Filed 9/24/26 P. v. Manuel CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B344268
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. KA106041)
KEVIS LAVELLE MANUEL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jacqueline Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Lori A. Nakaoka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jonathan J. Kline and Megan Moine, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant Kevis Lavelle Manuel (Manuel)
appeals from the trial court’s order resentencing him under Penal
Code section 1172.75.1 We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts
“On May 28, 2014, Manuel questioned Brenita Doe
(Brenita), his intermittent girlfriend, about another man. In the
living room of their house, he cussed and yelled at her, accused
her of lying, and then hit her in the face and shoulders.” (People
v. Manuel (July 12, 2016, B262872) [nonpub. opn.], at p. 3
(Manuel), fn. omitted.)
“Brenita ran out of the house and down the street to get
help. Manuel ‘dragged’ her back and threw her on the ground in
front of the house. After that, he picked her up and took her
inside where he repeatedly slapped and punched her.
Eventually, he instructed Brenita to put on a short dress and”
instructed Brenita’s 12-year-old daughter, D.D., “to put on short
shorts. He announced that he was going to prostitute their
bodies.” (Manuel, supra, B262872 at p. 3.)
“After Brenita and [D.D.] changed, Manuel forced them
into the family’s car. He drove them to a Rite Aid and told
Brenita to get out and make some money. She got out, went to a
bus stop and took a seat. Manuel offered her for sale to
passersby. He told them he had Brenita’s 12-year-old daughter
in his car.
“No one accepted Manuel’s solicitations. Eventually, he
drove [D.D.] to a 7-Eleven across the street from the Rite Aid and
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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parked while Brenita remained at the bus stop. Manuel got out
of the car and told [D.D.] that if she moved, he would kill her.
While making the threat, Manuel pulled a gun part way out of
his waistband so it was visible to [D.D]. Then he pointed the gun
at her head. Subsequently, he tucked the gun back into his
waistband and threatened [D.D.] by saying, ‘If you scream or if
you yell or get out, I’ll kill you.’
“Manuel made Brenita return to the car and told her to get
inside. After she complied, he drove back to the house.
“Shortly thereafter, Manuel drove Brenita and [D.D.] to
some train tracks. He turned off the car and told them to get out.
When they refused, he tried to forcibly remove them, but they
fought back. He said he was going to kill them. When he could
not pull them out, he got back in the car. Eventually, Manuel
drove them to a trailer park, after which he drove them home.
“At home, Manuel told Brenita to cook food. Later, he told
her to get back in the car so they could take another ride.
Because she was afraid he would hit her, she complied. He drove
to a park.
“[D.D.] told [her brother] to call the police. He spoke to
some neighbors and asked them to make the call. One of the
neighbors called 911. When Manuel returned home with Brenita,
the police were present. He parked in a neighbor’s driveway and
got out. The police saw Manuel trying to hide. Soon after, they
arrested him.” (Manuel, supra, B262872 at pp. 3–4.)
II. Procedural History
A. Conviction and sentencing
In 2014, a jury found Manuel guilty of two counts of
kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2); two counts of criminal
threats (§ 422, subd. (a); counts 3 & 4); and one count of injuring
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a former cohabitant, girlfriend, or child’s parent (§ 273.5,
subd. (f)(2); count 5). Manuel admitted that he had suffered a
prior “strike” conviction pursuant to the Three Strikes law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), a prior serious
felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), three prior prison terms
(former § 667.5, subd. (b)), and a prior domestic violence
conviction.
In 2015, the trial court sentenced Manuel to 19 years
4 months in state prison. The sentence included only one former
section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement, as
the court had struck the two other prior prison term
enhancements.
The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. (Manuel,
supra, B262872 at pp. 2, 13.)
B. Section 1172.75 proceedings
In 2023, Manuel was deemed eligible for resentencing
under section 1172.75. In 2024, Manuel filed a petition
requesting that the trial court “strike all legally invalid
enhancements” and dismiss the five-year serious felony
enhancement.
On February 20, 2025, the trial court recalled the sentence,
struck the remaining former section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior
prison term enhancement, and resentenced Manuel to serve
18 years 4 months. The court considered the underlying facts of
the case, Manuel’s prior criminal history, and his prison
disciplinary record in declining to strike the five-year section 667,
subdivision (a)(1) serious felony enhancement. As relevant here,
on count 5, the court reimposed and stayed the upper term of four
years, doubled to eight years for the strike.
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Manuel filed a timely notice of appeal from his
resentencing.
DISCUSSION
Manuel contends that the trial court erred by reimposing
(albeit also staying) the upper term on count 5 without the
relevant aggravating factors being admitted or proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
I. Standard of Review
While we generally review a trial court’s sentencing
decisions for abuse of discretion (People v. Moseley (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 870, 874), here our review is de novo because the
appeal turns on a question of statutory interpretation (People v.
Terwilligar (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 585, 595).
II. Relevant Law
Section 1172.75 renders “legally invalid” any former
section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement
imposed before January 1, 2020, except for a prior conviction for
a sexually violent offense. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) A defendant
who qualifies for the recall of sentence under section 1172.75 is
entitled to “a full resentencing” at which the trial court may
reconsider all prior sentencing decisions. (People v. Monroe
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), provides: “Unless the
court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are
circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term
of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have
been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
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beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (Italics added.)
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err
The unambiguous language of section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4), “carves out an exception to the general rule
that all ameliorative changes to the law must be applied at a
section 1172.75 resentencing and does not require aggravating
factors to be found true beyond a reasonable doubt if the upper
term was previously imposed.” (People v. Brannon-Thompson
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 458 (Brannon-Thompson); see also
People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265 [when interpreting
a statute, “[t]he plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity in
the statutory language”].)
Because Manuel was originally sentenced to the upper
term on count 5, the trial court could reimpose the upper term at
resentencing without the relevant aggravating factors being
admitted or proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
McAlister (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 498, 502; People v. Lua (2026)
121 Cal.App.5th 472, 478; People v. Moss (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th
375, 380–381, review granted July 22, 2026, S296595; People v.
Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 374, review granted Aug. 13,
2025, S291628 (Mathis); Brannon-Thompson, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 466–467.) We respectfully disagree with
the contrary holding of People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
312, 329–330.2
2 The California Supreme Court has granted review to
resolve the split regarding “whether section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4), allows a trial court to reimpose an upper term
sentence where the facts underlying one or more aggravating
circumstances were neither stipulated to by the defendant nor
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We also disagree with Manuel that his Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial was violated. “When [Manuel] was
[originally] sentenced, in 201[5], his sentence was imposed
pursuant to the version of section 1170, subdivision (b), that
granted the trial court broad discretion to select any of the three
applicable prison terms. . . . [U]nder that sentencing scheme,
there was no requirement for the judge to find a particular fact to
justify imposition of the upper term. [Citation.] As a result, the
court’s selection of an upper term at [Manuel]’s 201[5] sentencing
did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment. [Citations.] [¶] The
same statutory scheme under which [Manuel] was sentenced had
long been in effect at the time that the Legislature established
the [section 1172.75] resentencing procedures applicable here. As
a result, it was not necessary for the Legislature to impose the
heightened factfinding requirements for defendants . . . who
originally received upper term sentences under the prior version
of section 1170, subdivision (b).” (Mathis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th
at p. 373, review granted.)
Accordingly, we reject Manuel’s claim that the trial court
erred in resentencing him to the upper term on count 5.
found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the factfinder. (See
People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025, C096853) [nonpub. opn.], review
granted May 14, 2025, S289903.)” (Mathis, supra,
111 Cal.App.5th at p. 373, fn. 6, review granted.)
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GOORVITCH, J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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