Filed 9/1/26 P. v. Martin CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B346799
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA089862-01)
v.
JOEL MARTIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
Defendant and appellant Joel Martin (defendant) appeals
from the denial of his petition for vacatur of his murder
conviction and resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6.
1 All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.
Defendant’s appointed counsel identified no arguable issues and
filed a brief requesting we exercise our discretion to conduct an
independent review of the record as set forth in People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Defendant
contends his hearing counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
claims under the Racial Justice Act (Pen. Code, § 745) (RJA) and
to request “full resentencing” under various sentencing reform
statutes. He also asserts his innocence. Finally, he claims his
trial counsel was ineffective.
We have considered defendant’s supplemental brief and
reviewed the record. Finding none of defendant’s contentions are
cognizable in this appeal, and having conducted an independent
review of the record, we affirm the court’s order.
BACKGROUND
Procedural Background
In 2010, a jury convicted defendant of second degree
murder of Carlos Espinoza but was unable to reach a verdict on
the alleged firearm enhancements. Upon retrial, in 2011, a jury
found true the personal firearm use allegations. Defendant was
sentenced to an aggregate term of 40 years to life in prison,
comprised of 15 years to life for the murder, plus 25 years to life
under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). As to the remaining two
firearm enhancements, the trial court imposed terms of 20 years
and 10 years respectively and stayed them pursuant to section
654. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. (People v. Martin
(Feb. 6, 2013, B232642) [nonpub. opn.] (Martin I).)
2
On March 20, 2020, defendant filed a petition to vacate his
murder conviction and for resentencing under section 1172.6,2
which provides a procedure for persons convicted of murder,
manslaughter or attempted murder to obtain retroactive relief if
they could not be convicted under sections 188 and 189 as
amended effective January 1, 2019. A petition for such relief may
be filed by those who were not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or were not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (See Senate Bill No. 1437; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd.
(f); Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 223, fn. 3.) The court
summarily denied defendant’s petition on the grounds the jury
found defendant personally discharged a firearm and, as such,
determined he was the actual killer.
Defendant timely appealed.3 (People v. Martin (May 31,
2023, B306008) [nonpub. opn.] (Martin II).) On appeal, in light of
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis) and People v. Offley
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598, this court reversed the trial
court’s denial and remanded for the trial court to proceed to a
prima facie hearing. (Martin II, supra, B306008.)
2 At the time of filing, the section for such relief was found in
section 1170.95. The section was renumbered in June 2022, with
no substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to
these proceedings using the current numbering.
3 On April 11, 2022, defendant filed a second petition. On
June 30, 2022, the court issued an order noting defendant’s
previous petition was denied and “an appeal is pending,” as such,
the court denied the petition.
3
In September 2023, the People filed an opposition to the
petition arguing defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. In February 2024, defendant filed his reply asserting the
record of conviction “does not eliminate the possibility that the
jury reached its verdict based upon an imputation of malice.” On
March 13, 2024, the court decided, based on this court’s opinion
in Martin II, that it would set the matter for an evidentiary
hearing. On May 27, 2025, defendant filed an evidentiary
hearing brief arguing because he was convicted of second degree
murder, he could not be found to have intended to kill Espinoza.
On May 29 and 30, 2025, an evidentiary hearing was held.
The court noted receipt of defendant’s petition, the briefs of the
parties, and the Court of Appeal opinion in Martin II. The court
explained its understanding of the People’s burden of proof. The
People did not offer any new evidence. Defendant testified on his
own behalf. On May 30, 2025, following argument, the court
denied the petition.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order of
denial.
Factual background4
First trial
On February 4, 2009, Hazar Escamilla Parra visited her
friend Espinoza. Parra testified Espinoza introduced her to a
friend of his they met near the restaurant where they ate lunch,
but she did not see Espinoza argue with him or anyone else that
day. After their visit Espinoza accompanied Parra to the bus
stop near his home and waited with her for the bus. Parra was
seated on Espinoza’s lap on the bench when an older-model gray
4 The factual background is taken from our opinion affirming
defendant’s underlying conviction in Martin I, supra, B232642.
4
Astro van pulled up to the curb very close to them. Parra
testified there were two people in the van, both in the front. The
passenger pulled out a gun, said with a thick accent, “You
Carlos?” When Espinoza acknowledged he was, the passenger
fired his weapon. Espinoza pushed Parra out of the way, stood
up and the shooter continued to fire, more than five times in all.
Parra was not able to identify either the driver or the shooter.
The police arrived quickly, and Espinoza was able to
answer their questions as they waited for medical assistance.
Pomona Police Officers James Gibson and Dennis Cooper both
testified that Espinoza said the shooter fired from the passenger
seat of the van after saying, “Fuck you, Carlos.” Espinoza also
said he knew the shooter from the neighborhood as “Huero” and
that one of Huero’s brothers, Miguel, had been shot and killed a
month or two earlier at the nearby Guadalajara Market. Officer
Cooper asked Espinoza about his quarrel with Huero. Espinoza
denied there had been a quarrel, but he had been a friend of the
man who killed Huero’s brother. Espinoza later died at the
hospital from multiple gunshot wounds.
Crime scene investigator Sheri Orellana recovered a bullet
and some bullet fragments at the scene. A firearms expert, Los
Angeles Deputy Sheriff Edmund Anderson, testified that the
bullet was consistent with a nine-millimeter bullet, which was
almost always fired from a semiautomatic pistol, and only rarely
from a .38-caliber revolver. Anderson explained that among the
differences between a semiautomatic pistol and a revolver, a
semiautomatic could hold seven or more rounds of ammunition
depending on the size of the magazine, and ejected shell casings
when fired, whereas a revolver held six bullets and did not eject
casings.
5
Pomona Police Detective Mark McCann was one of the lead
investigators in the December 2008 murder case of defendant’s
brother at the Guadalajara Market. He was also assigned to
investigate this case. After a two-year search, Detective McCann
found defendant living in New Mexico. Detectives McCann and
Aguirre had defendant detained and interviewed him there in
jail. A recording of the interview was played for the jury.
Defendant admitted his nickname was “Huero.”5 After many
denials, defendant eventually admitted to having shot Espinoza.
Defendant previously heard that Espinoza had spoken badly of
his brother, Miguel. Defendant claimed he was alone in the van
driving to the carwash, when he happened to see Espinoza at the
bus stop.6 Defendant did not recall seeing Parra. He said, “I
just—I change—I took off my seat belt and I changed seats. And
I (inaudible).”
Defendant did not know how many rounds he fired, only
that it was more than three. He told detectives he bought the
gun a few hours earlier from someone on the street. He did not
remember the kind of gun it was, but later said it was a “3–8”
that held 10 rounds in a clip, and that the casings were ejected
5 We note at trial defendant’s nickname was spelled as
“Huero.” During the evidentiary hearing testimony of defendant
it was spelled “Guero” and during the People’s argument at the
hearing, it was spelled “Wedo.”
6 Defendant said, “I saw him ‘cause he was (inaudible)
saying that my brother was—my brother was a piece of shit and
it was good. It was good to him to they killed [sic]. And I was—I
was so pissed off, sir.... I was really, really ... I wasn’t—where he
living, I wasn’t know where he used to live [sic].” “But things
happened when I seen him.... I couldn’t hold (inaudible).”
6
into the van when he fired. Defendant later threw away the gun
and abandoned the van. He told detectives he “wasn’t wanting to
kill him”; he was “just ... feeling something here.”
Defendant presented no witnesses and did not testify at the
first trial.
Second trial
Prosecution evidence
The prosecution presented the same evidence of defendant’s
guilt as was presented in the first trial. Parra testified that
before the shooting she and Espinoza went to lunch at a
restaurant and nothing unusual occurred during their visit until
the old gray Astro van pulled up to the bus stop. Parra and
Officers Gibson and Cooper gave essentially the same testimony
regarding Espinoza’s statements that the shooter was Huero,
who lived a few blocks away, and whose brother Miguel had been
shot at the Guadalajara Market by a friend of Espinoza’s. The
prosecution again presented testimony regarding the nine-
millimeter bullet found at the scene, and the medical examiner
again testified that the cause of death was multiple gunshot
wounds. Defendant’s recorded interview was played for the jury.
Defense evidence
After the defense rested without presenting evidence, the
parties stipulated that a drug screen conducted by the coroner
showed that Espinoza had 0.09 micrograms per milliliter of
methamphetamine in his system, but it could not be determined
the time the victim consumed the drug or whether it had any
intoxicating effect on him. After the jury began deliberating, the
defense was permitted to reopen its case to present the testimony
7
of two witnesses, Andrea Torres7 and defendant’s sister Lorena
Vacquz.
Torres testified she lived near the scene of the shooting,
and although she did not know Espinoza, she knew his family
and his sister. Torres was outside her trailer park at the time of
the shooting, about 35 feet from the bus stop. She heard what
she thought were firecrackers and then screams, looked in the
direction of the noise, and saw the shooter and a van. There were
seven or more shots in the space of five seconds, and before the
gunfire stopped, she turned away to go inside to be with her baby.
Torres saw two men in the van, dressed alike. The driver was
the shooter. Torres described him as bald, hatless, wearing a
white tank top, with many tattoos, one of which was a shark.
Torres testified that five or 10 minutes earlier, she had seen
defendant near a neighborhood fast food restaurant, arguing with
a light-skinned Hispanic man in a black or gray van.
Vacquz testified that defendant had no tattoos on his face
or neck, that as far as she knew he had not removed any tattoos,
and had no scars from tattoo removal. Defendant pulled down
his collar to show his neck to the jury.
Rebuttal
Detective McCann testified that in his 2009 interview with
defendant, defendant was thinner and wore his hair much
shorter than during trial. Within a week after the shooting,
Espinoza’s sister telephoned Detective McCann, told him she
knew Torres, and that Torres had contacted her and said she
witnessed the shooting. Detective McCann called the number
Espinoza’s sister gave him, left a message, and located Torres at
7 Torres had received a subpoena but claimed that she had
forgotten to come in earlier.
8
the trailer park after she did not return his call. Detective
McCann estimated the distance from Torres’s trailer to the bus
stop to be 50 or 60 yards.
Evidentiary hearing
Defendant’s testimony
Defendant, also known as “Guero,” testified that on the day
of the murder he was driving a dark blue Astro van, with gray
stripes. Defendant’s brother, Israel Martin8, was in the front
passenger seat and defendant was in the driver’s seat.
Defendant was wearing a Cowboys jacket and Israel was wearing
a black hooded sweatshirt with the hood up. Israel was three or
four years younger than defendant; both men were of light
complexion; Israel was taller than defendant and “heavier set.”
Defendant came to the intersection of Buena Vista Avenue
and Mission Boulevard where he planned to make a right turn
from Buena Vista Avenue onto Mission Boulevard. He never
stopped at the curb and was going approximately five miles per
hour the entire time. After he made the right turn, he checked
his rearview mirror in an effort to change lanes to the left lane.
While checking his mirror, he heard the sound of approximately
three to four gunshots and a scream. After he heard the
gunshots, he “turned to see[9] what happened.” By the time he
turned, the gunshots had stopped, and he saw Israel turned
looking over his right shoulder with what appeared to be “half
8 Because both men have the same surname, we will refer to
defendant’s brother as Israel. No disrespect is intended.
9 On cross-examination, defendant testified he did not look in
the direction of the gunshots and “did not pay attention” to
whether there were people in the area on the passenger side of
the car.
9
the part of a pistol.” Defendant “took off” toward the freeway
because he panicked. He believed Israel must have fired the gun
he saw in Israel’s hand. Defendant did not know Israel was
armed.
Defendant was uncertain if anyone had been hit. When he
asked Israel what he had done, Israel told him to let him out of
the car. About 10 seconds down the road, defendant let Israel get
out. Defendant got onto the freeway and headed to Bakersfield
where he stayed with a friend. Defendant was scared to return
home “because of what Israel had done.” Defendant moved to
New Mexico after the murder “because [he] did not want to get
involved in that shooting,” and he was afraid he would be
implicated “because [he] was driving.”
After he moved to New Mexico, defendant was arrested and
interviewed by a Pomona police detective. Defendant learned
from Detective McCann that Espinoza was the person killed at
the bus stop. Defendant knew Detective McCann because he was
also the detective in the case involving Miguel’s murder. During
the interview with detectives, defendant initially denied being
near the scene of the shooting. Eventually he admitted being
present but told police he was in the van by himself. He lied to
police and told them he committed the shooting on his own to
protect Israel. Defendant claimed he was telling the truth now
because Israel passed away in late 2022.10
Defendant did not really know Espinoza; rather he knew of
him and thought “perhaps” Espinoza knew of defendant. Israel
told defendant a few months after the Espinoza shooting that
Israel believed Espinoza was connected to their brother Miguel’s
10 We note defendant filed his petition for resentencing in
March 2020, more than two years before Israel died.
10
killing. Defendant was not aware of this prior to Espinoza’s
shooting. Specifically, Israel told defendant that Espinoza “bad
mouthed Miguel” after Miguel’s murder and that Espinoza “was
involved with the friends of the [people] that murdered [Miguel].”
Other evidence
Along with defendant’s testimony, counsel introduced the
photographic lineup shown to Parra during the investigation, as
well as a video recording and transcript of a one-minute portion
of an interview with Parra.
Hearing argument
The People argued the evidence supported a finding that
defendant was the actual shooter and he acted with malice.
Defense counsel argued, consistent with his briefing, that the
People could not establish malice because the “first jury” rejected
such a finding by failing to reach a verdict on the firearm use
allegations. Counsel also pointed to Parra’s identification of
defendant as “‘not the shooter.’” Accordingly, counsel argued the
evidence did not establish defendant was the shooter, and there
is no evidence he knew what his brother planned to do.
The court’s ruling
The court denied the petition, finding both brothers were in
the van at the time of the shooting, and both had a motive to kill
Espinoza. The court found the shooter harbored express malice
at the time of the shooting based on Espinoza’s vulnerable
position sitting at the bus stop with Parra on his lap.
The court also found defendant’s testimony not credible.
Specifically, defendant’s claim that he did not stop near the curb
and was maneuvering his car to the left while his brother fired
multiple times and struck Espinoza six times—and avoided
hitting anyone else—from a moving vehicle was “remarkable.”
11
Due to the accuracy of the shots, the court found Parra’s account
of the shooting made more sense and found the driver would have
needed to “line[] up the shooter in order to achieve … that style of
accuracy” rather than from a moving vehicle. Thus, even if
defendant was not the shooter, the driver “helped facilitate that
shooting,” and both men had motive to shoot Espinoza.
The court pointed to defendant’s actions following the
shooting as demonstrative of his consciousness of guilt.
Specifically, the court noted defendant fled town immediately
following the shooting, and according to defendant, Israel (as the
shooter) asked defendant to drop him off 10 seconds from the
shooting scene with the murder weapon still on his person.
Finally, the court credited Espinoza’s identification of defendant
as the man who shot him. Ultimately, the court found “even if
[defendant] was not the shooter, he certainly is a direct aider and
abettor” based on “the way the vehicle was maneuvered.”
DISCUSSION
Where, as here, appointed counsel finds no arguable issues
in an appeal that is not from the first appeal after conviction, we
are not required to conduct an independent review of the record.
(See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.) However, even if we
do not independently review the record to identify unraised
issues in a case, we give the defendant the opportunity to file his
or her own supplemental brief or letter and we then evaluate any
specific arguments raised. (See id. at pp. 231-232.)
Counsel provided defendant with a copy of the record on
appeal and informed him of his right to file his own supplemental
brief. We notified defendant of counsel’s brief and gave
defendant 30 days to file his own letter or brief stating any
12
grounds for an appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished to be
considered and if he did not, the appeal would be dismissed.
Defendant filed a supplemental brief within the time allowed.
First, defendant asserts his actual innocence, claiming, “I
did not ‘kill the victim,’” and avers he only admitted to doing so to
“protect[]” Israel. He also points to other factual issues with his
case, including Parra’s failure to identify him as the shooter.
Second, defendant alleges his trial counsel was ineffective
because he “did nothing.” Third, defendant asserts a violation of
the RJA because, according to defendant, he was not provided an
interpreter during his police interview. Fourth, defendant
contends his hearing counsel was ineffective because he failed to
(1) “add a[n] ‘RJA claim’” and (2) bring other postjudgment
resentencing requests.
Notably, defendant does not allege the trial court erred in
denying his petition for relief pursuant to section 1172.6, and we
note, most of defendant’s claims are not cognizable in this appeal.
We take each of his assertions in turn.
First, to the extent defendant raises challenges to his
underlying trial unrelated to the changes brought about by
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), including his claim
of innocence, section 1172.6 “does not permit a petitioner to
establish eligibility on the basis of alleged trial error.” (People v.
DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438, abrogated on other
grounds by Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952.) Instead, section 1172.6
is a mechanism to provide relief for murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter convictions that may have been based on now-
invalid theories. (Lewis, supra, at pp. 959–960.)
Second, his allegation that trial counsel was ineffective is
not properly before us because the “appropriate means of raising
13
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is either by direct
appeal or by petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (People v.
Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 1477.) This postjudgment
appeal fits neither of those categories.
Third, defendant’s claim regarding the RJA is not properly
before this court on appeal from his postconviction section 1172.6
petition. (See § 745, subd. (b) [“For claims based on the trial
record, a defendant may raise a claim alleging a violation of
subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence.”
(Italics added.)].) Defendant’s claim regarding interpreter
services during his police interview is neither based on the trial
record, nor is it being raised on direct appeal from conviction or
sentence. Therefore it is not properly raised in this appeal and is
more appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Fourth, defendant’s claim that hearing counsel was
ineffective is unavailing. Regarding counsel’s failure to raise an
RJA claim, pursuant to section 745, subdivision (j), an
incarcerated defendant “whose judgment is already final [is]
permitted to bring a Racial Justice Act claim only in … a petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 1473.” (People v.
Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 1000.) Moreover, the RJA did
not become retroactive to cases that became final before 2015
until January 1, 2026. (See § 745, subd. (j)(4) & (5).) Defendant’s
judgment became final in 2013 after his petition for writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court was denied. (See
Martin v. California (2013) 571 U.S. 993.) Therefore, even if it
were appropriate to file an RJA claim during a section 1172.6
proceeding, such a filing would have been premature at the time
of defendant’s May 2025 hearing.
14
Defendant’s claim that hearing counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise other postjudgment resentencing requests,
including a “full resentencing” under later-enacted statutes, is
also without merit. As noted, section 1172.6 is a mechanism to
provide relief for murder … convictions that may have been based
on now-invalid theories (Delgadillo, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 223;
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, 959–960) and does not provide for
“retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal statute”
after the judgment is final. (People v. Lopez (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 337, 341-342.) Because defendant’s case became
final in 2013, hearing counsel was not ineffective for failing to
bring such requests.
DISPOSITION
The May 30, 2025 order denying defendant’s section 1172.6
petition is affirmed.
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J. RICHARDSON, J. GOORVITCH, J.
15