Filed 7/9/26 P. v. Mejia CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064560
v. (Super. Ct. No. 21CF2417)
NATHAN ALEXANDER MEJIA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Elizabeth G. Macias, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Maxine Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
* * *
Appellant Nathan Alexander Mejia was convicted of carjacking,
kidnapping, and assault with an assault weapon, as well as various
sentencing enhancements. On appeal, he contends the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to apply a statutory presumption pursuant to Penal
Code1 section 1170 in favor of the lower term and by failing to dismiss the
sentencing enhancements under section 1385. We conclude the court did not
abuse its discretion.
The Attorney General argues on appeal that the judgment should
be corrected to accurately reflect that the crime-bail-crime enhancements
were stayed. We agree and modify the abstract of judgment to reflect that
these enhancements were imposed and stayed. We otherwise affirm the
judgment.
FACTS
A. Facts Related to the Crimes
On August 17, 2021, the victim was driving in Tustin when she
saw a man, later identified as Mejia, moving back and forth across the street,
about 20 to 30 feet in front of her car. She slowed down to avoid hitting Mejia.
Mejia suddenly ran toward the victim’s car. She slammed on the brakes and
came to a complete stop. The victim noted Mejia was holding something
black, which she at first thought was a bat. She tried to put her car in reverse
but accidentally put it in park instead, which automatically unlocked the car
doors.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Mejia opened the front passenger side door and got in. He pointed
a rifle at the victim’s head and yelled, “Go, go, go.” Mejia also said that
someone was trying to kill him. The victim began to drive but decided she
needed to get out of the car. After driving approximately half a block, she
started to slow down and opened her car door. As she was about to jump,
Mejia said, “Don’t do it,” and she felt something hit her head. The victim then
“launched” herself out of the car. As she jumped, one of the car’s tires rolled
over her leg.
When the victim landed on the pavement, she was in such severe
pain that she could not move. She watched as her car drove away from the
scene. The victim suffered serious injuries from jumping out of the car,
including asphalt burns on her back, hips, and leg, tire marks on the back of
her leg, and severe injury to her knee.
That night, a man called police after finding a semiautomatic
rifle in his backyard, which was located approximately 100 yards from where
the victim jumped out of her car. Mejia’s DNA was found on the gun. The
next morning, police found the victim’s car at Mejia’s home, which was
around 200 to 300 yards from where she jumped out of the car.
The victim was diagnosed with a leg injury called “Morel-
Lavallee lesion,” which is a type of “degloving” injury, where the skin and
subcutaneous tissue are separated from the underlying tissue that holds
together the muscles, blood vessels, and nerves. She spent almost three
weeks in the hospital and testified she has difficulty walking and standing for
long periods of time, as well as nerve damage and severe pain, which are
likely to be permanent.
The defense called one witness in its case. Mejia’s stepfather,
J.P., testified that he was with Mejia sometime between 10:00 p.m. on
3
August 17 through the next morning. While he was with Mejia at Mejia’s
residence, Mejia said, “somebody is out to get me.” Mejia was acting frantic
and out of control, so J.P. took Mejia to his shop; Mejia made statements that
people were surrounding the shop, and he asked J.P. to check the doors to
make sure nobody was there.
B. Procedural History
Mejia was charged with carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a); count 1),
kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 2), and assault with an assault weapon
(§ 245, subd. (a)(3); count 3.) It was alleged that Mejia committed each count
while released from custody on bail in three separate felony cases (§ 12022.1,
subd. (b)), that he personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission
of each count (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), that he personally used a firearm in the
commission of counts 1 and 2 (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and that he personally
used an assault weapon in the commission of count 3 (§ 12022.5, subd. (b)).
The information alleged the following aggravating circumstances: (1) the
offenses involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily
harm, and other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and
callousness (Cal. Rules of Court,2 rule 4.421(a)(1)); and (2) Mejia was armed
with and used a weapon during the offense (rule 4.421(a)(2)).
The jury found Mejia guilty of all counts and found true all the
enhancement allegations and aggravating circumstances, except the crime-
bail-crime enhancements, which Mejia admitted. The trial court sentenced
Mejia to the midterm of eight years on count 3, three years for the great
bodily injury enhancement, and five years for the assault weapon
2 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of
Court.
4
enhancement, for a total term of 16 years. The remaining counts and
enhancements were stayed.
C. Sentencing Hearing
Mejia’s probation report documented childhood abuse and
trauma. The probation report identified Mejia’s age as a mitigating factor
because Mejia was 21 at the time he committed the crimes. The prosecution
and defense both filed sentencing briefs. The prosecution argued the only
mitigating factor was Mejia’s lack of prior convictions. Mejia’s sentencing
brief requested the low term of four years on count 3. The defense’s
sentencing brief did not specifically identify any mitigating factors but
argued the low term was appropriate because Mejia did not intend to harm
the victim.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted it had reviewed
the sentencing briefs and the probation report, which attached letters of
support from Mejia’s friends and family. The court then addressed the
mitigating factors under rule 4.423. The court stated it had “look[ed] very
carefully at the probation report” and asked both counsel as to whether they
believed Mejia’s childhood abuse and trauma as documented in the probation
report qualified as a mitigating circumstance under rule 4.423(b)(3). (Ibid.
[“The defendant experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,
including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence
and it was a factor in the commission of the crime”].)
The court noted that, according to the probation report, Mejia
had a “strained relationship with his mother as a result of how he was
conceived,” and his mother and stepfather “engaged in heavy drinking and
domestic violence.” The court also noted Mejia’s exposure to gangs and drug
use at a young age, while living with his maternal grandmother, as well as
5
that Mejia returned to live with his mother during high school to protect her
from his stepfather.
When defense counsel failed to directly address rule 4.423(b)(3),
the trial court again focused on whether it qualified as a mitigating factor.
The court also noted other possible mitigating factors, including Mejia’s
youth, his drug addiction, the fact that application of an enhancement could
result in a sentence over 20 years, and multiple enhancements were alleged
in a single case. The court then stated it had made the notes it needed to
make “with regard to the criteria that the [c]ourt must consider,” and invited
argument from counsel. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel provided
detailed argument as to the applicability of mitigating and aggravating
factors.
After hearing argument, the trial court stated, “I very carefully
review[ed] everything that has been submitted, including the probation
report, briefs, as well as the law that the [c]ourt is required to apply.” The
court then focused on the seriousness of the crime, including the extreme
injury Mejia caused the victim. The court noted that, although “everyone
makes mistakes, the degree to which . . . Mejia made a mistake” was going to
“cost him severely.” It also stated that the victim experiences the
consequences of Mejia’s actions “every single day,” and described her injuries
as “horrific.”
The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances
applied: “the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great
bodily harm, or other act disclosing [a] high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness” (rule 4.421(a)(1)); Mejia “was armed with or used a weapon
during the crime” (rule 4.421(a)(2)); and he “engaged in violent conduct that
indicates a serious danger to society” (rule 4.421(b)(1)). The court clarified
6
that it was relying only on Mejia’s conduct in the present case, not the
conduct in his other pending cases.
The trial court found the following mitigating circumstances
applied: (1) Mejia had no prior record (rule 4.423(b)(1)); (2) he had
“experienced psychological or physical or childhood trauma, including abuse
and neglect” (rule 4.423(b)(3)); (3) “application of an enhancement could
result in a sentence of over 20 years” (rule 4.423(b)(10); and (4) “multiple
enhancements [were] alleged in a single case” (rule 4.423(b)(11)).
Before pronouncing sentence, the trial court stated it had
considered the required sentencing factors and the general objectives of
sentencing in rule 4.410.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE MIDDLE TERM
Mejia argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the
middle term on count 3 because his childhood trauma and youth triggered a
statutory presumption to impose the lower term under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) (section 1170(b)(6)). He argues the case must be remanded
for resentencing because there was no indication the court was aware of the
statutory presumption in favor of the lower term, and the court did not
expressly state that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances such that the midterm sentence was appropriate.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.3
3 Because we address Mejia’s claim on the merits, we decline to
consider whether the claim is forfeited based on defense counsel’s failure to
object at trial or whether such failure constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel.
7
A. Legal Standard
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), makes
the middle term the presumptive sentence for a determinate term of
imprisonment. (People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1041.) Section
1170, subdivision (b)(2), authorizes an upper term sentence “only when there
are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a
term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying
those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.”
Additionally, section 1170(b)(6) provides that, notwithstanding
section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), “unless the court finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [so] that imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall
order imposition of the lower term” if any of certain enumerated factors “was
a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.”
We review a court’s sentencing choices for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988 (Fredrickson).) A
defendant is entitled to a sentencing decision made in the exercise of
informed discretion, and a court that is unaware of the scope of its discretion
cannot exercise informed discretion. (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416,
424.)
“To prove an abuse of discretion, ‘“[t]he burden is on the party
attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was
irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial
court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives,
and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not
8
be set aside on review.”’ [Citation.] To meet this burden, the defendant must
‘affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing
discretion.’ [Citation.] When ‘the record shows that the trial court proceeded
with sentencing on the erroneous assumption it lacked discretion, remand is
necessary so that the trial court may have the opportunity to exercise its
sentencing discretion at a new sentencing hearing. [Citations.] Defendants
are entitled to “sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed
discretion’ of the sentencing court,” and a court that is unaware of its
discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.’ [Citation.] If
the record is silent, however, the defendant has failed to sustain his burden of
proving error, and we affirm. [Citation.]” (People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th
861, 866-867; see also People v. Ochoa (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 841, 852
[appellate court assumes trial court understood and properly exercised its
sentencing discretion, and error will not be presumed from a silent record];
rule 4.409 [“[U]nless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise,” appellate
court presumes sentencing court considered all relevant factors in the rules].)
The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to show the court
misunderstood its sentencing discretion. (Fredrickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th
at p. 988.)
B. Analysis
Mejia first argues it is unclear whether the trial court was aware
of the low term presumption because the court expressly mentioned his
childhood trauma but did not cite to or make express findings regarding
section 1170(b)(6).
After discussing Mejia’s drug addiction and childhood trauma,
the trial court detailed the seriousness of the crime, the long-term effects
Mejia’s violence had on the victim, and the danger his conduct presented to
9
society. Nothing in the court’s acknowledgement of Mejia’s childhood trauma
and abuse suggests that it misunderstood its obligation to apply section
1170(b)(6), particularly when this acknowledgement was followed by a
recitation of the aggravating factors. (People v. Nielsen (2026) 119
Cal.App.5th 816, 825–826 (Nielsen) [no evidence court was unaware of
section 1170(b)(6) where it noted defendant’s childhood trauma and then
weighed it against seriousness of the crime and other factors].)
As noted, section 1170(b)(6) requires the imposition of the lower
term when certain mitigating circumstances are present “unless the court
finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances.” Consistent with this provision, the trial court expressly
discussed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and decided to
impose a middle-term sentence. The court was diligent in considering the
mitigating factors under rule 4.423. The court considered Mejia’s lack of a
prior criminal record, his childhood trauma, his age of 21 at the time of the
offense, whether the application of an enhancement would result in a
sentence greater than 20 years, and the presence of multiple enhancements.
The trial court sought input from the parties regarding the mitigating factors
it was considering. Just before imposing sentence, the court identified the
mitigating factors it was considering by their subsection number in rule
4.423, citing subsections (b)(1), (3), (10), and (11).4 The court also considered
the nature of the victim’s severe injuries.
4 The trial court did not identify rule 4.423(b)(6), which addresses
whether a defendant was under 26 at the time of the commission of the
crime, as a mitigating factor. However, the record reflects the court was
aware Mejia was 21 at the time of the crime and, given the court’s diligence
10
Under these circumstances, the court was not required to
explicitly address section 1170(b)(6). In People v. Caparrotta (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 874, 905 (Caparrotta), the court stated, “We reject
Caparrotta’s argument because nothing in the record establishes that the
trial court was unaware of its obligations under Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) or that it failed to apply that provision. ‘In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court “knows and applies the
correct statutory and case law.”’ [Citation.] Thus, although the trial court did
not specifically mention . . . section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), it is presumed to
have known of the provision. Moreover, because Caparrotta highlighted . . .
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) in his sentencing memorandum, we presume
that the trial court was aware Caparrotta was seeking to benefit from that
provision.”
Although the trial court did not explicitly mention section
1170(b)(6), the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that the court
misunderstood or was unaware of its sentencing discretion under that
section. The court stated it was aware of Mejia’s childhood trauma and age at
the time of the crimes. The record supports the inference that the court
balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors and considered Mejia’s
childhood trauma and age. After conducting this balancing, the court
determined that the middle term of eight years was the appropriate sentence
for count 3. Although the court did not expressly mention section 1170(b)(6),
it complied with section 1170(b)(6) by implicitly finding that the aggravating
factors outweighed the mitigating factors. Specifically, the court could have
in identifying the applicable mitigating factors, we conclude its failure to
identify this factor was inadvertent.
11
reasonably found that the victim’s “horrific” injuries and Mejia’s use of an
assault weapon outweighed the mitigating factors.
Moreover, the fact Mejia’s sentencing brief did not specifically
reference section 1170(b)(6) does not demonstrate that the court was unaware
of the low term presumption. (See Nielsen, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 827,
fn. 6 [rejecting argument that, because the defendant’s sentencing brief did
not mention section 1170(b)(6), it rendered the trial court record ambiguous].)
Nor do we agree with Mejia that we must remand the case for a
new sentencing hearing because the trial court did not make explicit findings
on the record pursuant to section 1170(b)(6). Recent cases addressing
section 1170(b)(6) have rejected the argument that the trial court is required
to make an express finding that “‘imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice.’” (Caparrotta, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 906, fn. 14; see also Nielsen, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 828.)
Furthermore, where a statute requires a statement of reasons, rule 4.406(a)
requires a judge to “state in simple language the primary factor or factors
that support the exercise of discretion,” but “[t]he statement need not be in
the language of the statute or these rules.” Here, the court considered the
proffered evidence, balanced the mitigating and aggravating factors, and
applied the relevant sentencing laws. Under these circumstances, we cannot
say the court abused its discretion.
II.
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MEJIA’S MOTION
TO DISMISS THE ENHANCEMENTS
Mejia argues the trial court committed reversible error in
denying his request to dismiss the enhancements. He claims the court “found
that at least three of the mitigating circumstances enumerated in section
12
1385[, subdivision ](c)(2) were present,” i.e., childhood trauma, mental illness,
and multiple enhancements were alleged. However, the court “fail[ed] to
properly apply” the factors provided for in section 1385, subdivision (c)
(section 1385(c)), which requires the court to afford great weight to mitigating
circumstances when considering whether to dismiss enhancements. Mejia
further argues the court erred in failing to make an express finding that
dismissing the enhancements would not be in the furtherance of justice. We
conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.5
A. Legal Standard
Section 1385 gives a sentencing court discretion to dismiss or
strike a sentencing enhancement, or strike the additional punishment for the
enhancement, in furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subds. (a), (b), (c)(1).) In
2022, section 1385 was amended to include subdivision (c), which now
provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal
of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385(c)(1).)
Section 1385(c)(2) provides as follows: “In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.” The term “‘[e]ndanger public safety’” is statutorily defined as
5 As with Mejia’s other claim of error, because we address this
claim on the merits, we decline to address forfeiture or ineffective assistance
of counsel.
13
“a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical
injury or other serious danger to others.” (Ibid.)
The requirement in section1385(c)(2) that a sentencing court
“afford great weight” to mitigating circumstances does not create a rebuttable
presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement unless the trial court
finds that dismissal would endanger public safety. (People v. Walker (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033 (Walker).) Rather, absent a finding that dismissal
would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or
dismiss enhancements, but it must assign significant value to the
enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. (Id. at p. 1029.)
Thus, “the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance
will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement, unless the
sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors
that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating
circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice.’” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036.) However, even where
mitigating circumstances are present, the court must engage in a ‘“holistic
balancing’” which gives these mitigating factors “‘increased significance and
importance.’” (Ibid.) And even when mitigating factors are present and given
great weight, they may be offset by “substantial, relevant, and credible
evidence of aggravating factors.” (Ibid.) “‘[T]he ultimate question . . . remains
whether it is in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement.’” (Id. at
p. 1033.)
“Section 1385(c) does not mean that, whenever a listed
mitigating circumstance is present, the trial court must dismiss all
enhancements unless it finds dismissal would endanger public safety. The
California Supreme Court has explained that, even without ‘a finding that
14
dismissal would endanger public safety,’ the trial ‘court retains the discretion
to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value’
to the presence of any listed mitigating circumstances.” (People v. Bravo
(2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157 (Bravo).)
The trial court “is presumed to have considered all of the relevant
factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.” (People v.
Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) When, as here, the record is silent as
to the court’s reasons, we presume that the court “‘correctly applied the law.’”
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378.) “Second, ‘[a]bsent evidence to
the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it.’”
(Bravo, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1157.) We review for abuse of discretion
a lower court’s decision not to strike a sentencing enhancement under section
1385. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) A court abuses its
discretion only when its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.
(Ibid.)
B. Analysis
The trial court expressly considered Mejia’s childhood trauma
and the presence of multiple enhancements. The court also explored whether
the crimes were connected to a mental illness.
First, as to Mejia’s childhood trauma, the trial court addressed
this circumstance with the parties even though the sentencing briefing did
not raise this issue. The record reflects the trial court gave this circumstance
significant value. For example, the court described its view of the childhood
trauma by noting that Mejia had a “strained relationship with his mother as
a result of how he was conceived,” and his mother and stepfather “engaged in
heavy drinking and domestic violence.” The court observed that Mejia
“described living with his maternal grandmother, which exposed him at a
15
young age to gangs and drugs.” Later in the sentencing hearing, the court
stated, “the defendant experienced psychological or physical or childhood
trauma, including abuse and neglect. The [c]ourt does believe that this factor
applies for all of the reasons previously stated by the court.”
Second, the trial court addressed the presence of multiple
enhancements. For counts one and two, the jury returned true findings as to
the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and the personal
use of a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). For count 3, the jury
returned true findings as to the great bodily injury enhancement (§12022.7,
subd. (a)) and personal use of an assault weapon enhancement (§ 12022.5,
subd. (b)). The jury found the enhancements true as to each crime. Based on
these findings, the multiple enhancement circumstance applied under
section 1385(c)(2)(B).
As with the childhood trauma circumstance, the trial court
initiated this discussion. In referring to rule 4.423(b)(11), the court stated, “I
also note neither counsel addressed subdivision (b)(11). Does that section not
apply, multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case.” Both counsel
agreed that this circumstance applied. During the sentencing hearing, the
prosecutor expressed his view that the court should impose both
enhancements because striking the enhancements “would completely devalue
the seriousness of the crime.” The court expressly found that the multiple
enhancements mitigating factor applied under rule 4.423(b)(11).
Third, the trial court considered whether Mejia suffered from a
mental or physical condition under rule 4.423(b)(2). Section 1385(c)(5) states
in part, “a mental illness is a mental disorder as identified in the most recent
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
including, but not limited to, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, schizoaffective
16
disorder, or post-traumatic stress disorder but excluding antisocial
personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and pedophilia.”
The trial court stated, “I believe that there was evidence during
the trial that he was delusional.” It also stated, “I have oftentimes received
reports in other cases of defendants who are addicted to drugs. And the
[Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-Fifth Edition] does diagnose them with a
controlled substance disorder.” After the court heard from the parties on this
issue, it concluded, “While we certainly had a discussion regarding the
[c]ourt’s previous history in other cases whereby there is a [Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual-Third Edition] diagnosis regarding controlled substances,
I’m not going to make any such diagnosis. And I don’t find that this section
applies.”
The testimony from the victim and Mejia’s stepfather supported
the trial court’s conclusion that there was evidence Mejia was delusional at
the time of the crimes. There was no evidence, however, that Mejia had a
“mental disorder” as defined in section 1385(c)(5). Because there was no
expert testimony that diagnosed Mejia with a mental disorder identified in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the court
correctly concluded that it could not make such a diagnosis. Accordingly, the
court did not act capriciously or arbitrarily in finding that Mejia did not have
a mental disorder within the meaning of section 1385(c)(2)(D) and (5).
We also find that the trial court gave significant value to the
childhood trauma and multiple enhancement circumstances as required by
Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at page 1029. The record demonstrates that the
court initiated the discussion regarding these circumstances. The court
discussed these circumstances with the parties and sought their input.
Although the court did not expressly refer to section 1385(c) or expressly
17
state that it had balanced these factors against credible evidence of
countervailing factors, the record supports the inference that the court
conducted the analysis required under Walker. The court heard from the
parties as to applicability of the childhood trauma and multiple enhancement
circumstances. It diligently considered these circumstances and recognized
their importance by initiating the discussion as to these circumstances.
Against the significant value the trial court gave to these
circumstances, it had substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors.
Specifically, the evidence showed that Mejia pointed an assault rifle at the
victim’s head after entering her car. In order to escape, the victim jumped out
of a moving car and suffered injuries that the court described as “horrific.”
The court also considered the victim’s impact statement. Based on these
countervailing factors, the court could reasonably conclude that imposition of
both the great bodily injury and personal use of an assault weapon
enhancements for count 3 was proper.
We recognize the Walker case had just been decided at the time of
sentencing in this case. The record, however, supports the inference that the
court conducted the analysis required by Walker as discussed above.
We also acknowledge the trial court did not expressly refer to
section 1385(c) or expressly conduct the balancing required by Walker. The
court, however, balanced the relevant factors, and the record does not
affirmatively reflect that the court misunderstood its discretion or misapplied
the law. The fact the court did not expressly state on the record that it was
declining to exercise its discretion under section 1385(c)(1) to strike the
enhancements does not require remand. In assessing section 1385, a
sentencing court “‘is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors
in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.”’ (People v. Brugman
18
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.) From our review of the record, we find that
the trial court assigned significant weight to the mitigating factors and then
impliedly found that the countervailing factors outweighed the mitigating
factors.
Consistent with Walker, we note the trial court could have chosen
not to dismiss any of the enhancements without making a public safety
finding. Walker and Bravo, however, affirm the trial court’s discretion to
impose both enhancements in the furtherance of justice as long as the court
assigned significant value to the mitigating circumstances in section
1385(c)(2). Even if the court did not find Mejia posed a threat to public safety,
it could still conclude dismissal of the enhancements was not in furtherance
of justice under Walker.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not fail to properly
apply section 1385(c) when imposing sentence.
III.
CORRECTION OF ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT
On appeal, the Attorney General requests that we correct the
abstract of judgment to reflect that the crime-bail-crime enhancements were
stayed. The abstract of judgment does not include the crime-bail-crime
enhancements, and the court did not address them at sentencing. However,
the minutes from the sentencing hearing state that punishment under
section 12022.1, subdivision (b), was stayed.
“When a trial court’s intention is clear, we ‘need not remand for
resentencing, but can modify the judgment to reflect the intent of the trial
court.’” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 535, 539.) Here, it is clear
the court intended to stay the crime-bail-crime enhancements but failed to
include the stayed enhancements on the abstract of judgment. Accordingly,
19
we modify the judgment to reflect that the crime-bail-crime enhancements
were imposed and stayed.
DISPOSITION
We modify the judgment to reflect the fact that the crime-bail-
crime enhancements were imposed and stayed. The trial court is directed to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the modification and
forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
SCHWARM, J.*
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
MOORE, J.
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
20