Filed 11/16/26 P. v. Martinez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B345343
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA046718)
v.
JONATHAN MARTINEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Jonathan Martinez (defendant) appeals from the order of
the trial court denying his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code1 section 1172.6. Defendant’s attorney filed a brief raising
no issues and asked this court to independently review the
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
record. Defendant submitted a supplemental brief on his own
behalf. Under the standard articulated in People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), we decline counsel’s invitation
to undertake an independent review of the record. Instead, we
evaluate the arguments defendant raises in his letter brief. (Id.
at pp. 231-232.) Because his arguments lack merit, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
A. The underlying crime
Following a party at a Palmdale residence in August 2009,
two rival gangs squared off in the middle of the street. As some
people attempted to defuse the confrontation and retreat toward
the house, defendant drew a gun, asked about gang affiliation,
and fired several shots. Francisco Govea and Pablo Reyes were
struck by the gunfire and later died of their wounds. Witnesses
identified defendant as the shooter, and ballistics testing linked
bullets recovered from Reyes’s body to a revolver recovered from
the location where defendant and his companions were later
detained.
B. Charges, trial, sentence, and appeal
In April 2010, the People charged defendant with the
murders of Govea and Reyes (§ 187). The People also alleged
2 We take judicial notice of this division’s prior, unpublished
appellate opinion affirming defendant’s conviction (People v.
Martinez (Mar. 28, 2013, B239357) [nonpub. opn.] (Martinez)).
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) We do not rely on these facts in
assessing whether the trial court properly concluded that
defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for
resentencing. (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Patton (2025) 17
Cal.5th 549, 569, fn. 12.)
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gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)) and firearm enhancements
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), and (d)). The People further alleged
that defendant’s 2008 conviction for carjacking constituted a
serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) as well as a “strike” within the
meaning of our State’s “Three Strikes” law (§§ 1170.12, subds.
(a)–(d), 667, subds. (b)–(j)).
The matter proceeded to trial. Defendant testified that he
fired the gun because he feared for his life. He acknowledged,
however, that he did not see any of his attackers with weapons.
The jury convicted defendant of two counts of second-degree
murder and found all enhancements to be true. The trial court
sentenced defendant to prison for 80 years to life. For each
second-degree murder conviction, the court imposed a sentence of
40 years to life, comprised of a base term of 15 years to life plus
the 25 year minimum for the firearm enhancement.
On direct appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of
the evidence of malice aforethought. A prior panel of this division
affirmed the convictions. (People v. Martinez, supra, B239357.)
II. Procedural Background
In March 2023, defendant, representing himself, filed a
form petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 and
requested counsel. That same month, the trial court denied the
petition without a hearing, finding the record disclosed as a
matter of law defendant was the actual killer and therefore did
not fall within the scope of section 1172.6. Defendant did not
appeal from the March 2023 denial.
On February 25, 2025, defendant filed a second form
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, and requested
counsel. On March 14, 2025, the trial court denied the petition
without appointment of counsel or a hearing. The court noted
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defendant’s previously filed petition that was denied in March
2023 on the basis that defendant was ineligible for relief as the
actual killer.
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
The trial court did not err in summarily denying
defendant’s petition because the record of conviction conclusively
establishes that defendant was the actual killer. Defendant
admitted that he fired the weapon, and the jury found true the
allegations that he personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing death. Because defendant was the actual killer,
he is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233;
3
People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973.)
In his supplemental brief, defendant raises four arguments.
First, he asks us to employ our inherent authority to act as
a neutral adjudicator and as his advocate, based on principles of
equity and equal protection. We decline the request that we
serve as his advocate; that is inconsistent with the role of the
judicial branch.
Second, he asks that we consider “that he was merely
months into his 18th year when the offense occurred,” and that
his aggregate 80-years-to-life sentence is “harsh.” This just
amounts to a general plea for sentencing leniency, which does not
3 In light of this analysis, we have no occasion to decide
whether the trial court erred in suggesting that defendant’s
petition was without merit merely because it was successive to
his prior petition. (Accord, People v. Farfan (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 942, 950 [collateral estoppel may bar a successive
section 1172.6 petition if it rests on the same law and facts].)
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establish section 1172.6 eligibility.
Third, defendant asserts that he fired the gun without
looking, that he acted out of fear, and that he did not harbor
malice. He further questions whether the evidence was sufficient
to establish all elements of second-degree murder and whether
the jury understood the governing instructions. These arguments
are irrelevant to the question before us—namely, whether the
trial record conclusively establishes that defendant was the
actual killer.
Fourth and finally, defendant cites People v. Frederickson
(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 910, but that case addresses resentencing
proceedings under section 1172.1—not section 1172.6. They are
distinct statutes with distinct requirements.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s section 1172.6
petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
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