Filed 7/24/26 P. v. Mendez CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B347025
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA043129-01)
v.
JOSE MENDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Affirmed.
Jose Mendez, in pro. per.; and Laura Vavakin, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Jose Mendez appeals from an order denying his petition for
homicide resentencing. (Pen. Code, § 1172.6.) We affirm.
In 1993, Mendez pleaded guilty to first degree murder and
attempted murder without premeditation. (Pen. Code, §§ 187,
664.)
Years later, in 2024, Mendez filed a check-the-box form
Penal Code section 1172.6 petition seeking resentencing on his
murder and attempted murder convictions. (See People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558 (Patton) [noting the availability of
resentencing in light of changes to California’s homicide laws
effective as of 2019].)
The People opposed, providing a preliminary hearing
transcript they claimed showed Mendez was the sole shooter and
direct perpetrator of his crimes. Julio Rosado, the attempted
murder victim, testified at the preliminary hearing. He had seen
a shooter fire rounds at him and Ruben Jaramillo. Both were
shot. Rosado survived but Jaramillo did not. Rosado had known
Mendez for about six years and identified him as the shooter at
the preliminary hearing. In addition to Rosado’s testimony, the
People presented recordings of an interview police conducted of
Mendez after he was in custody. On them, Mendez admitted to
the shooting, admitted he had the intent to kill, and admitted he
had lain in wait.
The trial court denied Mendez’s resentencing petition in
July 2025 because he had not shown a prima facie case.
Mendez appealed. His counsel filed a brief that identified
no arguable issues.
In People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo),
our Supreme Court offered “guidance for counsel and courts to
follow in postconviction appeals” under the homicide resentencing
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statute “where counsel finds no arguable issues.” (Id. at p. 231.)
Under Delgadillo, where “counsel finds no arguable issues to be
pursued on appeal: (1) counsel should file a brief informing the
court of that determination, including a concise recitation of the
facts bearing on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court
should send, with a copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the
defendant, informing the defendant of the right to file a
supplemental letter or brief and that if no letter or brief is filed
within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp.
231–232.) “If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental
brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the
specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written
opinion. The filing of a supplemental brief or letter does not
compel an independent review of the entire record to identify
unraised issues. [Citation.] If the defendant does not file a
supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal may dismiss the
appeal as abandoned. [Citation.] If the appeal is dismissed as
abandoned, the Court of Appeal does not need to write an opinion
but should notify the defendant when it dismisses the matter.
[Citation.] While it is wholly within the court’s discretion, the
Court of Appeal is not barred from conducting its own
independent review of the record . . . .” (Id. at p. 232.)
Mendez has filed a supplemental brief, and we address it.
In his supplemental brief, Mendez forthrightly “take[s] full
accountability” for the shootings and does “not contest, in any
way, [his] actual accountability.” But he does contest the
imputation of malice solely from his commission of the crimes.
And he argues resentencing is still available for actual killers
who could have been convicted of second degree felony murder.
He contends, inconsistent with his guilty pleas and recorded
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confession, he only intended to scare the victims when shooting
them, not harm them. He contests the use of an unstipulated
preliminary hearing transcript containing that confession, which
he now claims, with respect to his intent, was untrue and
coerced.
First, we note Mendez raised none of these arguments in
the trial court. They are forfeited. (Perez v. Grajales (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591–592 [“arguments raised for the first
time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited”].)
Even so, Mendez’s first degree and attempted murder
convictions are not subject to the homicide resentencing process
because there is no dispute he was the actual killer. Mendez
cites People v. Nino (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 844, but that case
addressed a defendant with a second degree murder conviction
who could have been convicted under a felony murder theory the
court concluded was no longer viable. (Id. at p. 849; see id. at p.
856 [noting negligent discharge of a firearm could not underpin
first degree felony murder].) Thus, Nino confirms that if a
defendant is an actual killer, he is not eligible for relief from a
“conviction of first degree murder or attempted murder.” (Id. at
p. 849; see also Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233
[“Delgadillo is not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6”
where “the record . . . makes clear that Delgadillo was the actual
killer and the only participant in the killing”]; People v. Fisher
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1029 [“Fisher’s argument that he did
not specifically admit to a particular mens rea has no teeth”
when he “admitted he was the direct perpetrator”].) Malice,
under the circumstance of Mendez’s guilty pleas, was not
improperly imputed and the trial court properly denied relief at
the prima facie stage of the homicide resentencing process.
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Mendez asserts his confession, as to his intent, was coerced,
but that assertion does not undo his guilty plea and the
consequences it establishes with respect to his resentencing
petition. The resentencing process was not intended to address
wide-ranging collateral attacks on convictions. (People v. Nguyen
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1157.) Moreover, as we just
explained, the lack of a specific admission as to mental state, in
light of the undisputed fact that Mendez was the killer, does not
alter our analysis under the resentencing statute. (See People v.
Fisher, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1029.)
We also reiterate a trial court may properly consider
preliminary hearing transcripts at the prima facie stage of a
homicide resentencing proceeding. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
pp. 568–569.) Mendez asserts he did not stipulate to the
preliminary hearing transcript when pleading guilty. The
transcript of his plea hearing, however, was unavailable and is
not in the record. Regardless, the absence of a defendant’s
stipulation to a preliminary hearing transcript during an earlier
plea colloquy does not detract from its utility. (Id. at p. 569.)
Finally, Mendez cites People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433. But “Curiel concerned what facts, related to whether Curiel
could presently be convicted of murder because of the 2019
amendments to homicide law (see § 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)), could be
conclusively established, as a matter of issue preclusion, from
certain jury findings after a contested jury trial where the
petitioner had maintained his innocence and not pleaded guilty,
and where an invalid theory was supported by the evidence and
argued by the parties. (Curiel, at pp. 440–446, 470–471; id. at p.
442 [the evidence showed Curiel did not have anything to do with
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the shooting].)” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 565, fn. 8.) Curiel
does not govern the guilty plea scenario before us. (Ibid.)
Having addressed the issues Mendez raised in his
supplemental brief, we decline to conduct a further independent
review of the record. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying relief under Penal Code
section 1172.6.
SCHERB, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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