Filed 10/5/26 P. v. Mendoza CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065636
v. (Super. Ct. No. FBA008347)
RUBEN FELICIANO MENDOZA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San
Bernardino County, Steve Malone, Judge. Affirmed.
Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2007, a jury found Ruben Mendoza guilty of premeditated
attempted murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. He was
sentenced to a determinate term of one year, plus an indeterminate term of
life with the possibility of parole. In 2023, Mendoza filed a form petition for
resentencing of his attempted murder conviction under Penal Code section
1172.6.1 The trial court denied the petition, concluding Mendoza had failed to
state a prima facie case for resentencing relief.
Mendoza appealed, and his appointed counsel filed a brief under
the procedures outlined in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, stating
no arguable issues could result in a disposition more favorable to Mendoza
(id. at p. 232). Although we granted his request for an extension of time to file
a supplemental brief, Mendoza did not file a brief. Nevertheless, we exercise
our discretion to conduct an independent review of the record and appointed
counsel’s brief. (Ibid. [“While it is wholly within the court’s discretion, the
Court of Appeal is not barred from conducting its own independent review of
the record”].) After independent review, we find no reasonably arguable issue
on appeal, and therefore, affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 23, 2006, the San Bernardino District Attorney filed a
Fourth Amended Information, charging Mendoza and a codefendant with
premeditated attempted murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle.
As to the attempted murder, it was alleged a principal was armed with a
firearm during the commission of the offense.
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless
otherwise stated.
2
On August 3, 2007, a jury found Mendoza guilty as charged. The
trial court sentenced Mendoza on the attempted murder charge to an
indeterminate sentence of life with the possibility of parole, plus one year for
the firearm enhancement. As to the other charged offense, the court imposed
the middle term of five years, but stayed it pursuant to section 654.
On March 27, 2023, Mendoza filed a form petition to vacate his
attempted murder conviction. In response, the district attorney requested the
trial court deny the petition, arguing the jury was never instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or conspiracy under the doctrine.
Rather, it was instructed to find Mendoza guilty if he had the intent to kill
and on direct aiding and abetting. The district attorney attached the relevant
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jury instructions.
Mendoza, represented by appointed counsel, filed a response
arguing he had made a prima facie case for relief by making the required
allegations in his petition.
Following the prima facie hearing, the trial court denied the
resentencing petition because the jury found Mendoza had the specific intent
to kill.
DISCUSSION
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part that a
“person convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition with the court that sentenced
the petitioner to have the petitioner’s . . . attempted murder . . . conviction
vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the
2
In this appeal, counsel augmented the record to include the trial
transcript wherein the court instructed the jury.
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following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint . . . was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . .
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶]
(2) The petitioner was convicted of . . . attempted murder . . . following a trial
. . . . [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of . . . attempted
murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019.” The petitioner has the burden of making a prima facie case for relief.
The prima facie stage bar is “‘very low,’” but not nonexistent. (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis).) “If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order
to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
The court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage if the
record of conviction discloses that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–971.) “In reviewing any
part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court
should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’” (Id. at p. 972.) We independently review the trial
court’s determination that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie
showing for relief. (People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)
A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing relief if “the jury was
not instructed on any theory of liability for murder . . . that required that
malice be imputed to him.” (People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205.)
After independent review, we conclude the record of conviction, including the
trial transcript of the jury instructions, conclusively establishes Mendoza was
not convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or any other theory imputing malice. The jury was
instructed on attempted murder, but that instruction does not reference the
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natural and probable consequences doctrine. There was no separate
instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, felony murder
or conspiracy.
The jury also was instructed on direct aiding and abetting
attempted murder. Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of
murder and attempted murder. (See People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
539, 548; People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 945 [petitioner
convicted of murder as an aider and abettor ineligible for relief as a matter of
law as Senate Bill No. 1437 did “‘not eliminate direct aiding and abetting
liability for murder’”].) “To be guilty of a crime as an aider and abettor, a
person must ‘aid[ ] the [direct] perpetrator by acts or encourage[ ] him [or
her] by words or gestures.’ [Citations.] In addition, . . . the person must give
such aid or encouragement ‘with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the
[direct] perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of
encouraging or facilitating commission of,’ the crime in question. [Citations.]
When the crime at issue requires a specific intent, in order to be guilty as an
aider and abettor the person ‘must share the specific intent of the [direct]
perpetrator,’ that is to say, the person must ‘know[ ] the full extent of the
[direct] perpetrator’s criminal purpose and [must] give[ ] aid or
encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the [direct]
perpetrator’s commission of the crime.’” (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613,
623–624, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v.
Rodriguez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 816, 824; see § 31 [A defendant may be
convicted as the direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor].)
Here the record reflects the jury was instructed on the elements
that must be found to establish direct aiding and abetting attempted murder,
including finding that Mendoza had the intent to kill. (See People v. Coley,
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supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548 [“Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid
theory of attempted murder”].) Mendoza thus is ineligible for resentencing
relief as a matter of law. (See, e.g., People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 52 [“[I]f the record shows that the jury was not instructed on either the
natural and probable consequences or felony-murder doctrines, then the
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law”].) The trial court properly
denied the resentencing petition.
In the appellate briefing, counsel asks us to consider whether the
trial court erred in denying resentencing relief based on the court’s conclusion
that Mendoza had the specific intent to kill. Harboring a specific intent to
kill, by itself, is insufficient to sustain an attempted murder conviction. (See
People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463 [noting that “a finding of intent to
kill . . . is only one element. It does not by itself establish any valid theory of
liability”].) However, here, the jury also was instructed on all the required
elements of direct aiding and abetting, which is a valid theory of liability for
attempted murder.
Counsel also asks us to consider whether the trial court, in
“affirming [Mendoza’s] conviction,” erred in finding he “remain[s] guilty of
willful, premeditated and deliberate attempted murder though the jury was
not required to find that [he] personally possessed these mental states at the
time of the attempted murder.” We conclude this challenge to the attempted
murder conviction is outside the scope of this appeal. However, we note the
California Supreme Court has held that “section 664(a) properly must be
interpreted to require only that the murder attempted was willful, deliberate,
and premeditated, but not to require that an attempted murderer personally
acted with willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation, even if he or she is
guilty as an aider and abettor.” (People v. Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 627.)
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In summary, based on our independent review of the record,
Mendoza is not entitled to resentencing relief. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 222.) Consequently, we affirm the postjudgment order.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Mendoza’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
SCOTT, J.
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