Filed 9/23/26 P. v. McCracken CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F090097
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CF01659787)
v.
MICHAEL ALAN MCCRACKEN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan B.
Conklin, Judge.
John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Meehan, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant and defendant Michael Alan McCracken (defendant) was charged with
murder with two special circumstances. In 2002, he entered into a negotiated disposition
and pleaded guilty to first degree murder with personal use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon, and also pleaded guilty to separate felony offenses of burglary and unlawfully
taking or driving a vehicle. In entering the plea, defendant admitted that he stabbed and
killed the victim. The court dismissed both special circumstances as part of the plea
agreement. He was sentenced to 25 years to life for first degree murder, plus seven years
eight months for the other offenses and personal use enhancement.
In 2025, the trial court denied defendant’s petition for resentencing filed pursuant
to Penal Code1 section 1172.6, and found he failed to state a prima facie case for relief
because he admitted to being the actual killer at the time he entered his plea.
On appeal from the denial of his section 1172.6 petition, appellate counsel filed a
brief which summarized the facts and procedural history with citations to the record,
raised no issues, and asked this court to independently review the record pursuant to
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216.
In response to this court’s invitation, defendant filed a supplemental letter brief.
We address his contentions and affirm the trial court’s denial of his section 1172.6
petition.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 10, 2000, a complaint was filed in the Fresno County Superior Court
charging defendant with count 1, murder of John Renna on or about August 15, 2000, and
alleged two special circumstances: he committed the murder while engaged in the
commission of a robbery, and also while engaged in the commission of a burglary
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).
1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2.
On May 18, 2001, an amended complaint was filed that again charged appellant
with murder with the same two special circumstances, and further alleged he personally
used a deadly or dangerous weapon, a knife, in the commission of the murder (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)).
On May 31, 2001, the information was filed that again charged appellant with
murder with same two special circumstances and the same personal use enhancement.
Defendant’s Plea and Sentence
On September 9, 2002, appellant entered into a negotiated disposition. On that
date, he signed a “FELONY ADVISEMENT, WAIVER OF RIGHTS, AND PLEA
FORM” (plea form) and initialed each paragraph that stated the following terms for his
guilty pleas.
Defendant pleaded guilty to count 1, murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and admitted the
personal use enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The parties “stipulated [the murder] to
be a [f]elony [m]urder due to underlying [sections] 211/212.5[, subdivision ](a)” robbery.
Defendant also pleaded guilty to a “new” count 2, burglary (§§ 459, 460), and a “new”
count 3, unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851). Defendant did not
admit the special circumstances. The trial court dismissed the remaining allegations,
consisting of both special circumstances.
Defendant’s maximum possible sentence was life in prison plus seven years
eight months, he would be on lifetime parole, and he waived all accumulated time credits
and his right to an appeal.
Defendant also initialed the following paragraph that stated the factual basis for
his plea: “[Defendant and] accomplices burglarized [Renna]’s home to get keys to steal
[Renna]’s car. During later contact between [Renna and defendant], a struggle ensued in
which [Renna] was stabbed & killed by [defendant].”
3.
Defendant initialed the paragraphs that stated he had enough time to discuss the
case and possible defenses with his lawyer; and stated his constitutional rights, and his
understanding and waiver of those rights.
Defendant signed the plea form and declared under penalty of perjury that he read,
understood, and initialed each provision, and everything on the plea form was true and
correct.
Defendant’s attorney signed the paragraph that stated he went over the plea form
with defendant, explained each of his rights, answered all of his questions about the plea,
discussed the facts of the case with defendant, and explained the consequences of his
plea, the elements of the offenses, and the possible defenses, and he concurred in
defendant’s decision to plead guilty.
The trial court signed the paragraph at the end of the plea form that stated it
reviewed the form, questioned defendant about his constitutional rights, and found
defendant had “expressly, knowingly, understandingly and intelligently waived his …
constitutional rights,” and found “defendant’s plea(s) and admission(s) [were] freely and
voluntarily made with an understanding of the nature and consequences thereof, and that
there is a factual basis for the plea(s).”
Thereafter, defendant entered his pleas and admissions, and the trial court
dismissed both special circumstances.
On October 8, 2002, defendant was sentenced to seven years eight months plus
25 years to life consistent with the plea agreement, based on 25 years to life for count 1,
first degree murder, plus one year for the personal use enhancement, the consecutive
upper term of six years for count 2, first degree residential burglary, and a consecutive
eight months (one-third the midterm) for count 3, unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle.2
2 It is clear from the entirety of the record that defendant pleaded to and was
convicted of first degree murder. As stated in the plea form, the trial court dismissed
both special circumstances, and defendant’s maximum possible sentence was 25 years to
4.
SECTION 1172.6 PETITION
On February 13, 2025, defendant, in propria persona, filed a petition in the trial
court for resentencing of his first degree murder conviction pursuant to section 1172.6.
He used a preprinted form where he checked boxes to declare that a complaint,
information, or indictment was filed that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, he was convicted of murder after a plea, and that he could not be
presently convicted of murder after the amendments to sections 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 1989. He requested appointment of counsel.
In addition to the petition, defendant, again acting in propria persona, filed points
and authorities that stated he was 16 years old when he “was assaulted by an older man”
who “became [defendant’s] victim,” and he “stabbed a man who had stabbed him.”
Defendant further alleged he entered into the plea agreement because of alleged
ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct, there was a “gross miscarriage of
justice,” the prosecution failed to turn over evidence favorable to the defense, and his
appeals were “time barred.” Defendant asserted an evidentiary hearing must be held
because he was not the only participant, and there were police reports about more
suspects being involved.3
life plus a determinate term. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced
defendant to 25 years to life, consistent with both the plea agreement, and the term for
first degree murder without a special circumstance. (§§ 189, subd. (a), 190, subd. (a),
190.2, subd. (a); see, e.g., People v. Lopez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1002, 1006 [first degree
murder is “punishable by ‘imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 25 years to
life’ ”].)
3 Also in his points and authorities, defendant discussed several legal principles that
were inapplicable to a plea to first degree murder with personal use of a knife, such as the
elements of attempted murder, purported instructional errors, the “kill zone” theory,
5.
Defendant claimed he was eligible for resentencing because he was not a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to life, based on the factors in People v.
Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522.
Also in support of his petition, defendant attached three pages that were marked as
excerpts from “Attorney’s Briefs.” These excerpts addressed an alleged interview by an
officer with two juvenile females and described them as “the girls found with the
minor/defendant after the alleged homicide and car chase/crash.” Defendant alleged the
prosecution had unreported interviews with both female juveniles, one juvenile may have
given a statement inconsistent with her previous interview, and the prosecution
purportedly failed to disclose these statements to the defense.
The trial court appointed counsel for defendant.
The Prosecution’s Opposition
On April 7, 2025, the prosecution filed opposition to defendant’s petition, and
argued defendant was ineligible for resentencing. Defendant failed to state a prima facie
case under section 1172.6 because he admitted to being the actual killer in the plea form.
As a result of that admission, he was not convicted based on imputed malice and his
conviction was still valid after the amendments to sections 188 and 189.
The Trial Court’s Denial of the Petition
On July 1, 2025, the trial court held the prima facie hearing. Defense counsel
asked the court to review the record of conviction, which included the complaint,
information, and plea form. The prosecutor replied that based on the “change of plea
discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle and into another motor vehicle, and a
purported jury finding on personal use of a firearm.
Defendant raised issues that were irrelevant to a section 1172.6 petition and not
cognizable in this appeal, including that he was entitled to a youthful offender hearing
pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, and he should be resentenced
pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d), regarding juvenile offenders who are sentenced
to life without parole.
6.
form in this case, as well as the record of conviction as a whole, the defendant fails to
make a prima facie case” because he stipulated to the factual basis that “[Renna] was
stabbed and killed by defendant, showing that he’s the actual killer.”
The trial court agreed with the prosecutor and denied defendant’s petition. The
court found the plea form “clearly establishes the defendant was, and admitted to be, the
actual killer in this case.” The court found “beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the
actual killer, that there was no theory of natural and probable consequences relied on in
this case that would allow for relief.”4
On July 2, 2025, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
As explained above, appellate counsel filed a brief with this court pursuant to
Delgadillo. The brief also included counsel’s declaration that appellant was advised he
could file his own brief with this court.
In response to this court’s invitation, appellant filed a supplemental letter brief and
raised several issues.
I. Section 1172.6
We begin with the relevant statutory provisions. In 2018, the Legislature enacted
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) which “altered the
4 On February 13, 2025, when defendant filed, in propria persona, points and
authorities in support of his petition, he asserted the preliminary hearing transcript could
not be relied on to make the prima facie determination.
Less than one month later, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, that the trial court may “rely on unchallenged, relief-foreclosing
facts within a preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox allegations”
in a petition to make the prima facie determination. (Id. at p. 564.)
The trial court conducted defendant’s prima facie hearing after Patton was decided
and could have reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript. The court did not do so,
however, likely because of defendant’s admission to being the actual killer as stated in
the factual basis.
7.
substantive law of murder in two areas. First, with certain exceptions, it narrowed the
application of the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e) to the Penal
Code. [Citation.] Under that provision, ‘A participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if
one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The
person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission
of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448
(Curiel), italics added.)
“Second, Senate Bill 1437 imposed a new requirement that, except in cases of
felony murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought’ to be convicted
of murder. [Citation.] ‘Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.’ [Citation.] One effect of this requirement was to eliminate
liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.)
Senate Bill 1437 also added former section 1170.95, now renumbered as
section 1172.6, which created a procedural mechanism for those convicted under the
former law to seek retroactive relief. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.)
When a petition for resentencing is filed, the trial court shall appoint counsel if
requested by petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) After counsel is appointed and the
parties have had an opportunity to submit briefing, “the court shall hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner
makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue
an order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
8.
In making the prima facie determination, a petitioner is ineligible for resentencing
“as a matter of law if the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no
factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations,” that the petitioner could
still be convicted after the amendments to sections 188 and 189. (People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13–14, italics added.)
While a defendant is not required to admit the truth of specific facts at a plea
hearing, that does not mean a defendant cannot do so. (People v. Fisher (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1022, 1029.) Although “there may be details that a defendant would not
contest because they are not relevant to a plea agreement, that the defendant … killed [the
victim] … is not a detail that people blithely admit simply because the admissions will
have no immediate consequences.” (Ibid.) A defendant would not admit that he is the
actual killer “if he did not believe it to be true.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Ramos (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 460, 463, 466.) A petitioner is not entitled to any relief under
section 1172.6 where the record makes clear that the petitioner was convicted of
first degree murder as the actual killer. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233;
People v. Nino (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 844, 849.)
Analysis
Defendant was charged with murder with the burglary-murder and robbery-murder
special circumstances. He pleaded guilty to first degree murder with the personal use
enhancement, and also pleaded guilty to separate felony charges of burglary and
unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. He did not admit any of the special
circumstances, and the trial court dismissed both special circumstances as part of the plea
agreement.
When defendant entered his plea, defense counsel did not offer a stipulation to a
generic factual basis. Instead, defendant personally initialed the admission that he
“stabbed [and] killed” Renna. The trial court correctly denied defendant’s petition for
failing to state a prima facie case based on the record of conviction. Defendant’s
9.
admission in the plea form that he was the actual killer established as a matter of law that
he was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6.
II. Challenges to Validity of Plea
In his supplemental letter brief, defendant argues he had a valid self-defense claim
to felony murder and he was prevented from raising that defense. Defendant further
argues his plea was coerced and his free will was “overborne” by “government agents”
with threats of being sentenced to the death penalty or life without parole to force him to
accept the plea. (Id. at pp. 6–7.)
Defendant’s challenges to the validity of his plea are not cognizable in this appeal
from the trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. (People v.
Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865; People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942,
947.)
III. The Nature of Defendant’s Pleas and Admission
Throughout his supplemental letter brief, defendant repeatedly asserts that in
entering his pleas, he made “a coercive admission” to both the robbery-murder and
burglary-murder special circumstances, and the matter must be remanded for a hearing so
he can “attack the special circumstance admissions, as coercive.”
Defendant’s claims about the special circumstances are refuted by the record.
When defendant entered into the plea agreement, one of the specific provisions was that
he would plead guilty to murder and admit the personal use enhancement, and admit the
new felony charges of burglary and unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, and the court
would dismiss the remaining allegations—the burglary-murder special circumstance and
the robbery-murder special circumstance.
The plea form stated defendant’s maximum possible sentence was 25 years to life
for first degree murder, plus a determinate term of seven years eight months for the
personal use enhancement and his convictions for the separate felonies of burglary and
unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. If the plea agreement had been for defendant to
10.
admit one or both special circumstances, his maximum possible sentence would have
been either life in prison without the possibility of parole or death. (§ 190.2, subd. (a).)
The record of conviction shows defendant did not admit either of the special
circumstances and the trial court dismissed both special circumstances, consistent with
the plea agreement.
IV. Banks and Clark Factors
Defendant argues his “admissions” to the felony murder “special circumstance[s],”
“standing alone,” did not mean he was ineligible for resentencing, and his section 1172.6
petition should have been evaluated pursuant to the factors addressed in Banks and Clark
as to whether he was a major participant in the underlying felonies who acted with
reckless indifference to life.
As explained above, after the amendments enacted by Senate Bill 1437, a
participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a specified felony in which a
death occurs is liable for murder only if the defendant was the actual killer, defendant
was not the actual killer but acted with the intent to kill, or defendant was “ ‘a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.’ (§ 189, subd. (e).)” (Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 448; People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1, 7.)
Banks and Clark set forth factors to determine “major participant” and “reckless
indifference” for purposes of section 190.2, subdivision (d). (In re Taylor (2019) 34
Cal.App.5th 543, 561.) When “Senate Bill 1437 amended … section 189 to incorporate
major participation and reckless indifference requirements, it codified the understanding
of those requirements elucidated in Banks and Clark.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 710.) “Findings issued by a jury before Banks and Clark [were decided] do
not preclude a defendant from making out a prima facie case for relief under Senate
Bill 1437.” (Ibid.)
11.
Defendant erroneously asserts the Banks and Clark factors must be applied to this
case because he allegedly “admitted” special circumstances at the time of his plea in
2002, prior to the decisions in those cases. As explained above, however, defendant
never admitted any of the special circumstances, and both allegations were dismissed as
part of the plea agreement. While the parties stipulated in the plea form that defendant
was pleading guilty to a felony murder, he specifically entered his guilty plea to
first degree murder based on the factual basis that he was the actual killer.
Defendant did not admit any special circumstances prior to the decisions in Banks
and Clark, and the factors addressed in those opinions are irrelevant to this case.
V. Validity Of A Plea By An Alleged “Infant”
Defendant asserts he was incapable of entering into the plea agreement because he
was 16 years old, “infants cannot contract and their contracts are voidable,” and plea
agreements with minors are “are coercive in nature.”
As previously explained, the validity of defendant’s plea is not cognizable in an
appeal from the denial of his section 1172.6 petition. (People v. Burns, supra, 95
Cal.App.5th 862, 865; People v. Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.)
Moreover, the record refutes defendant’s arguments. The complaint, amended
complaint, and information state defendant was born in 1983. The charging documents
also state the actual date and month of defendant’s birthday. Suffice it to say that, simply
based on the year of his birth, defendant was at least 16 years old when he committed the
offenses on August 15, 2000. Defendant was at least 18 years old and an adult on
September 9, 2002, when he signed the plea form and pleaded guilty to murder with the
personal use enhancement, burglary, and unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. (See,
e.g., People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1032 [summarizing cases
holding age is a bright-line rule and an 18-year-old is an adult].)
In addition, defendant cannot rely on contract law and Civil Code provisions to
argue that plea bargains with minors are void. (Brown v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 229
12.
Cal.App.4th 320, 323.) Such an argument “incorrectly assumes that since civil statutes
govern contracts in general, they must govern plea bargains as well.” (Ibid.) Instead,
plea bargains are governed by the Penal Code and not civil law, so that “principals of
contract law should not be imported wholesale into the plea bargaining process.” (Ibid.;
see, e.g., Breazeale v. Victim Services, Inc. (9th Cir. 2017) 878 F.3d 759, 770.)
When a minor enters into a plea agreement, “[t]he relevant considerations are
whether the plea bargain was ‘freely and voluntarily made’ and whether it has a factual
basis. [Citations.] Since plea bargains are enforced by courts on ‘due process grounds,’
principles of contract law should not be imported wholesale into the plea bargaining
process.” (Brown v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 323.) “A
defendant’s age is one factor among many that may be relevant to the issue of
voluntariness; it is not the sole factor.” (Id. at pp. 323–324, citing In re Uriah R. (1999)
70 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1158 [juvenile waivers generally valid]; In re Charles P. (1982)
134 Cal.App.3d 768, 772 [a minor’s age alone does not prevent waiver of rights].)
Defendant was not a minor when he pleaded guilty and he did not make a timely
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
VI. Alleged “Package-Deal” Plea
Finally, defendant characterizes his plea as an alleged “ ‘[p]ackage-deal’ plea
bargain[].” He argues all such deals are unreasonable and inherently coercive, and he
should be allowed to collaterally attack his alleged coercive plea, and the coerciveness of
the plea bargaining process in general.
Again, the validity of defendant’s plea is not cognizable in this appeal. In any
event, this argument is again refuted by the record. A so-called “package-deal” plea
bargain is one in which “the prosecutor offers a defendant the opportunity to plead guilty
to a lesser charge, and receive a lesser sentence, contingent upon a guilty plea by all
codefendants.” (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 286, disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175–1178.)
13.
Ibarra rejected the argument that a package-deal plea is inherently coercive. (In
re Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 283–284, 286–287.) Ibarra explained that normally a
trial court may properly rely on a validly executed waiver form in determining the
voluntariness of a guilty plea. (Id. at p. 281.) Ibarra further held that “when a defendant
pleads guilty pursuant to a ‘package-deal’ arrangement, the trial court has a duty to
conduct further inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea: although such a bargain is not
per se coercive, it may be so under a totality of the circumstances.” (Id. at pp. 281–282.)
In defendant’s points and authorities filed in propria persona, and in support of his
petition, defendant attached documents that stated two “girls” were found with him after
“the alleged homicide and car chase/crash.”
The factual basis in defendant’s plea form also referred to accomplices, and
partially stated that “[defendant and] accomplices burglarized [Renna]’s home to get keys
to steal [Renna]’s car.”
The entirety of the record, however, shows that defendant was not subject to a
“package deal” plea bargain. The complaint, amended complaint, and information
charged only defendant with murder, and did not charge or even refer to any
codefendants, coconspirators, or accomplices. As already explained, defendant admitted
he stabbed Renna in the plea form. Further, there were no statements in the plea form
that the plea offer to defendant was contingent on any unidentified accomplices or
codefendants accepting their own plea offers.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order of July 1, 2025, denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition
for resentencing, is affirmed.
14.