Filed 7/1/26 P. v. Manown CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
THE PEOPLE, C103330
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. MAN-CR-FE-
v. 2021-0011935)
STEVEN ANDREW MANOWN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Steven Andrew Manown pleaded no contest to contacting a minor with
intent to commit a sexual offense (Pen. Code, § 288.3, subd. (a)).1 Before sentencing,
Manown moved to withdraw his plea, claiming that his attorney rendered constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not knowing and voluntary due to
counsel’s deficient performance. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced
Manown consistent with the plea agreement.
On appeal, Manown contends that the trial court’s denial of his motion was in
error. He argues that his counsel performed deficiently by failing to obtain a forensic
examination of his cell phone to recover its exculpatory contents and by misadvising him
of the consequences of his plea. We affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
BACKGROUND
The People charged Manown with attempted lewd or lascivious acts with a child
under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); count 1), contact with a minor to commit a sexual
offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a); count 2), and arranging a meeting with a minor to engage in
lewd and lascivious behavior (§ 288.4, subd. (b); count 3). The parties stipulated that
Manown arranged to meet a law enforcement decoy, whom he believed to be a 13-year-
old girl, to engage in oral copulation and then arrived at the agreed-upon time and
location. Manown pleaded no contest to contact with a minor for a sexual offense
(§ 288.3, subd. (a)). The remaining counts were dismissed on the prosecutor’s motion.
Before sentencing, Manown retained new counsel and moved to withdraw his plea
pursuant to section 1018. The motion contended that Manown’s prior attorney, Mary
Ann Bird, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in four respects: by failing to
conduct a forensic examination of his cell phone to retrieve data critical to his defense;
“coerc[ing] and manipulat[ing]” him into accepting the plea by telling him that he would
be “shanked” in prison if he did not accept the offer with jail time; incorrectly advising
him that he could petition to be relieved from lifetime sex offender registration; and
erroneously informing him that, following his conviction, he could care for his minor
child without restrictions. Manown asserted that he would not have accepted the plea
deal absent these shortcomings.
The trial court held a hearing on Manown’s motion at which multiple witnesses
testified. Manown testified that he retained Bird after his arrest, met her in her office
three or four times, and spoke with her on the phone about 10 times. While Manown was
still in jail, Bird conveyed an initial plea offer of 120 days in jail.
Manown testified that he consistently maintained his innocence to Bird. Manown
told Bird that, on the day of the alleged offense, he was texting with multiple escorts and
became confused; he said he did not intend to meet with a minor. Manown believed that
deleted messages on his cell phone would corroborate this account, and he asked Bird
2
between five and seven times if she had received his cell phone, which had been
confiscated by law enforcement, or the information it contained. At various times, Bird
informed Manown that she had not heard back, that she had not yet received the phone
records, and that the district attorney would not let her see the phone so she would have
to get a court order. Bird received screenshots from the law enforcement decoy’s phone,
but gained access to Manown’s cell phone only shortly before the scheduled preliminary
hearing.
Four or five days before that hearing, Bird and Manown met for 45 minutes to an
hour. Bird informed Manown that the review of his cell phone yielded no other text
messages. According to Manown, Bird explained the terms of the prosecution’s new plea
offer: that he could pick which of the three charges he would plead to, he would register
as a sex offender, and he would receive two years of probation and no jail time.
Depending on the charge to which he pleaded, Manown would be required to register as a
sex offender for either 20 years or life.
Manown said that Bird discussed the risks of not taking the plea, including serving
time in prison. Because of the nature of his offense, the risk of being “shanked” was
higher in prison than in jail, and Manown might have to align with “ ‘skinheads’ ” for
protection. Manown expressed his innocence, and Bird shrugged her shoulders and told
him, “ ‘[t]his is still a pretty good deal’ ” and “ ‘[t]he [sex offender] list isn’t a big deal,
you don’t need to worry about it.’ ” She also said that taking responsibility by accepting
the plea deal would give him “ ‘bonus points’ ” in family court.
Manown further testified that, after his meeting with Bird, he called his mother
and told her about the plea offer, including that it did not require jail time. He told her
that Bird said he risked being “shanked” in prison and would have to associate with
“skinheads” for protection.
3
Manown also testified that Bird texted him the night before the scheduled
preliminary hearing to ask for his decision. He felt pressured because he had not yet
made up his mind.
Thirty minutes before the preliminary hearing was scheduled to begin, he met with
Bird outside the courtroom. Manown asked if he could ever be removed from the sex
offender registry, and Bird said he could petition to remove his name. She also informed
him that the plea had changed and now included 120 days in jail. She did not explain the
reason for the change. Bird told Manown to make a decision that day, before the
preliminary hearing, or else the offer would be withdrawn. Manown took the deal.
Manown additionally testified that, at some point, he and Bird had spoken about
the potential impact the plea could have on his ability to be around his children. Bird told
Manown he would be able to pick up and drop off his children at school, and doing so
would “only become[] a problem when someone makes it a problem.” She answered
similarly about taking his children to parks. Bird said that if he took the deal, Manown
would have to leave his house for six months to a year but would be able to return.
Manown testified that he was seeking to withdraw his plea because of the jail time
and the plea’s impact on visitation with his children. Manown explained that the
important considerations in deciding to take the plea included the fear of prison, avoiding
jail time so he could continue to work and participate in his home life, and being able to
be around and care for his children.
Manown’s mother testified at the hearing as well. She said that Manown called
her after his in-person meeting with Bird before the scheduled preliminary hearing. His
voice was shaking, and he told her he thought he had to take the plea offer but did not
disclose its terms. He said Bird told him he would be “shanked” if he did not take the
deal. Manown’s mother attended most of Manown’s court hearings and was present
when he pleaded no contest, including during the conversation outside the courtroom
4
between Manown and Bird. Manown became quiet and pale after Bird informed him
about the change in the prosecution’s offer.
The prosecution called as witnesses defense investigator Brian Swanson and Bird.
Swanson testified that Bird directed him to review Manown’s cell phone for any text
messages close to the date of Manown’s arrest. Swanson inspected Manown’s cell phone
at the sheriff’s department for 10 to 15 minutes but found no relevant messages.
Swanson did not conduct a forensic extraction of the cell phone’s data. He picked up
Manown’s cell phone records containing a list of phone numbers and delivered them to
Bird’s office.
Bird testified that she communicated to Manown the prosecution’s offer of
120 days in jail for pleading to any one of the three charges. At no time did she tell him
he would not face jail time. Bird shared possible alternatives to incarceration, including
work programs, but informed him that sex offender registrants were typically rejected
from such programs. Bird informed Manown that, if incarcerated, he needed to be aware
that gangs might physically harm him. She denied telling him that “he would be
shanked,” clarifying she “would have said something along the lines of, this is a potential
that this could happen. And you need to be aware for your own personal safety.” She did
not recall whether she told him to align with any specific groups in prison, but
acknowledged doing so can be productive.
Bird further testified that Manown wanted to avoid registering because he was
seeking custody of his children. Bird provided a mitigation packet to the prosecution in
an effort to resolve the case without a registration requirement. Preparation of the
mitigation packet included having Manown meet with a doctor and asking individuals to
write character letters. After submitting the packet, Bird “begged and pleaded” with the
prosecution for a settlement without sex offender registration based on Manown’s lack of
criminal history, his early acceptance of responsibility, and a risk analysis. Bird called,
texted, and met with the prosecutor and “was on the verge of stalking her,” but the
5
prosecutor declined. Bird advised Manown to stay abreast of potential future changes in
the law, but told him that registration was currently for life for the section 288.3 and
288.4 charges. She advised him that registration would prevent him from participating in
school activities and taking trips with his children; she said it would significantly affect
his ability to parent.
Bird stated that Manown wanted her to investigate his phone to show that he had
been texting multiple women at the same time and that his texting was focused on a
person other than the decoy. Manown told Bird that he liked texting with older women
and that when he was texting the decoy he thought he was communicating with a 30-
year-old. He said “he was confused as to who, in fact, he was texting at the end.” It took
weeks, but Bird obtained a court order to review the phone. Swanson reviewed the phone
and found that the text messages with women other than the decoy had been deleted.
Bird testified that she thoroughly reviewed this potential defense prior to the scheduled
preliminary hearing.
Bird further testified that, on the day of the plea, she reviewed the supplemental
probation orders with Manown. The supplemental probation orders included sex
offender registration provisions. As a standard practice prior to a plea, Bird reviews with
her clients the offer, the consequences of any plea, the maximum and minimum exposure,
any defenses, and their constitutional rights. Manown appeared to understand all of this.
Bird informed him that the plea deal would expire after the preliminary hearing and that
any subsequent offer would likely involve a prison term. After Bird discussed and re-
reviewed everything with Manown, he decided to enter the plea the day of the scheduled
preliminary hearing.
Bird denied ever threatening or lying to Manown to induce him to plead. She
denied telling Manown he would get “bonus points” with the family court if he pleaded
and did not know what that meant. Bird did more for Manown than she had for other
clients, including securing a risk assessment from a doctor, preparing a mitigation packet,
6
and going to “extraordinary measures” to obtain data from the cell phone. Bird had
“exhausted all avenues.”
The trial court denied Manown’s motion to withdraw his plea. Addressing each of
the four contentions advanced in Manown’s motion, the court first found that Bird had
conducted an adequate investigation given the early stage of the case. The court read into
the record the text exchange between Manown and the law enforcement decoy:
“[S]he says, ‘Oh, are you okay with younger?’ He says, ‘What’s younger?’ ‘Like
not 18,’ is the response. He responds, ‘Okay.’ IDK, ‘I don’t know about that.’ [¶] She
says, ‘Okay. No problem.’ Then, he responds again. ‘You’re not 18. You look 18.’
And she says, ‘Thanks. Not – I’m a little younger than that.’ Various emojis. He says,
‘No, okay.’ He says, ‘Sorry. Sounds kind of like a setup. I don’t mean any offense. If
it’s not just too sketchy for me.’ [¶] She says, ‘Okay. I understand. Thanks.’ Then he
texts, again. ‘No problem. I would like to meet you, though, if that’s okay with you.
Will you be 18 soon?’ Suggesting that he was not confused about who he was texting at
this time. She responds, ‘I’ll be almost 14 soon.’ He says, ‘Oh, damn.’ She said, ‘And
then, how do you get your room? I have a girl I’m working with that helps me with that.’
‘Oh, okay.’ ‘I could see her, maybe.’ She says, ‘She don’t date anymore.’ [¶] ‘Oh,
okay.’ Then, she says – then, he says, ‘She there with you?’ And she says, ‘You’re
asking a lot of questions for someone who doesn’t want to book.’ And then, he answers,
‘My bad. Would you consider a car date?’ ”
Given this exchange, the trial court reasoned, there was no likelihood that the
assertedly missing messages would have shown that Manown was confused about the age
of the person with whom he was texting. He “consistently is told that this individual is
younger than 18. And then, younger than 14. And he continues to … text message her.
[¶] And there does not appear to be any confusion about which text thread he is using. It
appears he is making reference to earlier messages in the text chain.”
7
Second, the trial court rejected Manown’s claim that Bird’s reference to potential
prison violence coerced him to accept the plea. She was not conveying a threat, and an
attorney would be remiss not to explain to his or her client the potential consequences of
a decision whether to plead, including extra-judicial consequences.
Third, the trial court found that Bird had discussed sex offender registration with
Manown. It found her testimony credible and noted other references to registration in the
plea materials and colloquy. The court also saw no shortcoming in counsel’s reference to
the possibility of future changes in the law involving sex offender registration. To the
contrary, advising clients that the law could evolve was part of a lawyer’s job.
Finally, the trial court found that Bird had extensive discussions about Manown’s
ability to continue caring for his children if required to register as a sex offender. Based
on these findings, the court saw no evidence supporting Manown’s motion to withdraw
his plea.
The trial court then turned to sentencing. Consistent with the terms of the plea
agreement, the court imposed and stayed a sentence of two years in prison, placed
Manown on two years of formal probation, and imposed 120 days in jail. The court also
ordered Manown to register as a sex offender under section 290.
Manown timely appealed. The trial court granted his request for a certificate of
probable cause.
DISCUSSION
I.
Manown argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his
plea because, he contends, the plea was the result of his counsel’s ineffective assistance,
specifically Bird’s failure to obtain a forensic examination of his cell phone. We
disagree.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant “ ‘must
satisfy a two-pronged showing: that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the
8
defendant was prejudiced, that is, there is a reasonable probability the outcome would
have been different were it not for the deficient performance.’ ” (People v. Woodruff
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 736; see generally Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
687.) “[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies … . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be
followed.” (Strickland, at p. 697.) “To establish prejudice, the defendant has the burden
of showing ‘ “that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s incompetence, he
[or she] would not have pled guilty.” ’ ” (People v. Codinha (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
1047, 1064.) A defendant’s statement that he or she would not have accepted a plea must
be corroborated by objective evidence. (See In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 938.)
Assuming without deciding that Bird performed deficiently in not obtaining a
forensic examination of Manown’s cell phone, Manown has failed to show prejudice
from that omission. Manown claims that “had counsel produced a proper extraction and
corroborating records demonstrating concurrent texting, deletion of the ‘decoy’ messages
after age disclosures, and message volume inconsistent with focused intent to
communicate with underage females, there is at least a reasonable probability [he] would
have rejected the plea bargain and elected to proceed to trial.” The record, however,
contains none of the missing digital evidence Manown claims would have made the
difference in his decision. As a result, Manown’s contention that he would not have
entered the plea had counsel recovered his cell phone’s exculpatory contents rests on
nothing more than speculation. That is not sufficient to demonstrate error. (People v.
Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1147, quoting People v. Williams (1988)
44 Cal.3d 883, 937 [defendant must establish “ ‘prejudice as a “demonstrable reality,” not
simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel’ ”]; see also In re
Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 938 [objective evidence required to corroborate claim by
9
defendant he would not have pleaded guilty].) Manown maintains that his own testimony
about his text messaging substantiates his claim, but the question is not whether he
himself believed there was helpful evidence in the phone but whether a forensic
examination would have corroborated his belief and thus led him to decline the plea
offer. On that score, the record is silent, and his claim of ineffective assistance therefore
fails.
II.
Manown next contends that Bird’s deficient plea advice constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel and established good cause to withdraw his plea under section 1018.
Again, we disagree.
A trial court may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea upon a
showing of good cause. (§ 1018; People v. Archer (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 693, 702.)
“ ‘To establish good cause to withdraw a guilty plea, the defendant must show by clear
and convincing evidence that he or she was operating under mistake, ignorance, or any
other factor overcoming the exercise of his or her free judgment, including inadvertence,
fraud, or duress.’ ” (Archer, at p. 702; see also People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562,
566.)
“A trial court’s decision whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea
under section 1018 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Patterson (2017)
2 Cal.5th 885, 894.) A constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is subject
to our independent review. (People v. Ogunmowo (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 67, 76.) “We
accord deference to the trial court’s factual determinations if supported by substantial
evidence in the record, but exercise our independent judgment in deciding whether the
facts demonstrate trial counsel’s deficient performance and resulting prejudice to the
defendant.” (Ibid.) Moreover, the “ ‘standard for judging counsel’s representation is a
most deferential one.’ [Citation.] We ‘must indulge a “strong presumption” that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance
10
because it is all too easy to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was
unreasonable in the harsh light of hindsight.’ [Citation.] ‘Unlike a later reviewing court,
the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and
interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.’ ” (In re Long
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 773.)
Manown claims that Bird misadvised him in two respects: (1) she initially
informed him that the plea offer would not include jail time but then said the opposite
only moments before he had to make a decision whether to plead; and (2) she failed to
accurately advise him about lifetime sex offender registration and its effect on his ability
to parent. Bird testified on both of these topics, stating that she never conveyed a no-jail-
time plea offer to Manown and that she advised him about the consequences of the
registration requirement. The trial court found Bird’s account credible, and the record—
including Bird’s testimony and other evidence of her efforts to obtain a resolution
without a registration requirement—amply supports this finding.
Manown also claims that Bird “deployed fear-laden, coercive risk framing” to
induce him to plead by telling him he would be “shanked” in prison and would need to
align himself with “skinheads” for protection. After hearing testimony from Manown,
his mother, and Bird, the trial court found that Bird’s statements were not a threat and fell
within the range of appropriate advice to a client who may be facing a prison term. Here
too, the record contains adequate evidence to support this finding, including Bird’s
testimony about the nature and context of the cautionary advice she conveyed. We
therefore conclude that Manown has not demonstrated that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel.
11
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
12