Filed 10/30/26 P. v. Mejia CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B348134
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA399060)
ALBERTO MEJIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
Alberto Mejia appeals the denial of his petition for a
Franklin1 proceeding. His appellate counsel filed a brief under
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo) identifying
no issues, and appellant then filed a supplemental letter brief.
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
1 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
1. Shootings
In June 2012, appellant was walking down a sidewalk in
Los Angeles, California when he saw two men he recognized on
the other side of the street. He “mad-dogged” them (that is, he
stared them down). They started to cross the street. They never
made it because appellant stepped into the street, took “a couple
of seconds . . . to get a good aim,” and opened fire. The men were
unarmed and turned to flee. Appellant kept shooting until he ran
out of bullets. He stood over one of the men as the man lay dying
in the street, cursed him for belonging to a rival gang, and
proclaimed that he “would have shot him in the face” “if he had
another round.” Both men died.
Appellant was just a month past his 18th birthday at the
time of the shootings.
2. Conviction and appeal
The People charged appellant with one count of murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) for each victim.3 As to each murder, the People
also alleged that appellant intentionally discharged a firearm
causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and that the murder
benefited a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
The matter proceeded to trial. The trial court instructed
the jury on the crimes of first and second degree murder and on
the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter due to heat
of passion and due to imperfect self-defense.
2 These facts are drawn from our prior opinion. (People v.
Mejia (June 26, 2017, B266554) [nonpub. opn.].)
Appellant’s request for judicial notice of this opinion is
granted.
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The jury convicted appellant of two counts of second degree
murder and found true the firearm enhancement; it did not find
true the gang enhancement.
The trial court sentenced appellant to 80 years to life. For
each murder conviction, the court imposed a sentence of 40 years
to life comprised of a base term of 15 years to life plus the 25-year
minimum for the firearm enhancement.
We affirmed appellant’s convictions on direct appeal, but
remanded the case for the trial court to assess whether appellant
had been given “sufficient opportunity” to present evidence
regarding his “characteristics and circumstances at the time of
the offense.”4 (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.)
3. Remand
The trial court then convened a hearing on March 27, 2018,
at which appellant was present with his counsel. According to
the minute order from that hearing, defense counsel and the
People stipulated to both parties submitting a packet to the
California Department of Corrections (CDCR) for any future
youth offender parole hearing.5 The court noted that it received
defense counsel’s packet, and continued the hearing to April 12,
2018, for receipt of the People’s packet.
4 At the time of appellant’s sentencing section 3051,
governing youth offender parole hearings, only reached persons
who were under 18 when they committed their offenses. The
section was amended while his appeal was pending to include
persons under 23. (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats.
2015, ch. 471, § 1.)
5 We take judicial notice of this minute order, which is not
part of the record on appeal but is included in the physical case
file we received from the county clerk. We received no reporter’s
transcripts for the Franklin proceedings.
3
The minute order from April 12, 2018, states that the case
was forwarded to the judgment clerk with instructions to send
the following items to CDCR for review at appellant’s youth
offender parole hearing: the reporter’s transcript from July 13,
2015, the People’s statement of view, and defense counsel’s
packet. These items are not in the record on appeal.
4. Petition for Franklin hearing filed June 25, 2025
On June 25, 2025, appellant filed a petition requesting a
Franklin proceeding “to make a record of mitigation evidence tied
to his youth.”
The trial court denied appellant’s petition that day, noting
that “Franklin proceedings in this matter were conducted and
concluded on April 12, 2018, with the People’s Statement of View
and Defense counsel’s Franklin packet both forwarded to the
Parole Board for consideration.”
DISCUSSION
After appellant’s appointed counsel filed a Delgadillo brief,
appellant filed a letter brief stating that he was never “made
aware that [his] case had been finalized or that the courts had
appointed counsel to work on [his] Franklin packet.” This is
belied by the minute order dated March 27, 2018, which shows
that appellant was personally present when his counsel
stipulated to the “submission of packet from both parties for
forwarding to [CDCR] for future parole hearings.” The minute
order shows appellant’s packet was submitted that day.
Appellant states in his brief that he had a consultation on
August 29, 2025, regarding his youth offender parole hearing
(scheduled for December 21, 2031), and that at this consultation
the Board of Parole Hearings did not have the documents that
were forwarded to the CDCR. However, nothing in the record
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suggests the Board lacks access to these documents, which the
judgment clerk forwarded to the CDCR on April 12, 2018. (Evid.
Code, § 664 [“It is presumed that official duty has been regularly
performed”]; Fergus v. Songer (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 552, 565
[“ ‘This presumption applies to the duties of clerks of court’ ”];
Smith v. Smith (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 658, 662 [it is presumed
that the minutes of the court are correct].) That the documents
may not have been present at appellant’s consultation regarding
a parole hearing scheduled six years out is insufficient for us to
conclude that the CDCR lacks the Franklin packet altogether.
Trial courts have discretion to conduct Franklin proceedings
efficiently and to deny “further proceedings” if it finds they are
not warranted. (People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141,
152.) Because the record shows appellant had an opportunity to
(and did) place evidence in the record in 2018, when his case was
remanded to the trial court for that purpose, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s denial of his 2025 request for
further proceedings. (See People v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
743, 749 [“the manner and extent of a Franklin [proceeding] is
left to the discretion of the trial court”].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J. CHAVEZ, J. GOORVITCH, J.
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