Filed 6/30/26 P. v. Mejia CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064729
v. (Super. Ct. No. 09CF3083)
JESUS HUMBERTO MEJIA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Larry Yellin, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Michael Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Joshua Trinh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
* * *
On remand for resentencing, defendant Jesus Humberto Mejia
was sentenced to 14 years to life consecutive to 31 years and four months. On
appeal, Mejia argues the trial court erred by failing to dismiss a firearm
enhancement and by sentencing him to the middle rather than the lower
term on all determinate sentences. We find the trial court properly
considered all relevant factors on those counts, and therefore, the sentence
must be upheld. We did, however, notice two additional potential issues and
requested further briefing from the parties. One of those issues was not an
error. The second, a missing sentence for one count, will result in an ordered
modification to reflect the court’s intent. In all other respects, we affirm the
judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Background Facts and Trial
We summarized the facts in our prior opinion in this case. (People
v. Mejia (Jul. 27, 2022, G052967) [nonpub. opn.].) “Early one morning, Jose
Ramirez and his wife, Alberta, heard their car alarm sounding. Alberta saw a
young man standing at the garage. Jose went to the garage and noticed Mejia
was outside standing next to a black car talking on a cellphone. When Jose
entered the garage, he saw the back passenger window of his vehicle was
broken. He watched Francisco Rodriguez, who was inside the vehicle,
attempting to remove the speakers. Jose tried to leave the garage when
Rodriguez turned and pointed a shotgun at him. Mejia, who was now holding
a pistol, ordered Jose back into the garage.
“Alberta, who was standing nearby, was holding a cellphone in
her hand. Mejia pointed his pistol at her and grabbed her phone. At this
point, the apartment complex manager arrived and told the two culprits,
‘Lower your weapon. Don’t be a fool. Think about what you’re doing.’
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Rodriguez pointed his shotgun at Jose and pulled the trigger three times, but
the weapon did not fire. Hearing sirens in the background, Mejia said, ‘Let’s
get out of here.’ The men escaped in the black car that had been left outside
the garage.” (People v. Mejia, supra, G052967.)
A jury convicted Mejia of possession of a firearm by a felon
(former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1);1 counts one & 11); second degree
vehicle burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b); count two); second degree robbery
(§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count three); attempted premeditated murder
(§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a); counts four and nine); attempted first degree
robbery (§§ 664, subd. (a), 211, 212.5, subd. (a); counts five and seven); first
degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a); counts six and eight); and street
terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 10). The jury found true that in counts
three and nine, Mejia personally used a firearm during the commission and
attempted commission of such offenses. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) As to counts
four and seven, vicarious use of a firearm by a gang member was also found
to be true. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)(1)). Counts one to nine and 11 were
found to have been committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The jury also found true a prior conviction qualifying
as a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two prior convictions qualifying
as strikes (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(2)(A)). “The
court sentenced Mejia to an aggregate term of 44 years to life, consecutive to
a determinate term of 62 years and four months.” (People v. Mejia, supra,
G052967.)
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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B. First Appeal
In September 2019, we issued an opinion which was
subsequently vacated by the California Supreme Court. The case was
remanded to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider in light
of Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) (SB 775). (People v. Mejia, supra,
G052967.) Based on changes in the law, we reversed and remanded the
convictions for attempted murder (counts four and nine) and street terrorism
(count 10). We also reversed the findings on vicarious use of a firearm by a
gang member (counts four and seven) and the findings that the crimes were
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang on counts one through
nine and 11. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) We also reversed and remanded the 10-
year sentence on the firearm enhancement in order to allow the court to
exercise its discretion to strike the five-year prior. (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).) We
affirmed in all other respects. (People v. Mejia, supra, G052967.)
C. Remand
The prosecution chose not to retry one of the attempted murder
counts (count four) or the gang offenses or enhancements.
At resentencing, on the remaining attempted murder count
(count nine), the court imposed an indeterminate sentence of seven years to
life, doubled to 14 years because of the strike prior. On the robbery count
(count three), the court imposed a middle sentence of three years, doubled to
six due to the strike prior. On the burglary convictions (count six and eight),
the court imposed a consecutive sentence of one-third of the middle term of 16
months, doubled to 32 months due to the strike prior. Sentence on the
remaining counts (counts one, two, five, and seven) was stayed under section
654. The court imposed consecutive 10-year sentences on the firearm
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enhancements attached to counts three and nine. The aggregate sentence
was 14 years to life consecutive to 31 years and four months in state prison.
Mejia appeals from the sentence imposed after remand.
DISCUSSION
I.
FORFEITURE
The Attorney General contends Mejia forfeited the issue raised in
this appeal by failing to raise them adequately at the resentencing hearing.
We disagree. His resentencing brief specifically requested dismissal of the
firearm enhancement and section 1385 was discussed at some length.
Amended section 1170 was also cited. We find no forfeiture occurred.
II.
SECTION 1385, SUBDIVISION (C)
A. Statutory Framework and Standard of Review
As amended by Senate Bill No. 81 (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1),
section 1385 permits the court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss
certain enhancements, or to strike the punishment for those enhancements.
(§ 1385, subds. (a), (b)(1).) Under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), in
exercising that discretion, “the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove” that certain mitigating
circumstances are present.
Those circumstances include multiple enhancements, when
alleged in a single case (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B), and “prior victimization or
childhood trauma” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(E)). “Proof of the presence of one or
more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
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Section 1385, subdivision (c)(6)(A) states: “‘Childhood trauma’
means that as a minor the person experienced physical, emotional, or sexual
abuse, physical or emotional neglect. A court may conclude that a defendant’s
childhood trauma was connected to the offense if, after reviewing any
relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports,
preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, medical records, or
records or reports by qualified medical experts, the court concludes that the
defendant’s childhood trauma substantially contributed to the defendant’s
involvement in the commission of the offense.” Section 1385, subdivision
(c)(6)(B) is similar. It states: “‘Prior victimization’ means the person was a
victim of intimate partner violence, sexual violence, or human trafficking, or
the person has experienced psychological or physical trauma, including, but
not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. A court may
conclude that a defendant’s prior victimization was connected to the offense
if, after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not
limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness
statements, medical records, or records or reports by qualified medical
experts, the court concludes that the defendant’s prior victimization
substantially contributed to the defendant’s involvement in the commission of
the offense.”
The language section 1385, subdivision (c)(6)(A) (childhood
trauma), and subdivision (c)(6)(B) (prior victimization), is permissive. The
court “may conclude” these were connected to the offense if certain facts are
present. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(5).) The court, however, is not required to do so.
We review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1093.) “A court abuses its
sentencing discretion when it acts arbitrarily and capriciously, relies on
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improper matter in reaching its decision, or is unaware of the scope of its
discretion so that it does not exercise informed discretion at all.” (People v.
Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765.) “The burden is on the party
challenging the sentencing decision to show that the court abused its
discretion.” (Ibid.)
In People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033, the California
Supreme Court concluded that it was “clear that the structure [of section
1385, subd. (c)(2)] does not ‘presume’ [citation] an enhancement should be
dismissed whenever an enumerated mitigating circumstance is present, but
instead ‘the ultimate question before the trial court remains whether it is in
the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement’ [citation] and this
‘furtherance of justice’ [citation] inquiry requires a trial court’s ongoing
exercise of ‘discretion’ [citation]. Thus, notwithstanding the presence of a
mitigating circumstance, trial courts retain their discretion to impose an
enhancement based on circumstances ‘long deemed essential to the
“furtherance of justice” inquiry.’”
B. No Abuse of Discretion
In the Probation Report prepared for the initial trial, the
probation officer noted a number of circumstances in aggravation and none in
mitigation. The aggravating circumstances included the threat of great bodily
harm, the use of a firearm, the vulnerability of some of the victims, the spree
nature of the crimes, the commission of multiple serious and violent offenses,
the defendant’s prior record of gang activity and serious criminal conduct,
and prior unsatisfactory probation performance.
On resentencing, Mejia’s resentencing brief included a
psychologist’s report, which diagnosed him with PTSD, depression, and
substance abuse. He was the youngest of 14 children, and all of his brothers
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were in the same gang. He joined that gang at 12 or 13 years old. He had
witnessed domestic violence between his parents on at least one occasion. He
had also witnessed a friend commit suicide with a gun. The psychologist
opined that “the impact of trauma, developmental age and immaturity, and
adverse experiences . . . contributed to [Mejia’s] behaviors and actions and led
to his conviction.” Counsel also argued that “drug addiction, mental health
issues, and childhood trauma were factors in the commission of the crimes.”
At the hearing, counsel pointed out that Mejia had made progress in
receiving substance abuse treatment and obtaining his G.E.D.
The prosecutor argued that dismissing the enhancements would
“endanger public safety” under section 1385. The prosecutor discussed Mejia’s
priors and noted that he had only been out of custody for about 20 days when
he committed the crimes in the instant case. The trial court stated it had
taken all relevant factors into consideration, including Mejia’s progress in
prison and the nature of the instant crimes. The court did not find good cause
for striking the enhancements.
The court was well within its discretion. Mejia claims the court
did not give “great weight” to the factors enumerated in the statute, but the
court was clear that it had considered the papers submitted, which included
the psychologist’s report. But ultimately, the court found Mejia had
committed “a series of very dangerous and violent crimes.” Thus, the court
adequately considered the outcome that best served the interest of justice.
(People v. Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1031.) We find no error.
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III.
SECTION 1170, SUBDIVISION (B)(6)(A)
A. Statutory Framework and Standard of Review
As amended, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) provides that
“unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary
to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if
any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence.”
Once again, abuse of discretion is the relevant standard of
review. (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428, fn.8.)
B. No Abuse of Discretion
As part of the same hearing discussed above, the court imposed
middle term sentences. Mejia argues this was error because “there was
undisputed evidence that appellant had ‘a history of adverse childhood
experiences and trauma’ and that his childhood trauma ‘contributed to [his]
behaviors and actions that led to his conviction.’” While Mejia did submit
evidence on the issue of childhood trauma, the court’s statements about the
seriousness of the crimes indicated its finding that imposition of the lower
term would be contrary to the interests of justice. There are no “magic words”
the court must use to indicate its decision on that point. The court referred to
the crimes as “dangerous and violent” and that it was only “by good fortune”
that nobody had been killed. The court’s rationale was clear, and its decision
was not irrational or arbitrary. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
375.)
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IV.
ISSUES RAISED BY THE COURT
This court requested further briefing on two issues by the parties:
the status of count 11, which appeared to be missing from the abstract of
judgment; and whether the trial court erred by imposing a full 10-year
sentence on the firearm enhancements attached to counts three and nine.
A. Count 11
Defendant was convicted in count 11 of possession of a firearm by
a felon. (Former § 12021, subd. (a)(1).) At the resentencing hearing, the trial
court initially imposed a consecutive sentence of one-third the midterm of one
year and four months. Approximately two weeks later, the court corrected the
sentencing order stating it had imposed a total determinate sentence of 32
years and eight months when it had intended to impose 31 years and four
months. To reach the intended sentence, it would “stay imposition of sentence
on count 11” which reduced the sentence by one year and four months.
This, however, was error, as the court cannot stay imposition of a
sentence. (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 380; People v. Alford
(2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472–1473.) Mejia suggests we remand to the
trial court to impose sentence on count 11, noting the court can reach the
same result by imposing a concurrent sentence. ~(ASB p2 )~ The People,
however, recommend we simply order the judgment modified ourselves. We
find this appropriate because the trial court would undoubtedly impose the
same term. (See, e.g., People v. Baylor (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 232, 236.)
B. Firearm Enhancements
The second question we asked the parties related to the court’s
imposition of a full 10-year sentence on both firearm enhancements.
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) We asked whether this was permissible in light of
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section 1170.1, subdivision (a); People v. Moody (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 987,
990–991.
As relevant here, section 1170.1, subdivision (a), states: “Except
as otherwise provided by law, and subject to Section 654, when any person is
convicted of two or more felonies . . . and a consecutive term of imprisonment
is imposed . . . the aggregate term of imprisonment for all these convictions
shall be the sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any
additional term imposed for applicable enhancements for prior convictions,
prior prison terms, and Section 12022.1. The principal term shall consist of
the greatest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any of the crimes,
including any term imposed for applicable specific enhancements. The
subordinate term for each consecutive offense shall consist of one-third of the
middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each other felony conviction for
which a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed, and shall include one-
third of the term imposed for any specific enhancements applicable to those
subordinate offenses.” (Italics added.)
Section 12022.53, subdivision (b), states that any person
convicted of a listed felony, and who in the commission of that felony
personally used a firearm, shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of 10
years in the state prison, which shall be imposed in addition and consecutive
to the punishment prescribed for that felony. “The firearm need not be
operable or loaded for this enhancement to apply.” (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).)
While this might seem to allow for the full 10-year enhancement
to be applied, section 1170.11 clarifies that “As used in Section 1170.1, the
term ‘specific enhancement’ means an enhancement that relates to the
circumstances of the crime. It includes, but is not limited to, the
enhancements” set forth in section 12022.53. “In section 1170.1, the term
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‘specific enhancement’ is used to compel reduction of the term of an
enhancement, imposed in a consecutive subordinate term, to one-third of the
enhancement term. Thus, as we have seen, section 1170.1 expressly says a
subordinate, consecutive term ‘shall include one-third of the term imposed for
any specific enhancements applicable to those subordinate offenses.’ (Italics
added.) Section 1170.11 therefore commands that an enhancement pursuant
to section 12022.53 is subject to the one-third limitation of section 1170.1.”
(People v. Moody, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 992–993.)
There is an additional wrinkle, however, that is present here.
Mejia was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 14 years to life on count
nine, the attempted murder count. He was sentenced to a determinate term
of six years on count three, the robbery count. When attached to an
indeterminate term, “section 1170.1’s one-third limit for consecutive
subordinate terms and enhancements does not apply.” (People v. Felix (2000)
22 Cal.4th 651, 656.) “We thus conclude that the court should impose the full
term for enhancements attached to indeterminate terms.” (Ibid.)
“Section 1170.1, which requires reduction of consecutive terms to
one-third, ‘fully applies only when all terms of imprisonment are
“determinate,” i.e., of specified duration. A life sentence is “indeterminate,”
i.e., not for a fixed period. When a defendant is sentenced to both a
determinate and an indeterminate sentence, the determinate sentence is
served first. Nonetheless, neither term is “principal” [n]or “subordinate.”
They are to be considered and calculated independently of one another.’”
(People v. Garza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1094.) Accordingly, we find no
error, and thank the parties for their additional briefing on this issue.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed as modified. The clerk of the court is
ordered to modify the judgment and the abstract of judgment to reflect a
concurrent sentence of one year and four months on count 11, and to submit a
certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
MOORE, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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