Filed 8/31/26 P. v. Makboul CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084615
v. (Super .Ct. No. BAF2400327)
MAKBOUL AHMAD MAKBOUL, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Randall S. Stamen, Judge.
Affirmed.
Matthew Aaron Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Kathryn
Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Makboul Ahmed Makboul of one count
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of stalking (Pen. Code, § 649.9, subd. (a); count 1) and three counts of intentionally
violating a protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a); counts 2-4), and the trial court sentenced
him to 10 years. Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by denying his
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Faretta motion to represent himself at trial and ordering him to register as a lifetime sex
offender (§ 290.006). We affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2004, defendant was in a six-month relationship with Leslie S. She eventually
got a restraining order against him because of his behavior, which included refusing to
leave her house, getting into her car and refusing to get out, and calling her “constantly”
and leaving her “[a]ngry” voicemails.
Defendant violated the restraining order on several occasions by calling her and,
on one occasion, entering her house in the middle of the night while she was asleep.
Defendant was arrested for violating the restraining order, but he continued to contact
Leslie while in custody by sending her 27 letters and calling her repeatedly. Leslie
changed her name and phone number and moved to get away from defendant.
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Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.
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In 2023, Georgianna S. began a “purely sexual” relationship with defendant that
lasted about four or five months. Defendant made Georgianna feel uncomfortable “all
the time,” and she found his behavior to be “very off.”
She ended the relationship when she learned that defendant had a prior conviction for
stalking.
Defendant continued to call and text Georgianna incessantly and frequently drove
by her house honking the horn. Georgianna told defendant to leave her alone, but he
“would not take no for an answer” and continued contacting her. She eventually got a
“no contact” restraining order against him because she felt “very uncomfortable” and
“very scared” due to his behavior.
Defendant continued contacting Georgianna despite the restraining order. He
frequently drove up and down her street, backed into her driveway and almost hit her, and
called and texted her repeatedly. Because Georgianna was “in fear [for her] life,” she
reported defendant’s conduct to law enforcement seven times.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Faretta Motion
On the day defendant’s trial was scheduled to begin, defendant complained about
his attorney. Defendant complained that his attorney had not yet filed a Romero motion
to strike his prior strike convictions and had not filed a motion for bail review. The court
asked defendant if he wanted a new attorney, and he replied, “No, I represent myself for
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today.” The court confirmed whether defendant wanted another attorney or represent
himself, and defendant replied, “No. For now, I represent myself.” The court explained
that defendant could have a Marsden hearing or he could move to represent himself.
When he confirmed he did not want a Marsden hearing, the court asked whether he
wanted to proceed with trial. Defendant responded that he needed a ruling on a motion
his attorney had not yet filed. The trial court directed defendant and his attorney to
confer off the record.
After doing so, defense counsel admitted that he had miscalculated defendant’s
maximum sentence exposure. Counsel explained that he had mistakenly believed
defendant was facing a 25-years-to-life sentence as a “third striker” when he faced a
maximum sentence of 15 years, four months. Counsel confirmed that he was ready to
proceed with trial, but defendant reiterated that he wanted to represent himself.
The trial court advised defendant of the risks of self-representation and asked him
some questions about his ability to represent himself. The trial court then denied
defendant’s request to represent himself. Among other things, the court questioned
defendant about what he would ask prospective jurors during voir dire. Defendant
responded by explaining that he first needed to locate a potential (unidentified) witness to
testify on his behalf and against Georgianna S.
The court found defendant’s request was “very, very late . . . given . . . that we
have approximately 40 jurors outside of this courtroom waiting to be sworn in and seated
in the courtroom.” In the court’s view, defendant’s request “at this late, late stage . . .
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would disrupt and delay the trial” given that the People were prepared to proceed and had
“a number of witnesses ready to go,” including two or three peace officers, and two
witnesses who were subpoenaed to testify on the following day.
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation if the
defendant’s request for self-representation “is made within a reasonable time prior to the
commencement of trial, is unequivocal, and is made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.” (People v. Wright (2021) 12 Cal.5th 419, 435-436.)
The trial court therefore may deny an untimely Faretta motion. (People v.
Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 433 fn. 15.) The denial of an untimely Faretta motion
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Buenrostro (2019) 6 Cal.5th 367, 426.)
“Motions made just prior to the start of trial are not timely.” (People v. Scott (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205.) Courts have consistently held that Faretta motions made days
before trial are not timely. (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 742 [two days];
People v. Howze (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1397 [two days]; People v. Scott, supra, at
p. 1205 [four days]; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 757 [five days]; People v.
Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780, 791 [six days].)
Defendant’s Faretta motion, made on the morning trial was set to begin, was
untimely. (See People v. Frierson, supra, at p. 742; People v. Wright, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
p. 436.)
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Defendant argues the motion was timely because he made it immediately after he
learned that his attorney had made an error about his maximum sentencing exposure.
Defendant does not cite, nor can we locate, any authority that suggests this renders his
exceptionally untimely Faretta motion timely. If anything, it suggests that defendant’s
request to represent himself was borne out of frustration with his attorney, which does not
justify granting a Faretta motion. (See People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 21; see
also People v. Scott, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1205 [trial court properly denied Faretta
motion as equivocal where defendant’s “comments suggest he made the Faretta motion
only because he wanted to rid himself of appointed counsel”]; Moon v. Superior Court
(2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1529-1530 [Faretta request motivated by dissatisfaction
with counsel is not equivocal]; People v. Weeks (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 882, 885-885
[same].)
Since defendant’s Faretta motion was untimely, we must determine whether the
trial court abused its discretion in denying it. (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327,
398.) The court abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitrary, capricious, patently
absurd, or falls outside the bounds of reason. (Ibid.) The trial court’s decision here was
reasonable and within its discretion.
“In exercising its discretion,” to deny an untimely Faretta motion, “‘the trial court
should inquire into the defendant’s reasons for the request[s]’ and should consider factors
including ‘“the quality of counsel’s representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior
proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the
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proceedings, and the disruption or delay which might reasonably be expected to follow
the granting of such a motion.”’” (People v. Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 399.)
Here, the trial court properly denied defendant’s Faretta motion largely because
trial was about to begin and granting the motion would disrupt and delay the proceedings.
As the court explained, there were about 40 prospective jurors waiting to be empaneled,
several witnesses were poised to testify that day or the day after, and the People were
prepared to proceed. Trial courts need not grant an untimely Faretta request like
defendant’s if it would “interfere with the orderly administration of justice.” (People v.
Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008, 1057.) The trial court reasonably found that granting
defendant’s request would do so. This is true even though defendant did not request a
continuance given that he wanted to locate an unidentified witness, which suggested that
he would need and seek more time to prepare for trial. (See People v. Buenrostro, supra,
6 Cal.5th at pp. 427-428.) The court thus properly denied the motion.
B. Lifetime Sex Offender Registration
As part of its sentence, the trial court ordered defendant to register as a lifetime
sex offender under section 290.006. The court found that defendant committed the
stalking offense “as a result of a sexual compulsion, or for the purpose of sexual
gratification.” The court reasoned that defendant and Georgianna S. had a sexual
relationship and he repeatedly contacted her for sexual reasons, noting that on several
occasions he texted her because “‘mushroom head’” (what he called his penis) missed
her. The court found sex-offender registration was proper given defendant’s history of
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stalking women and because jail time and probation had not sufficiently deterred this
behavior.
As part of a sentence, the trial court has discretion to order a person convicted of
felony stalking to register as a sex offender. (§§ 646.9, subd. (d), 290.006.) When
exercising that discretion, “[T]he trial court must engage in a two-step process: (1) it
must find whether the offense was committed as a result of sexual compulsion or for
purposes of sexual gratification, and state the reasons for those findings; and (2) it must
state the reasons for requiring lifetime registration as a sex offender.” (People v.
Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1197, overruled on other grounds in Johnson v.
Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 888.) We review the trial court’s decision
to order sex offender registration for an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Eastman
(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 638, 650.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion here. The trial court properly followed
the two-step process mandated by our Supreme Court. First, the court found that
defendant stalked Georgianna for purposes of sexual gratification or the result of a sexual
compulsion. The record supports that finding. As the court explained, many of
defendant’s text messages to Georgianna referred to his “mushroom head.” One text it
was “‘From mushroom head. He misses you.’” Another text told her to “‘say good by t
mushroom head.’” On another occasion, defendant texted Georgianna to come to a motel
for a half-hour, which suggested he wanted her to come by for sex. Defendant also sent
her a picture of another woman with the caption, “‘That’s the one who cleaned ur baby
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the mushrooms hed [sic].’” And in another text, defendant told Georgianna, “‘u need t
take of ur braces so u could give a good head.’” Given these multiple sexually explicit
texts, the trial court reasonably found that defendant stalked Georgianna for purposes of
sexual gratification or as the result of a sexual compulsion. (People v. Marchand (2002)
98 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1063-1064 [facts supporting registration need be proven only by a
preponderance of the evidence].)
The trial court also properly stated its reasons for ordering defendant to register as
a sex offender. The court reasoned that defendant had a long history of stalking women
(dating back to around 2004), and probation and prison did not deter him from stalking
Georgianna about 20 years later. As the court properly observed, defendant tried to
contact Georgianna from jail while he was awaiting trial in this case, and he repeatedly
contacted Leslie from prison. The trial court thus rationally found that sex offender
registration was necessary to deter defendant from stalking sexual partners in a similar
fashion (i.e., for sexual purposes or gratification) in the future. (See Hubbart v. Superior
Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1157 [noting that past criminal conduct can indicate a
“likelihood of future harm”]; see also People v. Contreras (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 247,
255 [risk of reoffending not necessary for discretionary sex offender registration but is
appropriate consideration].) For these reasons, the court found that lifetime sex offender
registration was warranted.
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By stating its entirely valid reasons for its decision on the record, the court
satisfied the second part of our Supreme Court’s two-step process. The court’s
imposition of sex offender registration on defendant under section 290.006 was not “so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it” because it was
largely for the purpose of protecting the public in the future. (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 377; Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 527.) We therefore
find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision ordering defendant to register as a
lifetime sex offender.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
MILLER
J.
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