P. v. Masterson CA2/2

Filed 10/27/26 P. v. Masterson CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B333069

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA487932)
v.

DANIEL PETER
MASTERSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Charlaine F. Olmedo, Judge. Affirmed.
Cliff Gardner and Lazuli Whitt for Defendant and
Appellant.
Schaerr | Jaffe, Gene C. Schaerr, James C. Phillips; Cohen
Williams and Alyssa D. Bell for the Church of Scientology
International as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and
Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Susan
Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and
Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
******
Defendant and appellant Daniel Peter Masterson appeals
his conviction of two counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261,
subd. (a)(2)).1 The jury found true the allegation that defendant
committed the offense against more than one person. Defendant
was sentenced to consecutive terms of 15 years to life on each
count, for a total prison term of 30 years to life.
We affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND
On June 3, 2021, an information charged defendant with
three counts of forcible rape against J.B., N.T., and C.B. and
alleged that he raped more than one person. At defendant’s first
trial in 2022, the jury deadlocked on all counts, and the trial
court declared a mistrial.
At defendant’s second trial in 2023, victims J.B., N.T., C.B.
and witness Kathleen J. each testified that she was raped by
defendant between 2000 and 2003. Defendant, J.B., N.T., and
C.B. were all affiliated with the Church of Scientology at the
time. The victims disclosed the rapes to Scientology ethics
officers, who dissuaded them from reporting defendant to the
police.
J.B. nevertheless reported defendant to the police in 2004,
but the district attorney’s office declined to prosecute. In 2016,
after learning about J.B.’s allegations, C.B. reported defendant to

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated
otherwise.

2
the police. Additional women came forward claiming to have
been raped by defendant, who was charged in 2020 with three
counts of forcible rape with a one-strike allegation that he
committed the offense against more than one victim. The jury in
the 2023 trial convicted defendant of count 1 (against J.B.) and
count 2 (against N.T.), deadlocked on count 3 (against C.B.), and
found true the one strike allegation.
I. J.B.’s testimony
J.B. testified she met defendant in 1997. They were both
Scientologists, shared common friends, and socialized together.
J.B. was also friends with defendant’s assistant, Brie Shaffer,
who was also a Scientologist.
A. 2002 uncharged incident
In September 2002, J.B., defendant, and a group of friends
went to a bar after a film screening. Shaffer agreed to drive J.B.
home that night because J.B. was planning to drink alcohol for
the first time in nine months. Shaffer was running late but
phoned J.B. to say she would be there.
When J.B. joined the group at a table, defendant had a
drink waiting for her. J.B. consumed the drink and got up.
When she returned, another drink was waiting. The second
drink was very strong, and J.B. did not finish it. When she got
up to use the restroom, she felt drunk.
When J.B. returned from the restroom, defendant told her
Shaffer was not coming but J.B. could stay in his guest room that
night. Defendant drove J.B. to his home. When they arrived,
J.B. felt intoxicated and had difficulty ascending the stairs that
led from the street to the front door of defendant’s home. She
said she was surprised she felt so drunk after only two drinks.
Defendant said, “Oh, the second was a triple. Oops.” After they

3
entered the home, defendant gave J.B. a glass of liquid. J.B. did
not know whether it was water or alcohol. J.B. turned toward
the guest room, which was on the first floor of the home, but
defendant pulled her toward the stairs leading to his second floor
bedroom.
In defendant’s bedroom they started kissing. J.B. told
defendant, “This is so stupid. What are we doing?” Defendant
had given J.B. no previous indication that he wanted to be
intimate with her. He had called J.B. his “homie” in the past,
and J.B. never thought they were anything more than friends.
J.B. was on her back on defendant’s bed. She testified, “At some
point, I recall him having intercourse with me. I wasn’t saying
No. I was laughing.”
J.B. fell asleep. When she awoke, she was on her stomach,
and her feet were touching the floor. She felt a sharp stabbing
pain, a burning sensation, and penetration in her anus. J.B.
pulled away, and the stabbing sensation stopped but the pain
continued. She rolled over and eventually fell asleep again.
When she woke up the following day, defendant was gone. J.B.
asked a friend to pick her up. She told the friend she and
defendant had sex but did not mention the anal sex. J.B. felt
“[c]onfused; a little hurt; stunned and really, really ashamed.”
J.B. had pain and a burning sensation in her anus and pain
on her right side. She saw a doctor for the pain on her side but
did not mention the anal penetration.
J.B. told her friends Lisa Presley and Paige Dorian about
the September 2002 sex with defendant. They were shocked and
horrified. Word about the incident spread to the Scientology
community and to defendant’s friends through written
“knowledge reports.” J.B. explained that Scientologists are

4
instructed or trained to file knowledge reports about themselves
or fellow members to inform the organization about a Scientology
member’s bad behavior. J.B. had seen knowledge reports about
her regarding the September 2002 sex incident with defendant.
After the Church of Scientology learned of the
September 2002 incident between J.B. and defendant, it directed
J.B. to undergo counseling “to look for my part in this and why I
had had this happen to me.” J.B. eventually concluded that it
was “the greatest good for the greatest number that I let it go.”
She no longer felt safe being alone with defendant, however, and
saw him less frequently.
B. April 24, 2003 rape
On April 24, 2003, J.B. drove to Shaffer’s house, which
Shaffer shared with Luke Watson and his sister, who were also
Scientologists. J.B. intended to spend the night there because
she had agreed to drive Shaffer to the airport early the following
morning. Later that evening, Shaffer drove J.B. and Watson to a
birthday party at a nearby restaurant. J.B. had dinner at the
restaurant but consumed no alcohol. After dinner, Shaffer
returned home to finish packing, and J.B. left with two other
women to go to a club. One of the women agreed to drive J.B. to
Shaffer’s home at the end of the night. Watson said he would
meet up with J.B. later to give her keys to the house.
The club J.B. and her companions intended to visit was
closed. The group ended up at defendant’s home, where 20 or 30
people had gathered. Watson was also there. J.B. went to an
outdoor patio where she sat talking with Watson. Defendant
came outside and asked J.B., “What are you drinking?” She
responded, “I don’t know, vodka something.” Defendant went
back inside and a short time later handed J.B. a clear tumbler

5
containing red liquid. That drink was the first and only alcoholic
beverage J.B. had that night. Defendant went back inside the
house, and J.B. consumed half the drink, which tasted like fruit
punch. Approximately 30 minutes later, defendant came back
outside wearing swim shorts and said “[J.B.] is going in the
Jacuzzi.” J.B. and Watson both said, “No,” but defendant
grabbed J.B.’s wrist and pulled her out of her chair. Defendant
pulled J.B. through the house, with Watson following saying,
“Oh, come on, man.” When they reached a set of stairs leading to
the backyard Jacuzzi, defendant picked J.B. up and carried her to
the Jacuzzi while she struggled to remove her boots and pants.
Defendant put J.B. on the Jacuzzi ledge and pushed her in.
In the Jacuzzi, J.B. felt dizzy and had difficulty breathing.
She felt like her body was shutting down. When J.B. told Watson
how she felt, he helped her out of the Jacuzzi, wrapped her in a
towel, and set her down on the outdoor tile. Because J.B. could
not sit up, Watson supported her. J.B. felt confused and
nauseated. Her vision was impaired. She heard defendant say to
Watson, “She needs to throw up. I’m going to stick my fingers
down her throat.” J.B. said, “No,” and Watson said, “Let me do it.
It’s better I do it.” Defendant said, “No, I’m just going to take
her. I’m going to take her to the bathroom. I’m going to stick my
fingers down her throat. I’m going to make her throw up.”
Defendant picked up J.B., who protested. Watson
continued to insist he would help. Defendant responded, “Oh, my
god, she’s my homie. I would never. I’m not going to lay a hand
on her.” Defendant then carried J.B. to an upstairs bathroom,
despite there being another bathroom downstairs.
Once upstairs, defendant put J.B. down on the bathroom
floor, held her by the waist and stuck his fingers down her throat.

6
J.B. vomited and slumped down on the floor. Defendant told her,
“You’re disgusting, you’re getting vomit all over your hair. You’re
covered in vomit.” J.B. passed out. When she regained
consciousness, the shower was running and defendant was
dragging her into the shower. She said, “No, no, no. Please leave
me here.” J.B. realized she was naked when defendant began
soaping her breasts. She again lost consciousness. When she
came to, defendant had a towel and picked her up and carried her
through a door. J.B. landed on her back on a bed and again lost
consciousness.
When J.B. regained consciousness, defendant was having
sexual intercourse with her. He was angrily saying, “You’re not
going to fucking tell Lisa. You know what you’re not going
fucking to do? You’re not going to fucking tell anyone. It’s
nobody’s fucking business. You’re not going to tell Paige. You’re
not going to tell Lisa. You like this. This feels good.” J.B.
believed defendant was angry that she had told Presley and
Dorian about the September 2002 incident.
J.B. grabbed a pillow and tried to pushed it between them.
Defendant pushed the pillow back forcefully onto J.B.’s face. She
could not breathe and reached for something to grab onto.
Defendant used one hand to pin J.B.’s hands above her head. He
put his other hand on J.B.’s neck and squeezed until she passed
out. While doing so, defendant continued to sexually penetrate
her.
When J.B. came to, she was on the right side of the bed
near a nightstand with a table lamp. She heard banging on the
door and a man’s voice yelling frantically. Defendant seemed
agitated and alarmed and pulled a gun out of the nightstand
drawer. He did not threaten J.B. with the gun but told her to

7
“shut the fuck up.” Defendant responded to the voice at the door,
dropped the gun back into the drawer, but did not close the
drawer. J.B. reached toward the nightstand trying to grab the
gun, and defendant asked, “What the fuck are you doing?” J.B.
replied, “I’m trying to grab the lamp, I’m trying to find something
to hit you with.” Defendant slammed the drawer shut on J.B.’s
hand. He then got up and told J.B. not to move. J.B. again lost
consciousness.
When J.B. regained consciousness, defendant was gone.
She attempted to leave the room but could not sit up. She rolled
off the bed and crawled into a closet, where she hid. Sometime
later, J.B. heard defendant calling her name. She did not
respond and remained in the closet, where she again passed out.
When J.B. awoke, it was morning. She was cold, naked,
confused, and still in the closet. She crawled out of the closet
past the bed and heard defendant say, “What the fuck are you
doing?” Defendant was on the bed looking down at her. He got
up, put her on the bed, and said, “Go the fuck to sleep.” J.B.
again passed out.
J.B. next heard defendant say, “Hey, wake up. Luke’s
downstairs.” She opened her eyes and thought to herself, “Oh,
my God, what am I doing? How did I get here? What just
happened?” After dressing and going downstairs, J.B. saw
Watson and said, “I need to ask you a question.” Watson
responded, “Nope, no talking. You’re not going to say anything.
You’re going straight to [Scientology’s Celebrity Centre], straight
to the president’s office.” Watson called a taxi for J.B., but J.B.
directed the driver to take her to Shaffer’s house instead. J.B.
retrieved her belongings and drove to her parents’ home, where

8
her father’s birthday party was in progress. Throughout the day
J.B. experienced vaginal pain and gastrointestinal distress.
J.B. and her family flew to Florida that night for a long-
planned family vacation. About 24 to 48 hours after arriving in
Florida, bruises became visible on J.B.’s neck, back, inner thighs,
left arm, and right hand. J.B.’s cousin Rachel Dejneka noticed
the bruises and asked what happened. J.B. told her she had been
at defendant’s home and that “[s]omething really, really bad
happened to me.” J.B. made Rachel promise not to tell anyone.
After J.B. returned from Florida, she reported the April 24,
2003 rape to Julian Swartz, her Scientology ethics officer. J.B.
explained that she was under Swartz’s supervision. When J.B.
told Swartz that defendant raped her, Swartz closed the door to
his office and said, “We don’t say that word.” He retrieved
several Scientology books from a bookshelf, slammed them down
on a table, and asked J.B., “Who did you tell?” Swartz then
directed J.B. to read sections in the books that prohibited her
from reporting defendant to law enforcement. Swartz explained
that doing so would be considered “suppressive for Scientology.”
J.B. reported to Swartz for several days. Swartz directed
her to write several reports, including a knowledge report about
the April 24, 2003 incident with defendant. Swartz rejected
several drafts of J.B.’s reports and instructed her to rewrite them
so they did not portray her as a victim. J.B. explained that being
a victim is “a criminal act in Scientology.” Swartz told J.B. she
could not use the term “rape” in any of her reports. J.B. testified,
“I had to write it from the view that I was completely responsible
for the condition I found myself in … .” Swartz also admonished
J.B. not to mention the presence of a gun in any of her reports.

9
In December 2003, J.B. was summoned to Scientology’s
Celebrity Centre for a “punishment action” for reporting
defendant’s rape. J.B. spent months in an “ethics program”
requiring her to report daily to Swartz for interrogations to
determine what she had done to cause the incident with
defendant.
Swartz led J.B. to believe that the Celebrity Centre would
handle defendant. However, J.B. lost confidence that Scientology
would address defendant’s conduct when she read defendant’s
report of the April 24, 2003 incident. Defendant’s report
confirmed the events described in J.B.’s report but denied it was
rape.
J.B. thereafter received a “non-‘interbulation’ order,” which
was also sent to everyone in her group. The order stated that a
third party investigation had been initiated against J.B. J.B.
described the investigation as similar to a court martial. The
order further stated J.B. would be expelled if there were any
additional reports that she had upset any member of the group.
J.B. explained that being expelled from Scientology meant she
would “lose everything,” including all contact with her parents,
lest they too suffer expulsion.
In April 2004, J.B. made a formal request to the Church of
Scientology for permission to file a civil lawsuit and criminal
charges against defendant. Pursuant to Scientology policy, J.B.
had to send a written request to Scientology’s International
Justice Chief for permission. J.B. received a written response to
her request on April 21, 2004. The response cited a policy on
“Suppressive Acts, Suppression of Scientology and
Scientologists,” which prohibits reporting a member in good
standing to civil authorities. J.B. cried when she learned that

10
defendant was still considered a member in good standing.
Reporting defendant to law enforcement would therefore be
considered a suppressive act violative of Scientology policy and
sanctionable by excommunication.
On June 6, 2004, J.B. reported the rape to the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) at the Hollywood Wilcox Station. She
spoke to the desk officer on duty that day, Alexander Schlegel,
who took notes. J.B. gave Schlegel a redacted copy of her
knowledge report, something written by defendant, and
photographs of her taken in Florida. J.B. told Schlegel about sex
with defendant in September 2002, which she said was
consensual. She admitted having too much to drink that night.
At Schlegel’s request, J.B. provided names of people who could
verify she knew defendant. She gave him Swartz’s name, as well
as Watson’s and a few others.
In July 2004, the Church of Scientology’s internal legal
counsel asked J.B. to sign a nondisclosure agreement. J.B.
signed the agreement because she believed she had no choice.
The agreement refers to defendant as Danny Duncan and
prohibits J.B. from saying his name, anything about him, or
anything about the rape. The agreement provided for a $400,000
payment to J.B.
In late 2001 or early 2002, Shaffer contacted J.B. and asked
her to gain C.B’s trust. J.B. did not know C.B. personally but
understood that she was defendant’s girlfriend. Shaffer told J.B.
that C.B. had accused defendant of rape, but C.B. was lying.
Shaffer wanted J.B. to write a knowledge report so C.B. could be
sanctioned. J.B. refused.
In 2016, C.B. reached out to J.B. through Twitter. Careful
not to violate her nondisclosure agreement, J.B. indirectly

11
suggested to C.B. that the same thing had happened to her. C.B.
told J.B. about N.T., whom J.B. did not know.
LAPD Detectives Esther Myape2 and Villegas interviewed
J.B. on January 26, 2017. That interview was recorded and
played for the jury.
J.B. and N.T. first spoke in the summer of 2017. They did
not discuss the details of what defendant had done to them but
talked about stalking and harassment they were both
experiencing at the time. They also discussed the status of the
ongoing criminal investigation.
In 2019, J.B., C.B., and N.T. sued defendant; Scientology;
and David Miscavige, the leader of the Church of Scientology,
seeking civil damages for harassment and stalking.
II. N.T.’s testimony
N.T. became acquainted with defendant through
Scientology’s Celebrity Centre in 1999 or 2000. In 2003, N.T.
lived with her friend Ilaria Urbinati, who was also defendant’s
friend. One night in 2003, N.T. and Urbinati met defendant and
Watson at a bar. At the bar, defendant stared at N.T. intensely,
making her feel nervous and a little flattered. At defendant’s
request, N.T. gave him her phone number.
A few days later, defendant texted N.T., telling her, “Come
over now. You’re getting in the pool or Jacuzzi. You’re putting
on a bathing suit. And you’re getting—you’re coming over right
now.” N.T. declined but said defendant could take her on a date.
Defendant kept texting, insisting that she come over. N.T. was
confused but thought this might be defendant’s way of flirting.

2 Detective Myape was formerly known as Detective Reyes
and is referred to in the trial transcript as Reyes.

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Urbinati encouraged N.T. to go, telling her, “I know he really
likes you. I’ve never seen him like that with a girl before.” N.T.
was a little excited, nervous, and intrigued. She decided to go.
N.T. suffered from social anxiety. Before she left for defendant’s,
she had two or three sips of vodka to calm her nerves. Urbinati’s
apartment was near defendant’s home, and N.T. walked over.
Defendant greeted N.T. at his front door. No one else was
present in the home. N.T. and defendant sat on a couch in his
living room and talked for a while. Defendant then went into the
kitchen to get her a drink. When he returned, he handed N.T. a
glass of red wine. N.T. was nervous and did not want defendant
to watch her drinking the wine. She tried to make conversation
and asked defendant if he wanted to give her a tour of the house.
Defendant said no and insisted she drink. N.T. had a few sips,
“[n]ot two sips,” but “not ten.”
N.T. and defendant walked around the first floor of the
home and eventually entered the backyard, where there was a
pool and a Jacuzzi. Defendant told N.T., “Take off your clothes
now.” N.T. responded, “What?” She was giggling and said, “I’m
not doing that. I’m not going in the pool.” Defendant insisted,
saying, “Take your clothes off now or I’m going to take them off.
Strip now. You’re getting in the water.” N.T. continued to
refuse, but suddenly everything went black. Approximately 30
minutes had elapsed since N.T. started drinking the wine.
N.T.’s clothing came off and she found herself in the
Jacuzzi, but she had no memory of how that happened. She was
in and out of consciousness and felt very tired. In the Jacuzzi,
defendant kissed N.T., rubbed his fingers over her vagina, and
penetrated her digitally. N.T. kept repeating “No, no, no. I don’t
want—this is too much.” She felt “out of it” and “not present.”

13
Her body felt heavy, and her vision blacked out from time to time.
N.T. had never before experienced these symptoms after
consuming alcohol.
N.T. did not remember getting out of the Jacuzzi, but once
outside, defendant directed her to “[g]o inside and go get up in
the shower now.” N.T.’s next memory was being in the shower
with defendant. He kissed her “really heavily” while she was
against the shower wall. N.T. kept saying, “We cannot have sex.”
“We cannot have intercourse. Do you understand me?”
Defendant ignored her and digitally penetrated her. When
defendant initiated sexual intercourse, N.T. said, “What are you
doing? No. I told you no.” She used two hands in an effort to
push defendant away. N.T.’s vision continued to fail, and her
perception was impaired.
When N.T. exited the shower, defendant directed her to
“[g]o get in my bed.” Defendant kissed her “really heavily” on the
bed. N.T. felt “limp-ish, not fully present and engaged.” She
pleaded with defendant, saying, “[W]e can’t—cannot have sex.
Do you understand me? We can’t have sex. We can’t do that.”
Defendant said, “Yeah, okay,” but ignored her and began digitally
penetrating her again. Defendant then suddenly said, “Okay.
That’s it.” He flipped N.T. over so that she was on her hands and
knees and penetrated her with his penis, “really, really hard.
Like, it hurt.” When defendant penetrated her, N.T. looked
behind her at defendant and said, “I told you we can’t do that.
Oh, my God. What are you doing? I said we can’t do that.” N.T.
found the experience “really painful” and started to vomit in her
mouth. Defendant did not stop, and N.T. said, “Okay. If you’re
not going to listen to me can you just put a condom on?” N.T.
explained that she was not consenting to sex but was simply

14
trying to protect herself from a sexually transmitted disease or
pregnancy. Defendant held N.T. down by the hips, flipped her
onto her back and continued to thrust forcefully into her.
Afterward, N.T. and defendant talked. When asked why
she stayed to talk to defendant, N.T. replied, “I don’t know. I was
just trying to make what happened into something less upsetting.
[¶] … [¶] … A protective mechanism for myself. I didn’t want
to think of it as what it was because this was someone, that I
knew in my circle of friends…. [¶] I’m in this church with him.
If I’m not even allowed, in this church, to have thoughts like that
about other members[,] [i]f I were to think that I was raped, I
would have lost my whole community.”
N.T. explained that before the encounter with defendant,
she was raped by a former boyfriend. The boyfriend was also a
Scientologist, and N.T. reported the rape to the Celebrity
Centre’s chaplain. The chaplain showed N.T. policies prohibiting
her from going to the police or taking legal action against a
member in good standing. Doing so would be a suppressive act,
which could cause N.T. to lose her family and friends.
N.T. admitted calling defendant a few days after the rape
and telling him, “I thought you were going to call me. … I
thought you liked me, and I like you.” Defendant said, “No. I’m
busy. Bye.” N.T. explained that contacting defendant was her
attempt to “recontextualize and reframe this entire incident for
myself so I could survive it.” She thought, “Okay, maybe if he
would ha[ve] done that to me, there must be a reason for it. He
must like me and want to date me.”
After speaking to defendant on the phone, N.T. called her
mother. She did not say that defendant raped her but told her
mother that something “really bad” had happened, that

15
defendant was “really rough,” and that it hurt so much she
vomited in her mouth. N.T.’s mother confirmed that N.T. called
her a few days after the rape. N.T.’s mother testified that N.T.
said defendant “was coming at her from behind, very forcefully,
like a jackhammer and that it hurt and that she asked him to
stop and—but he didn’t. And that she threw up in her mouth.”
A few weeks later, N.T. told her friend Jordan Ladd about
defendant. N.T. did not use the word “rape,” but said, “[h]e was
coming at me like a jackhammer.” Ladd testified that in late
2003 N.T. said she had sex with defendant and begged him to
stop but he would not. Ladd’s impression was that the incident
was “violent in nature.” Ladd recalled that during their
conversation, N.T. was shaking, nervous, stumbling over her
words, and experiencing difficulty breathing. N.T. did not use
the word rape; but when Ladd did, N.T. panicked and begged
Ladd not to tell anyone. Ladd and N.T. did not speak again until
2017 when Ladd saw a headline about the rape allegations. She
texted N.T., who immediately called Ladd and asked, “Why are
you texting me this message?” Ladd responded, “Because I
remember what you told me.” N.T. did not remember having
disclosed the rape to Ladd. At N.T.’s request, Ladd contacted law
enforcement.
N.T. also told her friend and fellow Scientologist Rachel
Smith that she had sex with defendant that was “very, very
forceful and jarring, painful.” Smith testified that in late 2003
N.T. told her defendant had raped her. N.T. did not use the term
“rape,” Smith explained, because that “would be victim mentality,
and that’s unacceptable.” N.T. told Smith defendant was very
demanding about coming over to his home; N.T. found that
intriguing and strange but went; things started happening and

16
N.T. begged defendant not to have sex. Smith recounted that
N.T. said, “‘Please. Let’s not have sex,’ over and over again. And
the next thing she knew, he did it anyway, violently, like a
jackhammer.” Smith said that N.T.’s description of the rape
“really stood out to me. It just stuck with me.” Smith and N.T.
became estranged in late 2003 because Swartz ordered Smith to
stop being friends with her. Smith called N.T. in late 2017 when
she learned N.T. was one of the victims in defendant’s criminal
investigation.
In the fall of 2016, C.B. contacted N.T. via Instagram direct
messaging. C.B.’s message was cryptic and said, “I would like to
talk to you about something that I heard happened to you
happened to me, too.” N.T. and C.B. subsequently spoke by
telephone. They talked about having both been raped by
defendant but did not discuss details. C.B. asked N.T. if she
would speak to law enforcement. N.T. was reluctant to do so,
because it was against Scientology policy, but she eventually
spoke to Detectives Myape and Villegas in January 2017. N.T.
told Detective Myape that maybe defendant had “roofie’d me.”
N.T. also told the district attorney in 2017 that defendant may
have drugged her: “I don’t know for sure that he drugged me. I
can’t prove it, you know. But all of the feelings out of it and
pieces of it that I’m missing. All of that contributes to you
feeling, okay, it probably was?”
III. C.B.’s testimony
C.B. dated and lived with defendant for six years, starting
in 1996. She became a Scientologist and started taking courses
in January 1997. After a year together, defendant became “[v]ery
controlling, insulting, very aggressive sexually.” Defendant was

17
“really rough” and sometimes became physically violent or
abusive if C.B. refused to have sex or angered him.
In December 2001, C.B. had two glasses of wine at dinner
with defendant and did not remember anything until the
following afternoon. She woke up naked in bed and in pain. Her
anus was torn and bleeding. She found defendant, told him she
was in pain, and asked what happened. Defendant laughed and
said he had anal sex with her. C.B. had refused to have anal sex
with defendant in the past. C.B. asked if she was unconscious
during sex, and defendant said “Yeah.” The incident caused C.B.
to end the relationship.
C.B. reported the incident to her Scientology ethics officer,
Miranda Scoggins. Scoggins told her rape could not occur in a
relationship and the term rape should not be used. Scoggins told
C.B. she had “done something to pull it in,” and put C.B. on an
ethics program for two months. Scoggins showed C.B.
Scientology policies that prohibited her from reporting defendant
to law enforcement. One policy stated that reporting a celebrity
to law enforcement would be investigated as a “high crime.”
C.B. left Scientology in 2016 after learning defendant had
raped other women. She found out about J.B. and N.T. through
mutual friends and contacted them to let them know she believed
them. They did not discuss any details of their respective rapes.
C.B. felt responsible for what happened to J.B. and N.T. and filed
a police report. Almost immediately thereafter, C.B. and her
family became subject to harassment and stalking. She is a
plaintiff in a civil lawsuit to stop the harassment.

18
IV. Kathleen J.’s testimony
Kathleen testified as an Evidence Code section 1108
witness.3 Kathleen testified that she worked as an assistant prop
master on a film in Toronto. In July 2000, she attended a wrap
party for the film with her husband and two stepdaughters at the
hotel where they were staying. She did not drink any alcohol.
Around midnight, they went to another party on another floor of
the hotel.
Kathleen sat on a couch while her husband smoked on a
balcony. Defendant sat next to her and gave her a short glass
containing vodka and orange juice, which she drank. Kathleen
had been introduced to defendant, but she did not recognize him
at that time and did not know his last name. Within 15 to 20
minutes after consuming the drink, Kathleen started feeling
lightheaded and nauseated. She said she needed to go to the
restroom, and defendant offered to show her its location.
Kathleen’s memory was impaired from the time she stood
up from the couch. She was unsteady on her feet. She opened a
door but discovered it was a bedroom. She said, “It’s not the
bathroom,” and turned to leave. Defendant guided her into the
bedroom and the next thing she knew, she was on her back on the
bed. She could not get up and could not use her arms or motor
skills. Her mouth felt numb. She tried to speak but could not.
Defendant had forced sexual intercourse with her. Kathleen then
blacked out.
The next thing Kathleen remembered was walking down
the hotel hallway, holding her shoes. It was about 6:15 a.m., and

3 Evidence Code section 1108 “allows, when proper, evidence
of prior uncharged sexual offenses to prove propensity.” (People
v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1160.)

19
she did not know where she was. A door opened, and her
stepdaughter appeared. Kathleen did not say anything although
she felt pain in her vagina and anus. She found her hotel room
and undressed there. There was blood on her underwear and
Kathleen threw them out. Her husband was asleep in bed.
Kathleen got into bed and cried. She did not disclose the rape to
her husband or to anyone else at the time.
Kathleen and her family went home the following morning.
Kathleen felt ashamed. The symptoms she had felt the previous
night were not consistent with the amount of alcohol she had
consumed. She had never before experienced such symptoms.
In December 2000, Kathleen and her husband were
watching a movie when she recognized defendant in the film.
She broke down crying and had a panic attack. Kathleen told her
husband what happened with defendant on the night of the wrap
party. She did not report the rape to police because she thought
it was too late.
In 2021, Kathleen learned that others had accused
defendant of rape. She contacted C.B. Although they did not
share any details, Kathleen said the same thing had happened to
her. C.B. encouraged her to contact law enforcement. Kathleen
reported the rape to the Toronto police and gave a recorded
interview.
Before speaking to the Toronto police, Kathleen was
contacted by a journalist. She told the journalist about the
incident with defendant, and the journalist published an article
on the Internet.4 Kathleen asked the journalist to take the
article down, but he refused.

4 The parties stipulated that Kathleen made certain
statements to the reporter that were inconsistent with her trial

20
V. Expert testimony
A. Expert testimony on rape trauma
Barbara Ziv, a forensic psychiatrist who specializes in
sexual assault, testified that in the majority of cases where a
victim is sexually assaulted by someone the victim knows, the
victim and perpetrator will have subsequent contact with each
other and may even develop a consensual sexual relationship.
Women victims of a known offender often blame themselves,
believing they did something to cause the sexual assault. Most
women prefer to forget about the assault, particularly with a
known perpetrator with whom they have friends or colleagues in
common.
Ziv testified that victims of a known rapist almost always
remain with the offender immediately after the rape instead of
leaving. The victims stay because they are confused, depleted,
intoxicated, or humiliated, or because they hope the perpetrator
will apologize or make things better.
The majority of sexual assaults go unreported. When
victims do report, they often do so in a piecemeal manner.
Trauma affects the victim’s memory because the victim focuses
on critical information. The victim’s memory concerning
important details can be impaired if a date rape drug was used.
These drugs include GHB, an odorless substance that becomes

testimony: (1) She remembered that it was defendant who
chatted her up and offered her a drink; the next thing she
remembered was waking up in a hotel room in terrible pain. (2)
When her husband asked her why she broke down, she could not
tell him, but she did years later. (3) She said defendant and
possibly others had raped her. (4) Gerard Butler invited her and
others to his suite.

21
undetectable in the victim’s system after 30 to 90 minutes. Date
rape drugs also impair the victim’s motor functioning and
judgment.
B. Expert testimony on date rape drugs
Forensic toxicologist Jennifer Ferencz testified that
between 2000 and 2005, the most common date rape drugs
besides alcohol included GHB, Rohypnol, and ketamine. GHB is
odorless and colorless and is easy to mix into a drink undetected.
When ingested in low doses, it causes euphoric and relaxed
feelings. In higher doses, GHB can cause nausea, vomiting, lack
of muscle control, drowsiness, and dizziness. The drug takes
effect within 10 to 20 minutes after ingestion and can remain
effective for six hours.
Rohypnol is a prescription sleep drug. It takes effect within
20 to 30 minutes after being ingested and impairs muscle control.
Amnesia is a side effect of the drug. GHB or Rohypnol taken
together with alcohol causes greater impairment and sedation
than taking either drug alone.
Ferencz opined, based on hypothetical facts that matched
the victims’ experiences, that the victims’ symptoms were
inconsistent with the amount of alcohol they consumed.
C. Expert testimony on Scientology
Claire Headley testified as a Scientology expert. Her
testimony is discussed in part VI of the Discussion.

DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Defendant contends his convictions should be reversed for
the following reasons:
I. The 10-year statute of limitations period prescribed by
former section 803 (now section 801.1, subdivision (b)) barred
defendant’s prosecution for forcible rape.

22
II. Denying defendant’s request for judicial notice of Code
of Civil Procedure section 340.3 violated his federal and state
Constitutional rights to confrontation and due process.
III. Admitting opinion testimony by Detective Myape that
communications among the victims did not contaminate the case
and precluding defendant from cross-examining Myape as to
whether the victims were truthful violated defendant’s right to a
fair trial.
IV. Quashing subpoenas seeking the victims’
communications with each other violated defendant’s state and
federal constitutional rights to a fair trial and to present a
defense.
V. Denying defendant’s request for a continuance and
quashing a subpoena seeking information from Evidence Code
section 1108 witness Kathleen violated defendant’s right to
effective assistance of counsel.
VI. Admitting Scientology evidence for the truth of the
matter violated state and federal law, and the trial court
exhibited hostility toward Scientology.
VII. Excluding defense evidence impeaching the victims’
harassment claims violated defendant’s rights to confrontation
and to present a defense.
VIII. Delay in prosecuting count 1 violated defendant’s
rights to due process and a fair trial.
IX. Precluding defense evidence that J.B. was intoxicated
when she arrived at defendant’s home violated defendant’s state
and federal rights to confrontation and a fair trial.
X. Cumulative errors require reversal of the convictions.
XI. If the count 1 conviction involving J.B. is reversed,
count 2 involving N.T. must also be reversed.

23
DISCUSSION
I. Statute of limitations
We reject defendant’s contention that the 10-year
limitations period under former section 803 (now section 801.1,
subdivision (b))5 barred his prosecution for forcible rape. Section
801.1 is inapplicable where, as here, forcible rape offenses were
committed against more than one victim. Forcible rape offenses
committed against more than one person are not subject to any
statutory limitations period. (§§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c), (e)(4), 799,
subd. (a).)
The applicable limitations period for prosecuting forcible
rape depends on whether there was more than one victim. A 10-
year limitations period applies to forcible rape against a single
victim, and a maximum sentence of eight years may be imposed
for the offense. (§§ 290, subds. (b), (c), 801.1, subd. (b).)6 There is

5 Former section 803 prescribed a 10-year statute of
limitations for forcible rape. Effective January 1, 2005, “a
chaptered statute changed the statutory home of the 10-year
statute of limitations, without substantive textual change, to a
new statute—former section 801.1 (‘Notwithstanding any other
limitation of time described in this chapter, prosecution for a
felony offense described in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2) of
subdivision (a) of [former] Section 290 shall be commenced within
10 years after commission of the offense.’ [Stats. 2004, ch. 368,
§ 1 …])—and deleted the 10-year statute of limitations from
former section 803, subdivision (i)(1) … .” (In re White (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1576, 1580–1581, italics omitted.)
6 The punishment for forcible rape against a single victim is
three, six, or eight years. (§ 264.) Normally, an offense
punishable by a maximum of eight years is subject to a six-year
limitations period. (§ 800.) Convictions for forcible rape,
however, require sex offender registration (§ 290, subds. (b), (c)),

24
no time limitation for prosecuting forcible rape committed
against multiple victims. In such cases an alternate penalty
scheme—section 667.61—imposes a 15-year-to-life sentence.
(§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c)(1), (e)(4).) No limitations period applies
to an offense punishable by life imprisonment. Section 799,
subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “Prosecution for an
offense punishable by death or by imprisonment in the state
prison for life or for life without the possibility of parole … may
be commenced at any time.” Defendant’s prosecution for forcible
rape against multiple victims could be “commenced at any time”
and was not time-barred.
Defendant argues that section 805, subdivision (a), which,
for purposes of determining the applicable statute of limitations,
governs the maximum punishment that may be imposed for an
offense, precludes imposition of a 15-year-to-life term for his
forcible rape convictions. Section 805, subdivision (a) provides:
“For the purpose of determining the applicable limitation of time
pursuant to this chapter: [¶] (a) An offense is deemed
punishable by the maximum punishment prescribed by statute
for the offense, regardless of the punishment actually sought or
imposed. Any enhancement of punishment prescribed by statute
shall be disregarded in determining the maximum punishment
prescribed by statute for an offense.” Defendant contends the 15-
year-to-life term imposed by section 667.61 is an “enhancement of
punishment” that must be disregarded under section 805,
subdivision (a) when determining the maximum punishment
applicable to his offenses for statute of limitations purposes.

and a 10-year statute of limitations applies to such offenses
(§ 801.1, subd. (b) (former § 803)).

25
Defendant further contends eight years is the maximum
punishment he could have received for each offense under section
264; 10 years is the applicable limitations period for prosecuting
those offenses (§ 801.1, subd. (b)); and prosecution for his offenses
is therefore time-barred.
The court in People v. Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 231
(Perez) rejected this argument. The defendant in Perez argued
that his convictions for lewd or lascivious acts on a child by force
or fear under section 288, subdivision (b)(1) were barred by the
six-year limitations period ordinarily applicable to such offenses.7
(Perez, at p. 237.) The trial court ruled that the offenses,
committed against multiple victims, were punishable by life
imprisonment under section 667.61 and could be prosecuted “at
any time” under section 799. On appeal, the defendant in Perez
argued, as does defendant here, that the life sentence imposed
under section 667.61 was an “enhancement of punishment” the
court should have disregarded under section 805. (Perez, at
p. 237.) The appellate court in Perez held that section 667.61
imposed no “enhancement of punishment” within the meaning of
section 805, but rather applied “an alternate penalty scheme
that, when charged, defines the length of imprisonment for the
substantive offense … . Thus, the unlimited timeframe for
prosecution set out in section 799 for an offense ‘punishable by
death or by imprisonment in the state prison for life…’
applies … .” (Perez, at p. 239.)

7 The defendant in Perez argued that, because the maximum
sentence for violation of section 288, subdivision (b)(1) is eight
years, the six-year limitation period prescribed by section 800
applied.

26
The court in Perez cited California Supreme Court
authority distinguishing “sentence enhancements, which merely
add to the substantive offense’s term,” from “alternative
penalties, which provide for a different term of imprisonment for
the substantive offense itself under certain circumstances.”
(Perez, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 238–239, citing People v.
Jones (2009) 47 Cal.4th 566, 576 [life term imposed under
§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4) for shooting at inhabited dwelling for
benefit of street gang an alternate penalty, not a sentence
enhancement] & People v. Brookfield (2009) 47 Cal.4th 583
(Brookfield).) The Perez court concluded that section 667.61 is
such an alternate penalty scheme to which section 805 does not
apply. (Perez, at p. 239.) The Perez court’s reasoning and
conclusion are persuasive and we apply them here.
Defendant’s argument against Perez is unpersuasive.
Defendant contends use of the of word “any” in the phrase “[a]ny
enhancement of punishment” reflects the Legislature’s intent to
include alternate penalty schemes as enhancements of
punishment to be disregarded under section 805. The
Legislature’s intent, expressed in the Law Revision Commission
comments to section 805, contradicts defendant’s position. The
Law Revision Commission comments reflect that under section
805, an “enhancement” is an additional term of imprisonment
added to a “base term”: “Section 805 clarifies the rules applicable
in classifying offenses for the purpose of determining the relevant
statute of limitation under this chapter. [¶] Under subdivision
(a), an offense is classified consistent with its maximum
punishment. … The punishment for an offense is determined
without regard to enhancements over the base term for the
purpose of determining the relevant statute of limitation. See,

27
e.g., §§ 666–668 (enhancement of punishment for habitual
criminals). For the definitions of ‘base term’ and ‘enhancement,’
see Rules of Court[, former rule] 405.” (Cal. Law Revision Com.
com., 50 pt. 1 West’s Ann. Pen. Code (2020 ed.) foll. § 805,
pp. 154–155.)
Former rule 405 of the California Rules of Court (now rule
4.405) defines “base term” as “the determinate prison term
selected from among the three possible terms prescribed by
statute or the determinate prison term prescribed by law if a
range of three possible terms is not prescribed.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, former rule 405(b).)8 “Enhancement” is defined as “an
additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, former rule 405(c).) The alternate penalty
scheme set forth in section 667.61 does not impose an “additional
term of imprisonment” to any “base term.” Rather, it provides for
an indeterminate life sentence. (§ 667.61.) Section 667.61
imposes no “enhancement” of punishment as that term is used in
California Rules of Court, former rule 405 and section 805.
Section 805 is inapplicable and does not preclude imposition of a
15-year-to-life sentence for each of defendant’s forcible rape
offenses.
We reject defendant’s argument that the Law Revision
Commission’s reference to “See, e.g., §§ 666–668 (enhancement of
punishment for habitual criminals)” in its comments following
section 805 reflects the Legislature’s intent that the types of

8 Current California Rules of Court, rule 4.405 defines “‘Base
term’” as “the determinate or indeterminate sentence imposed for
the commission of a crime, not including any enhancements that
carry an additional term of imprisonment.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.405(2).)

28
enhancements to be disregarded under section 805 include all
statutes between and including sections 666 and 668, whether
enacted before or after section 805. The parenthetical language
following “See, e.g., §§ 666–668” clarifies and limits the example
to recidivist enhancements. (See former §§ 666 [prescribing
punishment for petit theft with a prior theft offense], 667
[imposing a five-year enhancement for persons convicted of a
serious offense with a prior serious felony conviction] & 668
[application of foreign convictions as prior convictions].)
Brookfield, supra, 47 Cal.4th 583, on which defendant
relies, does not support his claim that “enhancement” as used in
section 805 includes alternate penalties. Brookfield involved
unique circumstances not present here, arising from the interplay
between two statutes: section 186.22, which imposes increased
punishment for participants in criminal street gangs; and section
12022.53, which imposes sentence enhancements for firearm use
while committing certain felonies. (Brookfield, at pp. 592–593.)
The defendant in Brookfield was convicted of shooting at an
inhabited dwelling (§ 246), a felony ordinarily punishable by
three, five, or seven years. A felony committed to benefit a street
gang, however, is punishable by a sentence enhancement ranging
from two to 10 years (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) or by an alternate
penalty of an indeterminate life term (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)).
(People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 451, 460, fn. 7.) The
defendant in Brookfield was sentenced under section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(4) to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life
because his crime was gang-related. (Brookfield, supra, 47
Cal.4th at pp. 586–587.)
Under section 12022.53, a principal’s personal use of a
firearm while shooting at an inhabited dwelling can result in a

29
sentence enhancement of 10 years (for personal discharge of a
firearm), 20 years (for personal and intentional discharge), or 25
years to life (for personal and intentional discharge causing death
or great bodily injury). (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d).) The
defendant in Brookfield did not personally use a firearm, but his
coperpetrator did. The defendant in Brookfield received a 10-
year section 12022.53 firearm enhancement in addition to the
section 186.22 15-year-to-life sentence.
At issue in Brookfield was whether imposition of both the
life term under section 186.22 and the 10-year enhancement
under section 12022.53 was valid under section 12022.53,
subdivision (e)(2), which provides in part: “An enhancement for
participation in a criminal street gang … shall not be imposed on
a person in addition to an enhancement imposed pursuant to this
subdivision, unless the person personally used or personally
discharged a firearm in the commission of the offense.” The
Supreme Court in Brookfield held that the term “enhancement”
as used in section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(2) “was intended to
refer broadly to any greater term of imprisonment for a crime
that, as here, is committed to benefit a criminal street gang. This
means that, as used in the statute, the word ‘enhancement’
includes not only the sentence enhancements in section 186.22,
but also the alternate penalty provisions in that section.”
(Brookfield, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 593.)
The Supreme Court reasoned that narrowly construing the
term “enhancement” in section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(2) to
mean an “additional term of imprisonment” exclusive of alternate
penalties would “nullify” the distinction drawn by the Legislature
between offenders who personally used and discharged a firearm
while committing a gang-related offense and their accomplices

30
who did not. Under section 12022.53, offenders who personally
used or discharged a firearm in committing a gang-related
offense are subject to both the enhancement provisions of section
12022.53 and the gang-related sentence increases of section
186.22; whereas accomplices to a gang-related offense who did
not personally use or discharge a firearm are subject to additional
punishment under either section 12022.53 or section 186.22, but
not both.
The Supreme Court explained that narrowly construing the
term “enhancement” to mean “‘an additional term of
imprisonment’” would result in this anomalous result: “A
defendant who in a gang-related offense personally used or
discharged a firearm would be punished more harshly than an
accomplice to such an offense in cases in which an increased
sentence is imposed under a sentence enhancement provision of
section 186.22; but when an increased sentence is imposed under
a penalty provision of section 186.22, the perpetrator who
personally used or discharged the gun and the accomplice who
did not do so would receive equally severe penalties.” (Brookfield,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 594.) The court in Brookfield concluded
that “[t]o allow such a result would be inconsistent with the
Legislature’s apparent goal, in section 12022.53’s subdivision (e),
of reserving the most severe sentences for those who personally
used or discharged a firearm in the commission of a gang-related
crime.” (Ibid.)
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court in
Brookfield acknowledged, but did not apply its decisions
construing the term “‘enhancement’” in section 186.22 as
“meaning an additional term of imprisonment,” and
distinguishing it from “a penalty provision [that] is not a

31
sentence enhancement because [it] provides an alternate penalty
rather than an additional punishment.” (Brookfield, supra, 47
Cal.4th at pp. 592–593, citing, e.g., People v. Briceno, supra, 34
Cal.4th at p. 460, fn. 7, Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30
Cal.4th 894, 899 & People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101.)
The Supreme Court reasoned that the Legislature did not have
the benefit of these decisions when it enacted section 12022.53 in
1997. (Brookfield, at p. 593.) Underpinning the court’s reasoning
was its analysis of section 12022.53 and the Legislature’s
“apparent goal” of punishing more severely defendants who
personally used or discharged a firearm during a gang-related
crime. (Brookfield, at p. 594.) The court in Brookfield
emphasized the very narrow and specific nature of its holding:
“Nothing in this opinion should be read as undermining the
validity of the strict distinction this court has drawn in the past
between sentence enhancements and penalty provisions in other
contexts.” (Id. at p. 595.)
Brookfield does not support defendant’s position that “an
enhancement of punishment” as used in section 805 encompasses
a 15-year-to-life term under section 667.61. While it is true that
the Legislature’s enactment of section 805 predates Supreme
Court authority distinguishing between enhancements and
alternate penalties under section 186.22, that latter statute is not
at issue in this case. Unlike Brookfield, construing
“enhancement of punishment” in section 805 to mean “an
additional term of punishment added to the base term” produces
no anomalous consequences and is consistent, not inconsistent,
with the Legislature’s intent. In enacting section 805, the
Legislature clearly intended the term “enhancement” to mean “an
additional term of punishment added to the base term” by

32
incorporating the California Rules of Court definition of that
term in the Law Revision Commission’s comments following
section 805.
This case does not involve the issues presented in
Brookfield regarding the distinction between enhancements and
alternate penalties in section 186.22 and 12022.53. Brookfield is
accordingly distinguishable.
II. Code of Civil Procedure section 340.3
Denial of defendant’s request for judicial notice of Code of
Civil Procedure section 340.3 did not violate his federal or state
constitutional rights to confrontation and due process. The trial
court’s exclusion of evidence concerning the possible effect of
section 340.3 on the victims’ pending civil action did not preclude
defendant from presenting evidence of the victims’ possible
financial motives as a basis for challenging their credibility.
A. Relevant procedural background
Defendant requested judicial notice of Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.39 before trial commenced.10 His counsel
argued that if the jury convicted defendant of rape, Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.3 would enable the victims to file a civil

9 Code of Civil Procedure section 340.3, subdivision (a)
states: “Unless a longer period is prescribed for a specific action,
in any action for damages against a defendant based upon the
defendant’s commission of a felony offense for which the
defendant has been convicted, the time for commencement of the
[civil] action shall be within one year after judgment is
pronounced.”
10 Defendant also requested judicial notice of Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.3 before his 2022 trial. The trial court
denied that request and precluded questions or testimony
concerning that statute.

33
action for damages based on the rapes. The victims’ pending civil
action against defendant sought damages for harassment and
stalking, but not for rape, as that claim was time-barred.
Defense counsel argued that if defendant were convicted, the
victims would likely seek to amend their civil complaint to add a
rape claim. Defense counsel further argued that because
monetary damages for a civil rape claim would likely be more
substantial than a civil harassment claim, the victims had a
strong financial motive to testify in a manner to secure rape
convictions.
The trial court denied the request for judicial notice, ruling
that statements contained in a document “and its proper
interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters
are reasonably disputable.” The court also excluded testimony
and evidence concerning Code of Civil Procedure section 340.3,
concluding that such evidence would be speculative, irrelevant, or
collateral, and would require the jury to “speculate about actions
which have not yet occurred, and to further consider the impact
of a guilty verdict on the defendant.” The trial court permitted
evidence that the victims had a pending civil action for damages
against defendant, Scientology, and Miscavige, alleging claims of
harassment and stalking. The trial court also permitted evidence
of the settlement agreement between defendant and J.B. and the
amount paid to J.B. pursuant to that settlement.
B. Applicable law and standard of review
We review the trial court’s judicial notice ruling for abuse
of discretion. (Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v.
Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 175, 182.)
“A matter ordinarily is subject to judicial notice only if the matter
is reasonably beyond dispute. [Citation.] Although the existence

34
of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of
statements contained in the document and its proper
interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters
are reasonably disputable.” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont
General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113 (Fremont
Indemnity).)
We review the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence for
abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the evidentiary ruling
will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that the trial court
acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a
miscarriage of justice. (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921,
951.) A trial court does not abuse its discretion by excluding
evidence that produces only speculative inferences. (People v.
Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 445 (Nieves).)
A trial court has “wide latitude” to impose reasonable limits
on cross-examination based on concerns such as confusion of the
issues, harassment, prejudice, and interrogation that is repetitive
or only marginally relevant. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475
U.S. 673, 678–679 (Van Arsdall); People v. Jennings (1991) 53
Cal.3d 334, 372.) Although the confrontation clause of the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to test the
credibility of adverse witnesses through cross-examination, that
right is not unlimited. (Van Arsdall, at p. 679.) “[‘T]he
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’”
(Ibid.)
Reviewing a trial court’s ruling limiting the scope of cross-
examination involves a two-step analysis. (People v. Castaneda-
Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1284 (Castaneda-Predo).) In

35
the first step, an appellate court makes a threshold
determination whether the trial court exercised sound discretion
under state law evidentiary standards. (Id. at p. 1282.) Under
Evidence Code section 352, a trial court has discretion to restrict
cross-examination of an adverse witness. (People v. Quartermain
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623–624; see Evid. Code, § 352
[authorizing exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury”].) Such discretionary determinations are
reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.
(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713–714; Castaneda-
Prado, supra, at p. 1284.) A trial court acts within its discretion
if it excludes only “evidence of marginal impeachment value”
(People v Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 545) or performs the
routine evidentiary function of controlling the scope of
permissible cross-examination (Castaneda-Prado, at p. 1282). In
such circumstances, no further analysis is required, and there is
no error under either state law or under the Sixth Amendment.
(Ibid.)
If a trial court effectively renders cross-examination an
exercise in futility, however, a second constitutional analysis is
required. In this second analysis, a reviewing court must
determine whether “[a] reasonable jury might have received a
significantly different impression” of the challenged witness’s
credibility if the proposed cross-examination had been permitted.
(Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680.) “At this stage of the
analysis, courts conduct what is akin to a mini-prejudice inquiry
focused on the witness’s cross-examination rather than the

36
outcome of the trial as a whole, examining whether the defense
had other means of impeachment … .” (Castaneda-Prado, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1282.) “[T]he constitutionally improper
denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias,
like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman
harmless-error analysis.” (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684,
citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) “The
correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential
of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court
might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684.)
Whether a particular confrontation clause violation is harmless
“depends upon a host of factors,” including “the importance of the
witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on
material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise
permitted, and ... the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.”
(Ibid.)
C. No abuse of discretion and no constitutional
error
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
defendant’s request for judicial notice of Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.3. The facts and assumptions underpinning that
request were both unknowable and reasonably disputable:
whether the jury would convict defendant of rape; whether the
victims would subsequently seek to amend their civil complaint
to include a rape claim; whether the court in the victims’ civil
action would allow leave to amend to include a rape claim;
whether the victims would recover any damages in their civil

37
action; and whether the victims would recover substantially more
damages on a civil rape claim compared to their stalking and
harassment claims. (Fremont Indemnity, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th
at p. 113.) These facts and assumptions were incapable of
“immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of
reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).)
Given the speculative inferences the jury would have to make
regarding possible future events, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding evidence concerning Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.3. (Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 445.)
For the same reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by limiting the scope of cross-examination to exclude Code of
Civil Procedure section 340.3. Allowing such inquiry would
require the jury to speculate about possible future outcomes.
Even assuming evidence concerning Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.3 was relevant, it was within the trial
court’s discretion to exclude it if the court determined the
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by
its possible prejudicial effects. (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th
583, 609.) In cases where an accuser has hired a civil attorney
and filed a civil lawsuit, courts have held that limiting cross-
examination on the issue of financial bias is not an abuse of
discretion. (See, e.g., People v. Lee (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 161,
180–181 [precluding cross-examination about assault victim’s
civil action against defendant not an abuse of discretion; fact of
civil lawsuit and civil attorney’s presence at the trial were
presented to the jury].)
People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, on which defendant
relies to support his position, is distinguishable. The court in
that case prevented defense counsel from introducing any

38
evidence that a third party witness had a financial interest in the
defendant’s conviction. (Id. at p. 271.) Here, in contrast,
defendant had ample opportunity and did cross-examine each of
the victims about their pending civil action for damages against
defendant. There was also evidence that J.B. received a $400,000
monetary settlement from defendant in 2004. Based on this
evidence, defense counsel emphasized during closing argument
that the victims had a financial motive to testify against
defendant.
Because we conclude the trial court acted within its
discretion by excluding evidence and cross-examination
concerning Code of Civil Procedure section 340.3, we need not
assess the constitutionality of those evidentiary rulings under the
Sixth Amendment. (Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1282.) Any error, however, was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684.) Defendant’s
counsel cross-examined the victims about their pending civil
action for damages against defendant and J.B.’s previous
$400,000 settlement with defendant. Defense counsel also
challenged the victims’ credibility by cross-examining each of
them extensively about their prior statements to law enforcement
and others that changed over time.
The evidence presented corroborated the material facts and
circumstances of the crimes—defendant provided the victims
with a drink; the victims believed they had been drugged,
impairing their ability to resist defendant’s sexual assaults and
their ability to recall details concerning the assaults; the victims
went in and out of consciousness during the assaults; when
conscious, the victims were aware that defendant was sexually
penetrating them; the victims verbalized their lack of consent to

39
sexual intercourse with defendant; in the aftermath of the
crimes, the victims were confused, in pain, and had only partial
memories of the assaults. The victims’ testimony was
corroborated by evidence that defendant drugged and raped third
party witness Kathleen. Given these circumstances, any error in
limiting cross-examination regarding Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.3 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant’s argument that the jury’s inability to reach a
verdict in his 2022 trial shows that his 2023 trial was a “close
case” as to the victims’ credibility is unpersuasive. “To conclude
that the case is weak merely because a jury, or even two, did not
return a verdict is often an exercise in speculation. [¶] … [¶] …
Juries fail to agree for a variety of reasons and the rules of
evidence prohibit inquiry into the jurors’ subjective reasoning
process.” (In re Richards (2016) 63 Cal.4th 291, 316 (conc. opn. of
Corrigan, J.).) We find equally unpersuasive defendant’s
argument that prolonged jury deliberations in his 2023 trial
indicates the victims’ credibility was at issue. The voluminous
appellate record shows that jurors in this case heard testimony
from multiple victims, detectives, third party witnesses, and
expert witnesses and were presented with extensive documentary
evidence. The jury’s lengthy deliberations “could as easily be
reconciled with the jury’s conscientious performance of its civic
duty, rather than its difficulty in reaching a decision.” (People v.
Walker (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 432, 438–439.)
The trial court’s evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of
discretion and did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights.
III. Detective Myape’s testimony
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing
Detective Esther Myape to opine that the victims’

40
communications with each other did not “contaminate” the case
or by limiting the scope of Myape’s cross-examination to preclude
her from testifying as to the veracity of the victims’ statements.
A. Relevant background
From January 2017 to March 2017 Detective Myape was
the lead officer assigned to investigate the victims’ rape
allegations. Myape interviewed all three victims in early 2017.
The jury viewed a video recording of Myape’s interview of C.B.
and heard an audio recording of Myape’s January 2017 interview
of J.B.
Myape testified on direct examination that she admonished
all three victims not to talk to each other about the case. When
Myape first admonished N.T. in January 2017, N.T. responded
that “she could pretty much talk to anybody she wanted to.”
After Myape explained to N.T. why she should not talk to the
other victims about the case, N.T. said she understood that doing
so could cause cross-contamination in the case. Myape told N.T.
at the time that she did not believe the victims were creating a
problem or contaminating the case by speaking to each other.
The following exchange then occurred:
“[PROSECUTOR:] As you sit here today with the time
you’ve had investigating this case, are you still of the opinion that
these three victims have not contaminated this case based on
talking to one another?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Objection; relevance, lack of
foundation.
“THE COURT: Overruled. But clarify the question. One,
it’s compound and, two, it’s overly broad.

41
“[PROSECUTOR:] As you sit here today, do you still have
the same opinion that you do not believe that they have
contaminated this case?
“THE COURT: Okay. That’s just asking the same
question. Rephrase the question.
“[PROSECUTOR:] As you sit here today, what is your
opinion about what, if any, impact any conversations these
victims had with each other had on this case?
“[MYAPE:] I think that each victim can speak for
themselves. I think that—I don’t think that they colluded or
contaminated each other’s testimony.
“THE COURT: The court will strike the word ‘colluded.’
That calls for speculation. But the latter portion may remain.”
Defense counsel cross-examined Myape as follows:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] You just indicated that you did
not believe that this case has been contaminated in any way
based upon whatever discussions the women had with each other;
is that correct?
“THE COURT: That misstates the testimony. Rephrase
your question.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Is it your opinion that this case
has been contaminated?
“[PROSECUTOR:] Same objection.
“THE COURT: Overruled. [¶] You may answer that.
“[MYAPE:] No.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] And I assume that opinion is
based upon your review of various interviews and reports; is that
correct?
“[MYAPE:] That’s correct.”

42
Defense counsel then asked Myape whether she had
reviewed transcripts of the victims’ statements and testimony
from prior proceedings. Myape stated she had not. This
exchange followed:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Now, would it be accurate to say
that you do not know whether any of the statements made to you
by the Jane Does are truthful?
“[PROSECUTOR:] Objection; it’s overbroad.
“THE COURT: It’s an inappropriate question, so the
objection is sustained.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] You’re trained in how to conduct
interviews; correct?
“THE COURT: You can ask about consistent statements.
You cannot ask about the veracity of statements. Rephrase your
question.”
The trial court then admonished the jury: “And, ladies and
gentlemen, the credibility of any witness is for you and for you
alone to decide. All right?”
Later, out of the presence of the jury, the following
exchange occurred:
“THE COURT: … I just wanted you to understand the
Court’s sustaining. Police officers cannot testify as to whether or
not they believe any witness’s testimony is credible or truthful.
[¶] There is case law on point. Can’t do it, will not allow you. So
any question you intend to ask, do you think this was truthful,
did you think that is truthful, the Court will not allow and I’ll
interpose my objections.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] And I followed the court—can I
just make one comment? [¶] I objected when the detective was
asked for her opinion as to whether or not there was

43
contamination or whatever word was used. I objected. [¶] I
thought that called for an improper opinion because I think what
really is being asked is: do you find these women credible or do
you find there are not inconsistencies or problems coming about
from contamination? [¶] That objection was overruled. I
believe—once that testimony was allowed, I believe it’s
appropriate, then, to explore what that opinion is. And the
opinion is that she finds them credible; hence, no contamination.
“THE COURT: There is a difference between finding there
is contamination and someone being credible. You can believe
that there is no contamination, and you can still believe a witness
is not credible. They are not one in the same thing. [¶] So no, I
disagree with you with regard to that premise, and the court’s
going to limit that. You can explore why she did not believe or
did believe there was contamination. [¶] The court will give you
some leeway with regard to that as long as it’s phrased in a way
that doesn’t ask for the credibility of the witnesses.”
Defense counsel later returned to “follow-up on this issue of
contamination” and asked Myape why she admonishes victims
not to talk to other witnesses or complaining victims about a
case. Myape responded: “Because I’m trying to protect the case,
the investigation. I don’t want them to talk about their—I don’t
want them to talk about the case so they change their own—or
remember it different than, I know, when they first spoke.”
Defense counsel then asked: “In this case, it’s your position
that you did not have a concern about the [victims] having
spoken with each other. Is that fair to say?” Myape responded,
“About the case.” Defense counsel then elicited testimony that
after Myape admonished C.B. not to speak to the other victims
about the case, both N.T. and J.B. independently contacted

44
Myape before Myape had initiated contact with them. J.B.’s and
N.T.’s contact with Myape prompted Myape to warn C.B. that if
she continued to talk, it would be “fatal” to the case. Myape
issued this warning to C.B. because Myape believed the victims
were speaking with each other. Myape gave the same warning to
N.T. and J.B. She also admonished J.B. that the victims’
communications with each other would “contaminate” the case.
Myape told J.B.: “I met with the D.A. on the case already, and
she says it’s fatal to the case if you guys continue to communicate
with each other.”
Myape further testified on cross-examination that in
February and March 2017, each victim requested a copy of her
police report, and Myape gave them one-page summaries rather
than the whole report, because of her concern about
contamination. When defense counsel asked Myape the basis for
her opinion that no contamination in the case had occurred,
Myape responded, “My training and experience and my
conversations with the victims.” Defense counsel clarified that
the “conversations with the victims” on which Myape based her
opinion included only interviews Myape herself had conducted,
and not interviews the victims had given to anyone else.
On redirect, the prosecutor asked Myape whether, based on
her experience, victims interviewed separately at different times
by different investigators recounted the same details in each
interview. Myape responded: “No. Different details can change.
They may remember things differently or maybe they withheld
something the first time we interviewed them because they’re
scared they’re going to be judged or there may be other reasons.
Maybe they just didn’t remember it at that time because they
were nervous. There could be a multitude of reasons.”

45
Defense counsel then followed up on recross-examination
with this line of questioning:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] “Could it be they’re not being
truthful?”
“[PROSECUTOR:] Objection, your honor.
“THE COURT: Overruled.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Could that be one of the reasons?
“A Sure. [¶] … [¶]
“Q And your opinion that inconsistencies may come about
that someone may not be truthful comes from your experience as
a sex detective; correct?
“A Yes.”
B. Applicable law and standard of review
Neither expert nor lay opinion testimony about the veracity
of a person’s statements is admissible (People v. Melton (1988) 44
Cal.3d 713, 744; People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 34, 39–
40) because it “invades the province of the jury as the ultimate
fact finder” (People v. Zambrano (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 228,
240). Such testimony “does not constitute properly founded
character or reputation evidence (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (e)),”
does not “bear on any of the other matters listed by statute as
most commonly affecting credibility (id., § 780, subds. (a)–(k)),”
and “has no ‘tendency in reason’” to prove or disprove the veracity
of the statements (People v. Melton, supra, at p. 744).
Admissibility of expert or lay opinion testimony is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Rowland (1992)
4 Cal.4th 238, 266.)
C. No abuse of discretion
The record discloses no abuse of discretion. The evidence at
issue is Myape’s opinion whether the victims’ communications

46
with each other “contaminated” their statements or recollections
about the crimes. Myape’s testimony on direct examination
contains no opinion concerning the victims’ veracity or credibility.
As the trial court noted in a conference with counsel outside the
presence of the jury, whether a witness’s statements have been
contaminated and whether those statements are credible are
separate and distinct issues.
Admission of Myape’s opinion concerning contamination,
even if improper, would not constitute prejudicial error. (People
v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 745.) During cross-examination,
defense counsel clarified that Myape’s opinion was based solely
on her own interviews with the victims in 2017 and not
interviews or statements the victims subsequently gave to
anyone else. The defense’s theory was that the victims’ accounts
of the crimes changed over time because they were untruthful,
and defense counsel elicited testimony by Myape that
inconsistencies in a witness’s statements could be the result of
untruthfulness.
The victims testified that they understood Myape’s
admonition against speaking to each other about the case and
that they did not discuss the details of defendant’s assaults with
each other. J.B. explained that the victims communicated with
each other to provide emotional support: “[I]t’s called trauma
bonding to the extreme. Like, I don’t know anyone else who
knows what it’s like. What we’re going through, there is nobody
that can understand. There is nobody that understands when
your kids cry. There is nobody that understands when your in-
laws are worried or don’t visit or when your best friend is scared
for you to meet them in public.”

47
Defendant fails to show prejudice as the result of any
purported contamination. Although defendant claims the
victims’ post-2005 communications were “the means by which
their stories were reshaped into a forcible rape scenario,” the
victims’ initial statements—made long before any
communications with each other occurred—described defendant’s
use of force. J.B. told Officer Schlegel in 2004 that defendant
smothered her with a pillow, pinned her hands over her head,
and choked her while raping her. She provided photographs
taken after defendant’s sexual assault that showed bruising on
her neck, arms, wrists, and inner thighs. J.B.’s cousin Dejneka’s
testimony confirmed there were visible bruises on J.B.’s body two
days after the rape. N.T. told her mother within days after
defendant raped her that defendant ignored her pleas to stop and
sexually assaulted her violently, causing her to vomit. N.T.’s
friends Ladd and Smith testified that in 2003 N.T. disclosed that
she had nonconsensual sex with defendant that was “violent in
nature” and “forceful and jarring, painful.”
Finally, the jury was instructed during Myape’s testimony
and again before deliberating pursuant to CALCRIM No. 226
that they alone must judge the credibility or believability of the
witnesses. We assume the jury followed these instructions and
reject defendant’s assertions of prejudicial error. (People v.
Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 879.)
IV. Victim subpoenas
The trial court did not violate defendant’s constitutional
right to a fair trial by quashing subpoenas seeking the victims’
communications about defendant with one another and with
other witnesses.

48
A. Relevant procedural background
Before the trial, defendant sought to subpoena all written
and electronic communications among the victims “referencing
Mr. Masterson” from 2016 to the present.11 Defendant
maintained the communications would show the victims had
colluded with one another before and after speaking to law
enforcement. The prosecution objected, arguing the victims’
communications were not evidence of collusion; and defendant’s
requests were overbroad and lacked specificity.
The trial court had quashed a similar subpoena before
defendant’s 2022 trial.12 The court therefore asked for any new
circumstances or arguments since its ruling quashing the
previous subpoena. Defense counsel responded that Detective
Myape had admonished the victims not to communicate with one
another to avoid contaminating the case; the victims admitted
communicating with each other; and “any mention of Masterson’s

11 Defendant sought from C.B. her communications with J.B.
and N.T.; from J.B., communications with C.B., N.T., and
Dejneka; and from N.T., communications with J.B., C.B., and
four other witnesses.
12 Before the 2022 trial, defendant subpoenaed each of the
three victims seeking between 24 and 27 categories of
information encompassing “all communications in your
possession, custody, or control between you and [the other named
victims] relating to the Masterson accusers, allegations against
Masterson of sexual assault, or any act of harassment, stalking,
hacking, or invasion of privacy allegedly committed by Masterson
or any Church of Scientology.” (Capitalization omitted.) The
prosecution moved to quash. After hearing argument from the
parties, the trial court gave a detailed explanation of its ruling
granting the motion to quash.

49
name post-2016 or circa 2016” was “absolutely relevant” because
any positive, neutral, or innocuous references to defendant in the
victims’ communications could be juxtaposed with their current
accusations to show contamination.
The trial court applied the factors set forth in Facebook,
Inc. v. Superior Court (Touchstone) (2020) 10 Cal.5th 329
(Facebook), which required defendant to “show some cause for
discovery other than the mere desire for the benefit of all
information.” The trial court noted that the requested
communications occurred more than 13 years after the crimes,
and that private communications were protected by state and
federal law. The court further noted that the defense theory of
post-2016 collusion among the victims was undermined by the
victims’ much earlier reports about the alleged rapes to
Scientology and the police. The court found “a strong
governmental interest” in protecting the victims’ private text
messages and written communications.
Applying a balancing test, the trial court noted that
defendant had “an incredibly large amount of materials”
regarding impeachment and alleged collusion, including the
victims’ preliminary hearing testimony, letters, and prior
statements to law enforcement, the district attorney’s office,
Scientology offices, the media, and their pending civil case.
Given the quantity of such material, the trial court concluded it
could not find “that the defense interest in presenting a defense is
violated or inhibited by the non-disclosure of the competing
interest that a third party has in its right to privacy.” The trial
court acknowledged that defendant’s current subpoenas were
narrower in scope and time than his 2022 requests, but explained
that overbreadth and lack of specificity were not the sole bases

50
for the court’s previous ruling quashing the 2022 subpoenas.
Incorporating the findings from its previous ruling, the trial court
again rejected defendant’s requests and granted the prosecution’s
motion to quash.
During deliberations, the jury requested “all social media
correspondence, emails, and texts among the three witnesses, i.e.,
People’s 19.”13 With both the prosecutor’s and defense counsel’s
consent, the trial court responded, “You have all the exhibits that
have been admitted into evidence. Please refer to CALCRIM
number 3550.”
B. Applicable law and standard of review
A defendant in a criminal case may generally issue a
subpoena duces tecum without any showing of good cause;
however, if a motion to quash is filed, the defendant “must at that
point establish good cause to acquire the subpoenaed records …
‘… other than “a mere desire for the benefit of all information.”’”
(Facebook, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 343–344.) When deciding
whether the defendant shall be permitted to obtain discovery of
the requested material, courts must “consider and balance” seven
factors: “(1) Has the defendant carried his burden of showing a
‘“plausible justification”’ for acquiring documents from a third
party … by presenting specific facts demonstrating that the
subpoenaed documents are admissible or might lead to
admissible evidence that will reasonably ‘“assist [the defendant]”’
… [o]r does the subpoena amount to an impermissible ‘“fishing
expedition”’ … ? [¶] (2) Is the sought material adequately

13 Exhibit 19 was marked for identification during C.B.’s
testimony, but the prosecution did not question C.B. about it or
refer to it subsequently. Exhibit 19 was not admitted into
evidence.

51
described and not overly broad? … [¶] (3) Is the material
‘reasonably available to the … entity from which it is sought (and
not readily available to the defendant from other sources)’? … [¶]
(4) Would production of the requested materials violate a third
party’s ‘confidentiality or privacy rights’ or intrude upon ‘any
protected governmental interest’? … [¶] (5) Is defendant’s
request timely? … [¶] (6) Would the ‘time required to produce
the requested information … necessitate an unreasonable delay
of defendant’s trial’? … [¶] (7) Would ‘production of the records
containing the requested information … place an unreasonable
burden on the [third party]’?” (Id. at pp. 345–347, citations and
footnote omitted.)
When a criminal defendant subpoenas records from a
potential witness, protection of the witness’s “‘right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure constitutes a “legitimate
governmental interest”’” and justifies a heightened plausible
justification standard. (Facebook, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 353.)
Although “‘“ordinarily” a criminal defendant may be entitled to
pretrial knowledge where “it appears reasonable that such
knowledge will assist him in preparing his defense,” … the
protection of the witness’s constitutional rights requires that the
“‘plausible justification’ for inspection” … be so substantiated as
to make the seizure constitutionally reasonable.’” (Ibid., citations
omitted; see Pacific Lighting Leasing Co. v. Superior Court (1976)
60 Cal.App.3d 552, 566 [protection of a witness’s “right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure constitutes a ‘legitimate
governmental interest’”]; see also Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10
Cal.3d 812, 822 [requiring discovery of sensitive information
about witness based on a minimal showing “could deter
eyewitnesses from reporting crimes”].)

52
When a criminal subpoena duces tecum is directed to a
victim of the crime, the California Constitution provides
additional protections for the victim’s privacy rights. The
California Constitution, as amended by Marsy’s Law in 2008,
specifically recognizes a crime victim’s right “[t]o prevent the
disclosure of confidential information or records to the defendant”
and to refuse a defendant’s discovery request. (Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 28, subd. (b)(4), (5); see also Facebook, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 355; Kling v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1068, 1080.) In
addition, the California Constitution guarantees a crime victim
the right “[t]o be treated with fairness and respect for his or her
privacy and dignity, to be free from intimidation, harassment,
and abuse ….” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(1); see also
Santos v. Brown (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 398, 418 [Marsy’s Law
“clearly demands a broad interpretation protective of victims’
rights”].)
Absent an apparent relationship between private
communications sought by subpoena and the crime itself, the
plausible justification for a defendant’s discovery request “must
be subject to even closer examination” to ensure the disclosure is
constitutionally reasonable. (Facebook, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
pp. 354–355.) When evaluating the sufficiency of an asserted
plausible justification, a court must “scrutinize[] and assess[]
[the] validity and strength” of “each legal claim that a defendant
advances to justify acquiring and inspecting sought information.”
(Id. at p. 352.)
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash a criminal
subpoena duces tecum is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(Facebook, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 359.)

53
C. No abuse of discretion
The record discloses no abuse of discretion. The trial
court’s detailed and extensive analysis shows that it properly
considered and balanced the seven factors set forth by the
Supreme Court in Facebook, supra, 10 Cal.5th 329.
Defendant’s plausible justification for obtaining the
subpoenaed communications—the victims’ accounts of the crimes
changed over time to “converge on a forcible rape version,”
enabling the prosecution to proceed under section 667.61 and
bypass the statute of limitations—is unsupported by the record.
J.B.’s and N.T.’s 2003 and 2004 statements to law enforcement
and others, made more than a decade before the subpoenaed
communications, described defendant’s use of force to sexually
assault them.
J.B. told Officer Schlegel on June 6, 2004, that defendant
disrobed her, pushed her into the shower, and picked her up and
threw her onto his bed, where she passed out. When J.B. awoke
and found defendant on top of her and sexually penetrating her,
she told him, “No, get off.” J.B. tried to push a pillow in
defendant’s face, but defendant pushed the pillow into her face
instead. J.B. could not breathe and thought she was going to die.
When J.B. continued to resist and reached toward the nightstand
for something with which to hit defendant, defendant pinned
J.B.’s hands above her head and choked her until she passed out.
A couple of days later, on June 8, 2004, J.B. told a Detective
Myers that in April 2003, after consuming a drink defendant
prepared for her, she had difficulty seeing and hearing and felt
like she was blacking out. J.B. said she suspected a date-rape
drug may have been in her drink. J.B. told Myers that defendant

54
carried her to an upstairs bathroom and that she asked him to
put her down.
N.T. told her mother days after defendant’s assault that
defendant, over her express nonconsent, sexually assaulted her so
violently that she vomited. In a 2003 conversation with Smith,
N.T. said she repeatedly told defendant she did not want to have
sex, but he ignored her and did it anyway, violently. Ladd
testified that when N.T. told her in 2003 about the rape, Ladd’s
“impression was that it was violent in nature.” J.B.’s and N.T.’s
accounts of the rapes, made long before they knew each other or
communicated with one another, described defendant’s use of
force.
The evidence defendant cites to support his collusion
argument does not mention the element of force. In a March 17,
2017 recorded telephone call between J.B. and her mother (which
J.B. knew was being recorded), J.B. urges her mother to respond
to someone and says: “… This is much bigger—what happened
to me was a long time ago. You haven’t put two and two
together, but there’s a reason the statute was reopened, and I
can’t help you.” J.B. continues: “Okay. So anyone continuing to
collude or cover is subject to the same terms as he is. Collusion is
how they reopened my case.” While J.B.’s conversation with her
mother refers to “collusion” and reopening of “the statute,” the
statements and the context in which they were made are unclear.
J.B.’s statements do not mention defendant’s use of force, and do
not indicate that J.B. colluded with other victims to include
defendant’s use of force to overcome their resistance.
Defendant cites a text exchange between J.B. and a
Detective Vargas in which Vargas notified J.B. that one of the
victims wanted to drop out of the case. J.B. expressed dismay,

55
indicating she had learned that another victim also wanted to
drop out: “Ugh. I was told she and [redacted] are both out of the
case. [¶] And that means 667.61 is out and therefore statute is
an issue and my case can’t go forward.” J.B. then urged the
detective or the prosecutor to call one of the victims so she would
remain in the case. The context of that text exchange indicates
that J.B.’s concern about the statute of limitations was the
multiple victim requirement of section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4),
which would apply only if another victim remained in the case.
There was no discussion or suggestion regarding use of force.
Defendant also cites an exchange between N.T. and the
prosecutor at the conclusion of a May 17, 2017 interview:
“[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. So—yeah, we’re going to finish
up our interviews, and then hopefully within a short time after
that come up with some kind of a decision on—
“[N.T.:] On what to do?
“[PROSECUTOR:] —What to do. What to do. And it
really is going to come down to—we’re going to take a really
really really close look at everything we have. Plus, the other
thing, too, is there’s a passage of time. [¶] … [¶] … —You know,
the statute of limitations issues that come up—
“[N.T.:] Right.
“[PROSECUTOR:] Depending on certain acts that were
done, and how they were done, and, you know, the fact that we
potentially (UI) …
“(END OF AUDIO)”
The foregoing exchange occurred at the conclusion of N.T.’s
interview, when she had already provided the prosecutor with a
recorded statement of defendant’s assault. The prosecutor
referred to the statute of limitations but did not mention what

56
types of acts would avoid the limitations period or that
defendant’s use of force was a necessary element. The cited
exchange does not support defendant’s assertion of collusion
among the victims to include the use of force.
Defendant contends the victims’ evolving accounts of the
crimes between their initial reports and their trial testimony
indicate contamination or collusion, and precluding discovery of
the victims’ communications denied him the right to a fair trial.
As the trial court noted, defense counsel had ample impeachment
material, including the victims’ initial reports to law enforcement
and others, subsequent recorded statements to law enforcement,
preliminary hearing testimony, and their testimony at the 2022
trial. Defense counsel relied on this information to cross-examine
the victims and other witnesses about changes in the victims’
accounts of the crimes over time as well as their communications
with each other. Defense counsel also emphasized the victims’
changing versions to the jury during closing argument, showing
the jury a timeline of the victims’ statements and highlighting
the changes over time.
People v. Madrigal (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 219, which
defendant cites to support his position, is distinguishable. The
defendant in that case subpoenaed jail calls made by an
incarcerated former codefendant who had been promised leniency
in exchange for her trial testimony. Although no motion to quash
had been filed, the trial court asked the defendant to explain the
materiality of the recordings. Defense counsel explained that the
codefendant’s statements changed substantially after being
promised leniency, and statements made in her jail calls about
the offense could be used to impeach her trial testimony. The
trial court quashed the subpoenas, ruling that the proffered

57
plausible justification amounted to “‘pure speculation.’” (Id. at
p. 256.) The appellate court reversed, noting that no party had
moved to quash the subpoena, there was no indication that
releasing the information “would intrude upon any protected
governmental interest, or violate any right of confidentiality,
privacy, or evidentiary privilege.” (Id. at p. 257.) The court in
Madrigal further noted that the subpoena was sufficiently
specific because it “specified all calls made on one jail’s phones by
one specific person over a specifically defined timeframe.” (Id. at
p. 259.) Because no factors weighed against disclosure, the court
held that the defendant met his burden of showing plausible
justification. (Id. at pp. 257–259, 261.)
Here, in contrast, disclosure of the victims’ communications
impinged upon the victims’ constitutionally protected privacy
rights. (Facebook, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 354–355.) The
subpoena requests were also overbroad. They were not limited to
communications regarding defendant’s use of force but sought all
communications “referencing Mr. Masterson.” The requests
lacked any apparent relationship with the crimes themselves.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motion
to quash. (Id. at p. 359.)
V. Kathleen J.
The trial court did not violate defendant’s right to effective
assistance of counsel by denying his request for a continuance or
by quashing a subpoena to Evidence Code section 1108 witness
Kathleen.
A. Relevant proceedings below
On March 6, 2023, the prosecution provided written notice
that it intended to call Kathleen as a witness pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1108. Defendant moved on March 17,

58
2023, to exclude the testimony. At a March 27, 2023 hearing,
defense counsel explained that in September 2022, the
prosecution provided defendant with a summary report of
Kathleen’s statement to the Toronto Police Department. At
defendant’s request, the prosecution then obtained and provided
defense counsel with recorded police interviews of Kathleen, her
former husband, and a friend of Kathleen’s. Defense counsel
described the recordings as “a treasure trove of information” with
“very fertile ground for impeachment.” Defendant moved for a
continuance to prepare for Kathleen’s testimony and possibly
subpoena Kathleen’s stepdaughter.
The trial court granted defendant’s request for a
continuance from April 11 to April 17, 2023, but found no good
cause to continue the trial beyond that date. The trial court
noted that counsel had known about Kathleen’s general
testimony for more than a year, and witness testimony would
likely not begin until a week after the trial commenced—more
than a month after defense counsel received notice that Kathleen
would testify. The trial court found that defendant had actual
notice and adequate time to prepare after receiving formal
written notice in early March 2023.
On March 28, 2023, defense counsel requested a
continuance to August 14, 2023, arguing that the trial court’s
rulings “drastically and dramatically changed the scope of
admissible evidence.” On March 30, 2023, the trial court heard
further argument on defendant’s continuance request and denied
it. The trial court explained why its rulings did not dramatically
change the case. The court then noted that counsel had sufficient
notice and ample time to attempt to obtain records from Canada,
multiple attorneys were working on defendant’s case, and the

59
court had heard only about lead counsel’s need for more time to
prepare. The trial court further noted that the case had been
filed in June 2020, nearly three years prior, and the defense had
been granted multiple continuances.
On April 5, 2023, defendant submitted a subpoena to the
court seeking from Kathleen “all communications relating to
Mr. Masterson for sexual assault or any discussion of court
process and preparation for court.” The prosecution argued the
request was overbroad and sought privileged information.
Defense counsel provided reasons for the request in camera.
The trial court expressed concern that it lacked jurisdiction
to issue a subpoena duces tecum to a person residing outside the
United States. The court nevertheless proceeded to apply and
balance the factors set forth in Facebook, supra, 10 Cal.5th 329
for determining whether defendant sustained his burden of
showing “plausible justification” for the requested information.
The trial court found that although defendant’s in camera
showing provided plausible justification that the requested
information could reasonably assist the defense or lead to
admissible evidence, the subpoena was overbroad and not
adequately described. The trial court further found that
Kathleen’s privacy interests weighed against the subpoena,
which was unduly burdensome, untimely, and would cause
unreasonable delay. The trial court quashed the subpoena to
Kathleen but signed a subpoena for information possessed by
Canadian law enforcement authorities.
B. Applicable law and standard of review
1. Continuance
A trial court retains wide discretion in the management of
its own calendar. (People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 1003

60
(Beeler), abrogated on another ground as stated in People v.
Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 462.) The decision whether to
grant a continuance accordingly rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court. (Beeler, supra, at p. 1003.) When a trial court
denies a defense motion to continue, the defendant bears the
burden of demonstrating that the court abused its discretion.
(Ibid.)
A reviewing court should not reverse an order denying a
continuance unless the defendant establishes that he was
actually prejudiced. (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 972–
973 (Zapien); see People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 840
(Samayoa).) “‘[I]t is not every denial of a request for more time
that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence
or is compelled to defend without counsel.’” (People v. Jenkins
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1039 (Jenkins).)
2. Subpoena
As discussed previously in part IV.B. of the Discussion, a
defendant in a criminal case seeking to overcome a motion to
quash a subpoena duces tecum must “establish good cause to
acquire the subpoenaed records … ‘… other than “a mere desire
for the benefit of all information.”’” (Facebook, supra, 10 Cal.5th
at pp. 343–344.) When deciding whether a defendant in a
criminal case shall be permitted to obtain discovery of material
from a witness, a court must “consider and balance” seven factors
delineated by the Supreme Court in Facebook, supra, 10 Cal.5th
329.14

14 As discussed in part IV.B. of the Discussion, the seven
factors are whether (1) the defendant presented specific facts
showing the requested documents are admissible or might lead to
admissible evidence that will reasonably assist the defendant; (2)

61
We review the trial court’s ruling quashing the subpoena
duces tecum on Kathleen for abuse of discretion. (Facebook,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 359.)
C. No abuse of discretion and no denial of effective
assistance
Defendant failed to make an adequate showing of good
cause for his request for a further continuance. As the trial court
observed, defendant received formal notice that Kathleen would
testify as an Evidence Code section 1108 witness in early March
2023. Defense counsel admitted receiving a summary report of
Kathleen’s statements to the Toronto Police Department as early
as September 2022 and obtaining recorded interviews of
Kathleen, her former husband, and another witness shortly
thereafter. Defense counsel described the recorded interviews as
a “treasure trove of information” for impeachment purposes.
Defendant provides no specific explanation for defense
counsel’s inability to prepare for Kathleen’s testimony during the
two-month period between formal notice and the time that
Kathleen testified. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial
court in denying the request for a further three-month
continuance. (See Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1003.)

the information sought is adequately described and not
overbroad; (3) the material is reasonably available to the person
from whom it is sought and not reasonably available to the
defendant; (4) production of the materials would violate a third
party’s confidentiality or privacy rights or intrude upon a
protected governmental interest; (5) the request is timely; (6) the
time required to produce the materials would necessitate an
unreasonable delay of the trial; and (7) production of the
materials would unreasonably burden the third party. (Facebook,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 345–347.)

62
Defendant also fails to demonstrate prejudice from the trial
court’s denial of the requested continuance. Defendant does not
identify any particular meritorious defense strategies or
evidentiary objections that could have been pursued, but were
not, as a result of the denial of the continuance. He merely
suggests some undefined prejudice should be “presumed,” which
is inconsistent with binding precedent requiring that appellant
show actual prejudice. (See Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 972–
973 [finding no prejudice from denial of a continuance, where
there was no reasonable basis to conclude from the appellant’s
showing this denial led to a less favorable result for the
defendant]; see Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 840; see also
Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1039.)
Defendant fails to demonstrate that denial of his
continuance request resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel
at the trial. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must show his counsel’s performance fell below
prevailing professional norms; and, more importantly, a showing
by defendant of prejudice, i .e., there is a reasonable probability
that there would have been a better result had counsel performed
competently. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
694.) A reasonable probability is a probability that undermines
confidence in the outcome. (Ibid.) As discussed, defendant fails
to demonstrate any specific prejudice from the actions or
inactions of his trial attorney. He has not shown that any
meritorious defense was foregone or that meritorious objections
were not made, so that a reasonable possibility would exist of a
different outcome had his attorney been better prepared.
Because we cannot presume prejudice, we reject this contention.
(Ibid.)

63
Defendant fails to establish any abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s ruling quashing the subpoena duces tecum on
Kathleen. The record shows that the court applied and balanced
the factors set forth in Facebook, supra, 10 Cal.5th 329. The
court found, based on defendant’s in camera showing, that the
information sought could reasonably assist in preparing his
defense or lead to admissible evidence and that the information
sought was not reasonably available from another source. The
trial court further found, however, that the other Facebook
factors weighed against issuance of the subpoena—the request
for all communications “between you and any other person
relating to [defendant]” was overly broad; production of the
requested materials violated Kathleen’s privacy rights and
intruded on a protected governmental interest; the request was
untimely, as the defense had known of Kathleen’s potential
testimony since September 2022 and the subpoena request was
not made until April 5, 2023; and the time required to produce
the requested information would unreasonably delay the trial.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by quashing the
subpoena duces tecum to Kathleen.
VI. Scientology evidence
Admission of Scientology evidence did not violate the First
Amendment and was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
A. Relevant background
Before trial, the prosecution moved to permit Headley to
testify as an expert on two subjects: “1) Scientology’s teachings
that a person in a relationship cannot be raped/that
Scientologists cannot use the word ‘rape,’ and 2) Scientology’s
teachings forbidding Scientologists from going to law enforcement
to report another member.” The prosecution argued the victims’

64
Scientology beliefs caused them to delay reporting the crimes to
law enforcement, and expert testimony would discuss those
Scientology tenets as a basis for the victims’ beliefs. Defense
counsel expressed concern that such expert testimony might go
beyond simply supporting credibility.
The trial court responded by suggesting the evidence could
be relevant not only to show the victims’ state of mind, but also
“as a principle to which the parties involved chose to live their
lives[.] [¶] … [¶] … What if it is admissible for the truth of the
matter asserted to show why the victims did or didn’t do certain
actions?” Defense counsel argued that admitting Scientology
evidence for that purpose would require the jury to “interpret
religious text” in violation of the First Amendment.
1. Trial court ruling
The trial court ruled that defendant lacked standing to
assert a First Amendment violation on behalf of Scientology; but
even if he had standing, admission of Scientology evidence would
not violate the First Amendment, the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine, or Evidence Code section 789. The trial court found the
Scientology evidence relevant to provide context for the victims’
delayed reporting of the crimes and to understand the victims’
meetings and relationships with defendant; defendant’s actions
toward the victims; the victims’ actions before, during, and after
the incidents; the victims’ initial acceptance of defendant’s
behavior and the families’ subsequent reactions. The trial court
ruled Scientology evidence, including definitions and
explanations of Scientology terms and positions within the
organization, admissible for the following purposes:
“a. To explain the victims’ delay in reporting the charged
crimes including reports made to individuals within the

65
Scientology organization and their response to those claims
including any correspondence and/or documents;
“b. To explain the victims’ belief that Scientology prohibits
them from reporting crimes committed by other Scientologists in
good standing to outside (non-Scientologists) law enforcement.
This includes the belief that Scientologists hold disdain for
outside law enforcement and the secular court systems;
“c. To explain the victims’ fear of retaliation, fear of being
declared a suppressive person and fear of harassment
experienced after reporting the charged crimes to outside law
enforcement;
“d. To explain the victims’ actions before, during and after
the charged incidents and relevant to the charged incidents;
“e. To explain all witness’ (prosecution and defense) ties to
the Scientology organization, past and present, in order to
understand the nature and context of the relationships between
the individuals testifying before the jury;
“f. To explain the discrepancy between J[.]B.’s first
statement as written under the direction of and supervision by
Scientology officials and J[.]B.’s later statements made free from
any direct and immediate Scientology influence; and
“g. Expert testimony regarding Scientology relevant to the
above listed categories and as further set forth later in this
Order.”
The trial court permitted Headley to testify as an expert
“on the subjects of 1) Scientology teachings that a person in an
intimate relationship cannot be raped; 2) that Scientologists
cannot use the word rape and 3) that Scientologists are
prohibited or discouraged from reporting other Scientologists in
good standing to outside law enforcement or face repercussions

66
for doing so; and 4) the purpose and meaning of conversations
with, statements to, and correspondence between the victims and
Scientology officials regarding the charged incidents.” The trial
court ruled that questions about Headley’s “qualifications and
bias go to the weight, not the admissibility of the proffered
testimony.”
2. Scientology evidence
Headley testified she was “born” into Scientology and
worked in several positions within Scientology until she left in
2005 at age 30. She described Scientology as “an applied
philosophy that members apply to all aspects of their life, every
aspect, relationships, work, friends and so forth.” Headley also
described Scientology’s organizational structure.
Headley testified that Scientology members who became
aware of transgressions by another member would prepare a
written knowledge report and submit it to an ethics officer.
Headley further testified that in a case involving a crime such as
rape, Scientology had implemented a code to exclude or remove
from written reports “terms of a sensitive nature” such as rape
and sexual assault. Headley stated Scientologists believe that
transgressions by another member will be handled within
Scientology and that it is “a known policy you do not call the
police.” A report to law enforcement is considered a “high crime,”
and under Scientology doctrine is known as a “suppressive act.”
Headley explained that a member who commits a suppressive act
is labeled a “suppressive person” and is no longer in good
standing as a Scientologist. A suppressive person loses all
connection to family members and friends who are also
Scientologists and can be expelled from Scientology altogether. A
suppressive person who speaks negatively about Scientology is

67
deemed “an enemy of Scientology,” subject to Scientology “fair
game” policies intended “to discredit, destroy utterly and
undermine that person to result in silencing them so they do not
speak negatively about Scientology anymore.”
J.B. and N.T. both testified that Scientology tenets
prohibited them from reporting defendant to the police, a police
report would constitute a suppressive act, and Scientology policy
required them to use Scientology’s internal justice system
instead. J.B. testified that on pain of expulsion from Scientology,
family members who are Scientologists must dissociate from any
family member labeled as a suppressive person.
Former Scientology member Smith testified she was “born
and raised in” Scientology but left in 2006. She testified under
significant fear of retaliation from Scientologists and Scientology,
stating: “I know fair game is real. I know people who have been
fair gamed, and I’m really scared of it.” Smith said that in 2003
and 2004 defendant was viewed in the Scientology community as
“an opinion leader” and an “up stat.” She explained that “an
upstat is someone who is in a position of power, and they’re sort
of above the law.”
3. Jury instructions
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
“You may consider evidence of Scientology only for the
following limited purposes:
“One, to explain the alleged victims’ delay in reporting the
charged crimes, including reports made to individuals within the
Scientology organization and their response to those claims;
“Two, to explain the alleged victims’ belief regarding
Scientology principles and practices related to, a, reporting
another Scientologist[] in good standing to outside law

68
enforcement or civil authorities and, b, fear of retaliation, fear of
being declared a suppressive person and fear of harassment for
reporting crimes of another Scientologist to outside law
enforcement;
“Three, to explain the alleged victims’ actions before,
during, and after the charged incidents and relevant to the
charged incidents;
“Four, to explain all witnesses’ ties to the Scientology
organization, past and present;
“Five, to evaluate both the circumstances under which
statements were made as well as the weight to give the
statements made by all witnesses including the alleged victims;
“And, six, to further evaluate the testimony of any expert
testimony regarding the above.”
B. No constitutional violation
We reject defendant’s contentions that admission of
Scientology evidence violated the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine, defendant’s First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion, and defendant’s due process right to a fair trial.
1. Ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine recognizes that the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment precludes judicial
review of claims that require resolution of ‘strictly and purely
ecclesiastical’ questions.” (McRaney v. North American Mision
Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, Inc. (5th Cir. 2020)
966 F.3d 346, 348, citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich (1976) 426 U.S. 696, 713.) The doctrine “grew out of
the so-called church property cases” involving “internal church
disputes whose resolution crucially depend on interpretations of

69
religious doctrine.” (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v.
Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 417, 432.)
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not preclude
admission of Scientology evidence for the purposes set forth in
the jury instructions. Defendant’s criminal trial did not involve
adjudication of an internal church dispute over church property,
church discipline, religious authority, or dogma. (Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 131
Cal.App.4th at p. 432 [ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
inapplicable to criminal investigation into alleged child
molestation by priests].) The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
accordingly did not apply.
a. Purported First Amendment violation
Admission of Scientology evidence did not violate
defendant’s First Amendment rights. “[T]he Constitution does
not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning
one’s beliefs and associations ... simply because those beliefs and
associations are protected by the First Amendment.” (Dawson v.
Delaware (1992) 503 U.S. 159, 165.) “If the evidence is relevant
to the issues being tried, its use does not violate the First
Amendment.” (People v. Bautista (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 762,
784 (Bautista).)
Bautista, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 762 is instructive. In
Bautista, the former pastor of an independent Pentecostal church
was convicted of sex crimes against two teenage congregants. He
argued on appeal that admission of testimony regarding his
religious beliefs deprived him of his First Amendment right to
the free exercise of religion. (Id. at p. 784.) The court in Bautista
rejected that argument, finding that admission of the
churchgoers’ religious beliefs did not violate the First

70
Amendment. The court concluded the evidence was relevant:
“The tenets of defendant’s church, including defendant’s religious
authority and the congregation’s concern with the appropriate
behavior of teenage churchgoers, provided an important context
for [the crimes.] The testimony regarding the churchgoers’ beliefs
was relevant to understanding the meetings with defendant,
defendant’s actions, the girls’ initial acceptance of defendant’s
behavior, and the families’ subsequent reactions.” (Ibid.)
Here, as in Bautista, evidence concerning Scientology
policies and tenets provided jurors with context for the victims’
Scientology beliefs; the victims’ interactions with defendant
before, during, and after the rapes; their delay in reporting the
rapes to law enforcement; and the circumstances under which
witness and victim statements were made. The jury was properly
instructed on the limitations of the Scientology evidence.
United States v. Ballard (1944) 322 U.S. 78, which
defendant cites, is distinguishable. The defendants in Ballard
were convicted of mail fraud—soliciting funds through the mail
based on knowingly false representations about their religious
beliefs, including their status as “divine messengers” and their
ability to heal people afflicted with diseases and injuries. (Id. at
pp. 79–80.) The trial court instructed the jury that they were to
find whether the defendants “honestly and in good faith believed”
the representations. (Id. at p. 82.) The appellate court reversed,
concluding that restricting the jury’s determination to the
defendants’ good faith belief was error and that the truth of the
representations concerning the defendants’ religious doctrines
should have been submitted to the jury as well. (Id. at pp. 83,
85–86.) The United States Supreme Court held that the trial
court “ruled properly when it withheld from the jury all questions

71
concerning the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or doctrines
of respondents” and reinstated the convictions. (Id. at p. 88.)
The Supreme Court reasoned that the First Amendment
precluded the jury from determining “the truth or verity of
respondents’ religious doctrines or beliefs.” (Id. at p. 86.)
The jury in this case was not asked to determine the truth
or falsity of Scientology doctrine or beliefs. The jury instructions
clearly limited the purposes for which the jury was to consider
Scientology evidence—to explain the victims’ delay in reporting
defendant’s actions; to explain the victims’ behavior before,
during, and after the charged crimes; to explain the witnesses’
ties to Scientology; and to evaluate the circumstances under
which statements were made and the weight to give statements
made by all of the witnesses. Admission of Scientology evidence
for those purposes did not contravene the First Amendment.
b. Relevance of Scientology evidence
Defendant concedes Scientology evidence was admissible to
assess the victims’ credibility. He argues, however, that
Scientology evidence was improperly admitted for “the truth of
the matter” in violation of his due process right to a fair trial.
The evidence was not admitted to show that Scientology tenets
are true, but to show that they are tenets of Scientology. That
evidence was relevant, as discussed, to understand the victims’
behavior toward defendant and their interactions with him; their
initial reports to Scientology; their delay in reporting the crimes
to law enforcement; their initial acceptance of defendant’s
behavior, and their families’ and friends’ subsequent reactions.
(Bautista, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 784.) The trial court did
not abuse its discretion or deny defendant his due process rights
by admitting Scientology evidence for these purposes. (Ibid.)

72
C. Trial court’s purported lack of neutrality
The First Amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion
requires the government “to proceed in a manner neutral toward
and tolerant of [a person’s] religious beliefs.” (Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n (2018) 584 U.S.
617, 638.) “Factors relevant to the assessment of governmental
neutrality include ‘the historical background of the decision
under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the
enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or
administrative history, including contemporaneous statements
made by members of the decisionmaking body.’” (Id. at p. 639.)
Defendant cites several statements by the trial court that
he claims demonstrate a lack of neutrality and even hostility
toward Scientology. Those statements, viewed in context,
evidence no animus or departure from neutrality regarding
Scientology.
Defendant claims the trial court overstepped the bounds of
neutrality at the preliminary hearing by stating that the court
would “interpret the pages [of scripture] that were just shown.”
The “pages” referred to were pages from the book Introduction to
Scientology Ethics by L. Ron Hubbard and a Hubbard
communication office policy letter, People’s exhibits 5 and 6 at
the preliminary hearing. Defendant mischaracterizes the trial
court’s statement as a pronouncement that the court and “not the
Church itself” would “interpret the pages [of scripture] that were
just shown” to the testifying witness.
The trial court’s statement was made during its assessment
of witness credibility at the preliminary hearing and what
relevance and weight to accord any exhibits when making that
assessment. The specific context is as follows: After C.B.

73
testified that Scientology would consider reporting defendant to
the police as a suppressive act, defense counsel asked C.B. to
point out where that is stated in the book Introduction to
Scientology Ethics by L. Ron Hubbard. On redirect examination,
C.B. identified passages in that book and in a Hubbard
communication office policy letter. On recross-examination, this
exchange occurred:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Well, nowhere does it say
reporting a Scientologist to the police is a suppressive act;
correct?
“THE COURT: The court will interpret the pages that
were just shown according to—the court will review it at the time
that I make my decision.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Well, the prosecutor just read
you a phrase, [‘]delivering the person of a Scientologist without
justifiable defense or lawful protest to the demands of civil or
criminal law.’ That means to frivolously report[] someone. It
doesn’t mean you can’t report someone; correct?
“[PROSECUTOR:] I’m going to object; that’s counsel’s
interpretation.
“THE COURT: Sustained. You can ask what it meant to
her. As I said the court will ultimately decide what relevance or
weight that necessarily has on the witness’s credibility.”
The final sentence in that exchange makes clear that
rather than relying on defense counsel’s interpretation of the
text, the court intended to determine for itself “what relevance or
weight” to give to the evidence when assessing the witness’s
credibility. The trial court did not purport to interpret the
Scientology text.

74
Defendant cites other statements by the trial court that he
claims demonstrate hostility toward Scientology by comparing
Scientology to white supremacists, gangs, and Satanists. All of
these statements, viewed in context, evidence no animosity
toward Scientology.
Defendant filed a motion before his 2022 trial to eliminate
or limit references to Scientology because of the public’s generally
negative view of Scientology. During argument, the trial court
asked how Scientology evidence was “more inflammatory than,
let’s say, evidence concerning street gangs, prison gangs, white
supremacy, outlaw motorcycle clubs which evidence comes in all
the time and it certainly is negative. [¶] Evidence of a serial
killer, you know, Richard Ramirez, the night stalker, being a
Satanist. Negative evidence comes in all the time, whether it’s
organizational related or individual related, if there is a
relevancy to it.” When ruling, the trial court stated that no
evidence “support[ed] the defendant’s conclusory contention that
the general negative view of the subject matter renders the
[admission] of that evidence per se inadmissible. [¶] Indeed, if
the defense argument had merit, it would stand to reason there
would be no reason for a gang member, a serial killer, a white
supremacist to obtain a fair trial if gangs or white supremacy or
multiple murders were admitted before the jury regardless of the
evidence’s relevance ….” The trial court’s examples did not
suggest that Scientology is like a gang, white supremacy, or
Satanism. The court’s statements simply addressed the defense
argument that Scientology is negatively viewed by society and
references to Scientology should be excluded at the trial.
Defendant cites as another example the trial court’s
response to his midtrial challenge to Headley’s qualifications as

75
an expert. The trial court noted that it had “cited cases where
gang members are deemed experts in that particular gang. White
supremacists can be deemed experts in, you know, the white
supremacy prison gangs, et cetera. [¶] So the membership in a
particular group or organization can oftentimes lend oneself to be
an expert in that particular group.” The trial court did not
suggest that Scientologists are like gang members or white
supremacists; the court simply used those groups as examples to
explain that members of a group can be qualified experts on that
group.
Defendant offers as another example of purported hostility
the trial court’s statements regarding audience members at the
trial who made witnesses visibly uncomfortable. At one point
during the trial, J.B. became uncomfortable and distracted when
she noticed a Scientology attorney in the audience react to her
testimony. The prosecutor asked the court whether he could ask
J.B whether someone in the audience made her feel
uncomfortable during her testimony. Over defense counsel’s
objection, the trial court ruled that the prosecutor could do so,
allowing the prosecutor to ask “any witness if there is anyone in
the courtroom that makes them feel uncomfortable, that they felt
intimidated by, why they did. [¶] That would be true whether or
not this was a gang case, whether or not this is an organization
case, whether or not this was a case involving two families that
disliked each other.” The trial court stated: “But if the defense
has a concern about Scientology’s organization presence in this
court, perhaps you might want to have a conversation that they
should stop asserting themselves in the criminal proceeding,
whether it’s in the form of filing amicus briefs or being present
for every court hearing or whatever it is they do. [¶] If they do

76
not wish to have their presence noted, then perhaps they
shouldn’t be present.” The court acknowledged, however, that
Scientology representatives were entitled to be present because
“it’s a public courtroom” The trial court reiterated, however, that
“[i]f something they’re doing is concerning to the witness and
that’s impacting the witness’s ability to testify or to focus on the
questions, the witness can explain why they’re having a hard
time … .” The trial court’s admonitions simply demonstrate the
exercise of its inherent authority to manage the trial proceedings.
(See Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 267.) They
evidence no hostility toward Scientology.
Defendant contends the trial court displayed hostility
toward Scientology by referring to it at times as an “organization”
rather than a church or religion. Defense counsel raised no
objection to that term and at times also referred to Scientology as
an organization. Defense counsel even proposed before trial that
the term “organization” be used instead of “Scientology” during
the trial. The jury instructions referred to Scientology as an
organization, and defendant raised no objection. The witnesses
themselves often referred to Scientology as an “organization.”
The trial court’s use of the term “organization” was not
disparaging, nor did it reflect hostility toward Scientology.
Defendant cites as another example an incident during
which the trial court questioned an audience member after the
prosecution advised the court that an audience member wearing
a large cross may be a Scientologist and asked that the person be
seated elsewhere in the courtroom. The audience member said
he was not affiliated with Scientology or the defense but was
observing the trial because he was interested in religious liberty.
The trial court stated that “[h]e certainly has the right to be

77
here,” noting that “I don’t think he is necessarily affiliated with
the defense or Scientology” and allowed him to “remain where
he’s at.” Nothing in the trial court’s statements or actions during
that interchange reflect any animosity toward Scientology or any
violation of defendant’s First Amendment free exercise right.
Defendant fails to establish any abuse of discretion or First
Amendment violation by the trial court.15
VII. Limiting harassment evidence
The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate
defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation, to present a
defense, or to a fair trial by limiting evidence of victim
harassment.
A. Relevant background
Before the 2022 trial, the prosecution sought to introduce
five specific incidents where the victims claimed they were
harassed or stalked by Scientologists. Defendant moved to
exclude all evidence of the victims’ harassment claims on
foundational, relevance, and Evidence Code section 352 grounds.
Defense counsel explained that if the victims were allowed to
testify about specific instances of harassment, defendant was
entitled to rebut that testimony with evidence showing the
harassment never occurred. Defense counsel made an offer of
proof as to the proposed rebuttal evidence. Defense counsel
further argued that even if the victims did not testify about

15 For reasons we discuss in addressing defendant’s First
Amendment claims, we find the First Amendment arguments
raised by the Church of Scientology in its amicus curiae brief
unpersuasive. The trial court did not adjudicate a religious
dispute, interpret or ask the jury to interpret Scientology
doctrine, and did not target or disparage Scientology.

78
specific incidents of harassment, but testified generally that they
had been harassed, defendant would be in the “untenable
position” of either not asking any followup questions or exploring
all the details and reasons why that was untrue. Defendant
would then be denied a fair trial because the jury would be “so
distracted by this inflammatory evidence” they would be unable
to focus on whether the prosecution met its burden of proof on the
forcible rape charges.
The trial court ruled evidence of harassment relevant and
admissible “for the non-hearsay purpose of showing why the
witnesses did not come forward earlier.” The court ruled,
however, that introducing even five incidents of harassment
would be an undue consumption of time. The court allowed the
victims to testify generally that they had been subject to
harassment and the defense to question whether any evidence
directly implicated defendant in the harassment.
Before the 2023 trial, defendant again moved to exclude all
evidence of harassment. The trial court ruled admissible
“testimony regarding the witnesses[’] fear of retaliation, fear of
being declared a suppressive person and thus separated from
family and friends or excommunicated from Scientology, belief
that they had been harassed by Scientology for cooperating with
police regarding the charged offense, the fact that the victims
filed a civil law suit alleging instances of stalking and
harassment related to reporting the charged incidents … and the
settlement agreement regarding the incident and the amount
paid pursuant to the agreement entered into between J[.]B. and
defendant.” The court found such evidence “more probative than
prejudicial” and relevant to the witnesses’ credibility, to explain

79
the witnesses’ actions after the incidents, and to explain their
delay in reporting the incidents to law enforcement.
J.B. testified at the 2023 trial that soon after she reported
defendant to the police in 2017, she experienced harassment and
stalking. J.B. further testified that ongoing harassment and
stalking made her concerned about testifying at trial. She was
part of a civil lawsuit filed in August 2019 against the Church of
Scientology, Miscavige and defendant to “stop this campaign of
terror” that “was just getting bolder and bolder and bolder.”
N.T. testified that she experienced stalking and
harassment shortly after her interview with Detective Myape and
that it continued throughout the 2023 trial. N.T. was “100
percent” certain the stalking and harassment was by the Church
of Scientology.
B. Applicable law and standard of review
Applying the ordinary rules of evidence does not infringe on
an accused’s right to present a defense. (People v. Dalton (2019) 7
Cal.5th 166, 222–223.) Courts have intrinsic authority and
discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of
orderly procedure and avoiding prejudice. (People v. Hall (1986)
41 Cal.3d 826, 834.) “Exclusion of impeaching evidence on
collateral matters which has only slight probative value on the
issue of veracity does not infringe on the defendant’s right of
confrontation.” (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298,
350.) “[A] matter is ‘collateral’ if it has no logical bearing on any
material, disputed issue. [Citation.] A fact may bear on the
credibility of a witness and still be collateral to the case.” (People
v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 152 (Contreras); see People v.
Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1291 [upholding denial of
impeachment of prosecution witness with evidence of his

80
dishonesty and “general lack of credibility” during probation,
which was collateral and not sufficiently probative].)
To be relevant, evidence must have some “tendency in
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code,
§ 210.) Unless a defendant can show that the excluded cross-
examination would have produced a “significantly different
impression of [the witness’s] credibility,” the trial court’s exercise
of discretion will not violate the confrontation clause. (Van
Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680.) A trial court’s ruling to
exclude impeachment evidence will be upheld unless the court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (People
v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 705 (Ledesma).)
C. No abuse of discretion
We reject the People’s contention that defendant forfeited
the right to challenge the limitation of harassment evidence
because he did not ask to present impeachment evidence at the
2023 trial. Defense counsel’s renewal of “all evidentiary motions,
requests and arguments” after the jury deadlocked in the 2022
trial was sufficient to preserve the issue.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding
specific impeachment evidence to rebut the victims’ claims of
harassment. Defendant’s counsel admitted that rebutting the
harassment claims would require an undue consumption of time
on collateral matters. Before the 2022 trial, defendant’s counsel
argued he would need to “call an additional 27 witnesses” to
rebut proposed evidence concerning five incidents of victim
harassment. Defense counsel further stated: “And that’s not
even kind of accounting for the kinds of cross-examination on

81
collateral topics that we would have to go into. [¶] This is
literally the definition of the 352 mini trial within a trial … .”
The trial court avoided such a “mini trial within a trial” by
allowing the victims to testify only that they were harassed after
reporting the rapes to law enforcement and by limiting cross-
examination to whether defendant was personally involved in the
harassment. The trial court specifically admonished the jury
that there was no evidence defendant was involved in any
stalking or harassment. The trial court’s limitation on
harassment evidence was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd. (Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 705.)
Defendant fails to establish any prejudice. He claims the
impeachment evidence impaired his ability to present his only
defense—challenging the victims’ credibility. The victims’
credibility with respect to claimed harassment, however, was a
collateral issue. “A fact may bear on the credibility of a witness
and still be collateral to the case.” (Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th
at p. 152.) Defendant was not precluded from challenging and
did challenge the victims’ credibility on matters that were
directly relevant to the circumstances of the crimes. Defense
counsel questioned J.B. about the quantity of alcohol she
consumed on the night of the crime, whether she saw defendant
prepare the beverage she consumed that night, whether she
walked or was carried up the stairs to defendant’s bathroom, and
about the absence of any evidence that she tried to call her father
that night.
Defense counsel also cross-examined N.T. about her
consumption of alcohol as a means of managing her social
anxiety, whether she was ever drunk, and whether as a result of
alcohol consumption she had difficulty remembering events from

82
the previous night. Defense counsel questioned N.T. about her
statements to Detective Myape during a January 2017 interview
that she was drunk on the night of the crime. Defense counsel
also questioned N.T. about her staying with defendant and
talking with him after the rape and phoning him a few days later
to tell him that she liked him and had been expecting him to call.
The trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion and
did not result in a miscarriage of justice. (Ledesma, supra, 39
Cal.4th at p. 705.)
VIII. Delay in prosecuting count 1
Defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated by the
delay in prosecuting count 1, the offense against J.B.
A. Relevant background
J.B. filed a police report on June 6, 2004, stating she had
been raped by defendant on April 25, 2003. LAPD opened an
investigation on June 8, 2004. On June 24, 2004, the district
attorney’s office declined to file charges.
In 2016, LAPD reopened the investigation after additional
women reported being raped by defendant. On June 16, 2020,
the District Attorney’s Office filed a complaint charging
defendant in count 1 with forcible rape of J.B. and two additional
counts of forcible rape against N.T. and C.B. A 16-year period
elapsed between J.B.’s 2004 report and the 2020 charges.
Before his 2022 trial, defendant moved to dismiss count 1
for pre-accusation delay, which the prosecution opposed. The
trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding no prejudice to
defendant and that any possible prejudice was outweighed by the
justification of additional victims and charges.

83
B. Applicable law and standard of review
Prosecutorial delay before a complaint is filed may violate
due process if the delay infringes upon the right to a fair trial.
(People v. Bracamontes (2022) 12 Cal.5th 977, 987.) A defendant
asserting a due process claim must first demonstrate prejudice
resulting from the delay. (Ibid.) “Prejudice to a defendant from
precharging delay is not presumed.” (People v. Jones (2013) 57
Cal.4th 899, 921.) If the defendant establishes prejudice, the
prosecution in response may offer justification for the delay.
(Ibid.) A court considers the motion to dismiss a charge then
balances the harm to the defendant against the justification for
the delay. (Ibid.) “But if the defendant fails to meet his or her
burden of showing prejudice, there is no need to determine
whether the delay was justified.” (Ibid.) A trial court’s ruling on
a motion to dismiss for prosecutorial delay is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. (Id. at p. 922.) Although defendant frames his
challenge to the trial court’s ruling as one under both the federal
and state Constitutions, “‘[b]ecause the law under the California
Constitution is at least as favorable to defendant as federal law,
we apply California law to defendant’s claim.’” (Id. at pp. 921–
922.)
C. No prejudice and the delay was justified
Defendant contends the deaths of two potential
impeachment witnesses, Bryten Goss and J.B.’s father Bill B.,
prejudiced his ability to present a defense. Goss, who died in
2006, purportedly prepared a written statement in October 2004.
The undated, unsworn, and unsigned statement claims that J.B.
told Goss in late 2002 that she had vaginal and anal sex with
defendant, causing her to sustain a pulled muscle injury. During
that disclosure, J.B. and Goss were at Goss’s home, where they

84
kissed and touched each other. J.B. repeatedly put Goss’s hand
on her neck and told him to choke her. J.B. also purportedly told
Goss that “she knows if sex is good by how many bruises she has
the next day.”
Goss died on October 26, 2006, less than two and a half
years after J.B. reported the rape to police. His death and
resulting inability to testify at trial was not due to the undue
passage of time. Prejudice premised on loss of a material witness
must be “due to [the] lapse of time.” (People v. Catlin (2001) 26
Cal.4th 81, 107 (Catlin).) Had Goss survived until the trial, it is
uncertain whether he would have been allowed to testify as to his
own prior sexual encounter with J.B. California’s rape shield law
(Evid. Code, § 1103) and Evidence Code section 352 may have
barred his testimony in that regard. In denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded defendant failed to
show prejudice from Goss’s death.
Defendant contends testimony by J.B.’s father, Bill B.,
could have been used to impeach J.B.’s account of forcible rape.
According to defendant, Bill B. contradicted J.B.’s initial report to
police, stating he had not seen injuries on J.B. and that he did
not believe the rape was forcible. Bill B. told police in 2004 that
he did not recall seeing J.B.’s bruises, but he noticed she seemed
“different” and could tell something was wrong. He later asked
J.B. what happened. When J.B. told him, Bill B. immediately
told his wife and tried to persuade J.B. to report the incident to
the police. In 2004, Bill B. sent defendant a letter accusing
defendant of rape, although Bill B. did not view it as “forcible
rape, such as some guy dragging a woman off a bus stop and
forcing her to have sex in the bushes.” In his letter, Bill B.
explained that his understanding of the incident came from

85
sources beyond J.B., including Shaffer’s and Watson’s reports,
and a conversation with Watson.
The trial court found that Bill B.’s letter accusing
defendant of rape “in no uncertain terms” arguably “cut against
the defense.” The trial court further found that testimony by Bill
B. about J.B.’s bruising was cumulative to other evidence
suggesting a lack of bruising, including photographs of J.B. in a
bathing suit taken shortly after the rape. The court concluded
that Bill B.’s death and inability to testify at trial “[did not] rise
to the level of prejudice” justifying defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Defendant also argues prejudice from the purported loss of
a recording of J.B.’s original interview with police. That
interview, however, was never recorded.
The trial court found no prejudice to defendant resulting
from the deaths of Goss and Bill B. We agree with the trial
court’s reasoning and find no abuse of discretion.
Notwithstanding its finding of no prejudice, the trial court
nevertheless undertook to balance the justification for
prosecutorial delay against any possible prejudice. We agree
with the trial court’s determination that additional victims’ rape
allegations against defendant, resulting in additional evidence
and charges, were sufficient to overcome any claimed prejudice.
The delay was investigative delay as the result of additional
victims coming forward. (See Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 109
[prosecutorial delay justified by additional evidence of guilt—
defendant’s involvement in the poisoning of two more victims].)
There was no abuse of discretion.
IX. Excluding evidence of J.B.’s purported intoxication
The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate
defendant’s Constitutional rights to confrontation and due

86
process by excluding evidence that J.B. urinated in the street on
her way to defendant’s house on the night of the crime.
A. Relevant background
Before trial, defendant sought to use as impeachment
evidence J.B.’s statement to Detective Myape that she urinated
in the street before arriving at defendant’s house on April 24,
2003. Defense counsel argued the evidence gave rise to a
reasonable inference that J.B. had consumed alcohol before going
to defendant’s house, contradicting her assertions that she had
not. The prosecutor argued the statement was made in the
context of J.B.’s description of the events that night—after going
to a restaurant, J.B. and two companions were trying to find
Watson to get the keys to Shaffer’s house so J.B. could return
there. J.B. explained: “We were going back and forth,” because
they weren’t at a specified location. J.B. told Myape, “I had to
use the restroom so bad. It was so bad I think I went to the
bathroom in the street.” The prosecution argued there was no
evidence J.B. had consumed alcohol or was intoxicated, and J.B.
had clearly stated the drink defendant gave her at his home was
the first alcohol she consumed that night. The trial court
excluded the evidence, concluding it was “speculative at best and
more prejudicial than probative” under Evidence Code section
352.
B. Applicable law and standard of review
Under Evidence Code section 352, “The court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” A “‘court enjoys broad discretion’” in

87
determining the admissibility of evidence under Evidence Code
section 352. (People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 532.) A
ruling under Evidence Code section 352 is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. (People v. Pineda (2022) 13 Cal.5th 186, 222.)
Under that standard, a ruling “‘will not be disturbed except on a
showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’” (Ibid.)
C. No abuse of discretion
Defendant contends the evidence he sought to introduce
was relevant to show that J.B.’s reported symptoms of dizziness,
heaviness, and confusion on the night of the crime may have been
caused by excess alcohol consumption rather than consuming a
spiked beverage prepared by defendant. There was no evidence,
however, that J.B. consumed alcohol that night before going to
defendant’s home, and J.B. testified that the drink defendant
handed her at his home was the first alcohol she consumed that
night. Evidence leading only to speculative inferences is
irrelevant (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035), and
exclusion of such evidence is not an abuse of discretion (People v.
Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 684). There was no abuse of
discretion and no violation of defendant’s constitutional rights.
(See, e.g., People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503
[discretionary evidentiary ruling did not violate right to present a
defense]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 620 [ordinary
rules of evidence generally do not infringe on the right to present
a defense; argument that restricted cross-examination violated
rights to confrontation, due process, and a fair trial rejected];
People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 [exclusion of

88
defense evidence on a subsidiary point is not a deprivation of due
process].)
X. Alleged cumulative error
We reject defendant’s contention that the cumulative effect
of the claimed errors identified in his appeal deprived him of due
process of law and a fair trial. Because we have found none of the
claimed errors to constitute individual errors, they cannot as a
group constitute cumulative error. (People v. Richardson (2008)
43 Cal.4th 959, 1036, abrogated on other grounds by statutory
repeal as stated in Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 509.)
XI. Conditional reversal of count 2
Defendant contends if count 1 (forcible rape of J.B.) is
reversed, count 2 (forcible rape of N.T.) would be time-barred and
should be conditionally reversed. Because we affirm defendant’s
conviction of count 1, his conviction of count 2 was not time-
barred and is also affirmed.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

We concur:

RICHARDSON, J.

GOORVITCH, J.

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