Filed 6/17/26 P. v. Miles CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B345324
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA020171)
v.
TRACEY MILES,
Defendant and Appellant.
Tracey Miles (defendant) appeals from the trial court’s
order resentencing him under Penal Code section 1172.75.1
Defendant’s attorney filed a brief raising no issues and asking
this court to independently review the record; defendant
submitted a supplemental brief on his own behalf. Under the
standard articulated in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216, we decline counsel’s invitation to undertake an independent
review of the record. Instead, we evaluate the arguments
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
defendant raises in his letter brief. (Id. at pp. 231-232.) Finding
his arguments unmeritorious, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The underlying crime
In 1994, Miles and two other men robbed a Taco Bell
restaurant. While one of the men was pointing a handgun at the
two employees present, Miles and the other man emptied the
cash registers. The three men were arrested shortly thereafter
and charged with two counts of robbery.
B. Conviction and appeal
On November 4, 1994, a jury found defendant guilty of two
counts of second degree robbery (§ 211). For both counts, the jury
found that a principal was armed with a weapon within the
meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). The jury also found
true the allegation that defendant’s June 4, 1985 conviction for
robbery (A030452) constituted a strike offense; found true the
allegations that his June 27, 1985 conviction for three counts of
robbery (A631415) constituted three strike offenses within the
meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12, and
were serious felonies within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (a); and found true the allegations that defendant
had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
In February 1995, the trial court sentenced defendant
under the Three Strikes law to a term of 36 years to life on the
first robbery count, comprised of a base term of 25 years to life
(as a third strike sentence), plus five years for each of his two
prior serious felony convictions, plus one year for one of the prior
prison terms. As to the second robbery count, the court imposed
a consecutive term of one year and four months (one-third of the
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three-year midterm for the robbery, plus one-third of the one-year
enhancement sentence for the firearm use).
Defendant appealed his conviction, and the state cross-
appealed his sentence. A different panel of this court affirmed
the conviction, but held that the trial court’s imposition of the
one-year, four-month sentence for the second count of robbery
was legally unauthorized. The panel explained that the trial
court had no jurisdiction under the Three Strikes Law other than
to impose a consecutive 26-year-to-life sentence (including the
full year enhancement sentence) as to the second count of
robbery. (People v. Miles (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 364.) On
remand, the trial court resentenced defendant accordingly.
One month later, our Supreme Court in People v.
Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508, held that trial courts had
discretion to impose concurrent terms when a defendant is
convicted of multiple felonies based on a single act of violence
against multiple victims. In 2018, defendant filed in the trial
court a motion for resentencing. The trial court denied the
motion. Defendant appealed, and a different panel of this court
concluded that defendant was entitled to the benefit of Hendrix,
vacated the resentencing order, and ordered defendant be
sentenced to a 36-years-to-life term on count one and a
concurrent 26-years-to-life term on count two. (People v. Miles
(Apr. 25, 2019, B288271) [nonpub. opn.].)
II. Procedural Background
On March 23, 2022, defendant filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus seeking resentencing pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1). The trial court summarily denied the petition
on March 30, 2022. Subsequently, the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant as serving a
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term that included a prior prison term enhancement.2 The trial
court reviewed the case and, on January 17, 2023, determined
defendant “may be entitled to be resentenced.”
The court appointed counsel and set a status conference to
discuss procedures and a date for the resentencing hearing.
Defendant then filed a brief requesting that the court recall his
sentence and “strike and dismiss all strike priors but one, as well
as the [] section 667(a) five-year priors, and also, the . . . section[]
667.5(b) priors.” The People did not object to dismissal of the
enhancements but opposed dismissal of defendant’s strikes, and
the principal armed with a firearm allegation.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court recalled
defendant’s sentence and struck the now-invalid one-year prior
prison term enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b), as
well as both prior serious felony enhancements under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1). The court declined to strike defendant’s prior
strike convictions or the firearm enhancement. The court
accordingly sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 26 years
to life, consisting of a base term of 25 years to life (as a third
strike sentence), plus a consecutive one-year firearm
enhancement. The court imposed a concurrent 25-years-to-life
sentence for the second robbery.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Enacted as part of Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.), section 1172.75 declares “legally invalid” all one-year
2 Defendant filed a second habeas corpus petition on August
24, 2022, again requesting resentencing pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1). The court summarily denied that petition on
September 26, 2023.
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sentencing enhancements for serving a prior prison term except
when the prior prison term was served for a “sexually violent
offense.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a); Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 12.) Once CDCR identifies a defendant as eligible
for relief under this provision (§ 1172.75, subd. (b)), that
defendant is entitled to a full resentencing at which the court can
reconsider all sentencing decisions under the law in effect at the
time of resentencing (id., subd. (d)(1)-(2); see also People v.
Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 373).
After recalling defendant’s sentence and striking the prior
prison term enhancement as well as the prior serious felony
enhancements, the trial court did not err in resentencing
defendant to a total of 26 years to life, consisting of a 25-year-to-
life term for the robbery conviction, plus a one-year firearm
enhancement. The Three Strikes Law dictates that where a
defendant has been convicted of two or more prior serious or
violent felonies (i.e., “strikes”), the defendant’s sentence for a
subsequent felony shall be, at a minimum, three times the term
otherwise imposed by law or 25 years, whichever is greater. (§
667, subd. (e)(2)(A); see § 213, subd. (a)(2) [maximum sentence for
second degree robbery is five years].) Because the statute defines
a serious or violent felony to include robbery (§§ 667.5, subd.
(c)(9), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19)), the trial court properly sentenced
defendant as a third strike offender based on his current and
prior convictions for robbery.
In his supplemental briefing filed with this court,
defendant raises three arguments.
First, defendant contends the trial court failed to consider
that he was under the age of 21 when he committed the prior
strike offenses. The record does not support this claim that his
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youth was ignored. Defense counsel repeatedly raised
defendant’s age at the time of the prior strike offenses, and the
court expressly acknowledged that circumstance during its
discussion of defendant’s prior strikes.
Second, defendant contends the trial court failed to award
custody credits. The transcript and the abstract of judgement
reflect that, the court awarded defendant 11,005 custody credits.
Third and lastly, defendant argues that his June 4, 1985
conviction for robbery (A030452) was reduced to a misdemeanor
pursuant to section 17, subdivision (c) following his discharge
from the California Youth Authority and therefore “cannot
qualify as an enhancing prior serious felony conviction for
purposes of section 667, subdivision (a) and therefore the
imposition of the five-year enhancement under that section was
improper.” Defendant is incorrect. Section 17, subdivision (c),
which deems certain “wobbler” convictions misdemeanors for all
purposes upon discharge from a Youth Authority commitment,
does not apply to the crime of robbery, which is by statute a
felony offense and never punishable in the discretion of the court
as a misdemeanor.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
MOOR
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