IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CHARLES LIGHTSEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
S226760
Kern County Superior Court
SC056801A
August 17, 2026
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban,
Evans, and Detjen* concurred.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
PEOPLE v. LIGHTSEY
S226760
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Defendant Christopher Charles Lightsey represented
himself during a portion of his capital trial, which took place
between 1993 and 1995. In his automatic appeal, we held that
the trial court reversibly erred by permitting Lightsey to
represent himself during proceedings in July 1994 to determine
whether he was mentally competent to stand trial. (People v.
Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 674 (Lightsey I); see id. at p. 692
[it “is beyond question” that the trial court “violated state
statutory law by failing to appoint counsel” to represent
Lightsey during the July 1994 competency hearing].)
Accordingly, we reversed the judgment and remanded for “the
trial court to determine whether a retrospective evaluation of
defendant’s competence to stand trial is feasible and, if it is, to
hold such a hearing.” (Id. at p. 674.) “If the trial court
determines that conducting a retrospective competency hearing
is not feasible, or if a retrospective competency hearing is held
at which defendant proves he was incompetent by a
preponderance of the evidence [citation], then the only
permissible remedy would be to let stand our reversal, subject
to defendant’s being retried if he is at that time mentally
competent to stand trial. If a fair and reliable retrospective
competency hearing can be conducted, and at that hearing
defendant fails to prove he was incompetent, the judgment will
be reinstated.” (Id. at pp. 709–710.)
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On remand, the trial court determined that a retrospective
evaluation of Lightsey’s competency was feasible and proceeded
to find that Lightsey was competent to stand trial in 1994. It
then reinstated the judgment. We conclude that the trial court
erred in determining that a retrospective competency hearing
was feasible. In so holding, we emphasize that retrospective
competency hearings are generally disfavored. In this case,
given the unavailability of a key expert and other witnesses, as
well as the limitations of the record resulting from the trial
court’s failure to appoint counsel for the July 1994 proceeding,
we find that the prosecution did not meet its burden to show
that the evidence in the record was sufficient “to reliably
determine the defendant’s mental competence when tried
earlier.” (People v. Ary (2011) 51 Cal.4th 510, 520 (Ary).)
Accordingly, we reverse the reinstated judgment. (See Lightsey
I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 709 [“If the trial court determines that
conducting a retrospective competency hearing is not
feasible . . . , then the only permissible remedy would be to let
stand our reversal”].)
I.
In 1993, Lightsey was charged with capital murder.
During the proceedings, numerous issues arose regarding
Lightsey’s representation and his mental competency. We
described those issues in Lightsey’s automatic appeal.
(Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 682–690.) In short,
“defendant’s counsel moved five different times during trial to
have the trial court declare a doubt about defendant’s mental
competence to stand trial. The court granted two of the
motions — the first on March 7, 1994, and the second on July 7,
1994 — held hearings both times, and twice concluded
defendant was not incompetent.” (Id. at p. 690.)
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
In our prior opinion, we detailed the trial court’s second
declaration of doubt as to Lightsey’s mental competence, which
followed the trial court granting Lightsey’s motion to represent
himself (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806) and the
appointment of advisory counsel: “[O]n April 11, 1994, the trial
court, after a very lengthy discussion, granted defendant’s
Faretta motion and relieved Attorneys [Edward] Brown and
[James] Sorena. Two days later, at defendant’s request,
Attorney Ralph McKnight, Jr., was appointed as advisory
counsel for defendant. On June 29, 1994, Attorney McKnight,
although serving only as advisory counsel, filed a motion
requesting that the trial court terminate defendant’s self-
representation due to his asserted mental incompetence.
Included with the motion were declarations from McKnight and
defendant’s former attorney, Sorena. McKnight declared that
in his view, based on the eight times he had met with defendant,
defendant was ‘demonstrating signs of serious mental
instability’ and ‘appears to be unable to comprehend and
appreciate either the substantive or the procedural law which is
applicable in this matter.’ According to McKnight, defendant’s
‘prior waiver of counsel appears to be a direct outgrowth of his
delusion that the justice system in general, and defense
attorneys in particular, are in league against him in an all
pervasive conspiracy. He also appears to have a belief in his
own super competence, which causes [him] to believe that he
alone has the correct interpretation of the law. These delusions
render him incompetent to knowingly and intelligently
appreciate the difficulties he will face representing himself and
what is at stake.’ McKnight reported that, as was the case with
defendant’s prior attorneys, defendant ‘refuses to cooperate with
myself as his advisory counsel, refuses to accept advice from me,
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
and remains hostile, accusatory and suspicious.’ Further,
defendant had repeatedly asked counsel to make various
motions or take other actions which were ‘impossible,
impractical or inconsistent,’ and then cited counsel’s refusal to
follow defendant’s orders as further proof counsel was ‘part of
the conspiracy against him.’
“Attorney Sorena’s declaration echoed these concerns. In
their first meeting, defendant could not focus his discussion, was
very suspicious of Sorena, and by the conclusion of the 45-
minute meeting was convinced that Sorena was ‘part of a
pervasive conspiracy against him.’ According to Sorena,
defendant believed ‘all members of the justice system were in
collusion to execute him, including the court reporters who
falsified the transcripts of prior hearings.’ Based upon Sorena’s
contact with another criminal defendant who had been
diagnosed with paranoid and delusional disorders, Sorena ‘was
convinced after my interview with [defendant] that he was
genuinely delusional to the point where his ability to assist
counsel was in substantial doubt.’
“On July 7, 1994, the trial court, based on Attorney
McKnight’s motion and over defendant’s objections, again
suspended the proceedings for an assessment of defendant’s
mental competence. The court, however, permitted defendant
to continue to represent himself, including choosing one of the
experts who would interview him.
“The two resulting medical opinions concerning
defendant’s competence presented to the court in written reports
came to conflicting conclusions. The expert chosen by the court,
Psychiatrist Luis Velosa, concluded defendant was ‘suffering
from a psychiatric disorder which impairs his thinking process
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
. . . best classified as bipolar disorder (manic type) or a paranoid
disorder. The defendant at present is exhibiting psychotic
symptoms characterized by a thought disorder in which [he]
experiences racing thoughts, looseness of associations, rambling
of thoughts, sometimes without any logical connection. In
addition, the defendant experiences paranoid thinking,
persecutory delusions, [and] a false belief that there is a
conspiracy against him.’ Dr. Velosa concluded that defendant
‘is at present able to understand the nature and purpose of the
proceedings taken against him. However, because of his
psychiatric symptoms, the defendant at present is unable to
cooperate in a rational manner with counsel in presenting a
defense. Furthermore, despite . . . the fact that the defendant
has a vast knowledge of the legal system and legal proceedings,
because of his psychiatric symptoms, [he] is not able to represent
himself.’ Dr. Velosa also noted that defendant’s judgment was
‘impaired and he [had] no insight into his mental disorder.’
“The expert chosen by defendant, Psychiatrist Sakrapatna
Manohara, found defendant to be ‘generally cooperative but . . .
quite manipulative.’ Defendant’s speech was ‘coherent but
appeared to be circumstantial,’ and he was ‘blaming all his
problems on the system.’ Dr. Manohara found defendant ‘did
not appear to be really delusional although he was highly
mistrustful of the system and the attorneys.’ According to
Dr. Manohara, defendant ‘performed well’ in tests designed to
assess his memory and concentration, and he ‘showed
appropriate affect to thought content.’ Defendant exhibited
‘some anger and frustration’ at being ‘railroaded’ and believed
he needed to ‘let go and let God take care of things.’ In
Dr. Manohara’s opinion, defendant had a ‘grandiose sense of self
importance,’ tended to ‘exaggerate achievements and talents,’
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
spoke in a manner that was ‘excessively impressionistic and
lacking in detail,’ and believed ‘his problems [were] unique and
[could] only be understood by other special people.’ Defendant
did not have a ‘clear-cut psychotic disorder,’ but did appear to be
‘excessively mistrustful of the system,’ and exhibited a
narcissistic personality disorder. Dr. Manohara concluded that
defendant’s ‘personality disorder makes it difficult to work with
him as an attorney but . . . he is competent to stand trial.
However, he is not competent to represent himself because of his
lack of objectivity and his grandiose sense of self importance and
his tendency to be circumstantial with a sense of entitlement.
He may over-react to criticism with feelings of rage.’
“The trial court held a hearing concerning defendant’s
mental competence on July 28, 1994. In summarizing the
doctors’ reports, the trial court noted Dr. Manohara had found
defendant competent to stand trial, while ‘Dr. Velosa, although
he reflects what I would suggest to be some reservation in that
regard, he does indicate that [defendant was] able to understand
the nature and purpose of the proceedings.’ Defendant, who
continued to represent himself at the hearing, insisted he was
competent to proceed and demanded a jury trial on the issue of
his mental competence. The prosecutor, also apparently
desiring a finding defendant was competent, suggested
defendant waive his right to a jury trial and agree to submit the
matter on the experts’ reports if the trial court was ‘inclined to
find that [defendant] is competent to stand trial, which I believe
is what he wishes.’ The trial court then asked defendant
whether he would ‘waive a jury trial on that issue so we can get
on with the show.’ Defendant agreed to do so, and the court
proceeded to find defendant competent. Thereafter, Attorney
McKnight, who had not participated in the hearing, asked to be
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
relieved as advisory counsel based on the complete breakdown
of his relationship with defendant. The trial court granted the
request.” (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 685–687.)
Following the July 1994 competency hearing, Lightsey
continued to show signs of mental deterioration, yet the trial
court did not conduct any further proceedings to evaluate his
competency.
The jury ultimately convicted Lightsey of the first degree
murder of William Compton (Pen. Code, § 187; all further
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code),
burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), and robbery (§§ 211, 212.5,
subd. (a)). As to each count, the jury found true the allegations
that Lightsey personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)) and that he had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)). The jury also found true the special circumstance
allegations that the murder was committed in the course of a
burglary and a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G)) and the
murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)). Following a penalty phase, the jury
returned a verdict of death.
In his automatic appeal, we held that the trial court
committed reversible error by allowing Lightsey to represent
himself at the second competency proceedings. (Lightsey I,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 674.) “The plain language of section
1368, specifically addressing the procedures in criminal
competency proceedings, provides that when the trial court
states on the record that a doubt exists concerning the
defendant’s mental competence, ‘[i]f the defendant is not
represented by counsel, the court shall appoint counsel.’ (§ 1368,
subd. (a), italics added.) Nothing could be clearer.” (Lightsey I,
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
at p. 692; see id. at p. 702 [“the trial court’s failure to appoint
counsel to represent defendant at the competency proceedings
in violation of section 1368 constitutes a reversible miscarriage
of justice under article VI, section 13 of our state Constitution”].)
We remanded the matter to the trial court for further
proceedings. (Id. at p. 674.)
On remand, the parties addressed the feasibility of a
retrospective competency hearing. The prosecutor, bearing the
burden of persuasion, argued there was sufficient evidence
available to conduct such a hearing. In her briefing, the
prosecutor described the contemporaneous medical evidence:
the examinations by Dr. Manohara and Dr. Velosa conducted for
the July 1994 competency hearing at issue; a report prepared by
Dr. Richard Burdick conducted for the March 1994 competency
hearing; and the examination by Dr. William Pierce conducted
in October 1994 for the penalty phase, which involved reviewing
the reports prepared by Dr. Burdick, Dr. Manohara, and Dr.
Velosa. The prosecutor represented that two of those experts,
Dr. Burdick and Dr. Manohara, would not be available for the
competency hearing, and the two remaining experts, Dr. Pierce
and Dr. Velosa, would be available. Dr. Pierce was prepared to
testify as to his opinion that Lightsey was “incompetent back in
1994.”
In addition, the prosecutor provided declarations from
employees with the Kern County Sheriff’s Department who
interacted with Lightsey in various capacities during his trial.
The prosecutor asserted: “These individuals will testify to their
observations of Mr. Lightsey as far as his interactions with his
attorneys, their opinions of his understanding of the proceedings
and his behavior during the relevant timeframe.”
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Finally, the prosecutor argued that the case presented “a
unique and ample opportunity to assess the defendant’s
statements since he represented himself at a number of court
hearings, prior to the trial.” The prosecutor further claimed
aspects of Lightsey’s self-representation demonstrated he
understood the nature of the proceedings.
Defense counsel argued against feasibility largely based
on the fact that one of the two experts who evaluated Lightsey
in July 1994 was not available to testify at any retrospective
competency hearing. Counsel asserted that “[u]nder Penal Code
section 1369, any retrospective competency hearing cannot be
properly held absent admissible evidence of at least two license
[sic] psychologists or psychiatrists.” Lightsey’s counsel
maintained that “the issue is whether there was an opportunity
to cross-examine the unavailable declarant on the subject of
their testimony and that the interest or motive for the hearing
and testimony is similar in nature.” Defense counsel noted that
Dr. Pierce was not evaluating Lightsey’s competency in 1994.
Defense counsel also noted there were several critical witnesses
who were no longer available, including Lightsey’s original
counsel (Stan Simrin), lead trial counsel (William Dougherty),
and his mother. Lightsey’s counsel pointed out that both
attorneys “had direct personal contact with the defendant and
would have relevant testimony to provide on behalf of the
defendant regarding the issue of competency.” Defense counsel
also surmised that Lightsey’s mother, who was deceased, “would
be able to give critical insight and direct observations as to her
son’s emotional and mental state during the course [of] the
trial.”
On May 6, 2013, the trial court determined that a
retrospective competency hearing was feasible. The court
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
considered “the passage of time” of 19 years, “[t]he availability
of contemporaneous medical evidence,” and the “availability of
individuals and trial witnesses, both expert and nonexpert, who
are in a position to interact with the defendant before and
during trial.” The court said that “if time passage alone was the
center or focus of the determination, that there would be a, per
se, rule in determining whether reversal is automatic or not.”
As to the availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, the
trial court said evidence “appears to be present by way of some
experts who are still willing and available to testify.” The court
also said Lightsey made contemporaneous statements that
could be introduced and considered. As to the availability of
witnesses who interacted with Lightsey, the trial court said
“there appears to be a lack of abundance of those that are still
available.” But the court maintained that “there still appear to
be quite a few available for this Court’s consideration, both those
that have been cited by the People and those that have been
cited procedurally through the interaction with the defendant
by way of counsel, as well as potential family members and the
like.” The court concluded: “It does appear that information is
available and will provide the defense a fair opportunity to prove
incompetence; and, therefore, the court is going to find that the
People have met their burden and that this Court can conduct a
meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the defendant’s
competency back in 1994 encompassing 1995.”
In February 2015, the trial court held a competency
hearing. On February 20, 2015, a jury found Lightsey had been
competent to stand trial. On February 27, 2015, the trial court
reinstated the death penalty judgment.
On appeal, Lightsey asserts that the trial court erred in
determining a retrospective competency hearing was feasible.
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
He also presents various claims of evidentiary and instructional
error relating to the retrospective competency hearing and
argues there was insufficient evidence establishing his
competence.
II.
We explained the relevant legal principles in Lightsey I:
“The United States Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly and
consistently recognized that “the criminal trial of an
incompetent defendant violates due process.” ’ (Cooper v.
Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 354.) A defendant is deemed
incompetent to stand trial if he lacks ‘ “ ‘sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding . . . [or] a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” ’ (Ibid.,
quoting Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402
(Dusky).) ‘Even when a defendant is competent at the
commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to
circumstances suggesting a change that would render the
accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand
trial.’ (Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 181 (Drope).)
State constitutional authority is to the same effect. (See People
v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1063.)
“The applicable state statutes essentially parallel the
state and federal constitutional directives. Section 1367,
subdivision (a) provides: ‘A person cannot be tried or adjudged
to punishment while that person is mentally incompetent. A
defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this chapter
if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the
defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a
rational manner.’
“Section 1368 provides in pertinent part: ‘(a) If, during the
pendency of an action and prior to judgment, a doubt arises in
the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the
defendant, he or she shall state that doubt in the record and
inquire of the attorney for the defendant whether, in the opinion
of the attorney, the defendant is mentally competent. If the
defendant is not represented by counsel, the court shall appoint
counsel. At the request of the defendant or his or her counsel or
upon its own motion, the court shall recess the proceedings for
as long as may be reasonably necessary to permit counsel to
confer with the defendant and to form an opinion as to the
mental competence of the defendant at that point in time. [¶]
(b) If counsel informs the court that he or she believes the
defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, the court shall
order that the question of the defendant’s mental competence is
to be determined in a hearing which is held pursuant to Sections
1368.1 and 1369. If counsel informs the court that he or she
believes the defendant is mentally competent, the court may
nevertheless order a hearing. Any hearing shall be held in the
superior court.’
“As we stated in People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701,
737–738, a trial court is obligated to conduct a full competency
hearing if substantial evidence raises a reasonable doubt that a
criminal defendant may be incompetent. This is true even if the
evidence creating that doubt is presented by the defense or if the
sum of the evidence is in conflict. The failure to conduct a
hearing despite the presence of such substantial evidence is
reversible error.” (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 690–691.)
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
A finding of such error gives rise to the possibility of a
retrospective competency hearing. “Before conducting the
retrospective competency hearing, the trial court must
determine whether such a hearing will be feasible. . . .
‘Feasibility in this context means the availability of sufficient
evidence to reliably determine the defendant’s mental
competence when tried earlier. . . . “[T]he defendant will be
placed in a position comparable to the one he would have been
placed in prior to the original trial.” ’ [Citation.] In assessing
whether a retrospective competency hearing is feasible, the trial
court should consider ‘ “ ‘ “(1) [t]he passage of time, (2) the
availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, including
medical records and prior competency determinations, (3) any
statements by the defendant in the trial record, and (4) the
availability of individuals and trial witnesses, both experts and
non-experts, who were in a position to interact with [the]
defendant before and during trial” ’ ” ’ [citation], as well as any
other facts the court deems relevant. We stress that the focus
of the feasibility determination must be on whether a
retrospective competency hearing will provide defendant a fair
opportunity to prove incompetence, not merely whether some
evidence exists by which the trier of fact might reach a decision
on the subject. In making its feasibility determination, the court
must consider the fairness of requiring defendant, who has
already established a reversible statutory violation, to prove his
incompetence to stand trial in 1994 with the now 18-year-old
evidence of his prior mental condition still available to him
today. . . . [T]he remedy provided must be ‘procedurally
adequate and substantively acceptable under the Due Process
Clause.’ [Citation.] Because of the inherent difficulties in
attempting to look back to the defendant’s past mental state
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
[citation], the burden of persuasion will be on the People to
convince the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that
a retrospective competency hearing is feasible in this case.”
(Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 710–711.)
“[E]ven if the trial court initially determines a
retrospective competency hearing is feasible, the trial court may
later revisit the issue of the fairness and reliability of the
resulting hearing. In other words, our reversal would stand and
defendant would be entitled to a new trial if the trial court were
to determine in hindsight that, despite its initial feasibility
finding, the actual hearing had not met the feasibility
requirements.” (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 711.)
III.
As an initial matter, Lightsey asserts that we should
review the trial court’s feasibility ruling independently rather
than for abuse of discretion, as the Attorney General urges. He
claims that “the predominantly legal nature of the crucial
questions in a feasibility determination, the importance of the
constitutional issues at stake, and the consequences of an
erroneous determination . . . support the need for independent
review of the feasibility determination, without deference to the
trial court.” A trial court’s decision to hold a competency hearing
is entitled to deference on review. (People v. Rogers (2006)
39 Cal.4th 826, 847; People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 220.)
However, we agree with Lightsey that the issue of whether a
retrospective competency hearing is feasible is a mixed question
of law and fact. “We previously have observed that in most
instances, mixed questions of fact and law are reviewed de
novo — with some exceptions, such as when the applicable legal
standard provides for a ‘ “strictly factual test, such as state of
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mind.” ’ [Citations.] ‘ “This is so because usually the application
of law to fact will require the consideration of legal concepts and
involve the exercise of judgment about the values underlying
legal principles.” ’ ” (Haworth v. Superior Court (2010)
50 Cal.4th 372, 385 (Haworth).)
The evaluation of feasibility in this case largely calls for
consideration of undisputed facts — the passage of time, the
record developed at trial, and the availability of witnesses at any
retrospective competency hearing. This court is in the same
position on appeal as the trial court was at the time of the
feasibility hearing in May 2013 to determine whether a
retrospective competency hearing was feasible. (See Haworth,
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 385) However, we need not conclusively
resolve which standard of review applies because we would not
uphold the trial court’s feasibility determination even under an
abuse of discretion standard. In reaching our conclusion that
the trial court erred, we need not reweigh any evidence. (See
People v. Johnson & Johnson (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 295, 352
[under an abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court does
not reweigh evidence or substitute its notions of fairness for
those of the trial court].)
Retrospective competency hearings are generally
disfavored. A retrospective competency hearing may go forward
only if it will “provide[] a defendant with an opportunity to have
a competency trial comparable to the one the defendant should
have been given but was denied.” (People v. Wycoff (2021)
12 Cal.5th 58, 93 (Wycoff); cf. Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 183
[noting “the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc
determination under the most favorable circumstances”]; Moran
v. Godinez (9th Cir. 1994) 57 F.3d 690, 696 [“although
retrospective competency hearings are disfavored . . . , they are
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permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing
to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the defendant”],
citations omitted.) The prosecution has the burden of showing
by a preponderance of the evidence that “it remains possible to
give defendant that to which he was entitled at trial — a fair
and reliable opportunity to prove his incompetence with the
assistance of counsel.” (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 707;
see also id. at pp. 710–711.) For several reasons, we conclude
that the prosecution did not meet this burden here.
First, we note the obvious: the passage of time was
extraordinarily long. Nineteen years had elapsed between the
flawed competency hearing in 1994 and the trial court’s
feasibility determination in 2013. This factor weighs against a
finding of feasibility.
Next, we address the contemporaneous medical evidence,
which bears significantly on whether a reliable reconstruction
of Lightsey’s mental state in 1994 is possible. As we discussed
in Lightsey I, the absence of counsel hampered the development
of the evidence, particularly the medical evidence, at the July
1994 competency hearing. “There are, in fact, myriad possible
strategic choices counsel might have made that could have
affected the outcome, for example, by choosing a defense expert
different from the expert defendant chose, asking for a third
expert to break the tie between the two experts already
consulted or, most notably, declining to submit the matter for
the trial court’s determination based on the written reports and
instead demanding defendant’s competence be tried to a jury.”
(Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 701.)
As noted, Lightsey represented himself in July 1994 with
the clear objective of avoiding any determination that he was
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incompetent. He repeatedly stated his deep-seated, delusional
belief that there was a systemic conspiracy against him based
on outlandish ideas, asserting, for example, that “the
prosecution had a hatred of Jesus” and was “seeking to
persecute him as a way of repersecuting or persecuting or
recrucifying Jesus.” In Lightsey’s mind, any attorney who
represented him was involved in the conspiracy against him.
Consequently, he was fixated on representing himself and
proving the charges and proceedings were the result of
widespread fraud, including the manufacturing of evidence by
court reporters. Lightsey engaged in delusions and uncontrolled
outbursts throughout the proceedings.
At the competency hearing, Lightsey wanted to be deemed
competent and “ ‘get on with the show’ ” to prove the charges
were fraudulent and a result of the conspiracy against him.
(Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 687.) With this goal, at the
time a doubt was declared as to his competency, Lightsey did
the bare minimum to satisfy the requirements of section 1369.
Two court-appointed experts prepared reports: The expert
Lightsey chose, Dr. Manohara, acknowledged his behavioral
issues but did not reach the conclusion that he was incompetent,
and the court-appointed expert, Dr. Velosa, found that “because
of his psychiatric symptoms,” Lightsey was “unable to cooperate
in rational manner with counsel in presenting a defense.” As
noted in his briefing, Lightsey “declined to use the competency
experts on the court approved list and instead chose his experts
by ‘instinct’ out of a telephone book.” During one expert’s
evaluation, Lightsey said, “Of course, I am competent and you
are going to find me competent.” Lightsey also stated that his
objective was “to prove that there is a conspiracy against him
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and that he is ready to go ‘to the newspapers and T.V. and bring
the whole matter out in the open.’ ”
Nevertheless, the expert reports were somewhat mixed as
to the extent of Lightsey’s delusions and whether he was
competent. As noted, Lightsey insisted that he was competent
and wanted a jury trial to prove he was not incompetent. The
prosecutor then suggested that Lightsey submit the reports
without a jury trial or any cross-examination. In response, the
trial court confirmed with Lightsey that he was not contesting
the issue of whether he was competent to stand trial. The trial
court proceeded to present Lightsey with the option to “ ‘get on
with the show’ ” and avoid further proceedings relating to his
competency. (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 687.) As
expected, Lightsey opted to do so.
By submitting the issue before a court that signaled it
would find him competent, Lightsey acquiesced in finding
himself competent. He presented unchallenged evidence to that
effect, including a report by an expert that Lightsey selected on
a whim, and did not develop any evidence supporting a finding
of incompetence. In short, the evidence bearing on Lightsey’s
competence was not developed in a manner that meaningfully
examined all sides of the issue. This context is critical as we
consider whether the evidence available for a retrospective
competency hearing was sufficient to “reliably” determine
Lightsey’s mental competence when tried earlier. (Ary, supra,
51 Cal.4th at p. 520.)
The record shows that Lightsey did not avail himself of
opportunities that any effective appointed counsel would have
pursued. If Lightsey had had the hearing to which he was
entitled, an attorney appointed to represent him could have
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PEOPLE v. LIGHTSEY
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
probed experts through cross-examination about any evidence
suggesting he was competent, such as the degree to which he
was able to perform competency in order to “prove” the mass
conspiracy against him. (See People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th
219, 240, fn. 8 (Rodas) [in determining feasibility, we consider
“whether evidence exists both to show defendant’s competence
at the time of trial and to permit defendant to respond fully to
that showing, such that a fair and reliable determination that
defendant was competent to stand trial could be made”], italics
added.) At the feasibility hearing, Dr. Manohara was
unavailable for cross-examination, and it is questionable
whether Lightsey could effectively probe the nuances of the
opinions offered by Dr. Velosa in 1994. Additionally, he was
unable to cross-examine Dr. Burdick, who had opined based on
an admittedly brief encounter that Lightsey was competent in
March 1994. Moreover, an attorney could have made “myriad
possible strategic choices . . . that could have affected the
outcome,” including choosing a different expert, “asking for a
third expert to break the tie between” Dr. Manohara and Dr.
Velosa, or “demanding defendant’s competence be tried to a
jury.” (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 701.) Such choices
may have produced a more fulsome record from which to conduct
a retroactive assessment of Lightsey’s competence. In light of
these circumstances, the contrast between the hearing that
Lightsey had and that which he should have had was
significant.
The Attorney General argues that a retrospective
competency hearing was feasible largely based on “significant
contemporaneous medical evidence” and the availability of Dr.
Velosa and Dr. Pierce. It is true that some medical evidence had
been developed in July 1994 and was available for a
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PEOPLE v. LIGHTSEY
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
retrospective competency determination. (See Lightsey I, supra,
54 Cal.4th at p. 707 [“the subject of defendant’s mental
competence actually was reviewed at the time of the trial and
contemporaneous evidence specifically addressing that issue
presumably still exists”].) But in Lightsey I, “[w]e stress[ed] that
the focus of the feasibility determination must be on whether a
retrospective competency hearing will provide defendant a fair
opportunity to prove incompetence, not merely whether some
evidence exists by which the trier of fact might reach a decision
on the subject.” (Id. at p. 710.)
As the Attorney General acknowledges, the state of
contemporaneous medical evidence carries particular weight in
determining whether a retrospective competency hearing is
feasible. The medical evidence adduced in July 1994 was not
developed with the assistance of counsel due to the trial court’s
error, and the medical evidence that was developed involved
nuanced and complex judgments regarding Lightsey’s mental
state. Nearly 20 years later, with the unavailability of witnesses
and passage of time, the prosecution did not demonstrate that
the deficiencies in the development and testing of the
contemporaneous medical evidence due to the trial court’s
failure to appoint counsel could be remediated. This weighs
strongly against the reliability of a retrospective determination
of Lightsey’s competence.
In addition, the Attorney General’s reliance on Dr. Pierce’s
availability for a competency determination overlooks the
weakness of the evidence proffered and how the prosecutor’s
proffer of his testimony was inherently unfair to Lightsey. At
the feasibility hearing, the prosecution did not demonstrate how
Dr. Pierce’s testimony meaningfully contributed to a reliable
determination of Lightsey’s competence. Dr. Pierce did not
20
PEOPLE v. LIGHTSEY
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
evaluate Lightsey to assess whether he was competent to stand
trial in July 1994. Instead, he was retained months later to
support the development of mitigation evidence for the
sentencing phase. For that purpose, Dr. Pierce reviewed the
contemporaneous medical opinions as to Lightsey’s competency
in July 1994 as part of his evaluation in October 1994. Dr.
Pierce was also not licensed at the time of the feasibility hearing.
(See § 1369, subd. (a)(1) [requiring opinions of “licensed”
experts].) Because these issues with Dr. Pierce’s testimony as
to Lightsey’s competency in July 1994 were readily apparent at
the feasibility hearing, it was entirely foreseeable that the
prosecutor, while pointing to Dr. Pierce’s availability to
demonstrate feasibility, would proceed to undermine Dr.
Pierce’s testimony at any eventual competency hearing. And
although there was a degree of overlap between the testimony
of Dr. Pierce and that of Dr. Velosa, who was also available to
testify, Dr. Pierce’s testimony differed in his specific diagnosis
and went a little further than Dr. Velosa’s in opining that
Lightsey did not understand the nature of the proceedings.
Dr. Pierce’s opinion in 1994 was relevant to the penalty
proceedings, and his opinion was favorable to Lightsey in that
context. However, the prosecution did not show how Dr. Pierce’s
opinion compensates for the absence of appointed counsel who
could have developed contemporaneous medical evidence or
challenged the evidence that was presented in July 1994. (See
Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 708 [after-the-fact expert
opinions “might only circumstantially assist” the determination
of a defendant’s competence at trial]; Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 241 [a retrospective competency hearing was not feasible, in
part, because it would “require an attempt by psychologists or
psychiatrists to reconstruct defendant’s mental condition at
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PEOPLE v. LIGHTSEY
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
trial based on the prior medical reports and defendant’s
behavior at the time of trial”].) In sum, the availability of Dr.
Pierce carries little or no weight in establishing that a
retrospective hearing would provide Lightsey with a fair
opportunity to prove his incompetence at trial.
The Attorney General also points to the availability of four
officers who guarded Lightsey during his competency trial, the
prosecutor’s representation that four of Lightsey’s trial
attorneys (Brown, McKnight, Sorena, and James Gillis, who was
initially appointed as advisory counsel in August 1994) may
have been available, and statements from Lightsey at several
hearings in July and August of 1994. As to the four officers,
those non-expert witnesses were responsible for transporting
Lightsey and ensuring courtroom safety and security; they were
not charged with evaluating or observing whether Lightsey was
able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or
to assist counsel in the conduct of the defense in a rational
manner. And as to the four trial attorneys, the prosecutor’s
mere assertion of their availability, without any supporting
declaration or evidence, does nothing to establish the actual
availability of those potential witnesses. Such speculation does
little to aid the prosecution in carrying its burden of proving
feasibility.
Further, the Attorney General, like the prosecutor at the
feasibility hearing, focuses on select passages of Lightsey’s
statements without demonstrating how those statements relate
to the paranoia and delusions he exhibited at the time a doubt
was declared as to his competency to stand trial. Particularly in
light of the deficiencies in the contemporaneous medical
evidence, the various statements chosen by the prosecutor do
not help to demonstrate that a retrospective hearing would place
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PEOPLE v. LIGHTSEY
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Lightsey “in a position comparable to the one he would have
been in at a timely competency trial.” (Wycoff, supra, 12 Cal.5th
at p. 96, citing Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 520.)
In evaluating whether a retrospective competency hearing
was feasible, we note that although the passage of time of nearly
two decades is not dispositive, it undoubtedly “aggravate[d]
the[] difficulties” with the available evidence. (Pate v. Robinson
(1966) 383 U.S. 375, 387 [the passage of time of six years
“aggravate[d] these difficulties” of the jury unable to observe the
defendant and experts testifying solely based on information
from the record].) In Wycoff, where “the trial court erred by
failing to initiate the formal competency procedures set forth in
sections 1368 and 1369,” we held that “the passage of time” —
13 years — “and the corollary difficulty of reconstructing
defendant’s mental state at the time of trial” made a
retrospective competency hearing infeasible. (Wycoff, supra,
12 Cal.5th at pp. 91, 95.) The Attorney General argued in
Wycoff that the defendant’s extensive testimony at trial could be
used by experts to retrospectively evaluate his competency, that
an available contemporaneous expert report “includes lots of
information that defendant could use,” and that “several people
who interacted with defendant during the relevant time period
(including his attorneys, the prosecutor, and [the psychologist
who prepared the expert report]) might be able to appear as
witnesses.” (Id. at p. 95.) We held that “none of that potential
evidence could possibly place defendant ‘ “in a position
comparable to the one he would have been placed in” ’ if a timely
competency trial had been held” 13 years earlier. (Ibid.)
We observed in Wycoff that the trial court there conducted
“no timely . . . competency trial,” whereas the trial court in
Lightsey’s case “conducted a timely competency trial” albeit
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PEOPLE v. LIGHTSEY
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
without appointing counsel as statutorily required. (Wycoff,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 95, 96.) Because contemporaneous
evidence was developed for the competency trial in Lightsey’s
case, “we concluded that the trial court should at least consider
whether a reliable retrospective competency determination
might be feasible.” (Id. at p. 96, citing Lightsey I, supra,
54 Cal.4th at pp. 706–710.) Having now reviewed the record
adduced at the feasibility hearing conducted by the trial court
in May 2013, we conclude that while “some evidence” was
available for consideration, it was not sufficient to provide
Lightsey with a “fair opportunity” to prove his incompetence at
trial (Lightsey I, at p. 710) “given the passage of time and the
corollary difficulty of reconstructing defendant’s mental state at
the time of trial” (Wycoff, at p. 95).
Our consideration of whether a retroactive competency
hearing was feasible is limited to the evidence before the trial
court at the feasibility hearing in 2013. The trial court’s error
in finding a competency hearing to be feasible could not be cured
by any subsequent competency hearing, even though a
subsequent hearing could establish the opposite — i.e., that
“despite [the court’s] initial feasibility finding, the actual
hearing had not met the feasibility requirements.” (Lightsey I,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 711.) Here, whatever additional evidence
was developed or presented at the 2015 hearing was irrelevant
to whether the prosecutor met its burden of establishing
feasibility in 2013.
Finally, the trial court’s error with regard to feasibility is
not subject to harmless error analysis. In Lightsey I, we
concluded that the trial court’s original error in failing to
appoint counsel for Lightsey at the July 1994 competency
proceedings was a miscarriage of justice that required reversal
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PEOPLE v. LIGHTSEY
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
of the judgment if a retrospective competency hearing was not
feasible. (Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 699–702.) Because
we have now determined that such a hearing was not feasible,
the judgment must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Because of the passage of time, the unavailability of key
witnesses, and the fact that the circumstances of the
competency hearing in July 1994 — especially the failure to
appoint counsel to represent Lightsey — compromised the
quality and fairness of the evidence available nearly 20 years
later, we hold that the trial court erred in finding that a
retrospective competency hearing was feasible. Accordingly, we
reverse the reinstated judgment “subject to defendant’s being
retried if he is at that time mentally competent to stand trial.”
(Lightsey I, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 709–710.) In light of this
disposition, we have no need to address Lightsey’s other claims
relating to the retrospective competency hearing.
LIU, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
DETJEN, J.*
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
25
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Lightsey
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal XX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S226760
Date Filed: August 17, 2026
__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Kern
Judge: John Kelly
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Mary K. McComb and Galit Lipa, State Public Defenders, Alexander
Post, Adriana Gonzalez, Nina Wilder, Deputy State Public Defenders,
and Cristina Borde for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General,
Sean M. McCoy and Kari Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Alexander Post
Deputy State Public Defender
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000
Oakland, CA 94607
(510) 267-3300
Kari Ricci Mueller
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 95614
(916) 210-7731