P. v. Meza CA5 — Fear Not Law

Filed 9/23/26 P. v. Meza CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F089629 & F089859
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. SC063320A)
v.

ALICIA ROSINA MEZA,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Tiffany E. Organ-
Bowles, Judge.
Kyle Gee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and
Viktoriya Chebotarev, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant Alicia Rosina Meza appeals from the denial of her petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6,1 following an evidentiary hearing. In
1996, Meza was convicted by jury of first degree felony murder with special
circumstances and two counts of second degree robbery. In addition, the jury found true
an enhancement for the personal use of a firearm. Meza was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole plus a determinate term of eight years.
On appeal, Meza contends the trial court’s cumulative errors, including the
consideration of inadmissible evidence and misapplication of the law, necessitates
reversal of the court’s order denying her petition for resentencing. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1996, Meza was convicted of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and
robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (c), counts 2 & 3). The jury found true a special circumstance
alleging that Meza committed the murder while engaged in the commission or attempted
commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(I)) and that she personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in the commission of the offense. The court sentenced
Meza to life without the possibility of parole plus a determinate term of eight years. We
affirmed the judgment on appeal in People v. Meza (Oct. 30, 1997, F025822) [nonpub.
opn.] (Meza I).
On June 24, 2019, Meza filed a petition for resentencing under former section
1170.95, now renumbered as section 1172.6.
On August 10, 2020, the trial court summarily denied Meza’s petition. Meza
timely appealed and this Court affirmed the trial court’s order, finding that jury’s true
finding on the special circumstance established that she was ineligible for resentencing as
a matter of law. (People v. Meza (May 6, 2022, F081612) [nonpub. opn.] (Meza II).)

1 All further undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

2.
On September 21, 2022, Meza filed a second petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition, and Meza appealed.
On January 18, 2024, following our Supreme Court’s decisions in People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 and People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, we reversed
the trial court’s denial of Meza’s petition and remanded with directions to issue an order
to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
(People v. Meza (Jan. 18, 2024, F085771) [nonpub. opn.] (Meza III).)
On April 3, 2025, the court held an evidentiary hearing on Meza’s petition.
On May 20, 2025, the court issued a written ruling denying Meza’s petition.
Meza filed a timely notice of appeal.
Evidence Adduced at the Section 1172.6 Evidentiary Hearing
1. The Preliminary Hearing Transcript
On the evening of June 9, 1995, A.S. and his cousin, Isidro Cardenas, visited a
motel on Union Avenue in Bakersfield. At some point during the evening, A.S. left the
motel to get some beer. When he returned, there were two female prostitutes in his room,
one of whom was subsequently identified as Meza.
Meza wanted to engage in sex in exchange for money, but Cardenas was not
interested. Meza stated that she was going to bring her “pretty girlfriends,” and A.S.
accompanied her to meet the girls. However, they returned to the motel room
approximately five or 10 minutes later.
As A.S. was standing outside the motel, an African-American woman approached
and stated, “this one will take care of this one,” as she brandished a barbecue fork at him.
Meza held A.S. with her arm; as he slipped away, she grabbed his shirt.
A.S. took the money in his wallet out and threw it on the ground. Three African-
American men jumped on top of him and began to physically assault him. A.S. managed
to flee just as Cardenas came outside to intervene. Cardenas stood in the middle of

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everyone and asked, “what’s the problem?” The woman with the fork brandished it at
Cardenas, who took it away from her.
According to A.S., Meza took out a gun from her waistband. As Cardenas ran,
Meza shot him in the back, killing him. When A.S. got up, everyone had fled.
F.G. was at the motel when he heard popping sounds. He observed a Hispanic
male run past him and then collapse onto the ground.
A white or Hispanic woman, whom F.G. later identified as Meza, approached him.
Meza brandished a firearm at F.G.’s stomach and demanded that he drop the cellular
phone he was holding. F.G. complied. An African-American male accompanying Meza
picked up F.G.’s phone.
Meza pulled F.G.’s necklace from his neck and demanded his wallet. F.G. again
complied. The African-American man took the money out of F.G.’s wallet and threw the
wallet on the ground. Meza and the man then fled on foot.
2. Trial Evidence
Although the jury instructions permitted the jury to convict Meza of murder based
upon her participation in the underlying robbery, the prosecutor argued that she was the
actual killer. Both A.S. and F.G. testified that they observed Meza brandish a firearm.
Meza also told a detective with the Bakersfield Police Department that she had shot
Cardenas. The relevant portion of the witnesses’ trial testimony is summarized as
follows:
On June 9, 1995, A.S. and his cousin, Cardenas, rented a room at the Plaza Motel
in Bakersfield. A.S. stated that he went to the motel to take a car to an acquaintance,
A.G.
While drinking beers inside of A.G.’s room, A.S. met a blonde Hispanic woman
whom he later identified as Meza. A.S. subsequently went with Meza to pick up Meza’s
friend, whom Meza described as “real pretty.” When A.S. was outside of the motel, he

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was confronted by an African-American woman with a fork. The woman stated, “we
could take this guy.”
Meza grabbed A.S.’s neck. As soon as A.S. broke loose from Meza, four or five
men jumped on top of him and began to physically assault him. A.S. threw the money in
his pocket on the ground. He tried to escape by fleeing to the right side of the motel.
Cardenas came to assist him, standing between A.S. and the woman with the fork.
Cardenas knocked the fork out of the woman’s hands.
Meza pointed a gun at Cardenas and A.S. and Cardenas began to run. A.S. heard a
gunshot but did not see Cardenas fall. He could not remember in which direction any of
the perpetrators fled after the gunshot, but he remembered first responders subsequently
working on Cardenas and law enforcement arriving sometime thereafter.
F.G. was sitting inside of his vehicle talking on his phone when he observed
Cardenas crawling by him and Meza holding a gun. F.G. explained that Meza had a
visible tattoo on her shoulder which was inscribed with her last name.
Meza told F.G. to drop the phone and demanded his money while holding a gun
against his stomach. Meza grabbed a necklace that F.G. was wearing and took it from
him. F.G. gave Meza his wallet and she passed it to an African-American male that
accompanied her. The man took the cash from F.G.’s wallet, dropped it, and picked up
F.G.’s phone.
Cardenas was transported to the hospital where he succumbed to his injuries. The
forensic pathologist that performed Cardenas’s autopsy opined that he died from a
gunshot wound to his back.
Detective Roger Kert Buckles with the Bakersfield Police Department interviewed
F.G. and A.S. and conducted a photographic lineup which included Meza’s picture. Both
men identified Meza as the woman who had brandished a firearm.
Detective Lesley Vincent with the Bakersfield Police Department interrogated
Meza following her arrest. During the interrogation, Meza gave several versions of

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events before admitting she had shot Cardenas. She told Vincent that she gave the gun to
her friend and told him to get rid of it. Meza also stated she was afraid to turn herself in
because she “had shot a man and that he was dead.”
At trial, Meza testified that on June 9, 1995, A.S. approached her and asked if she
was a prostitute. Meza stated that she was not, however, they struck up a conversation
and began drinking beers and doing cocaine together. During their encounter, A.S. asked
Meza to find some pretty girls for him. Meza agreed and got into A.S.’s vehicle. They
drove around the block.
According to Meza, A.S. started rubbing on her, stating that he wanted to be with
her. She walked back to the motel.
A.S. subsequently returned to the motel with a girl. Meza and Cardenas began
talking and drinking outside in the parking lot. When A.S. emerged from the room,
“Regulate,” Meza’s boyfriend’s brother, yelled at Meza to get back to her room. A.S.
told Regulate to leave Meza alone and began walking towards Regulate.
Meza put her arms around A.S. and told him to leave them (Regulate and his
companions) alone. Then, an African-American woman with the fork, “Dede,” emerged.
Multiple men also approached and began to physically assault A.S.
Regulate approached Meza and asked for the gun in her waistband. Meza claimed
that she then heard a “fire cracker” go off.
As she was removing the gun from her waistband, it suddenly “went off.” Meza
claimed that she had shot herself in her hand. She denied pointing the firearm at anyone,
or taking money from F.G. Meza asserted that the gun was pointed downward.
Meza fled the motel, leaving her young sons with a friend. When Meza later
called friends at the motel to check on her sons, they advised her that she was wanted for
police questioning and that Cardenas was dead.

6.
3. The Evidentiary Hearing on Meza’s Petition and Trial Court’s Ruling
On April 3, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Meza’s petition.
The prosecutor explained that he had submitted seven PDF files of evidence, including:
(1) a clerk’s transcript containing “processed” documents and the abstract of judgment;
(2) a file containing the preliminary hearing transcripts and police reports documenting
the offense; (3) appellate court documents from Meza II, supra, F081612, Meza’s appeal
from the denial of her first section 1172.6 petition; (4) our appellate opinion in Meza III,
supra, F085771, Meza’s appeal from the denial of her second section 1172.6 petition;2
(5) the first volume of the reporter’s transcripts from her jury trial; (6) the second volume
of reporter’s transcripts from her trial; and (7) the jury verdict forms.
The prosecutor asked the court to exclude the police reports from its review,
explaining they were not part of the People’s evidence and are inadmissible. The
prosecutor further clarified that the appellate court documents and opinion were being
offered “just for the procedural posture of the case,” rather than for their factual content.
He emphasized that the jury trial transcripts represented the thrust of their evidence. The
prosecutor further explained that the jury’s verdict was not particularly significant, except
insofar as it could offer the court guidance on how those who had observed the witnesses
testify had assessed their credibility.
Trial counsel objected to the admission of the clerk’s transcripts of motions filed
during the course of Meza’s prosecution, the preliminary hearing transcripts, and this

2 The Attorney General’s request for this Court to take judicial notice of the
record on appeal in Meza I, supra, F025822; Meza II, supra, F081612; and Meza III,
supra, F085771 is granted over Meza’s objection. (Evid. Code, §§ 459, subd. (a) [“The
reviewing court may take judicial notice of any matter specified in Section 452”], 452,
subd. (d) [permitting a court to take judicial notice of records of “any court of this
state”].) We have considered these records for the limited purpose of the procedural
history of this case.

7.
court’s appellate opinions. Counsel asserted that only the reporter’s transcripts and jury
instructions were relevant and admissible evidence.
Over counsel’s objections, the court admitted all seven files into evidence, while
acknowledging that counsel’s position was correct and confirming it would limit its
review to the materials the People had identified as evidence. The prosecutor stated that
his central theory of the case was that Meza was the actual killer, and that the transcripts
established a motive for the murder: Meza killed the victim to prevent him from
escaping during an ongoing robbery.
The prosecutor pointed out that Meza was observed running up behind the victim
with a gun immediately before a gunshot was heard. The prosecutor also represented that
a detective had testified that Meza had given multiple versions of the incident, including
a version in which she admitted to shooting the victim.
Trial counsel offered no evidence at the evidentiary hearing and submitted on the
briefs. The trial court then took the matter under submission.
On May 20, 2025, the trial court issued a lengthy written ruling denying Meza’s
petition. In denying Meza’s petition, the court summarized the trial evidence, including
the testimony of the witnesses. It also discussed the prosecutor’s comments in closing
argument, the instructions given to the jury, and the jury’s verdict.
We quote portions of the trial court’s order at length because they are relevant to
the issues raised on appeal:

“V. Burden of Proof:

“Pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6(d)(3), the prosecution must
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner is guilty of murder,
under current California law, including the amendments to Penal
Code Sections 188 and 189 ….”

“X. Conclusions:

“Since the amendments to the Penal Code in 2019, Petitioner can
now only be held accountable for the murder of the Victim if she

8.
was the actual killer, or as an aider and abettor, either acted with her
own intent to kill, or was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Petitioner is only entitled to relief under
Section 1172.6 if she could not be convicted of murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.
(People v. Lewis, (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, fn. 6). Those changes only
affect the potential culpability of an aider and abettor who lacked
malice aforethought, or a non-killer convicted on a felony murder
theory. Those changes did not affect the culpability of the actual
killer, even if convicted on a felony murder theory.

“In this case, it was conceded that Petitioner fired a gun at the scene
on June 9, 1995 and that the Victim died of a gunshot wound to his
back. The jury found true that Petitioner personally used a firearm
within the meaning of Penal Code Section 12022.5(a). Considering
the evidence presented to it, the jury could not have made this
finding[] about Petitioner’s firearm use without also concluding that
she was the actual killer.

“However, like the petitioner in the case of People v. Jasso, (2025)
17 Cal.5th 646, in the case at hand, there was no evidence that more
than one firearm had been used in the incident or that more than one
shooter had fired a gun. There was no evidence that the robbery
involved more than one armed participant or that the Victim suffered
any firearm-related injuries other than those inflicted by the one fatal
shot.

“The Court makes the factual findings that there was only one
gunshot during the incident at the motel on June 9, 1995, that the
gun was in the hands of Petitioner when the gun fired, and that the
bullet fired from the gun in Petitioner’s hand entered the back of the
Victim and caused his death. Based on the admissible evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing and at trial, this Court finds that,
beyond a reasonable doubt, Petitioner was the actual killer.

“With the conducting of an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner was
provided the opportunity to refute the conclusion that she was the
actual shooter. She did not do so. As the actual killer of the Victim,
Petitioner is not eligible for relief under Penal Code Section 1172.6.
(See, People v. Patton, (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 [actual shooter of a
victim who died of a gunshot wound is not eligible for relief but
should be provided the opportunity to present evidence that he was
not the sole and direct perpetrator of the shooting such that this

9.
conviction was not based on the natural and probable consequences
theory].

“Senate Bill 1437 made significant changes to murder liability but
only to theories applicable to accomplices. The amendments to
Penal Code Section 188 and 189 were meant to ameliorate the
injustice of finding someone guilty of murder when they are
involved in the commission of a felony, with no intent to kill
anyone, but someone dies at the hands of a confederate during the
commission of the felony. However, the changes in the law did not
affect culpability of the actual killer in a felony murder scenario.

“This Court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner, as the
actual killer, could still be convicted of murder even after the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, and
she is, therefore, not eligible for relief under Penal Code Section
1172.6. The 1172.6 Petition is denied.”
DISCUSSION
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING MEZA’S PETITION
Meza contends the trial court erred in denying her petition for resentencing. She
specifically asserts the trial court relied upon inadmissible evidence and made errors of
law in concluding that she was ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6.
We are not persuaded.
A. Reliance on Inadmissible Evidence
Meza argues the trial court relied upon incompetent evidence in denying her
petition, including: the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument, the jury instructions,
and the jury’s verdict and findings. We conclude that Meza has forfeited her claim for
failing to challenge the admission of this evidence in the trial court below. Forfeiture
aside, we further conclude she has failed to demonstrate prejudice from any presumed
error.
1. Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a resentencing petition under section 1172.6,
we review factual findings for substantial evidence, and we review the court’s application

10.
of the law to those facts de novo. (People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066.)
Applying this standard of review, we ask only whether the appellate record contains
“evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Hubbard
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 378, 392.) We “ ‘ “presume[ ] in support of the judgment the existence
of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ [Citations.]
Substantial evidence also ‘ “includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable
inferences drawn from that evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943,
951.)
“ ‘Evidence erroneously admitted is properly considered in weighing the
sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, notwithstanding its erroneous
admission.’ ” (People v. Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 684, quoting People v. Navarro
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 311; McDaniel v. Brown (2010) 558 U.S. 120, 131 [in analyzing
sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence
admitted by the trial court’ regardless of whether that evidence was admitted
erroneously”].)
If the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor proved guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt rests in part on erroneously admitted evidence, we must determine whether the
error was prejudicial. In other words, we must determine whether there is a reasonable
probability that a more favorable outcome would have been reached absent the error; that
is, the trial court’s reliance on improper evidence. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d.
818, 836.)
Given the nature of the asserted error, our inquiry is whether the properly admitted
evidence alone is sufficient to sustain the trial court’s order. If so, the error was
harmless. If however the properly admitted evidence was not sufficient and the error was
prejudicial, the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new evidentiary hearing where the
prosecutor may again attempt to prove the Meza’s guilt with admissible evidence. (See

11.
People v. Dixon (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 116, 137 & fn. 3 [prejudicial evidentiary errors
warrant remand for a new evidentiary hearing rather than remand for resentencing];
§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
2. Forfeiture
Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) governs the admissibility of evidence at an
evidentiary hearing on a petition for resentencing filed under this statute. This section
provides the following:

“(3) At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to
relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes
to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. The
admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the
Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence
previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible
under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence,
and matters judicially noticed. The court may also consider the
procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion.
However, hearsay evidence that was admitted in a preliminary
hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be excluded
from the hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible
pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule. The prosecutor and
the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their
respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
At Meza’s evidentiary hearing, the court admitted into evidence seven files
submitted by the prosecutor, which included the reporter’s transcripts from Meza’s trial,
the instructions given to the jury, and the jury verdict forms.
Trial counsel neither objected to nor otherwise challenged the admissibility of this
evidence. It is well-settled that “[a] defendant may not challenge the admissibility of
evidence on appeal if he or she failed to raise a proper objection on those grounds in the
trial court.” (People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 696; Evid. Code, § 353, subd.
(a).) (People v. Myles, at p. 696, quoting People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434

12.
[“ ‘The objection requirement is necessary in criminal cases because a “contrary rule
would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would ‘permit
the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his [or her] trial secure in the knowledge that a
conviction would be reversed on appeal’ ” ’ ”].)
We conclude that counsel’s failure to timely challenge the admission of the
prosecutor’s comments in closing argument, the jury instructions, and the verdict forms,
resulted in forfeiture of Meza’s claim on appeal.
3. No Prejudice
Forfeiture aside, Meza has not demonstrated prejudice. The jury instructions and
verdict forms merely memorialized matters reflected in the reporter’s transcripts from
Meza’s trial. Thus, even assuming trial counsel had not conceded that the jury
instructions were relevant and admissible—which she did—the trial court could glean the
substance of the instructions and verdict forms from the reporter’s transcripts.
Likewise, the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument were merely a
summation of the trial evidence, which was independently reflected in the reporter’s
transcripts. As the Attorney General observes, the trial evidence establishes that “[Meza]
was the undisputed sole perpetrator of the murder and the actual killer.”3 Thus, although
the trial court relied on the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument, which is not
evidence (CALCRIM No. 104; People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 47), Meza has
not demonstrated that the error affected the outcome of the section 1172.6 hearing.
In particular, Meza does not identify any respect in which the prosecutor misstated
the evidence or materially mischaracterized the witness’s testimony during closing
argument. Nor does she explain how the trial court’s reliance on the prosecutor’s

3 Meza does not dispute that there was sufficient evidence to find that she was the
actual killer.

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remarks led it to reach a conclusion that was unsupported by the properly admitted
evidence.
Moreover, even apart from the challenged material, the properly admitted
evidence overwhelmingly established that Meza was the actual killer. Not only did A.S.
and F.G. identify Meza as the woman who brandished the firearm, Meza told Detective
Buckles that she was afraid to turn herself in because she “had shot a man and that he was
dead.”
The reporter’s transcripts also included Meza’s own account of the shooting, in
which she claimed either that another person fired the fatal shot or that the shooting was
accidental. The trial court was therefore able to evaluate and reject those theories based
solely on properly admitted evidence.
To the extent Meza contends that the court’s reliance upon the challenged
materials was prejudicial, it is her burden to affirmatively demonstrate prejudice. (People
v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573 [“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of
appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the
appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error”]; Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza
Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1206, fn. 11 [an appellate court is not required to
develop an appellant’s arguments]; Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th
761, 768 [“The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking
error”].) We conclude that she has failed to carry her burden.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Meza has not shown that the trial court’s
consideration of the jury instructions, verdict forms, and prosecutor’s closing argument
affected the outcome of the section 1172.6 hearing. Any error was therefore harmless.
B. Misapplication of the Law
Meza asserts the trial court also committed two reversible errors of law. First, by
weighing against her the fact that she did not offer any exculpatory evidence at the

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evidentiary hearing, thereby shifting the burden of proof to her. And second, by relying
upon an improper legal standard in denying her petition. Neither contention has merit.
1. The Court Did Not Improperly Shift the Burden of Proof
Meza contends the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof by
commenting that she failed to present new or additional exculpatory evidence at the
evidentiary hearing. The record does not support her claim.
The trial court expressly found that the prosecutor had proven, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Meza was the actual killer. It then observed that although Meza
had the opportunity to present new or additional evidence to the contrary, she did not do
so. Read in the context of the court’s written order as a whole, this latter remark was
simply an observation about the state of the evidence: the prosecutor’s evidence
established Meza’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and Meza had introduced no
additional evidence that undermined that conclusion. It did not suggest that Meza bore
the burden of disproving her guilt.
Meza argues that this conclusion is belied by the fact that the trial court’s
statement that there was “ ‘no evidence that more than one firearm had been used.’ ” She
contends, “[e]ither the lower court did not consider her trial testimony, or found it of no
moment because [it was] not repeated at the evidentiary hearing.” The record again fails
to support her assertions.
The trial court summarized Meza’s trial testimony in its written ruling, including
her claim that she heard a “fire cracker” go off just before her gun discharged. There is
no indication that the court refused to consider Meza’s version of events because she did
not testify at the evidentiary hearing. Rather, the record reflects that the court considered
her trial testimony but found it unpersuasive in light of the evidence establishing that she
was the actual killer.

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2. The Trial Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard
Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) requires the prosecution to prove “beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January
1, 2019.” The statute expressly rejects substantial evidence as the applicable burden: “A
finding that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder … is
insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Meza contends the trial court erroneously denied her petition by concluding that
she “could still be convicted of murder even after the changes to Section 188 or 189,”
rather than finding that she is guilty of murder. Meza explains the trial court’s use of the
phrase “ ‘could still be convicted’ is logically equivalent to a ‘substantial evidence’
finding,” which falls short of the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Although we agree that use of the phrase “could still be convicted” of murder
“might suggest the application of an incorrect standard of proof” (see People v. Tyler
(2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 724, 731), the record refutes the possibility that the court applied
an improper legal standard in denying Meza’s petition.
In denying Meza’s petition, the court expressly observed that the applicable
standard of proof required it to determine whether the prosecutor proved, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Meza “is guilty of murder, under current California law.” In its
conclusion, the trial court made independent factual findings and determined, from those
findings, that the evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Meza was the
actual killer, stating:

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Victim and caused his death. Based on the admissible evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing and at trial, this Court finds
that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Petitioner was the actual killer.”
(Italics added.)
Nothing in the trial court’s ruling suggests that it treated Meza’s guilt as merely
supported by substantial evidence. Instead, the court resolved the ultimate question itself,
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Meza was the actual killer. That finding renders
Meza ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, and it
forecloses any claim that the court’s isolated comment that Meza “could still be
convicted of murder” was prejudicial.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Meza’s section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is
affirmed.

FRANSON, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

SNAUFFER, J.

DE SANTOS, J.

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