Filed 7/21/26 P. v. Mancillas CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B349157
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24VWCF01516
MARLON ALEXANDER
MANCILLAS,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Shellie L. Samuels, Judge. Reversed and
remanded for further proceedings.
Nathan J. Hochman, District Attorney, Cassandra Throp
and Byron Beck, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
California Appellate Project, Jennifer Peabody and Olivia
Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Respondent.
The People bring this appeal. They contend the trial court
imposed an unauthorized sentence by using Penal Code section
654 to sentence defendant Marlon Alexander Mancillas under
Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) rather than
sentencing him under Penal Code section 666.5.1 We agree and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
In 2025, Mancillas pleaded no contest to driving or taking a
vehicle he did not own without the owner’s consent in violation of
Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). Mancillas also
admitted that he previously sustained prior convictions under
that same Vehicle Code section within the meaning of section
666.5. The sentencing triad for a single violation of Vehicle Code
section 10851, subdivision (a) is 16 months, two years, or three
years in county jail. (Ibid.; § 1170, subd. (h)(1).) By contrast, the
sentencing triad for repeat offenders under section 666.5,
subdivision (a) is imprisonment for two, three, or four years.
(Ibid.)
With respect to the section 666.5 allegation, the trial court
stayed sentencing under section 654. The court thus effectively
sentenced Mancillas as though this were his first conviction for
violating Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). In doing so,
the court imposed a low term of 16 months imprisonment under
that statute, rather than sentencing Mancillas under section
666.5. This was an erroneous, unauthorized sentence.
Mancillas does not dispute that a stay of the section 666.5
allegation under section 654 is improper. But he contends the
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
trial court did not impose such a stay. Rather, according to
Mancillas, the court acted within its broad discretion under
section 1385 to dismiss the section 666.5 allegation and sentence
him in the manner it did. As we shall explained, however, the
record belies this contention.
TRIAL COURT’S RULING
The court made the following statements when sentencing
Mancillas:
I just want [the parties] to be aware that if I
can’t do this, what I’m doing with 666.5, if I can’t
stay [that allegation], I will get a letter from the [CDCR],
I guess, saying that there’s a mistake and [that I am
required to impose] the low term [of] two years [under
section 666.5]. ¶
¶ And [the CDCR] will want me to change [the sentence] to
two years. So I’m warning you right now I’m going to have
to, because if they have a code section that says I can’t do
this – I just have some vague memory of this happening
before and there being a letter. But I can’t say it’s going to
happen. ¶
As to count 1, a violation of 10851(a) of the Vehicle Code,
[Mancillas] is to be imprisoned in [ ] county jail for a total
aggregate term of 16 months. The court selects the low
term of 16 months as the base term per the plea agreement.
The 666.5 allegation is stayed[,] making the triad . . . . 16
months, two years, [or] three years, and I’m giving the low
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term on that. I’m pretty sure I’m going to get a letter, just
so you know. We will bring him back and he will have to
give up some of his credits, I guess[, if the CDCR deems the
sentence unlawful].
(Italics added.)
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Statutes and Standard of Review
We begin our discussion by reviewing the multiple statutes
cited by the trial court at the sentencing hearing and the parties
in their respective appellate briefs.
Vehicle Code section 10851 prohibits vehicle theft.
Subdivision (a) of the statute provides: “Any person who drives or
takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the
owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or
temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or
possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal
the vehicle, or any person who is a party or an accessory to or an
accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is
guilty of a public offense and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one
year or pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal
Code or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000),
or by both the fine and imprisonment.” Under section 1170,
subdivision (h), the sentencing triad for a single section 10851,
subdivision (a) violation is 16 months, two years, or three years
in county jail.
Section 666.5 increases the sentence for offenders who
commit more than one vehicle theft. Subdivision (a) of the
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statute states, “[e]very person who [ ] [has] been previously
convicted of a felony violation of Section 10851 of the Vehicle
Code, . . . regardless of whether or not the person actually served
a prior prison term for [that] offense[ ], [and] is subsequently
convicted of [that] offense[,] shall be punished by imprisonment
pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for two, three, or four
years, or a fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both the fine
and the imprisonment.” “Section 666.5 is an alternate
punishment scheme that prescribes an elevated sentencing triad
for recidivist car thieves who have a prior felony conviction for
car theft or related conduct.” (People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th
861, 869 (Lee).) “Section 666.5 does not define a new offense and
it is not an enhancement; it simply increases the punishment for
the crime.” (Lee, at p. 869.)
Sections 654 and 1385 are general sentencing statutes that
are not limited to vehicle theft. Section 654, subdivision (a)
provides, in pertinent part: “An act or omission that is punishable
in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or
omission be punished under more than one provision.” Under
section 1385, subdivision (a), “[t]he judge or magistrate may,
either on motion of the court or upon the application of the
prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an
action to be dismissed.”
We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847
(Sandoval).) “The trial court’s sentencing discretion must be
exercised in a manner that is not arbitrary and capricious” and
that is “consistent with the letter and spirit of the law.” (Ibid.)
“[A] sentence is generally ‘unauthorized’ where it could not
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lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular
case.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 (Scott).) It is
well settled that a trial court imposes an unauthorized sentence
when it erroneously stays a sentence using section 654. (Scott, at
p. 354, fn. 17.)
B. Analysis
1. The trial court sentenced Mancillas using section
654, not section 1385
As a threshold matter, the parties disagree over what
statute the trial court used to sentence Mancillas in the manner
it did. Whereas the People assert the trial court stayed the
section 666.5 allegation using section 654, Mancillas asserts the
trial court dismissed the section 666.5 allegation using section
1385. We agree with the People.
Although the reporter’s transcript does not indicate the
trial court mentioned section 654 when orally pronouncing
judgment, the court explicitly stated it was “staying” the section
666.5 allegation, which is the action courts are directed to take
when applying section 654. (See, e.g, People v. Duff (2010) 50
Cal.4th 787, 796 [“when a court determines that a conviction falls
within the meaning of section 654, it is necessary to impose
sentence but to stay the execution of the duplicative sentence.”
[italics added and omitted].) Moreover, the minute order of
Mancillas’s sentencing hearing explicitly states the court “stayed
[8 months of his sentence] pursuant to Penal Code section 654.”
(Italics added.)
Viewing the reporter’s and clerk’s transcript in tandem, the
only reasonable interpretation of the record is that the court
stayed the section 666.5 allegation under section 654. We reject
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Mancillas’s argument that the court’s multiple references to
“staying” the section 666.5 allegation rather than “dismissing” it,
as well as the explicit mention of section 654 in the minute order,
were all clerical errors.2
Having concluded the trial court stayed Mancillas’s section
666.5 allegation using section 654, we turn to whether the court’s
application of section 654 constituted an unauthorized sentence.3
2. The trial court imposed a sentence that was
unauthorized by section 654
We agree with the People that the trial court’s use of
section 654 to stay Mancillas’s section 666.5 repeat offender
allegation constituted an unauthorized sentence.
“Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for a single
physical act that violates different provisions of law.” (Jones,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 358.) We review a trial court’s finding
that it would violate section 654 to impose multiple sentences for
substantial evidence. (People v. Garcia (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th
1550, 1564.)
2 Section 654 requires courts to not impose multiple
punishments for single acts. (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th
350, 358 (Jones).) Section 1385, by contrast, is a discretionary
statute—it allows a sentencing court to dismiss an action in
furtherance of justice. Nothing in the record suggests the trial
court believed it would further the interest of justice to sentence
Mancillas in the manner it did.
3 Because we conclude the trial court did not dismiss the
section 666.5 allegation under section 1385, we need not address
Mancillas’s contention that dismissal of the repeat offender
allegation would have been permissible under section 1385.
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It is not always easy to ascertain what constitutes a single
physical act within the meaning of section 654. (Jones, supra, 54
Cal.4th at p. 358.) In this case, however, it is readily apparent
that Mancillas falls outside section 654. Mancillas’s three acts
that led to his Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a)
convictions occurred in February 2023, September 2023, and July
2024 respectively. Because these vehicle thefts all occurred on
separate dates, and indeed months apart from one another, they
could not have constituted single acts barring multiple
punishment within the meaning of section 654. The trial court
thus imposed an unauthorized sentence by applying section 654
to stay sentencing under section 666.5 in a manner unsupported
by substantial evidence. (See Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354, fn.
17.) Stated differently, the court abused its discretion by
imposing a sentence that was inconsistent with the “letter and
spirit” of section 654. (See Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 847.)
Given that the sentence imposed was unauthorized, we conclude
remand is warranted. 4
During oral argument, both parties stated through counsel
that on remand, Mancillas should be permitted to withdraw his
plea if he chooses to do so.
4 We reject Mancillas’s argument that the People forfeited
their challenge to his sentence by not objecting to it in the trial
court with adequate specificity. A lack of objection below does not
forfeit an appellate challenge to an unauthorized sentence.
(Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354.) Because we reject Mancillas’s
forfeiture argument on that basis, we need not address the
parties’ arguments concerning whether the People’s general
objection to the trial court’s imposition of a 16-month sentence
was sufficiently specific to preserve the arguments raised by the
People in this appeal.
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DISPOSITION
We vacate Mancillas’s sentence and remand the case for
further proceedings. On remand, the trial court is not prohibited
from giving Mancillas the opportunity to withdraw his plea if he
wishes to do so. If Mancillas again pleads or is otherwise
convicted, the trial court may consider its full range of lawful
sentencing options. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857,
893.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
COGLIATI, J.*
* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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