Filed 10/19/26 P. v. McClure CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065927
v. (Super. Ct. No. 25CF0335)
DAVID HOWARD MCCLURE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael J. Cassidy and Lewis W. Clapp, Judges. Affirmed with directions.
Appellate Defenders and William Paul Melcher, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Servidal, Matthew Mulford and Arlyn
Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop
was denied, David Howard McClure pled guilty to various charges in
exchange for a court-indicated sentence of 12 years in prison. McClure
appeals from the judgment, arguing the trial court erred in denying his
suppression motion. Specifically, he contends there was insufficient evidence
to support the finding a law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion to
conduct the traffic stop because his vehicle’s front windows were illegally
tinted. As discussed below, we conclude substantial evidence support the
court’s finding of reasonable suspicion, and thus, affirm the judgment.
McClure also contends certain fees set forth in the abstract of judgment were
not imposed by the court at sentencing. The Attorney General concedes the
sentencing error. Accordingly, we will strike those fees from the abstract of
judgment and order the court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the
fees actually imposed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
CHARGING DOCUMENTS
On January 18, 2025, the Orange County District Attorney filed a
felony complaint charging McClure with drug possession, possession of
firearm and ammunition by a felon, and resisting arrest.
On May 5, the district attorney filed an amended information
charging McClure and a co-defendant with possession of a controlled
substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1),
possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351,
11378; counts 2 & 4), and transportation of a controlled substance for sale
(Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, subd. (a), 11379, subd. (a); counts 3 & 5.)
McClure separately was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a
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felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 6), unlawful possession of
ammunition by a felon (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 7), and
resisting or obstructing an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); count 8).
The information alleged McClure had a prior felony conviction. It
further alleged as to counts 2 and 3 that the controlled substance exceeded
100 grams by weight. As to counts 1 through 7, it was alleged McClure was
on bail in Orange County Superior Court case numbers 23CF1264 and
23CF3008 when he committed the crimes.
II.
SUPPRESSION MOTION
On April 25, 2025, McClure filed a motion to suppress evidence
pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. He argued that evidence seized
during a traffic stop, including a handgun, ammunition, fentanyl and
methamphetamine, should be suppressed because they were discovered
during an illegal search and seizure.
The district attorney opposed the motion to suppress, arguing
McClure was lawfully detained based on reasonable suspicion that his
vehicle’s windows were illegally tinted.
At the hearing on the suppression motion, Orange County
Sheriff’s Deputy Cristian Godinez testified about the detention. According to
Godinez, at 12:40 am on January 24, 2025, he was conducting a patrol check
at the Tustin Bay Car Wash. The car wash was “well lit.” Godinez “looped
around the parking lot” of the car wash and observed a white Toyota Prius
parked in one of the bays. “[T]here was tint surrounding the entire vehicle.”
He could see both the front and rear passenger windows because “the car
wash bays are pretty large so you can see all sides of the vehicle.”
Additionally, because he had looped around the parking lot, Godinez was on
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“both ends of the car at [some] point.” Godinez observed McClure standing by
the vehicle. Godinez could not see if there were any occupants in the vehicle
because the rolled-up front windows and windshield were tinted. Godinez
described the tinting as “black in color” and “basically dark enough for me to
be unable to see anyone that was inside.”1
Godinez attempted to speak with McClure from his patrol
vehicle, but McClure refused to talk. Godinez then left the parking lot and
parked nearby. After the Toyota Prius exited the car wash, Godinez observed
the vehicle’s front windows were tinted and rolled up. He followed and
initiated a traffic stop because McClure was driving a vehicle with tinted
front windows.
Following argument from counsel, the trial court denied
McClure’s motion to suppress evidence. It found “[t]here is no dispute that
the windows were tinted to the extent that [Godinez] said they were tinted.”
Specifically, the windows “were tinted to the extent that you couldn’t see the
passengers or the driver inside, and [Godinez] made that observation when
he was in the car wash.” It concluded Godinez had sufficient probable cause
to pull over the car based on that observation.
III.
PLEA AND SENTENCE
After his suppression motion was denied, McClure accepted a
plea agreement. On August 19, 2025, he pled guilty as charged in the
amended complaint and admitted the prior felony conviction and the weight
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At the preliminary hearing in this matter, Godinez testified
when he pulled into the car wash parking lot, his patrol vehicle was about 20
feet away from the Toyota Prius and “near” the rear of the vehicle when he
first observed the tinting.
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and on-bail enhancements in exchange for a court-indicated sentence of 12
years and resolution of Orange County Superior Court case numbers
23CF1264 and 23CF3008.
McClure was sentenced to a total of 12 years, consisting of the
low term sentence of three years on count three, plus five years for the weight
enhancement, and four years for the two on-bail enhancements. He received
concurrent low terms on all remaining counts and two-year terms on the
remaining enhancements, which were stayed. Additionally, he received
concurrent low-term sentences in Orange County Superior Court case
numbers 23CF1264 and 23CF3008.
DISCUSSION
I.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
McClure contends the trial court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence obtained as result of Godinez’s warrantless detention
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. “‘The standard of appellate review of a court’s ruling on a
motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the court’s factual
findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In
determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent
judgment.’” (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 719.)
A defendant may move to suppress evidence on the ground that
“[t]he search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.” (Pen. Code,
§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) “‘A detention is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts
that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some
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objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal
activity.’ [Citation.] Ordinary traffic stops are treated as investigatory
detentions for which the officer must be able to articulate specific facts
justifying the suspicion that a crime is being committed.” (People v.
Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299.)
Here, Godinez detained McClure based on his vehicle’s tinted
front windows in violation of Vehicle Code section 26708. “A person shall not
drive any motor vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed,
installed, affixed, or applied upon the windshield or side or rear windows.”
(Veh. Code, § 26708, subd. (a)(1).) Subdivision (a)(2) prohibits driving “any
motor vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed,
or applied in or upon the vehicle that obstructs or reduces the driver’s clear
view through the windshield or side windows.” (Veh. Code, § 26708, subd.
(a)(2).) The statute does not apply to “[s]ide windows that are to the rear of
the driver” or “rear window or windows, if the motor vehicle is equipped with
outside mirrors on both . . . sides of the vehicle.” (Veh. Code, §§ 26708, subd.
(a)(4), 26708, subd. (a)(8).) Additionally, a “clear, colorless, and transparent
material may be installed, affixed, or applied to the windshield, side, or rear
windows of a motor vehicle” if certain conditions are met, such as the
material having a “minimum visible light transmittance of 88 percent.” (Veh.
Code, § 26708, subd. (e).)
In People v. Butler (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 602 (Butler), the
appellate court concluded the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of
reasonable suspicion of illegally tinted windows where the officer who
conducted a traffic stop observed the “side and rear windows were darkened.”
(Id. at p. 604.) The court found “no facts in this record to suggest that [the
officer] had a reasonable suspicion that the windows in the Cadillac were
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made of illegally tinted, rather than legally tinted, safety glass. He observed
the Cadillac from a distance late at night as he drove by the [parked vehicle]
and again as the car sped past him.” (Id. at p. 606.) The court held that
“[w]ithout additional articulable facts suggesting that the tinted glass is
illegal, the detention rests upon the type of speculation which may not
properly support an investigative stop.” (Id. at p. 607.)
In People v. Hanes (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th Supp. 6, the appellate
department of the superior court concluded the additional facts in that case
supported the legality of the detention. These facts included: (1) the officer
had substantial experience in enforcing the particular statute; (2) the vehicle
“passed relatively slowly and directly in front of the officer at a lighted
intersection”; (3) the tinting was “so dark as to appear black and prevent the
officer from seeing the occupants of the front seats”; and (4) “there was no
evidence that the stop in the present case was a pretext.” (Id. at p. 10.) The
Hanes court also noted these facts were similar to those in People v. Niebauer
(1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1278 (Niebauer), where the defendant was convicted,
not merely detained, because he was driving with tinted windows in violation
of Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a). (Niebauer, at pp. 1281–1293.)
In Niebauer, supra, 24 Cal.App.3rd 1278, the appellate court
concluded the arresting officer’s testimony was sufficient to support the
conviction for driving with tinted windows. The officer testified he stopped
Niebauer “because the windows were darker than normal and he could only
see Niebauer’s outline through the [side] window.” (Id., at p. 1292.) After
pulling Niebauer over, the officer stated that “looking through the windows
from where he stood outside the vehicle, his vision was obstructed.” (Id., at p.
1293.) In a footnote, the appellate court distinguished Butler, supra, 202
Cal.App.3d 602 from the instant case, because the officer “testified to
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additional facts giving him reasonable suspicion Niebauer was driving with
illegally tinted window other than merely the bare statement Niebauer’s truck
had tinted windows.” (Niebauer at p. 1293, fn. 10.)
Here, Godinez’s testimony is more akin to that of the officer in
Niebauer, supra, 24 Cal.App.3d 1278, than the officer in Butler, supra, 202
Cal.App.3d 602. Godinez did not merely testify that the front windows were
tinted. He testified he first observed the Toyota Prius had tinted front
windows when it was parked in a bay at the car wash. The car wash was well
lit. He looped around the parking lot and could observe the vehicle from all
sides. The tint was black in color and so dark that he could not see into the
vehicle to determine if there was any occupant. Based on his testimony, we
conclude Godinez had reasonable suspicion that McClure was driving with
illegally tinted front windows when Godinez initiated the traffic stop.
McClure seeks to recast Godinez’s testimony as limited to the
rear windows. He notes that during the preliminary hearing, Godinez
testified he was positioned near the rear of the Toyota Prius and could not
see into the vehicle from that position, i.e., the rear windows were tinted. We
disagree with that characterization of Godinez’s testimony at the suppression
hearing. As noted above, Godinez expressly stated the front windows were
tinted to such an extent that he could not see into the vehicle. Godinez also
testified he could see both the front and rear windows because he looped
about the parking lot and the car wash bays were large and well lit.
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding
that Godinez had reasonable suspicion that McClure was in violation of
Vehicle Code section 26708. The court properly denied the motion to suppress
evidence resulting from the traffic stop.
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II.
ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT
At sentencing, the trial court stated it would impose a $30
criminal conviction fee “as to each case” and a $40 court operations fee “as to
each case.” The abstract of judgment, however, reflects imposition of $600 in
conviction assessment fees and $800 in court operations assessment fees.
McClure contends the court imposed $90 in conviction assessment fees and
$120 in court operations fees, and requests this court exercise our
independent authority to correct the abstract of judgment. The Attorney
General concedes the sentencing error, and concurs in the request to correct
the abstract of judgment.
“In a criminal case, it is the oral pronouncement of sentence that
constitutes the judgment.” (People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303,
1324.) “Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of
judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral
pronouncement controls.” (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380,
385.) “[W]here, as here, the Attorney General [or defendant] identifies an
evident discrepancy between the abstract of judgment and the judgment that
the reporter’s transcript . . . reflect, the appellate court itself should order
the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment.” (People v. Mitchell (2001)
26 Cal.4th 181, 188.) Accordingly, we will order the trial court to correct the
abstract of judgment to reflect the imposition of Government Code section
30373 fees in the amount of $90 and trial court operations assessment fees
pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8 in the amount of $120.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend
the abstract of judgment to reflect the imposition of Government Code section
30373 fees in the amount of $90 and court operations assessment fees
pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8 in the amount of $120. The court is
further directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a
certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR),
and to issue an order directing the CDCR to reimburse McClure any amount
exceeding $210 that he has overpaid due to the clerical error in his abstract
of judgment.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
MOORE, J
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