Filed 7/13/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B346902
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24PDCF00287)
v.
NESTOR DANIEL MIRANDA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Rita L. Badhan, Judge. Affirmed.
Jake E. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran, Eric Swenson and Jonathan J.
Kline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
May California, consistent with the United States
Constitution, prohibit a “person [from] carr[ying] concealed upon
[his or her] person any dirk or dagger”? (See Pen. Code,
§ 21310. 1) We conclude it may. Because we further conclude this
defendant forfeited his challenge to his sentence, we affirm the
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 3, 2024 around 6:00 p.m., Nestor Daniel Miranda
used a scooter to break the windows of a vehicle parked at a
Monrovia grocery store. Miranda entered the vehicle’s driver
seat. It was later determined the vehicle owner kept a long knife
under that seat for protection.
Miranda fled the scene on foot. Witnesses called the police.
As Monrovia Police Officer Zaira Munguia and her partner
arrived, Officer Munguia saw Miranda at the corner; he matched
the suspect’s description and was carrying a scooter. Miranda
initially complied with Officer Munguia’s commands to drop the
scooter and step onto the curb. He then removed a knife from his
waistband, dropped it on the ground, and ran. The knife was
14 inches long with an eight-inch blade. Officer Munguia pursued
Miranda in her patrol vehicle. Miranda complied with her orders
to sit on the curb and was later arrested.
Miranda was charged in an amended information with
felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a); count 1) and carrying a
concealed dirk or dagger (§ 21310; count 2). As to count 1, it was
further alleged the vandalism resulted in more than $400 in
damages (§ 594, subd. (b)(1)). As to both counts, it was further
alleged Miranda had served a prior prison term and had
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
previously performed unsatisfactorily on probation. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3), (5).)
The jury found Miranda guilty on both counts and found
true the allegation on count 1 that the amount of damage
exceeded $400. The trial court granted the People’s request to
dismiss the California Rules of Court allegations. Miranda was
sentenced to two years in county jail: a low-term sentence of
16 months on count 1 and a consecutive eight-month (one-third
the midterm) sentence on count 2.
Miranda timely appealed. (See § 1237, subd. (a); Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.308(a).)
DISCUSSION
I. Section 21310 Is Constitutional
Miranda argues section 21310 violates the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution on its face.
A facial challenge may be raised for the first time on appeal.
(People v. Anderson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 577, 583–584.)
Section 21310 reads as follows: “Except as provided in
Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17700) of Division 2 of
Title 2, any person in this state who carries concealed upon the
person any dirk or dagger is punishable by imprisonment in a
county jail not exceeding one year or imprisonment pursuant to
subdivision (h) of Section 1170.” (§ 21310; see also § 16470
[defining “ ‘dirk’ or ‘dagger’ ”].) By its terms, section 21310
prohibits carrying a dirk or dagger only in a concealed manner; it
does not prohibit carrying those weapons openly. (See § 20200.)
The parties agree on the test governing Miranda’s Second
Amendment challenge, which was recently clarified by the
United States Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen). In Bruen, the
court reaffirmed the “text and history” test it had first articulated
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in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller) and
rejected an alternative approach other courts had developed in
the interim. (Bruen, at p. 22; see id. at pp. 18–22; see, e.g., People
v. Mitchell (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1373 (Mitchell)
[applying intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment challenge
to former § 12020], abrogated by Bruen, at pp. 18–22.)
The Bruen test proceeds in two parts. “When the Second
Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the
Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The
government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating
that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of
[arms] regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the
individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s
‘unqualified command.’ ” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 24.)
A facial challenge “is the ‘most difficult challenge to mount
successfully,’ because it requires a defendant to ‘establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be
valid.’ ” (United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680, 693
(Rahimi); People v. Hardy (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 45, 48, quoting
Rahimi, at p. 693.) “When evaluating a facial challenge to the
constitutional validity of a statute, we consider the text of the
statute itself, not its application to the particular circumstances
of the individual.” (Mitchell, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.)
The People “need only demonstrate that [section 21310] is
constitutional in some of its applications.” (Rahimi, at p. 693.)
A. Section 21310 Is Consistent with Historical
Arms Regulations
For purposes of this opinion, we assume, as do the parties,
the Second Amendment’s plain text presumptively covers
carrying a concealed 14-inch knife in public. (See Bruen, supra,
597 U.S. at pp. 31–33.)
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We thus proceed to consider if section 21310’s prohibition
on carrying concealed dirks and daggers “is consistent with the
principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” (Rahimi,
supra, 602 U.S. at p. 692.) To prevail, the People must show
section 21310 is “ ‘relevantly similar’ ” to historical arms
regulations with regard to both “how and why the regulations
burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.”
(Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 29; see also United States v. Hemani
(2026) 608 U.S. __, __ [2026 WL 1751710 at p. *5] (Hemani).)
Although Miranda questions the relevance of historical
evidence from the 19th century, we follow Heller, Bruen, and
Rahimi, which all considered evidence from before the founding
of our nation through the end of the 19th century. (Heller, supra,
554 U.S. at pp. 593–595, 600–619; Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at
pp. 20, 46–70; Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. at pp. 693–698.) The
period around the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868 is particularly relevant here because it is via the Fourteenth
Amendment that the Second Amendment applies to the states.
(Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 37; see id. at pp. 37–38
[acknowledging “ongoing scholarly debate” over which period
controls].)
Historical evidence during those periods shows consistent
regulation of concealed arms. In the early to mid-19th century,
multiple states banned concealed pistols and other small
weapons. (See Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at pp. 52–53; see also id. at
p. 52, fn. 16 [statutes enacted between 1813 and 1846]; id. at
p. 59 [“Virginia had criminalized the concealed carry of pistols
since 1838”]; Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 613 [Tennessee “did not
prohibit the banning of concealed weapons”]; id. at p. 626;
Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 691.) Those regulations persisted
during the second half of the 19th century. (Bruen, supra,
5
597 U.S. at pp. 62–63; see id. at p. 63, fn. 27; see also id. at p. 68,
fn. 30 [“[m]any other state courts during” the late 19th century
“continued the antebellum tradition of upholding concealed carry
regimes”].)
Miranda largely ignores those laws and seems to suggest
we must consider laws pertaining only to knives. We do not
agree. The People need not identify a “historical twin” of
section 21310 in order to demonstrate its constitutionality.
(See Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 30.) We have already assumed
that dirks and daggers are among the arms protected by the
Second Amendment, and Miranda has not argued they are
relevantly different, particularly when carried in a concealed
manner. In any event, “[l]aws banning the concealed carry of . . .
dirks and daggers were common in the antebellum period” and
after the Civil War. (Knife Rights, Inc. v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2026)
165 F.4th 1330, 1341, 1343 (Knife Rights).) Violators were
typically punished by fines or imprisonment. (Id. at pp. 1342,
1343, fn. 10.)
The historical regulation of concealed weapons was
generally motivated by public safety concerns, just as was
section 21310. It was commonly understood that those carrying
concealed weapons were not “ ‘interested in self-defense, [and]
instead must have an improper, aggressive motive.’ ” (Baird v.
Bonta (9th Cir. 2026) 163 F.4th 723, 734, rehg. en banc granted,
172 F.4th 1105; see also id. at pp. 734–736.) Thus, historical laws
were meant to protect the public “from . . . desperadoes with
concealed arms.” (Aymette v. State (1840) 21 Tenn. 154, 159
(Aymette); see also Knife Rights, supra, 165 F.4th at pp. 1343–
1344 [concealed knives were banned “because of their common
association with and use in criminal activity”].)
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The same concern motivated California’s prohibition on
concealed dirks and daggers. For example, in discussing the
former section 12020 (later renumbered in part as § 21310), the
Court of Appeal remarked: “[t]he Legislature’s purpose . . . was to
combat the dangers arising from the concealment of weapons,”
including surprise attacks on unsuspecting members of the
public. (Mitchell, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371; see In re
George W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1213 [purpose was to
“ ‘prevent[] surprise knife attacks’ ”].) Section 21310 was thus
meant to address the same threat to public safety that
historically motivated states to restrict concealed arms. (See
Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 692.)
For all those reasons, section 21310 is robustly supported
by our nation’s historical tradition of regulating concealed arms
and facially consistent with the Second Amendment. By so
holding, we do not mean to suggest the Constitution requires
every contemporary statute to mirror historical arms regulations
as closely as does section 21310. While a “law must comport with
the principles underlying the Second Amendment, . . . it need not
be a ‘dead ringer’ or a ‘historical twin’ ” of its precursors to pass
muster. (Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 692.)
B. Miranda’s Counterarguments Are Unpersuasive
Miranda ignores the historical concealed arms and knife
regulations we have identified, and instead relies upon a
Supreme Court of Massachusetts case finding a prohibition on
carrying a switchblade knife unconstitutional. (Commonwealth v.
Canjura (2024) 494 Mass. 508, 514; see id. at pp. 510, 515, 517–
518.) But that case did not discuss concealed weapons, let alone
concealed dirks or daggers—weapons traditionally and expressly
regulated since the founding. (See Knife Rights, supra, 165 F.4th
at p. 1341.)
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Miranda also misunderstands Heller when he argues that
case “specifically repudiated Aymette,” an 1840 Tennessee
Supreme Court case which had upheld Tennessee’s prohibition on
certain concealed knives. (See Aymette, supra, 21 Tenn. at
pp. 155, 159.) While Heller rejected part of Aymette’s holding, it
did not disturb the aspect relevant here: “the state constitutional
guarantee of the right to ‘bear’ arms did not prohibit the banning
of concealed weapons.” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 613.)
II. Miranda Forfeited His Challenge to His Sentence
Miranda also argues the trial court violated his right to due
process by purportedly basing his sentence on his decision to go
to trial. (See In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278–279.)
Although the People offered to resolve the case if Miranda pled
guilty to felony vandalism, Miranda refused to do so. He therefore
pled not guilty and proceeded to trial.
According to Miranda, the trial court refused to sentence
him to probation in part because he had refused a pretrial plea
bargain offer of probation. The People argue the record suggests
the trial court merely referred to Miranda’s earlier unwillingness
to accept probation to explain the court’s skepticism of his
assurances he would successfully comply with the terms of
probation. (See People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 35 [the trial
court must say something “reasonably giving rise to the inference
that [it] was penalizing defendant for exercising his right to jury
trial”].) The record reflects the trial court provided many other
reasons (beyond the prior plea discussion) the court refused to
sentence Miranda to probation after trial.
But we need not parse the record in detail because Miranda
forfeited the argument by failing to object. A defendant must
object at sentencing to preserve a challenge to “the trial court’s
failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing
8
choices.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 (Scott).)
Forfeiture is particularly appropriate here, where the absence of
an objection prevented the trial court and the parties from
further developing the record on the issue. (See People v. Bryant,
Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 426–427 [the
prosecution was “prevented . . . from developing the record” and
the trial court was prevented from taking remedial steps]; see
also People v. Williams (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 649, 656 (Williams)
[“ ‘Routine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily
prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention.’ ”].)
Miranda argues forfeiture is inapplicable because the
sentence “conflicts with [the] exercise of his constitutional right
to a jury trial.” But the fact a constitutional right is implicated by
a claimed error does not necessarily preclude forfeiture. (See
Williams, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 655–656 [vindictive
retaliation claim was forfeited by failure to object at sentencing];
see also In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95 [“that a right is of
constitutional stature does not mean . . . only the defendant can
waive the right”].)
Miranda has not shown his vindictive sentencing claim is
the type of constitutional claim that can be preserved without an
objection. (Cf. People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46 [right to a
jury trial]; People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 592 [double
jeopardy]; People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 276–277
[discussing “certain fundamental . . . rights”], abrogated on other
grounds in French, at p. 47, fn. 3.) On the contrary, claims of
vindictive sentencing—like Miranda’s here—are forfeited by a
failure to object. (See Williams, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 655–
656; see also Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [“complaints about
the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing
9
discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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