Filed 9/30/26 P. v. Martinez CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085120
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE423774)
RIGOBERTO MARTINEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Lilys McCoy, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Heather Monasky, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted Rigoberto Martinez of possession for sale of
methamphetamine. At his sentencing hearing, Martinez made an oral
motion under the California Racial Justice Act, Penal Code section 745,
relying on (1) trial testimony concerning the origins of illegal drugs,
(2) recently discovered happenings during jury deliberations, and (3) a
discussion between jurors observed by defense counsel and the prosecutor.
As to the second point, a juror in Martinez’s trial called the court’s clerk after
trial concluded; the clerk informed the trial judge of the conversation with the
juror; and the trial judge in turn documented the information it had received
in an e-mail that the judge inadvertently did not send to both counsel until
days before Martinez’s sentencing. The court denied the RJA motion and
sentenced Martinez to two years of formal probation with terms and
conditions, including 365 days in county jail.
On appeal, Martinez argues the trial court erred in (1) denying the RJA
motion on the ground that it was made orally rather than in writing,
(2) applying the wrong legal standard when evaluating the motion, and
(3) denying the motion for lack of evidence.
We conclude the RJA does not forbid the making of an oral motion.
Thus, to the extent the court denied Martinez’s motion because it was oral,
the court erred.
As to the proper legal standard, the People contend Martinez’s counsel
invited any error by informing the court that the relevant standard for its
consideration of the motion was a preponderance of the evidence. We
conclude the invited error doctrine does not apply here because the record
suggests counsel was mistaken rather than intentionally and tactically
misleading the court.
On this record, it is unclear what legal standard the court applied in
assessing Martinez’s RJA motion. To the extent the court applied a
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preponderance of the evidence standard in denying the motion, it erred by
skipping the prima facie stage, which requires a lower legal standard.
But even if the court used the proper standard in denying Martinez’s
motion, concluding he had failed to make a prima facie showing, the court
erred in denying the motion. Hearsay is not per se excludable under the
RJA. The court should have considered whether its own purportedly double-
hearsay e-mail was “trustworthy and reliable” before excluding it. (§ 745,
subd. (c)(1).) And by concluding the evidence before it was double hearsay,
the court failed “to consider the totality of the proffered facts” (Hernandez v.
Superior Court (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1130), including the evidence
beyond the e-mail, in assessing whether Martinez made a prima facie
showing. On this record, we conclude Martinez made such a sufficient
showing at the prima facie stage. We thus reverse and remand with
instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing under the RJA. Given this
outcome, we do not need to address Martinez’s claims that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel or that the trial court violated his
due process rights.
I.
A.
While patrolling a “known problematic area[] for drug sales in” El
Cajon, two law enforcement officers observed Martinez. They saw Martinez,
who was in front of an abandoned business, talk with one individual, reach
into his backpack, and make hand contact with another person. Upon
searching Martinez, the officers found a “baggie” containing a “white crystal
substance.” A search of Martinez’s backpack yielded, among other objects,
“two plastic bags that were tied off with golf ball-sized amounts of
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methamphetamine.” Martinez was charged with one count of possession for
sale of a controlled substance.
At trial, over defense counsel’s objections, evidence was introduced that
illegal drugs are generally brought across the border and into the United
States.
On September 13, 2024, the jury found Martinez guilty of possession
for sale of methamphetamine, a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11378.)
B.
On September 20, 2024, Juror No. 11 contacted the court clerk and
asked whether Martinez had been sentenced. When told “no,” Juror No. 11
related that “there were comments made in the jury room regarding
Col[o]mbians being responsible for drug problems,” although “[n]obody said
[Martinez] was Col[o]mbian.” Also, when the jurors entered the jury room for
deliberations, “10 people had already found the defendant guilty.” After the
verdict had been read and the jurors were talking to the attorneys in the
hallway, a juror mentioned “the border should be closed.” “Juror No. 11 was
concerned that these factors could have biased the whole group.”
After the clerk spoke with the court, the court “put [the information
conveyed by Juror No. 11] into an e-mail before anyone even slept on it for
one night,” because the court “wanted everyone’s memory to be fresh.” The
court intended the e-mail to be sent either that day, a Friday, or the following
Monday. Due, however, to “total inadvertence on the part of the court,” the e-
mail was not sent until Thursday, October 10, nearly three weeks later.
C.
Before the sentencing hearing on Monday, October 14, the court and
counsel for both sides “had an extensive chambers meeting and sidebar” to
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discuss the e-mail. The court memorialized the conversation on the record at
the start of the hearing.
Both defense counsel and the prosecutor stated on the record that they
had heard the remarks made in the hallway by Juror No. 11 and another
juror. The prosecutor added that Juror No. 11 said that “the team wasn’t
doing enough” “to prevent drugs from coming into San Diego County.” The
other juror “made a comment that the border should be closed.” “Juror
No. 11 immediately said, ‘I disagree with that.’ ”
The court told defense counsel that, if she “intend[ed] to make a[n] oral
motion under [section] 745 at this time,” she was “certainly welcome to do so.”
Noting that Martinez “appears to be Hispanic,” the information contained
within the court’s e-mail, and the “not relevant” trial testimony concerning
the origins of drugs in the United States, counsel argued “it is clear”
“Martinez’[s] race” “played a role, a[n] implicit bias with the jurors in this
case.” Counsel pointed the court “[s]pecifically” to subdivision (e)(2)(A) of
section 745, “which is after a judgment has been entered,” and “says that if
the court finds [an RJA violation] by a preponderance of the evidence[,] the
court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation.” Counsel asked the
court to reduce the conviction to a lesser included or related offense and to
sentence Martinez accordingly. Counsel noted that “Martinez does wish to
proceed with sentencing; however, the court can find . . . based on this e-mail
alone, that this is a preponderance of the evidence that race played a role.”
The prosecutor argued it was “improper” to make an oral motion, as a
“section 745 motion is a notice[d] motion.” The prosecutor also argued the
court’s e-mail was “a double hearsay statement coming from Juror No. 11,
paraphrased by Madam Clerk.”
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The court indicated it “would grant a motion if the defense were to
bring a motion seeking a continuance of the sentencing to allow the defense
an opportunity to bring a motion to unseal the contact information of Juror
No. 11, potentially other jurors,” and “allow the defense an opportunity to
explore these statements and gather affidavits or potentially live testimony
as to what would happen.” But the court “do[es] not have any such evidence
in front of [it].”
The court then informed Martinez that his counsel “could potentially
bring a written motion under the [RJA] in [his] favor” “that would by a
necessity . . . require a continuance.” The court indicated its understanding
that Martinez did “not want such a continuance; is that right?” Martinez
responded, “That is correct. Given the fact that I am in custody . . . , I would
like to get this over with.”
The court “want[ed] to make sure that [Martinez was] sure about this
decision to not have a continuance,” as “it is the court’s tentative to sentence
according to the probation report which would still have [him] serving time.”
Martinez again confirmed his desire to move forward with sentencing. In
response to further questioning, Martinez indicated he was “confident” in
wanting to move forward, had no reservations, and had received adequate
counseling from his attorney.
The court then stated, “The oral motion under Penal Code [section] 745
is denied for lack of evidence. For lack of notice, also.” The court deemed the
“statement from Juror No. 11 about other statements made[,] conveyed to
Madam Clerk[,] and conveyed to me” as inadmissible “double hearsay,” and
without it the court “d[id] not have evidence in front of [it] as a result.” It
concluded it could not grant “any of the oral requests” made under the RJA
“without a written motion under Penal Code 745 and competent evidence.”
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The court told Martinez, “If you had any thought that getting a continuance
and pursuing . . . any issues that Juror No. 11 raised would delay your
release, . . . it probably would not because you are not getting released today.”
The court asked if Martinez understood, and he replied, “Yes.” The court
then proceeded with sentencing Martinez.
II.
Martinez seeks reversal of the denial of his RJA motion at the prima
facie stage. He contends the trial court (1) erroneously denied his motion
because it was made orally rather than by written, noticed motion;
(2) applied the wrong legal standard; and (3) erroneously concluded his
motion was supported by a “ ‘lack of evidence.’ ” As the language of the
court’s order lacks clarity as to the standard applied, we cannot determine
whether it applied the wrong standard; yet we conclude the court erred in
denying the motion both because it was oral and allegedly unsupported by
competent evidence.
A.
It is a violation of the RJA for “[t]he judge, an attorney in the case, a
law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or [a] juror”
to “exhibit[] bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s
race, ethnicity, or national origin” or, “[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court
and during the proceedings,” to “use[] racially discriminatory language about
the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibit[] bias
or animus toward the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or
national origin, whether or not purposeful.” (§ 745, subds. (a)(1), (2).)
“A defendant may file a motion . . . alleging a violation of
subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (b).) “If a motion is filed in the trial court and
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the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a),
the trial court shall hold a hearing.” (Id., subd. (c).)
At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant bears the burden of proving
an RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 745, subd. (c)(2).)
Subject to inapplicable exceptions, if the court finds an RJA violation
by a preponderance of evidence, “the court shall impose a[n enumerated]
remedy specific to the violation.” (§ 745, subd. (e).) If judgment has yet to be
entered, one remedy is to “reduce one or more charges.” (Id., subd. (e)(1)(C).)
After judgment has been entered, “the court shall vacate the conviction and
sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent
with subdivision (a).” (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A).)
B.
Martinez argues the trial court erred to the extent it denied his RJA
motion because it was brought orally rather than by written, noticed motion.
Addressing this issue of statutory interpretation de novo (McIntosh v.
Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 41), we conclude the RJA does not
preclude the possibility of making an oral motion. Accordingly, the court
erred to the extent it denied the motion for being brought orally.
Under the RJA, a defendant “may file” a motion alleging a violation.
(§ 745, subd. (b).) “If a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant
makes a prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a), the trial court
shall hold a hearing.” (Id., subd. (c).)
Martinez claims “[m]otions may be made orally in court and notice is
not required unless the statute specifies such.” Martinez points out the RJA
uses the permissive word “may” and concludes that because it does not use
“must,” an oral motion is permissible. He contends requiring a written,
noticed motion “is unworkable,” particularly midtrial. “Given the delayed
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disclosure” of the court’s e-mail summarizing Juror No. 11’s statements,
Martinez argues he “utilized the only opportunity he had by making an oral
showing.”
Citing Black’s Law Dictionary, the People respond the plain meaning of
the word “file” involves submitting a document for inclusion in the record,
and thus the statute precludes oral motions. They claim the RJA’s reference
to habeas corpus proceedings, where the petition “must be verified under
penalty of perjury” and therefore must be written, “reinforces the[ir]
construction.” Likewise, “[t]he RJA’s inclusion of postconviction motions for
vacatur provides additional contextual clues that a prejudgment motion must
be in writing.” And “[c]ase law arising out of analogous contexts reflects that
the RJA contemplates a written RJA motion.” For example, People v. Lashon
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 816, held that an appellant forfeits an RJA
violation if the appellant does not “file[] immediately” an RJA motion. That
courts require the movant “to ‘include copies of reasonably available
documentary evidence supporting the claim’ ” also contemplates a written
filing. (Citing Finley v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 23.)
In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the Legislature’s
intent to effectuate the statute’s purpose. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 961.) “We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain
and commonsense meaning.” (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.)
“If the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.” (Voices of the
Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 519.)
The words, however, must be construed in context, so we look to the entire
section as well as “the statutory framework as a whole” in deciding what a
word or provision means, and we attempt to harmonize terms where possible.
(Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230.)
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“[W]e may reject a literal construction that is contrary to the legislative
intent apparent in the statute or that would lead to absurd results.”
(Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 27.)
When statutory language is ambiguous, “we look to a variety of
extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be
remedied, the legislative history, public policy, [and] contemporaneous
administrative construction.” (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002,
1008.) “Because uncodified findings of legislative intent are voted upon by
the entire legislative body, enrolled and signed by the Governor, they may be
entitled to somewhat greater weight than traditional legislative history
materials.” (Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 157.)
The statutory language here is ambiguous. Section 745 does not say a
defendant “must file” a motion; instead, as Martinez notes, it is permissive.
But nor does the statute say that a defendant “may make” an oral motion.
We therefore look to legislative findings made in support of the RJA to
discern the Legislature’s intent.
The Legislature passed the RJA as part of its “commitment to
‘ameliorate bias-based injustice in the courtroom.’ ” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2,
subd. (g).) “[N]o degree or amount of racial bias is tolerable in a fair and just
criminal justice system.” (Id., subd. (h).) Thus, “[i]t is the intent of the
Legislature to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system
because racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is
intolerable, [is] inimical to a fair criminal justice system, is a miscarriage of
justice under Article VI of the California Constitution, and violates the laws
and Constitution of the State of California.” (Id., subd. (i).) Given the
expansiveness of the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the RJA, it is
appropriate to construe the legislation liberally in favor of affording
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defendants an opportunity to raise potential RJA violations through an oral
motion.
The People argue that, “even if the RJA did not require a prejudgment
motion to be in writing, nothing prevented the trial court from insisting that
[Martinez] file a written motion.” But permitting a court to put restraints on
RJA motions beyond those statutorily imposed would be inconsistent with the
RJA’s expressly broad purpose of ameliorating racism in the justice system.
Accordingly, we agree with Martinez that the statute’s permissive language
does not foreclose bringing an oral RJA motion; therefore, to the extent the
court denied the motion because it was not a written, noticed motion, it erred
in doing so.
But having concluded that an RJA motion can be raised orally, we
caution that, in many circumstances, it may not be the best practice to do so.
While at the prima facie stage the court “ ‘should accept the truth of the
defendant’s allegations . . . unless the[y] are conclusory, unsupported by the
evidence presented in support of the claim, or demonstrably contradicted by
the court’s own records’ ” (Finley, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 23), the court could
continue the motion to give the People an opportunity to respond. Further, a
defendant may need to conduct discovery to support the motion, even at the
prima facie stage, and an oral motion could be premature to the extent it
lacks facts that could fully support it. Finally, bringing the motion orally
may create confusion as to what specific facts are being alleged in support of
the motion and will deny the court and both parties an opportunity to
prepare properly for the issues raised by the motion, including through the
filing of points and authorities for the court to consider. Such confusion and
inability to prepare appears to have played a role in creating one or more of
the issues raised before us.
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Given our decision, we do not need to address Martinez’s alternative
argument that the RJA only requires a written motion at the evidentiary
hearing stage.
C.
As to the proper legal standard, we conclude the invited error doctrine
does not apply. We further conclude that, while it is unclear what legal
standard the court applied in assessing Martinez’s RJA motion, even if the
court correctly considered whether Martinez had presented a prima facie
showing and denied his motion at the prima facie stage, it erred in concluding
no competent evidence supported the motion. On this record, we conclude
Martinez made a prima facie showing of an RJA violation. He is thus
entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the RJA.
1.
The People contend Martinez invited any error because “defense
counsel had the trial court focus on the wrong part of section 745” by arguing
Martinez “had to prove an RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence”
when “he only had to make a prima facie showing for relief.” We disagree.
“ ‘The doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent an accused from
gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error made by the trial court at
[defense counsel’s] behest.’ ” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004)
34 Cal.4th 1, 49.) “ ‘If defense counsel intentionally caused the trial court to
err, the appellant cannot be heard to complain on appeal.’ ” (Ibid.) But for
the doctrine to apply, “ ‘[i]t also must be clear that counsel acted for tactical
reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake.’ ” (Ibid.) “In cases involving an
action affirmatively taken by defense counsel,” courts “have found a clearly
implied tactical purpose to be sufficient to invoke the” doctrine. (Ibid.)
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The People posit “[d]efense counsel tactically chose to circumvent the
statutorily required prima facie stage and go straight to the stage applicable
for an evidentiary hearing to expedite relief for” Martinez, who “wanted ‘to
get this over with.’ ” “The specific relief [Martinez] sought was to have the
trial court reduce the conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor,” making
Martinez’s “release on credit for time served more likely.”
Martinez argues the People’s “claim is preposterous,” as the record
“shows that counsel made a mistake instead of intentionally lying to all
present.” He notes “the court decides the remedy, notwithstanding counsel’s
request,” and “there was no guarantee of release even if the court reduced the
conviction to a misdemeanor.”
We conclude it is not sufficiently clear on this record that Martinez had
a tactical purpose. Rather, the record supports the contrary conclusion: that
Martinez’s counsel simply misunderstood certain details of the RJA when he
brought the oral motion.
First, trial counsel was mistaken in arguing that Martinez’s RJA
motion was a post-judgment motion. It was a prejudgment motion. “In a
criminal case, judgment is rendered when the trial court orally pronounces
sentence.” (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, fn. 9.) Here, the
sentencing had not yet happened when the RJA motion was made, so no
judgment had been entered.
Second, despite invoking post-judgment provisions of the RJA, counsel
requested a form of relief not expressly available at the post-judgment stage
for the violations alleged here. Post-judgment, “the court shall vacate the
conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new
proceedings consistent with subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (e)(2)(A).) The
court may also “modify the judgment to a lesser included or lesser related
13
offense” “[i]f the court finds that the only violation of subdivision (a) that
occurred is based on paragraph (3),” which deals with charging or convicting
the defendant of a more serious offense than similarly situated defendants of
other races. (§ 745(e)(2)(A), (a)(3).) No tactical reason exists for Martinez’s
counsel, if Martinez were eager to be released, to request reduction to a
lesser-included offense—in which case, Martinez could still be sentenced to
time—rather than to vacate his conviction. We thus conclude the invited
error doctrine is inapplicable.
At any rate, “[a]pplication of the doctrine of invited error is not
automatic; it is discretionary with the appellate court.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal.
Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 8:248.13.)
Given the relative newness of the RJA and its evolving contours, resolution of
the questions this case raises warrants considering the merits of Martinez’s
claims.
2.
Martinez claims the court erred in applying a preponderance of the
evidence standard at what should have been the prima facie stage and in
denying the motion for lack of evidence. We agree that, on this record, the
court erred to the extent it concluded Martinez failed to make a prima facie
showing of an RJA violation.
Given the court ostensibly denied Martinez’s RJA motion “for lack of
evidence” as well as “lack of notice,” it is unclear what standard the court
applied here: a preponderance of the evidence or prima facie standard. The
court appears not to have reached the merits of Martinez’s claims at all (lack
of non-hearsay evidence), instead disposing of the RJA motion on procedural
grounds (lack of notice). But to the extent the court applied a preponderance
of the evidence standard at the prima facie stage (as Martinez’s counsel
14
urged it to do below), the court erred. RJA motions made in the trial court
are evaluated initially for a prima facie showing of an RJA violation. (§ 745,
subd. (c).)
To the extent the court applied the proper prima facie standard, it
nonetheless erred in concluding there was no evidence before it solely because
its e-mail relaying the clerk’s conversation with Juror No. 11 was “double
hearsay.”
First, “[f]or the purpose of a motion and hearing under [section 745],
out-of-court statements that the court finds trustworthy and reliable . . . are
admissible for the limited purpose of determining whether a violation of
subdivision (a) has occurred.” (Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (c)(1).) That evidence
is hearsay, therefore, does not categorically merit its exclusion under the
RJA. The court thus erred to the extent it excluded its own e-mail without
first considering whether it was “trustworthy and reliable.” (Ibid.)
Second, Martinez supported his arguments with evidence beyond the
court’s e-mail. While only the e-mail recounted what happened in the jury
deliberation room, Martinez also invoked (1) trial testimony that the court
heard firsthand about the source of illegal drugs in the United States and
(2) both the prosecutor’s and Martinez’s counsel’s personal observations of the
conversation between jurors in the hallway after the verdict was delivered as
relayed directly by trial counsel to the court. Martinez’s counsel noted
Martinez “appear[ed] to be Hispanic,” and the trial court itself observed
Martinez’s last name is “Latino.” The court thus erred to the extent it
overlooked this further evidence in evaluating whether, considering
Martinez’s claims “in the totality of the proffered facts,” he made the
requisite prima facie showing under the RJA. (Hernandez, 115 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1130.)
15
While the People argue Martinez failed to allege a prima facie RJA
violation, we disagree.
We review de novo a determination that an RJA movant has failed to
make a prima facie showing. (People v. Howard (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 625,
650.) A defendant makes a prima facie showing if “the defendant produces
facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a[n RJA
violation] occurred.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(2).) “A ‘substantial likelihood’ requires
more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than
not.” (Ibid.) “The court should accept the truth of the defendant’s allegations
. . . unless the[y] are conclusory, unsupported by the evidence presented in
support of the claim, or demonstrably contradicted by the court’s own
records” and “should not make credibility determinations.” (Finley,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 23.)
On this record—with these principles in mind and considering “the
totality of the proffered facts” (Hernandez, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 1130)—we
conclude that there is more than a mere possibility that an RJA violation
occurred. At a minimum, Martinez sufficiently alleged that one or more
jurors may have demonstrated bias or animus towards him because of his
race, ethnicity, or national origin (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)) or that, during his trial,
one or more jurors “used racially discriminatory language about [his] race,
ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards
[him] because of [his] race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2)).
Martinez has therefore made a prima facie showing of one or more RJA
violations. Martinez is accordingly entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (§ 745,
subd. (c).)
Given this disposition, we do not need to address Martinez’s ineffective
assistance of counsel and due process claims.
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III.
We reverse and remand for the trial court to hold an RJA hearing
consistent with this opinion.
CASTILLO, J.
I CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
DO, Acting P. J.
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