Filed 8/18/26 P. v. Magee CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B349499
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA106923)
v.
JEREMIA RENEE MAGEE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Thomas R. Sokolov, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeremia Renee Magee, in pro. per.; Linda L. Gordon, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Jeremia Renee Magee appeals from a judgment entered
after her no contest plea to issuing a check exceeding $950
without sufficient funds. The trial court sentenced her to
two years formal probation and ordered her to make restitution
to the victim in the amount of $9,950.10. We appointed counsel
to represent Magee on appeal. After reviewing the record,
counsel for Magee filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436 that did not identify any arguable issues. After
independently reviewing the record, as well as the arguments
raised in Magee’s supplemental brief, we have not identified any
either. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 14, 2021 Magee checked into a resort hotel. Over
the next 12 days, Magee used $15,510 worth of various amenities
at the hotel, including in-room dining, restaurant dinners,
parking, movie rentals, and use of the internet. On April 25 the
hotel attempted to charge Magee’s credit card, but the card was
declined. Magee provided a second credit card, but the hotel was
only able to charge $50 to the card. On April 27 Magee checked
out of the hotel and gave the hotel a personal check for the
remaining balance. However, the check was returned due to
insufficient funds.
On November 21, 2022 Magee was charged in a felony
complaint with one count of defrauding an innkeeper by
nonpayment over $950 (Pen. Code,1 § 537, subd. (a)(2); count 1)
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
and one count of issuing a check without sufficient funds
exceeding $950 (§ 476a, subd. (a); count 2).
On April 6, 2023, pursuant to a negotiated plea, Magee
entered a no contest plea to count 2 for issuing a check without
sufficient funds. The prosecutor explained the terms of the plea
agreement, under which the trial court would “put over
sentencing for one year for [Magee] to pay restitution to the
victim in a stipulated amount of $9,995.10,” and if Magee did not
have any “new convictions or cases,” stayed away from the hotel,
and complied with other conditions of the plea, the prosecution
“would ask the court to sentence [Magee] to a misdemeanor on
count 2 alone, and it will be one year of summary probation.”
However, “[i]f for any reason [Magee] pick[s] up any new cases or
[does] not pay the full restitution as stipulated by the one-year
date, [she] would be sentenced to the felony and be put on felony
probation for 24 months and still be required to pay full
restitution to the victim as well as stay away from the [hotel].”
In accepting the plea agreement, Magee acknowledged that
no one had threatened her or anyone close to her in order to get
her to change her plea, that she was changing her plea “freely
and voluntarily because [that] is what [she] want[s] to do,” and
that she was changing her plea “because after evaluating all the
facts and circumstances [she] believe[s] it is in [her] best interest
to take advantage of the deal today.” The trial court made a
finding Magee provided the waivers knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily, and that she understood the nature and
consequences of the plea agreement. The court then set the
matter for a sentencing hearing.
At the probation and sentencing hearing held on April 8,
2024, the trial court granted Magee’s request for additional time
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to pay victim restitution, and it continued the hearing. On
September 2, 2025 Magee, represented by counsel, filed a motion
to withdraw her plea pursuant to section 1018. In her supporting
declaration, Magee stated she was “innocent of the charge(s),” she
did not intend to commit any crime, she was a victim of domestic
violence and “was escaping abuse,” and she was attempting to
“secure stable housing” for herself and her children by staying at
the hotel. In addition, at the time she entered the plea, her
ability to assist her attorney and review discovery in the case
“was limited by trauma, housing insecurity, and urgent life
needs.” Further, at the time of the plea, she felt pressure to enter
into the plea as a result of her circumstances, which “overcame
[her] free judgment.”
On September 4, 2025, after a hearing, the trial court
denied Magee’s motion. The court explained that it “has at least
read three times the transcript of the plea in this matter . . . [and
it] puts great weight in the . . . reading of the transcript of the
plea. And quite honestly, there’s been [an] insufficient showing
to grant the withdrawal of the plea.” The court sentenced Magee
to two years formal probation and imposed multiple conditions,
including that she pay $9,950.10 in restitution to the hotel. The
court dismissed count 1 and advised Magee that if she “pays all
victim restitution, the court may reduce count 2 to a
misdemeanor.”
On October 1, 2025 Magee filed a notice of appeal
challenging the validity of her plea and requested a certificate of
probable cause. Magee asserted in her request that the case “was
wrongfully criminalized following false and retaliatory reports by
[the] opposing party” in the family law domestic violence context.
Further, she was denied a fair hearing, and “the plea entered was
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not made knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily, but under
duress, misinformation, and fear of further retaliation.” The trial
court did not grant Magee’s request for a certificate of probable
cause.2 Accordingly, on October 31, 2025 this court advised the
parties that the appeal would be “limited to issues that do not
require a Certificate of Probable Cause.”
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Magee in her appeal.
After reviewing the record, appointed counsel did not identify any
arguable issues. On April 15, 2026 appointed counsel advised
Magee that she was filing a brief stating she was unable to find
any arguable issues and that Magee could personally submit any
contentions she believed the court should consider. Counsel also
stated in her declaration that she sent Magee the transcripts of
the record on appeal and a copy of the brief.
On May 13, 2026 Magee filed a three-page supplemental
brief in which she explained that the underlying “dispute”
involving the hotel “arose during an extremely unstable and
traumatic period” in her life, which included “domestic violence,
housing instability, financial hardship, and ongoing coercive
control” by her former husband. Further, following the events at
the hotel, Magee attempted to increase her income and repay the
debt she owed, but her former husband assaulted her, and when
she attempted to relocate to Arizona, he “portrayed [her] planned
relocation as evidence [of] attempting to flee prosecution.”
2 Although the request for a certificate of probable cause
checks the box for the request being “granted,” the order is not
signed.
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Further, she lost public assistance and financial support during
this time period, both of which were needed to “provide for [her]
children.” Magee argued: “These circumstances severely affected
my ability to fully advocate for myself and meaningfully
understand the long-term consequences of the plea proceedings.”
Following entry of a judgment based on a plea of no contest,
with limited exceptions, a defendant must obtain a certificate of
probable cause from the trial court to appeal the judgment,
including to challenge to the validity of the plea or an admission.
(§ 1237.5; see People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75
[§ 1237.5 does not allow reviewing courts to hear the merits of
issues going to the validity of the plea unless the defendant has
obtained a certificate of probable cause].) Thus, without a
certificate of probable cause, our review is “limited to issues that
do not require a certificate of probable cause.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.304(b)(3).) Those limited issues include “(1) search
and seizure issues for which an appeal is provided under
section 1538.5, subdivision (m); and (2) issues regarding
proceedings held subsequent to the plea for the purpose of
determining the degree of the crime and the penalty to be
imposed.” (Panizzon, at pp. 74-75.)
We have examined the portion of the record that does not
require a certificate of probable cause and are satisfied appellate
counsel for Magee has complied with counsel’s responsibilities
and there are no arguable issues. (Smith v. Robbins (2000)
528 U.S. 259, 277-284; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-
119; People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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