Filed 7/9/26 P. v. Martin CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
THE PEOPLE, C101325
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. STK-CR-FE-
v. 1993-0006586, SC056415A)
EUGENE JAMES MARTIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Eugene James Martin appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 following an evidentiary
hearing. Appellate counsel filed a brief raising no arguable issues under People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216.2 Counsel notified
Martin that he had 30 days to file a supplemental brief raising issues he wished this court
to consider. Martin filed a supplemental brief raising two concerns.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Appellate counsel contends this appeal should not be limited to the review process of
Delgadillo, since it follows an evidentiary hearing. Rather, counsel contends we should
independently review the record for error pursuant to Wende, inviting this court to
distinguish this case from Delgadillo, which was decided at the prima facie stage. We
decline the invitation to determine Delgadillo’s scope. Instead, as in Delgadillo, we
exercise our discretion to independently review the record.
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After considering Martin’s contentions and independently examining the record,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Crime
On September 1, 1993, 70-year-old Charlotte got into her car in the parking lot of
the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), rolled down her driver’s side window, and
put her purse on the passenger’s seat. As she reached into her glove box, two Black men
appeared in her driver’s side window. One of them had bare shoulders covered only in a
“wide black band.” He reached behind Charlotte and took her purse. At trial, witnesses
identified Martin as the man who took Charlotte’s purse. The two men ran away.
Terrified, Charlotte got out of the car and started screaming.
Charlotte approached a man in the parking lot, George, who was driving with his
17-year-old stepson in the passenger seat. Charlotte told George what happened; he
turned his car around and drove after the two men. As he drove, a yellow Oldsmobile
pulled in front of him. He followed the Oldsmobile to a stop sign at the intersection of
California and Flora Streets. Both cars stopped; George told his stepson to get the license
plate number.
At the stop sign, a Black man wearing a T-shirt and pants got out of the
Oldsmobile holding a gun; George told his stepson to “get down” and put his car in
reverse. As George started to drive backward, the man began shooting. George could
see the gun was a revolver, maybe a .357-caliber, and the shooter was looking right at
him. The first shot struck the passenger side windshield of George’s car and wounded his
stepson in the shoulder. George heard three more shots hit the front of his car.
Out of the corner of his eye, George saw a DMV security guard running. George
also saw the man who was shooting at him turn his gun toward the security guard and fire
a single shot. The security guard fell to the ground with a bullet wound in his abdomen.
George estimated the entire incident lasted a “couple minutes maybe, if that long.”
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George’s stepson was taken away in an ambulance; George gave the responding police
officers a description of the Oldsmobile, including the license plate number.
That same day, Linda was at work when she heard “a lot of loud squealing.” She
looked up and saw a yellow Oldsmobile “hit the corner right there on Fremont and
Edison” and three Black men jump out. The first man wore a white T-shirt and was
holding a gun; she saw him drop the gun on the sidewalk as he ran. The second man,
wearing a striped pullover, ran in the same direction as the first but toward the nearby
homes. The third man who jumped out of the car had pants on but no shirt; he also was
carrying a gun. He ran toward a fenced area of the nearby homes, dropped the gun by a
chain link fence, and ran toward a vacant lot at the back of the homes.
Debbie worked with Linda. She also heard loud squealing and looked up to see a
yellow Oldsmobile “spinning in the intersection of Edison and west Fremont and three
gentlemen exiting the car.” The driver wore a white T-shirt and carried a gun in his hand.
He threw the gun down near the sidewalk and took off running. Debbie saw a second
man, wearing “blue jeans” and no shirt, get out of the passenger side of the car. He was
also carrying a gun. Debbie watched him run toward a vacant lot where he threw the gun
in the dirt, close to a chain link fence, then run toward the homes near the vacant lot. The
third man to get out of the car was wearing “something blue”; he too ran toward the
nearby homes.
Police Officer Douglas Haro responded to the report of a shooting at the DMV.
The report included the description of a yellow Oldsmobile involved in the shooting.
Officer Haro saw a car matching that description and followed it at intermittently high
rates of speed until it stopped in the middle of the road near the intersection of Fremont
and Edison Streets and three Black men ran from the car. One of the men was wearing
jeans but no shirt; another was wearing a blue shirt with a blue baseball cap; the third was
wearing a white T-shirt. The man in the T-shirt ran one direction; the other two men ran
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in a different direction. At trial, Officer Haro identified Martin as the man wearing jeans
and no shirt.
Officer Haro jumped out of his patrol car and chased Martin. Martin jumped
several fences while running from the officer, running in and out of the officer’s
sightline. During the chase, Officer Haro saw Martin run into and out of a residence. As
Martin came out of the residence, he was arrested. Martin was no longer wearing jeans
or shoes.
While investigating the scene at Edison and Fremont Streets, police officers found
a .32-caliber automatic handgun next to a chain link fence with one round in the chamber
and another in the magazine, as well as a Smith & Wesson .357 magnum handgun in the
dirt just south of the first gun. Inside the cylinder of the Smith & Wesson, they found six
“spent casings” indicating the gun had been fired. Both guns were operational. They
also found a pair of shoes in a vacant lot near the handguns.
Officers searched the Oldsmobile and found a pair of blue denim overalls in the
backseat, which witnesses identified at trial as the same overalls they saw Martin wearing
the day of the robbery and shooting. They also found a piece of paper with Martin’s
thumbprint on it. At the intersection where the shooting took place, police officers found
four empty shell casings from a .380-caliber pistol, and one expended bullet consistent
with a .357 magnum.
Several days later, a private citizen who lived on Edison Street found a .380-
caliber pistol in his back yard, near a chain link fence. The gun was operable, but it was
jammed; a full magazine sat beneath it. He turned the gun over to the police
immediately.
B. Trial, Sentencing, and Prior Appeal
The jury found Martin guilty of robbery, finding also that he knew or should have
known the victim was vulnerable (§§ 211, 667.9, subd. (a)), and three counts of
attempted, willful, deliberate, premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187). In a bifurcated
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proceeding, the trial court found Martin served a prior prison term (former § 667.5, subd.
(b)) and was previously convicted of three serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)). The court
sentenced him to life in prison for each count of attempted, premeditated murder. For the
robbery, the court imposed five years plus one year for the vulnerable victim
enhancement. (§ 667.9, subd. (a).) The court also imposed one year for the prior prison
term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and five years each for the three prior convictions (§ 667, subd.
(a)). In sum, the court sentenced Martin to prison for 22 years plus three life terms.
Martin appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions and his life terms must run concurrent with one another as a matter of law. In
People v. Martin (Mar. 18, 1996, C018510 & C020507) (nonpub. opn.), this court found
the evidence sufficient to support Martin’s convictions but agreed the life terms were to
be served concurrently. After modifying the sentence accordingly, we affirmed the
convictions in full.
C. Petition for Resentencing
In September 2021, Martin filed a form petition for resentencing under what is
now section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95) asserting he could no longer be convicted of
attempted murder based on subsequent changes to the murder statutes. The trial court
issued an order to show cause for an evidentiary hearing.
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court admitted as evidence the record of
conviction including the trial transcript, the preliminary hearing transcript, and the clerk’s
transcript from the prior appeal. The court noted it would consider the preliminary
hearing transcript as evidence except for any “Prop 115 hearsay.” Neither side presented
new evidence.
Considering the evidence as an independent trier of fact, the trial court found the
evidence showed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Martin aided and abetted in the
attempted murder of three people. The court denied Martin’s petition.
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Martin timely appealed in June 2024. Appellate counsel filed an opening brief on
September 9, 2025, and the People filed their response on January 23, 2026. On
February 23, 2026, appellate counsel filed a motion to strike the opening brief and file a
replacement brief; this court granted that motion and on March 11, 2026, counsel filed a
Wende/Delgadillo brief. On March 16, 2026, Martin filed his supplemental brief; the
matter was deemed fully briefed that same day.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill No. 1437) amended “the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 959.) Senate Bill No. 1437 amended sections 188 and 189.
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now provides: “Except as stated in subdivision (e)
of section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with
malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” Section 189, subdivision (e)(1)-(3), in turn, now provides: “A
participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision
(a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶]
(1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but,
with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶]
(3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”
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Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedural mechanism in section 1172.6 for
those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended.
(People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) later expanded the statute to apply to attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequence doctrine and manslaughter. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
Under section 1172.6, if a petitioner files a facially sufficient petition and makes a
sufficient prima facie showing he or she is entitled to relief (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)-(c)), the
trial court must issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing where
the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt petitioner could
still be convicted of murder (or attempted murder) under current law (§ 1172.6, subds.
(c), (d)).
At the evidentiary hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief,
the admission of evidence is “governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court may
consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible
under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters
judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The court may also consider the procedural
history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion. (Ibid.) Hearsay evidence
admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 872 must be
excluded from the hearing as hearsay unless the evidence is admissible under another
exception to the hearsay rule. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Both the prosecutor and the
petitioner may offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens. (Ibid.)
B. Discussion
Martin first argues that appellate counsel failed to include eyewitness testimony
from the preliminary hearing in their opening brief. We exercised our discretion to
review the entire record on appeal. Accordingly, whether counsel failed to include
relevant testimony from the preliminary hearing in their opening brief is irrelevant
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because we reviewed the transcript from the preliminary hearing. We thus considered all
the relevant, admissible testimony.
Next, Martin claims the trial court said it would not rely on the preliminary
hearing transcript to reach its decision. On the contrary, the trial court specifically said,
except for “any Prop 115 testimony,” it considered the preliminary hearing transcript in
reaching its decision.
After considering the arguments raised in Martin’s supplemental brief, and having
independently reviewed the record, we conclude no arguable error would result in a
disposition more favorable to him.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Martin’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is
affirmed.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
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