. The accomplice struck Victim 1 with a pistol and when
Victim 1 tried to flee, defendant gave chase while punching her in the head. Victim 1
sought refuge from her friends’ room, Victim 2 and Victim 3, but received no response
and ran to a neighboring motel room where the occupant responded.
Defendant and her accomplice then turned their attention to Victim 2 and
Victim 3’s room. Victim 2 awoke to loud banging on the door. Defendant stated, “ ‘open
the door; I want my shit.’ ” Victim 2 told her to go away and defendant responded,
“ ‘fuck that’ ” and broke the glass window. Victim 2 ran into the bathroom upon hearing
a gunshot. Victim 1 overheard defendant say, “ ‘Shoot them or give me the gun I’ll shoot
them.’ ” Victim 1 heard two gunshots as she ran to the front office and asked the clerk to
call 911.
Another witness reported that he saw a female shooting into Victim 2 and
Victim 3’s room and an officer later observed a bullet hole under the door handle.
Another witness saw defendant approach Victim 1’s vehicle, shoot into the front
passenger window, reach into the car, and grab a suitcase. Surveillance footage captured
defendant fleeing with Victim 1’s suitcase. Defendant yelled, “ ‘Dumbass bitch, I got
2 The factual background is taken from the police report.
3
you, I know where you live bitch, watch watch bitch, I am gonna shoot you bitch watch.
You gon come out watch bitch.’ ”
B. Procedural Background
On May 17, 2022, a felony complaint was filed charging defendant with assault
with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)); count 1), assault by means likely to produce great
bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)); count 2), shooting at an inhabited dwelling or
occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 3), criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 4), first
degree robbery (§ 211; count 5). The felony complaint also alleged that as to counts 1, 3,
4, and 5, the offenses were serious felonies (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)) and that count 5 was a
violent felony (§ 667.5, subd. (c)).
On May 23, 2022, the People added count 6, second degree robbery (§ 211).
Thereafter, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pled guilty to second degree
robbery (count 6). In return, defendant was sentenced to a stipulated term of two years in
prison and the remaining charges and allegations were dismissed.
Prior to pleading guilty, defendant signed and initialed a plea form. In relevant
part, defendant initialed the statement, “I understand that if I am not a citizen of the
United States, deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, and denial of
naturalization may, and for certain offenses will, result from a conviction of the offense(s)
to which I plead guilty/no contest.” Defendant also initialed the statement, “I have had
sufficient time to consult with my attorney concerning my intent to plead guilty . . . My
lawyer has explained everything on this Declaration to me, and I have had sufficient time
4
to consider the meaning of each statement. I have personally placed my initials on
certain boxes on this declaration to signify that I fully understand and adopt as my own
each of the statements which correspond to those boxes.” Defense counsel signed a
declaration stating, “I personally read and explained the contents of the above
Declaration to the Defendant.”
During the change of plea hearing, defendant acknowledged that she had initialed
and signed her plea form and that she understood the rights she was giving up and the
consequences of her plea. Neither the court nor defendant’s counsel personally explained
to defendant the immigration consequences of her plea.
The trial court signed a statement that stated (1) the defendant had read and
understood the plea form; (2) the defendant understood the nature of the crime charged
against him and the consequences of his guilty plea; (3) the defendant understandingly
and intelligently waives his/her constitutional rights; (4) the defendant had personally and
orally entered his plea of guilty/no contest; and (5) the plea of guilty was free and
voluntary.
C. Motion to Vacate Pursuant to Section 1473.7
Defendant was released on parole in August 2023. While on parole, she
participated in a comprehensive rehabilitation program and secured employment cleaning
houses. She was making significant progress in her rehabilitation and towards reunifying
with her young daughter when immigration authorities detained her in April 2025 while
5
she was on her way to work.3 Defendant was denied bond and has remained detained at
the Eloy Detention Center in Arizona. In September 2025, an immigration judge ordered
defendant removed to El Salvador. The immigration case is currently on appeal.
On August 27, 2025, defendant filed a motion to vacate her 2022 robbery
conviction pursuant to section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) (section 1473.7(a)(1)). She
argued that “she did not discuss immigration consequences with plea counsel and did not
understand that accepting the plea would jeopardize her long-held lawful permanent
resident . . . status.” She further claimed, “Had she understood the true ramifications, she
would not have accepted the plea and would have pursued an immigration-safe
disposition, sought mental-health diversion . . . or continued litigating the case.”
On October 1, 2025, defendant filed supporting points and authorities,
declarations, and exhibits. In her supporting declaration, defendant described her
longstanding residence in the United States, her family ties here, her understanding at the
time of the plea, and her childhood trauma and substance abuse history. She stated that
had she understood the plea would lead to deportation and separation from her daughter,
she would have rejected it and would have asked her counsel to attempt to negotiate a
disposition protecting her immigration status, including offering “residential burglary,”
and that if a status-protective disposition could not be obtained she would have continued
3 A section 211 robbery conviction with a sentence of 365 days or more is treated
in immigration proceedings as an “aggravated felony,” which renders a noncitizen
deportable, bars nearly all forms of discretionary relief (including asylum, voluntary
departure, and cancellation of removal), and subjects the individual to mandatory
immigration detention without bond.
6
fighting the case even at the risk of a longer sentence. She also declared that all of her
family was in the United States, that she had no ties to El Salvador, and that she had built
a life in the United States. She further declared that at the time of the plea she
“considered [herself] American,” and that her status as a “permanent resident” was “not
on [her] mind.” She also stated that she accepted the plea on one of the first court dates
while overwhelmed, exhausted, and suffering withdrawal from her drug addiction, and
felt pressure to resolve quickly because she was desperate to return to her daughter as
soon as possible. Defendant further claimed that since completing her sentence, she had
entered a residential substance abuse program and had completed an inpatient program,
secured employment and enrolled and completed numerous programs.
The People filed their opposition to defendant’s motion to vacate on October 10,
2025. The People argued that defendant had failed to show prejudicial error due to her
inability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or
potential adverse immigration consequences of her guilty plea. The People pointed out
that defendant’s goal was to get the shortest sentence possible so she could return to her
daughter.
On December 17, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
At the outset, the court found defendant had made a prima facie showing and proceeded
to an evidentiary hearing. The court then heard testimony from Attorney Shane Mathias,
defendant and Deputy District Attorney (DDA) Anil Kaushal.
7
Attorney Mathias testified he was defendant’s plea counsel and had 13 years of
experience as a deputy public defender. He stated he generally does not read the plea
forms word-for-word but summarizes them and emphasizes those parts that are more
important and relevant for the particular client he is representing. He testified that if he
believed a client was a U.S. citizen, he would not read the immigration advisement
verbatim, but would generally indicate that a plea may result in deportation or denial of
naturalization. In defendant’s case, he did not emphasize immigration consequences
because he believed she was a U.S. citizen, instead focusing on the consequences of a
strike offense. At the time of the plea, he believed defendant was a U.S. citizen, and that
his file included a contemporaneous notation reflecting a drop-down selection indicating
“U.S. citizen.” Attorney Mathias had no notes suggesting otherwise and that her fluency
in English reinforced his belief. He acknowledged he had no independent memory of the
exact exchange leading to that notation, and testified it was possible he asked “where are
you from” and she responded she was “from L.A.” He learned she was not a U.S. citizen
only after being contacted by her current counsel several months before the hearing.
Attorney Mathias acknowledged defendant initialed the immigration advisement
statement and signed the plea form acknowledging she reviewed it with him and
understood its contents. When he learns a client is not a citizen, he explains the
complexity of immigration consequences and generally seeks a continuance to consult
immigration specialists. Had he known defendant was a lawful permanent resident, he
would have advised continuing the case to consult an immigration specialist and would
8
have sought to have the offer held open while assessing immigration consequences and
alternatives. He would have explored alternative dispositions, including mental health
diversion. He confirmed the plea was taken at the pre-preliminary hearing and it was the
first time he had a chance to talk to defendant. There was no pressing need to proceed to
a preliminary hearing given the early stage, and that, because she was in custody, it was
more likely the People would agree to a continuance while alternatives were explored.
Attorney Mathias conceded that the two-year sentence was “a ‘good deal’ ” from a
criminal law perspective but stated “there’s always probably something more you can do
on a case.” However, had he known defendant was a legal permanent resident, he would
have sought a different resolution, such as a plea to residential burglary because he
understood that charge to be immigration-safe, and it’s “apples to apples” in that first-
degree residential burglary is a strike offense. He noted it even carried a higher
maximum than robbery in the second degree. He would have offered the section 459
burglary even if defendant demanded to resolve her case that day. But these negotiations
never occurred because Attorney Mathias was unaware, she was a legal permanent
resident rather than a U.S. citizen.
Defendant testified remotely from the Eloy Detention Center in Arizona. She is a
lawful permanent resident and was placed in removal proceedings based on the 2022
robbery conviction in this case. She affirmed under oath that everything in the
declaration she signed in support of the motion was true and correct to the best of her
knowledge. She testified that she came to the United States at age 12 and has lived in
9
Los Angeles for most of her life. Los Angeles was her home, and her family members
live in Los Angeles and the Valley area. She has an eight-year-old daughter who is “very
important” to her. She has no family in El Salvador and no home, job, or support there
and her whole life has been in the United States.
Defendant testified that she knew she was a green card holder and believed it
meant she had legal status “to be here” and thought that her legal status was “permanent.”
She did not think she would have immigration consequences because, as a minor in a
prior case, immigration consequences had been mentioned before but “nothing ever
happened,” so she believed she was safe. When she met her attorney for the first time,
her mindset was to start her time so she could get home to her daughter and believed she
would go to prison and then come home.
Defendant also testified that if she had realized the conviction carried serious
immigration consequences she would have asked for a “better solution,” would have been
willing to remain in custody while counsel assessed immigration consequences, and
would have asked counsel to try to obtain a disposition preserving her status even if it
was a “long shot.” She did not remember hearing the immigration advisal at the time,
and no one explained mandatory immigration detention, loss of her lawful permanent
resident status, the concept of an aggravated felony, or that the plea could affect her
ability to fight deportation. Had she understood those consequences, she “would have
been patient,” and “would have asked [her] public defender to help [her] to protect [her]
10
status even if [she] had to wait longer or served a longer sentence, [she] would have
waited just to protect [her]self from deportation.”
DDA Kaushal testified as the sole witness for the People. He stated he had
worked for the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office for approximately
24 and a half years and was the prosecuting attorney in defendant’s case and signed the
plea agreement. He verified the case was resolved by a plea to second degree robbery
with a two-year sentence. DDA Kaushal reviewed the police reports to refresh his
recollection regarding the underlying facts. Based on that review, he believed probation
was not available given aggravating factors, and that the low term was the lowest prison
commitment he could offer.
DDA Kaushal explained that he would not have considered a plea to residential
burglary with probation and 364 days as a condition of probation because the case
involved use of a weapon and violence. He acknowledged he had no independent
recollection of the plea negotiations in defendant’s case, and that his testimony was based
on his general practices, review of the file, and notes. He conceded that plea negotiations
can change over time based on changing information, and that prosecutors consider
mitigating information and immigration consequences. He noted that even in serious
cases, the resolution is “never fixed,” and that unless an “extreme factor” forces him to
proceed, he “most of the time” will agree to a continuance so the defense can provide
mitigating factors or other information, and he will maintain the offer—“leave the offer
open”—often on the record.
11
Following arguments, the trial court noted it had reviewed the moving and
opposition papers, heard the testimony, taken judicial notice of the court file, and
reviewed the exhibits received at the hearing, while not considering certain investigative
reports, such as the police report, and character letters submitted with the moving papers.
The court noted it was proceeding under section 1473.7(a)(1), applying a preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard and considering the totality of the circumstances. The court
found defendant is a noncitizen and was a lawful permanent resident at the time of the
change of plea, that her lawful permanent resident status was not disclosed to plea
counsel at the time of the plea, and that the conviction was currently causing her removal
or the denial of an application for immigration benefits, lawful status, or naturalization.
Based on defendant’s testimony and the contemporaneous notes from plea counsel stating
she is a U.S. citizen, the court found defendant did not meaningfully understand the
immigration consequences of the plea.
Turning to prejudice, the court stated that this was “where the crux of everything is
coming into play,” and that it was applying the factors pursuant to People v. Vivar (2021)
11 Cal.5th 510 (Vivar), a reasonable probability standard, and the totality of the
circumstances to determine what defendant would have done at the time of the plea. In
applying those factors, the court found that “at least at the time of the change of plea,
there was not a major focus placed on avoiding deportation.” The court found that,
instead, defendant’s emphasis was doing “as little amount of time as possible so she can
get out of custody and get back to her daughter,” and that “[a]t least at the time of the
12
change of plea that’s where her priorities were placed.” The court also considered the
seriousness of the charges and the testimony of both plea counsel and the prosecutor
concerning the disposition reached—two years state prison for a violent felony. The
court then considered whether there was any reason to believe an immigration-neutral
disposition had been possible, stating that this “wasn’t particularly considered in detail at
the time of the change of plea” because plea counsel believed defendant was a U.S.
citizen and, as a result, immigration consequences and immigration-safe dispositions
were not a focus of plea negotiations.
The court explained: “So in terms of any potential negotiations for something that
was immigration neutral, it doesn’t sound like there was a lot of consideration in terms of
that manner of negotiations because it looks like the overall feeling at the time was that it
wasn’t something that was necessarily applicable here.” The court also noted that it
considered whether a better outcome was possible. In doing so, the court credited the
testimony of both plea attorneys finding that “nothing is fixed” and “everything is
negotiable.” The court also credited the testimony of both these witnesses that the two-
year offer would remain open pending further investigation into immigration
consequences and presentation of mitigating factors. The court observed that these
negotiations “did not happen because of the representation Ms. Montesinos made to her
attorney,” which the court took to mean she was a U.S. citizen.
After laying out this analysis, the court stated that “ultimately” it focused on
defendant’s testimony that she had heard the immigration advisements in prior matters
13
and nothing had ever happened to her as a result. The court stated: “Ultimately, where
the Court is focused on, and I come back to that question as to what would
Ms. Montesinos have done at the time of her change of plea had she known the potential
immigration consequences in this matter, I cannot ignore her testimony that she indicated
she has had prior convictions prior to this one, both it sounded to the Court as a juvenile
and also as an adult, and I have looked at the RAP sheet that’s marked as Exhibit
Number 6 that does reflect that Ms. Montesinos had at least one adult felony conviction
prior to the conviction on this matter. Where that is of significance to the Court in terms
of assessing what Ms. Montesinos would have done at the time of change of plea is her
statements that she’s heard the immigration advisals before. She has accepted
dispositions or plea bargainings or outcomes before on her matters when she’s received
that admonishment or advisal and nothing has ever come of it in terms of any kind of
immigration or deportation consequences.”
The court further explained: “Whenever she’s considered or been given that
advisal, it's been her experience that nothing bad has come of it. When I take that into
consideration with what she did here, in terms of her priorities and trying to get as the
least amount of time possible so she can get out to her daughter, it appears to the Court
that, ultimately, Ms. Montesinos’ priorities were on the shortest amount of time as
possible in custody so she can get out of the custody as soon as possible and she can get
back to her child”
14
The court briefly noted defendant’s ties to the community, that her child is a U.S.
citizen, and that she had lived in the U.S. since age 12 or 13. However, the court
concluded that the prior-advisal testimony was decisive, stating: “But when I come back
to her representation that she’s heard this advisal before, more than once, and nothing bad
has ever come of it, . . . I have to think or conclude by a preponderance of the evidence
that Ms. Montesinos has not met her burden of proof as to that prong of whether she
would have done anything different than what she did at the time of the change of plea on
this matter.” The court concluded by stating: “I do find by a totality of the circumstances
and by a reasonable probability standard, given all the factors that are outlined, placing
significance to her representations more than once that she’s heard the advisal before.
Nothing bad has ever come of it. That, ultimately, at the time of her change in plea that
that would have been a determinative factor in terms of her resolution or decision to take
the offer, which was the—ultimately, the charge that she pled to the 211 for two-years
state prison.” The court found defendant had not met her burden to show a reasonable
probability she would have made a different decision at the time of the plea, and denied
the motion.
Defendant timely appealed.
15
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her section 1473.7 motion
because she had shown her misunderstanding of the immigration consequences caused
prejudicial error. For the reasons explained below, we agree.
A. Section 1473.7 Generally and Standard of Review
Section 1473.7(a)(1) provides that “[a] person who is no longer in criminal
custody may file a motion to vacate a conviction” if the conviction is “legally invalid due
to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand,
defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration
consequences of a conviction or sentence.”
To prevail, the moving party must show three things. (§ 1473.7, subds. (a)(1),
(e)(1).) First, they must show that they did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of their plea. (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319 (Espinoza).)
Second, they must show that their “misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error.”
(Ibid.) And third, they must show that the conviction or sentence being challenged
currently is causing “or has the potential to cause removal or the denial of an application
for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (f)(1).) The
moving party bears the burden of establishing entitlement to relief by a preponderance of
the evidence. (Ibid.)
16
To show prejudicial error under subdivision (e)(1) of section 1473.7, the moving
defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that the defendant would have
rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential
immigration consequences.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529; Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) “Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the
defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding
deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the
defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was
possible.” (Vivar, at pp. 529-530; Espinoza, at p. 320.) “Also relevant are the
defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome if he [or she] had rejected
the plea, as well as the difference between the bargained-for term and the likely term if he
[or she] were convicted at trial.” (Espinoza, at p. 320.)
“A defendant must provide ‘ “ ‘objective evidence’ ” ’ to corroborate factual
assertions.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) “Objective evidence includes facts
provided by declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s
immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence of the charges the
defendant faced.” (Ibid.; People v. Bravo (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1074 (Bravo).)
“However, ‘a defendant’s self-serving statement—after trial, conviction, and sentence—
that with competent advice he or she would have accepted [or rejected] a proffered plea
bargain, is insufficient in and of itself to sustain the defendant’s burden of proof as to
17
prejudice, and must be corroborated independently by objective evidence.” (Bravo, at
p. 1074, italics omitted.)
We independently review whether a movant has demonstrated entitlement to relief
under section 1473.7(a)(1). (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 524.) In this context,
independent review does not mean de novo review. (People v. Coca (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 451, 458 (Coca).) “We exercise ‘ “independent judgment to determine
whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” ’ ” (Ibid.) We weigh and consider all relevant
circumstances, with no single factor being dispositive. (Ibid.) We are in the same
position as the trial court “ ‘in interpreting written declarations’ when reviewing a cold
record in a section 1473.7 proceeding.” (Vivar, at p. 528.) We “may not simply second-
guess factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own observations.” (Id. at
p. 527.) We “afford ‘particular deference to factual findings based on the trial court’s
personal observations of witnesses.’ ” (Coca at p. 458.)
“But we do not defer to those findings that are based on written materials, since
we are similarly situated to the trial court when interpreting a ‘cold record.’ [Citation.]
And we may ‘ “ ‘reach a different conclusion [from the trial court] on an independent
examination of the evidence . . . even where the evidence is conflicting’ ” ’ and the trial
court’s conclusions are based in part on its assessment of ‘ “ ‘the credibility of witnesses
[it] heard and observed.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Ultimately, it is for us to decide, exercising our
independent judgment, whether the evidence, taken as a whole, establishes ‘prejudicial
error’ damaging [defendant’s] ability to meaningfully understand the immigration
18
consequences of the charges to which she pled, or her ability to defend against those
consequences or to knowingly accept them. [Citations.]” (People v. Hernandez (2026)
20 Cal.5th 598 (Hernandez).)
Recently, the California Supreme Court explained that “in determining whether a
defendant has established error for purposes of section 1473.7(a)(1), we focus on the
defendant’s subjective understanding at the time they entered their guilty plea. [Citation.]
We ask whether the defendant has shown that they were unable to ‘meaningfully
understand’ the immigration consequences of their plea, or that their ability to ‘defend
against’ or ‘knowingly accept’ those consequences was impaired. [Citations.] ‘[T]he key
is the mindset of the defendant and not what an objectively reasonable person would have
understood under the circumstances.” [Citation.]” (Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at
p. 614.)
“Because the error inquiry focuses on the defendant’s subjective understanding,
courts evaluating section 1473.7(a)(1) motions must look beyond the record of the plea
and consider the totality of the circumstances bearing on the inquiry. [Citations.]”
(Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 615, citing People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353,
361 [going “beyond the courtroom colloquy” and examining the “totality of
circumstances” to evaluate whether plea was knowing and voluntary]; People v.
Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 898-899 [in deciding whether to permit withdrawal of
guilty plea under section 1018 based on defendant’s mistake or ignorance courts consider
“ ‘all factors necessary to bring about a just result’ ”].)
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C. Analysis
Here, the trial court correctly found that defendant is a noncitizen and was a lawful
permanent resident at the time of the plea, that her lawful permanent resident status was
not disclosed to plea counsel at the time of the plea, that the conviction is causing adverse
immigration consequences, and that she did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of the plea. These findings are supported by the record. Attorney Mathias
testified that he did not emphasize immigration consequences in defendant’s case because
he believed she was a U.S. citizen. He stated his file included a contemporaneous
notation reflecting his belief she was a “U.S. citizen,” and he had no notes suggesting
otherwise. He further testified he learned she was not a citizen only after being contacted
by her current counsel months before the evidentiary hearing. Defendant likewise
testified that she did not understand the severe immigration consequences associated with
a conviction of second-degree robbery. She explained that no one explained to her that a
conviction for this offense would result in mandatory immigration detention and the loss
of lawful permanent resident status. The trial court therefore correctly found defendant
did not meaningfully understand the consequences of her plea.
The trial court, however, concluded defendant failed to show prejudicial error.
After acknowledging defendant’s strong ties to the United States and noting negotiations
were not “fixed,” “everything is negotiable,” and the offer could remain open while
further information was developed, the court denied relief because defendant had
20
previously heard generic advisals and “nothing bad” had happened in the past, and she
would have accepted the plea anyway as she wanted to return to her daughter.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding she had not met her burden of
showing prejudicial error under Vivar and the totality of the circumstances. Specifically,
defendant asserts the generic “may” advisal did not convey the severe immigration
consequences at stake here and the timing of her plea at the initial pre-preliminary
hearing and her first appearance with counsel supports a finding of prejudice. She further
argues Attorney Mathias would have continued the case to consult an immigration expert
and pursued immigration-informed negotiation had he known defendant was a lawful
permanent resident and DDA Kaushal testified that offers are not “fixed,” continuances
are common, and he would generally have kept an offer open while mitigation or other
information is developed. Finally, defendant claims the totality of the circumstances
under Vivar strongly supports prejudice and the court misapplied Vivar by treating prior
generic advisals and “nothing bad happened” as determinative, rather than answering the
required counterfactual question.
The People respond defendant did not meet her burden of establishing that any
error prejudiced her because she prioritized a shorter sentence, the prosecutor would not
have offered an immigration-neutral plea, and the likelihood of succeeding at trial was
low.
A defendant establishes prejudice by showing that there is a “reasonable
probability” that they would not have entered the plea if they had “correctly understood
21
its actual or potential immigration consequences” and their options for defending against
those consequences. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) “A reasonable probability does
not mean more likely than not. [Citation.] Instead, it means merely a reasonable chance,
which is more than an abstract possibility. [Citation.] In other words, a reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (People
v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 (Carrillo).) Because immigration consequences
may be more important to a noncitizen defendant than any term of incarceration, the
focus of this inquiry is on “ ‘what the defendant would have done, not whether the
defendant’s decision would have led to a more favorable result.’ ” (Vivar, at pp. 528-
529.)
As previously noted, in determining whether there is a reasonable probability that
defendant would not have entered the plea, we consider the “totality of the
circumstances.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529; accord, Hernandez, supra, 20 Cal.5th
at p. 615.) A defendant’s assertion that they would not have entered the plea had they
meaningfully understood its immigration consequences or their options for defending
against those consequences must be corroborated by objective evidence. (Id. at p. 530.)
Objective evidence may be presented through a defendant’s declaration or testimony,
declarations or testimony of others, or documentary evidence, including the record of the
underlying criminal proceedings. (Id. at pp. 530-531.) It includes evidence of “the
defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding
deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the
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defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was
possible.” (Id. at p. 530.) Also relevant is “the defendant’s probability of obtaining a
more favorable outcome if [they] had rejected the plea,” and “the difference between the
bargained-for term and the likely term if [they] were convicted at trial.” (Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.) “These factors are not exhaustive” and “no single type of
evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Id. at p. 321.) “Evidence relevant to the error
inquiry will often also be relevant to the prejudice inquiry.” (Hernandez, supra,
20 Cal.5th at p. 627.)
Considering the totality of the circumstances, defendant has established a
reasonable probability that, had she meaningfully understood that her plea would result in
deportation to El Salvador, she would have attempted to negotiate an immigration-neutral
plea or taken her case to trial. Defendant testified that if she had realized the conviction
carried serious immigration consequences she would have asked for a “better solution,”
would have been willing to remain in custody while counsel assessed immigration
consequences, and would have asked counsel to try to obtain a disposition preserving her
status even if it was a “long shot.” She also stated had she understood the immigration
consequences, she “would have been patient,” and “would have asked [her] public
defender to help [her] to protect [her] status even if [she] had to wait longer or served a
longer sentence, [she] would have waited just to protect [her]self from deportation.”
Defendant’s testimony and declaration was corroborated by evidence of defendant’s
strong ties to the United States, which “provide compelling evidence in support of a
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finding of prejudicial error.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 322.) The trial court
noted defendant has lived in the United States since age 12 or 13, has a U.S. citizen child,
and has community ties in this country. Defendant declared and testified that she had no
ties to her birth country of El Salvador. Defendant’s declaration and testimony
concerning her deep and longstanding ties to the United States is “objective evidence”
that corroborates her testimony and declaration that she would not have taken the plea
had she been aware of the immigration consequences of doing so. (Espinoza, at p. 322.)
Defendant need not establish that an immigration-neutral plea was available because she
demonstrated that she would have rejected the plea and gone to trial if necessary. (Bravo,
supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1073-1074.)
Defendant’s assertion is further corroborated by evidence of her behavior three
years later, when she was apprehended by immigration authorities while going to work in
April 2025 and placed in removal proceedings. Defendant was denied bond and has
remained detained at the Eloy Detention Center in Arizona. In September 2025, an
immigration judge ordered defendant removed to El Salvador. The immigration case is
currently on appeal. Rather than assenting to her removal from the United States,
defendant contested her case in immigration court and sought to withdraw her guilty plea
in state court.
Defendant also has shown some reason to believe an immigration-neutral
disposition of her charges was possible or she would have taken her case to trial.
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 323.) Although she has a prior criminal record, in
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which she suffered no immigration consequences, the plea occurred at the pre-
preliminary-hearing stage, before immigration consequences were investigated and
before immigration-informed negotiation occurred. Attorney Mathais testified that, had
he known defendant was a lawful permanent resident, he would have sought a
continuance, consulted immigration resources, and pursued a disposition designed to
avoid or reduce immigration harm. He explained that when he learns a client is a
noncitizen, he typically continues the case to consult immigration specialists before
finalizing a plea. DDA Kaushal acknowledged—and the trial court credited—that
negotiations were not fixed, that everything was negotiable, and that offers are commonly
left open while mitigation or other information is developed. He explained that unless an
“extreme factor” requires him to proceed, he “most of the time” will agree to continue a
case so the defense can provide mitigation or other information, and he will maintain the
offer—often placing that on the record. Attorney Mathias testified that the plea occurred
at the first meaningful meeting, early in the process, before the development of mitigation
and negotiation that often occurs in serious cases. Continuing the case to investigate
immigration consequences, consult an immigration expert, and present mitigation was
plausible, not speculative. (People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 719.) The
prejudice inquiry is not limited to whether the prosecution would in fact have offered a
different bargain. The question is whether there was evidence that would have led
defendant to expect that immigration-informed negotiation could be pursued before she
entered an immigration-dispositive plea. (Ibid.)
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The trial court acknowledged immigration-informed negotiation “wasn’t
particularly considered in detail at the time” because Attorney Mathais believed
defendant was a U.S. citizen and immigration consequences were therefore not a focus.
The court also credited testimony that negotiations were flexible—“nothing is fixed” and
“everything is negotiable”—and that a continuance and further negotiation were
realistically available while additional information, including immigration consequences
and mitigation, was developed. This is objective evidence. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 530.)
The court found that, “at least at the time of the change of plea, there was not a
major focus placed on avoiding deportation,” and that defendant’s priority was to obtain
the shortest custody time so she could return to her daughter. However, Vivar requires
asking what defendant would have done if she had meaningfully understood the
immigration consequences. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 528-530.)
The court also considered the seriousness of the allegations and the two-year
prison disposition for a violent felony. Serious exposure can make a plea attractive, but it
does not defeat prejudice where the plea also carries severe—even fatal—immigration
consequences for a long-term lawful permanent resident with deep ties to the United
States. Although defendant faced serious consequences and desired to get the shortest
possible sentence, based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant has shown there
is a “reasonable probability” that she would not have entered the plea if she had
“correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences” and her options
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for defending against those consequences. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) “A
reasonable probability does not mean more likely than not. [Citation.] Instead, it means
merely a reasonable chance, which is more than an abstract possibility. [Citation.] In
other words, a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” (Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 19.)
In sum, reviewing the record independently, we conclude that defendant has
established “prejudicial error damaging [her] ability to meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of
a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) She has shown that she did not meaningfully
understand that by pleading guilty, she was subjecting herself to mandatory deportation
from the United States and triggering a bar to reentering the country, and that she did not
receive the advice necessary to either meaningfully defend against or knowingly accept
those consequences. She has further shown that, were it not for these errors, there is a
reasonable probability that she would have rejected the plea offer and either attempted to
negotiate a plea with less dire immigration consequences or taken her case to trial.
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IV.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment and remand this case to the trial court to enter an order
granting defendant’s section 1473.7 motion and vacate her conviction.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
J.
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