Filed 10/30/26 P. v. Money CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B344806
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA497291)
v.
DORVAIL MONEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael Garcia, Judge. Affirmed.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott Taryle and Patricia Rosman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to strike a prior strike conviction,
meaning a felony conviction that triggers the “Three Strikes”
sentencing scheme. (People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576,
582; Pen. Code,1 §§ 667, 1170.12.) Defendant Dorvail Money’s
argument is constructed largely on authority he acknowledges
does not concern the “mandated considerations” for striking a
prior strike conviction. We conclude the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in not striking Money’s strike conviction and affirm
the judgment sentencing defendant to 30 years to life in prison
for the murder of Ricky Howard by means of a metal pipe.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Howard died of blunt head trauma. Prior to Howard’s
death, Howard was arguing with “Special” whose given name was
not identified. The argument concerned headphones, and
defendant was present during the argument.
Terri Clark, a witness to the argument between Howard
and Special told a detective that she believed Special was in
danger when Howard was arguing with her. Clark heard
Howard tell Special, “Bitch I’ll whoop your ass.” Clark saw both
Howard and Special swing fists at each other.
During the interaction between Howard and Special,
defendant went to his car and retrieved an 18-inch metal bar.
Defendant returned to where Howard was standing and struck
Howard with the metal pipe. In a pretrial interview, played for
the jury, Clark testified that she saw defendant hit Howard with
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2
the metal pipe. At trial, Clark denied seeing defendant hit
Howard.2
When police arrived at the scene, Howard was on the
ground and defendant was standing near Howard. An officer
asked defendant if he saw what happened, and defendant said he
had just arrived.
In defendant’s pretrial interview, played for the jury, he
described Special as his sister-in-law and stated she was
separated from his brother.3 Defendant described Howard as a
“troublemaker.” Defendant said Howard carried a “billy club”
and clarified by that, he meant a baton. Defendant never saw
Howard hit anyone with the baton.
According to defendant, during the incident involving
Howard and Special, defendant felt “like I’m being threatened,”
and “I got every right to defend myself.” Defendant said Howard
had accused Special of taking Howard’s headphones and
demanded to look in her bag. Defendant described Howard as “in
a rage because somebody stole his headphones.” According to
defendant, Howard “socks” Special on the side of her head.
According to defendant’s pretrial interview, defendant hit
Howard with a metal pipe once in the back of Howard’s head
when Howard was standing; Howard fell to the ground and
defendant hit him again to “make sure he was down.”
2 Clark knew defendant before the night of the killing and
testified he was friendly. She also testified that before that, prior
to the night Howard was killed, she heard defendant tell Howard
not to “sleep on his back porch and not to sell drugs out of his
apartment” and that upset Howard.
3 In the same interview, defendant said he was “the only
boy” and had two sisters.
3
When asked if he was sorry about what happened,
defendant responded, “Yes. I am very sorry about what
happened but, you know . . . [¶] . . . [¶] you can’t just threaten,
like try to threaten somebody like that. You know, like you can’t
— you can’t do that.”
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In a one-count information the People charged defendant
with the murder of Ricky Howard. The People alleged that in
2014, defendant suffered a prior serious or violent felony for
assault with a deadly weapon.
Defendant was tried by jury. He presented no affirmative
evidence. His defense was that he acted in defense of another.
Defense counsel argued defendant acted to protect Special.
The jury found defendant not guilty of first degree murder
and guilty of second degree murder. In a bifurcated proceeding,
the trial court found the prior strike allegation true.4
1. Defendant’s sentencing memorandum
In his sentencing memorandum, defendant argued that the
trial court should strike a prior strike conviction. Defendant
asserted his prior strike conviction was over 10 years old and he
had successfully completed probation. Defendant also argued
that he “suffers from lifelong intellectual disabilities that
contributed to his conduct in the case at hand.” Defendant cited
4 Evidence presented during the court trial on the prior
strike allegation showed that defendant pleaded no contest to
assault with a deadly weapon. Additionally, the South Central
Los Angeles Regional Center reported that in 2017, defendant
was in compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation.
4
no evidence indicating that a disability contributed to his conduct
during the murder.
Defendant attached to his sentencing memorandum a
psychological evaluation, which showed that in 1999, he was
diagnosed with borderline intellectual abilities. Defendant had
seizures since he was three months old. Cognitive tests showed
he was “in the borderline range of mental retardation” and
“borderline intellectual functioning.” A 2000 report from ALMA
Family Services also indicated “borderline intellectual
functioning.” (Capitalization omitted.) A 2000 report from the
South Central Los Angeles Regional Center reported that
defendant was eligible for Regional Center services.
2. The People’s sentencing memorandum
In their sentencing memorandum, the People requested
that the court sentence defendant to a 30-year-to-life
indeterminate term, consisting of a 15-year-to-life term doubled
for the prior strike conviction. The People argued that defendant
was not outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law, and the trial
court therefore should not strike his prior strike conviction.
Without any citation, the People described defendant’s
conduct underlying his 2014 conviction as follows: “On
September 15, 2013, the Defendant brutally attacked a
neighboring resident with a box cutter knife to the face after a
verbal altercation erupted. The Defendant caused severe injuries
to the victim’s head and face that required 200 stitches and left
permanent disfiguring scars.” Defendant did not contest that
description.
5
3. The probation report
The probation report states defendant was born in 1978. In
1998, he was convicted of two counts of burglary. In 2001 and
again in 2002, he was convicted of battery. In 2003, he was
convicted of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. In 2014, he was
convicted of assault with a deadly weapon.
4. Sentencing hearing and sentence
At the sentencing hearing, the court stated: “For the
record, the court understands, at this stage, it’s [the prior strike
conviction is] at least ten years old; however, the offense in the
instant case occurred in 2021, and that was approximately seven
years from the date of the prior offense, prior conviction. I will
also state for the record, notwithstanding Mr. Money’s
intellectual disabilities which are reflected in [the] defense
exhibits, there does not, [in] the court’s perspective, there does
not appear to be a sense of any remorse on Mr. Money’s behalf.”
The court continued: “The court did see the video [of the pretrial
interview played for the jury], the exhibits during the trial of the
incident. So the defense’s Romero[5] motion is respectfully
denied.”
The trial court sentenced defendant to 30 years to life in
prison, consisting of 15 years to life for the murder doubled
because of the prior strike prior.
5 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497,
504.
6
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying his request to strike his prior strike conviction
pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a).
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Not
Striking Money’s Strike Conviction
“The Three Strikes law prescribes an increased term of
incarceration for criminal defendants who have sustained one or
more prior ‘strike’ convictions — that is, convictions for felonies
categorized as ‘serious’ or ‘violent.’ [Citations.] If the defendant’s
current offense is serious or violent, and if the defendant has one
pleaded and proved prior strike, ‘the determinate term or
minimum term for an indeterminate term shall be twice the term
otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony
conviction.’ [Citations.] If the defendant’s current offense is
serious or violent, and if the defendant has two or more pleaded
and proved prior strikes, ‘the term for the current felony
conviction shall be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment
with a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence’ of at least
25 years.” (People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 253.)
The Three Strikes law “establishes a sentencing norm” and
“it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from
this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its decision
to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that
any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both
rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
378.)
In the furtherance of justice, section 1385, subdivision (a)
permits a trial court to dismiss a prior serious or violent felony
7
conviction. (People v. Dain, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 252.) “[A]
trial court must consider whether, ‘in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part . . . .’ [Citation.] If the
trial court determines the motion should be granted, it must state
its reasons on the record.” (Id. at pp. 252–253.)
Our review is “deferential” and we may not substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court “but instead must give due
regard to the discretion vested in that court.” (People v. Dain,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 258.) “The appellate court can find a
reversible abuse of discretion only if it concludes that no
reasonable judge would have agreed with the trial court’s
decision.” (Ibid.)
Applying these principles here, the relevant inquiry, as our
high court recently reaffirmed, is whether, “ ‘in light of the nature
and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Dain, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 252–253.) The circumstances of
the current offense show defendant went to his vehicle to retrieve
a metal pipe and then hit Howard twice with the metal pipe.
According to defendant’s pretrial interview, he hit Howard the
second time after Howard fell to the ground to make sure Howard
was down. Although defendant claimed that his conduct was the
result of his intellectual disabilities he cited no support for that
proposition and offers no explanation as to how his intellectual
disability contributed to his hitting Howard’s head with a metal
8
pipe two times. Defendant’s prior criminal history shows
multiple convictions, beginning in 1998 and continuing through
2014. Although defendant argues the trial court refused to
consider his background the record shows that the trial court
considered defendant’s intellectual disability, specifically
referring to it during sentencing. “[A]n appellate court may not
substitute its judgment about appropriate sentencing for that of
the trial court, but instead must give due regard to the discretion
vested in that court.” (People v. Dain, supra, at p. 258.)
B. Defendant’s Remaining Arguments Lack Merit
a. Defendant relies heavily on irrelevant authority
Defendant argues that he is “firmly” outside the spirit of
the Three Strikes law because of “his defense and diagnosed
intellectual disability, and his demonstrable capacity for
rehabilitation . . . .” Defendant relies on factors identified in
section 1385, subdivision (c) and section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
and California Rules of Court, rule 4.432. The problem with
those arguments is that this case is governed by section 1385,
subdivision (a), not other statutes or rules. (See People v. Dain,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 252 [§ 1385, subd. (a) permits a trial court
to strike a prior strike conviction].)
Section 1385, subdivision (c), specifies “factors that the trial
court must consider when deciding whether to strike
enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of
justice.” (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.)
Specifically, section 1385, subdivision (c) authorizes the trial
court to dismiss an enhancement if it is in furtherance of justice
and requires the court to consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove any of the specified
9
mitigating circumstances. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1), (2).) The Three
Strikes law is not an enhancement under section 1385,
subdivision (c), but rather “an alternative sentencing scheme for
the current offense.” (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237,
243.) Thus, “section 1385, subdivision (c)’s provisions regarding
enhancements do not apply to the Three Strikes law.” (Id. at
p. 244.)
Section 1170 governs determinate sentencing and
subdivision (b)(6) identifies the factors to consider when imposing
an upper or lower determinate term. Defendant does not show
the factors relevant to selecting a determinate term also apply to
the court’s exercise of its discretion whether to strike a prior
strike conviction under the Three Strikes law.
California Rules of Court, rule 4.423 is a rule that applies
when a defendant is convicted of one or more felony offenses and
describes factors in mitigation when imposing sentence. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 4.403 & 4.423.)6 It does not describe the
6 California Rules of Court, rule 4.423 provides:
“Circumstances in mitigation include factors relating to the crime
and factors relating to the defendant.
“(a) Factors relating to the crime
“Factors relating to the crime include that:
“(1) The defendant was a passive participant or
played a minor role in the crime;
“(2) The victim was an initiator of, willing participant
in, or aggressor or provoker of the incident;
“(3) The crime was committed because of an unusual
circumstance, such as great provocation, that is unlikely to
recur;
10
“(4) The defendant participated in the crime under
circumstances of coercion or duress, or the criminal conduct
was partially excusable for some other reason not
amounting to a defense;
“(5) The defendant, with no apparent predisposition
to do so, was induced by others to participate in the crime;
“(6) The defendant exercised caution to avoid harm to
persons or damage to property, or the amounts of money or
property taken were deliberately small, or no harm was
done or threatened against the victim;
“(7) The defendant believed that he or she had a
claim or right to the property taken, or for other reasons
mistakenly believed that the conduct was legal;
“(8) The defendant was motivated by a desire to
provide necessities for his or her family or self; and
“(9) The defendant suffered from repeated or
continuous physical, sexual, or psychological abuse inflicted
by the victim of the crime, and the victim of the crime, who
inflicted the abuse, was the defendant’s spouse, intimate
cohabitant, or parent of the defendant’s child; and the
abuse does not amount to a defense.
“(10) If a firearm was used in the commission of the
offense, it was unloaded or inoperable.
“(b) Factors relating to the defendant
“Factors relating to the defendant include that:
“(1) The defendant has no prior record, or has an
insignificant record of criminal conduct, considering the
recency and frequency of prior crimes;
“(2) The defendant was suffering from a mental or
physical condition that significantly reduced culpability for
the crime;
11
“(3) The defendant experienced psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to,
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence and it was a
factor in the commission of the crime;
“(4) The commission of the current offense is
connected to the defendant’s prior victimization or
childhood trauma, or mental illness as defined by section
1385(c);
“(5) The defendant is or was a victim of intimate
partner violence or human trafficking at the time of the
commission of the offense, and it was a factor in the
commission of the offense;
“(6) The defendant is under 26 years of age, or was
under 26 years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense;
“(7) The defendant was a juvenile when they
committed the current offense;
“(8) The defendant voluntarily acknowledged
wrongdoing before arrest or at an early stage of the
criminal process;
“(9) The defendant is ineligible for probation and but
for that ineligibility would have been granted probation;
“(10) Application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence over 20 years;
“(11) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single
case;
“(12) Application of an enhancement could result in a
discriminatory racial impact;
“(13) An enhancement is based on a prior conviction
that is over five years old;
12
factors relevant to whether to strike a prior strike conviction in
the interest of justice and defendant’s reliance on the rule
does not assist him.
b. The prior strike conviction was not so remote as to
show the trial court abused its discretion
In 2014, defendant was convicted of aggravated assault. In
2021, defendant committed the conduct resulting in the current
strike conviction. The latter seven-year period is not so remote as
to remove defendant from the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
(People v. Solis (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1125 [20- and 32-
year-old prior strike convictions not too remote to be considered
when evaluating whether to strike a prior strike conviction].) We
therefore reject defendant’s argument that the trial court was
required to strike his prior strike conviction because it was
remote.7
“(14) The defendant made restitution to the victim;
and
“(15) The defendant’s prior performance on probation,
mandatory supervision, postrelease community
supervision, or parole was satisfactory.
“(c) Other factors
“Any other factors statutorily declared to be circumstances
in mitigation or that reasonably relate to the defendant or the
circumstances under which the crime was committed.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.423, boldface omitted.)
7 Defendant states that under section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(H), a conviction over five years weighs in favor of dismissal.
As we have explained above, that statute does not apply here
13
c. Defendant does not show the trial court abused its
discretion in considering his lack of remorse
Defendant argues the trial court erred in considering his
lack of remorse “given that appellant had a defense to the killing,
and there was evidence supporting that defense.” Although there
was evidence that defendant acted in defense of Special, the jury
rejected that defense. Defendant cites no authority supporting
his view that presenting a defense supported by some evidence
warrants the striking of a prior strike conviction. Defendant’s
assertion that he did not show remorse because of his intellectual
disability is not supported by any evidence in the record and thus
this unsupported assertion does not demonstrate an abuse of
discretion on the trial court’s part. To the extent, defendant
argues remorse is not a proper consideration when deciding
whether to strike a prior strike conviction, we disagree. People v.
Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362, 372–373 holds that lack of
remorse is relevant to a defendant’s character and future
prospects.8 (People v. Nunez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 372–
373.)
because it concerns enhancements, not the alternate sentencing
scheme in the Three Strikes law.
8 Defendant cites People v. Weber (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th
1041, 1064, footnote 7, for the proposition that lack of remorse is
not an appropriate factor. That case, however, does not discuss
the criteria for striking a prior strike conviction in the interest of
justice. Weber instead concerned the imposition of an upper term
sentence and included a footnote discussing when lack of remorse
is an appropriate aggravating factor. (Id. at pp. 1063–1065 &
fn. 7.)
14
Finally, defendant makes additional assertions in his
“conclusion” that are not supported by the record. (Capitalization
& underscoring omitted.) For example, he suggests the trial
court was guided by personal antipathy towards the
consequences of striking a prior. Defendant implies that “racism
and misanthropy” were motives in the sentencing decision
because the court applied the “harshest sentence available.” The
record does not support these insinuations. Finally, defendant
states that the trial court “did not contemplate the effect of
sentencing appellant to a minimum 30-year term relative to the
state’s safety or pecuniary interests in his continued
incarceration,” but cites no authority that the trial court was
required to consider these factors.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
15