Filed 8/20/26 P. v. Lewis CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
THE PEOPLE, C103093
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 23FE013396,
v. 23FE015598)
COREY LEWIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Corey Lewis1 appeals the trial court’s denial of his application for
pretrial mental health diversion. He contends the court abused its discretion by denying
diversion because its finding that he is ineligible for diversion is not supported by
substantial evidence. We agree. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse and remand with
instructions for the trial court to reconsider defendant’s application for mental health
diversion.
1 Defendant’s name appears as “Corey Lewis,” “Corey Michael Lewis,” and
“Corey M. Lewis” in the record. We use defendant’s name as it appears on the abstract
of judgment.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I
Case No. 23FE013396
On May 27, 2023, a police officer checked the license number of a car he
observed and learned that the number was for a newer vehicle. When he pulled up next
to the vehicle, he could see “the steering column was peeled and stripped.” After he
stopped the car, a records check of the vehicle identification number reported the vehicle
as stolen. The officer detained defendant, who was driving. Defendant’s passenger,
C.M., stated that they had been driving the vehicle for five days and knew it was stolen.
A search of the vehicle located a bag containing bent and shaved keys commonly used to
steal vehicles.
Defendant was charged with receiving stolen property and possession of burglary
tools. It was also alleged that defendant had a prior strike conviction in 2017 for assault
with a deadly weapon.
II
Case No. 23FE015598
Defendant and C.M. lived on her grandparents’ property in a separate house. On
April 23, 2023, after an argument, C.M.’s grandparents left the property. C.M. entered
their residence through a doggie door and opened the door for defendant. Defendant
entered the residence, forced open a locked cabinet, and removed four firearms (two
black powder pistols and two Ruger pistols), as well as bonds and personal documents.
Defendant’s fingerprint was found on the cabinet. Defendant told C.M. he sold three of
the guns and kept a revolver for himself.
2
Defendant was charged with theft of the four firearms and burglary. The
prosecution also alleged the 2017 prior strike conviction.2
III
Application For Mental Health Diversion
On April 16, 2024, defendant filed an application for mental health diversion.
Included in defendant’s application was a crisis assessment report completed some
months after his arrest. The social worker who conducted the assessment diagnosed
defendant with depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and amphetamine and cannabis
abuse disorders.
On May 8, 2024, the prosecution opposed defendant’s application, arguing
defendant was ineligible for diversion because clear and convincing evidence established
defendant’s mental health disorders were not a significant factor in the commission of the
offenses. The prosecution argued defendant “is a validated gang member (Norteno [sic])
who is entrenched in a criminal lifestyle” and had suffered prior convictions involving
guns and violence. The opposition described a prior conviction in 2017 where defendant
and “three fellow gang members planned and executed the armed assault on another
inmate,” which was captured on video in jail. Defendant told law enforcement officers
the victim was assaulted because he had fallen out of favor with the gang. The
prosecution also noted that in 2021 the Board of Parole Hearings denied defendant’s
application, stating that after reviewing his criminal history and record during
incarceration he posed a risk to the community of violence and criminal activity, and also
2 Defendant was also involved in a fistfight in December 2023 while incarcerated
and charged in case No. 23FE020604 (case No. 604) with assault by means likely to
produce great bodily injury. The charges in that case were dismissed in light of
defendant’s plea. Defendant’s appeals do not include case No. 604. We discuss this case
in the context of the trial court’s ruling on defendant’s motion for mental health
diversion.
3
noting his lack of participation in opportunities for improvement while incarcerated. The
prosecution concluded, “Simply put, he is a violent gang member who likes guns and
when given the opportunity to engage in self-help/treatment he has shown minimal to no
effort to participate.”
The prosecution also opposed diversion on the grounds (1) defendant was an
unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community and (2) substantial
evidence supported the trial court’s exercise of its residual discretion to find defendant
unsuitable for diversion and that diversion would not meet the underlying goals of the
statute.
On October 21, 2024, defendant filed a clinical assessment completed by
Dr. Marvin Ali. Dr. Ali diagnosed defendant with persistent depressive disorder; other
specified trauma and stressor related disorder, persistent response to trauma with
posttraumatic stress-like symptoms; and stimulant (methamphetamines), cannabis, and
alcohol use disorders. Dr. Ali concluded defendant’s mental disorders played a
significant role in his commission of the charged offenses on April 23, 2023, and May 27,
2023. The offenses occurred when defendant was experiencing recurrent low level
depressive symptoms and turned to cannabis, alcohol, and methamphetamines to
self‑medicate for his depressive disorder. Defendant’s inability to control his behavior
led “to impulsive decisions” that “were better attributed to his psychiatric condition.”
On October 24, 2024, at the hearing on defendant’s application, defense counsel
argued that, as Dr. Ali stated in his report, all the charges “are indicative of a man who
has mental illnesses who’s basically found himself to be homeless because of the fact that
he is, in fact, mentally ill.” Counsel argued defendant is “suffering from depression,
post traumatic stress disorder, this amphetamine use. He’s medicating himself.” Counsel
urged the trial court to consider Dr. Ali’s report.
The prosecutor responded that Dr. Ali’s “observations, however well meaning
[sic] and accurate at the time that the doctor did his diagnosis, are not the ones that the
4
officers were able to obtain when they did the actual investigation, saw … defendant in
the condition he was in, all of those things at the time of the crimes occurred.” The
prosecutor argued, “There was not an indication that he did these things because he was
under the influence” of his mental disorders. Referring to the 2017 assault, the
prosecutor said: “[T]he one that jumps out is the four gang members in custody. One
had a falling out or was in disfavor of the Norteños or somehow fell out of favor with the
gang. And so … defendant and two other people -- one hid the surveillance camera with
a broom, and then … defendant commenced to beat his fellow gang member. And he
can’t do that unless he is somehow authorized by the gang.”
The prosecutor further argued that the Board of Parole Hearings in 2021 had
explained in detail that defendant “remained a threat of violence even in that very
controlled environment that the [p]arole [b]oard found and listed his violent behavior that
was documented while in prison.”
The trial court denied diversion. The court explained: “[T]he one that for the
[c]ourt perhaps jumps out the most is the residential burglary case from April of 2023.
And because there, [defendant], it’s alleged, had broken into the residence on the
property where they were living at a separate property and stole four guns. And [C.M.]
indicated that [defendant] had said he was going to sell the guns but keep the revolver for
himself. And he knew full well that he’s a convicted felon and prohibited from having a
firearm.”
The trial court continued by observing that defendant served a five-year
eight‑month sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon and the assault in 2017. The
court then said: “So, in looking at the parole denial, [it] bring[s] up that he likes guns.
And I’m not passing any moral judgment on that. I’ve often said if I were in, you know -
- under different circumstances, you know, I could see that the lure of a gang for sense of
community could be very strong. That part and parcel with that lifestyle, of course, is
firearms. [¶] And he chose to once again have himself in possession of a firearm. And I
5
don’t believe that it was his underlying diagnoses that [were] the causative factor, but
instead the fact that this is something that I think being in a gang one often would need a
firearm because of the dangers that can be presented with that kind of life. And, again,
I’m not passing moral judgment on it. I think it’s just a fact on so many levels.”
Turning to the vehicle theft and assault in December 2023 while defendant was
incarcerated, the trial court said that considering the burglary “sort of the dominos then
fall in terms -- obviously in terms of what all played out in custody on the assault matter.”
The court continued: “You know, I don’t think he’s posing an unreasonable risk to
public safety in terms of the very narrow definition that the [L]egislature saw fit to put in
the statute. But I do think that the presumption has been rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence that this was more of a beatdown than anything else. And as to the auto theft,
again, having denied the other two, there would be no way he could do community-based
treatment in any event.”
IV
Plea, Sentence, And Appeal
Defendant pled no contest to (1) burglary in case No. 23FE015598 (5598), for a
middle term sentence of four years, and admitted the prior strike, for a total term of eight
years, and (2) misdemeanor receiving stolen property in case No. 23FE013396 (3396),
for a term of eight months consecutive to be served prior to the eight-year term. The trial
court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea and imposed mandatory minimum
fines, fees, and assessments. The court granted defendant 509 days of actual credit and
508 days of conduct credit, for a total of 1,117 days of custody credit.
Defendant appeals in case Nos. 3396 and 5598. The trial court granted
defendant’s request for a certificate of probable cause in each case.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
request for mental health diversion. Defendant claims the court speculated that defendant
6
committed the offenses due to his affiliation with a gang. Defendant also asserts the trial
court abused its discretion by finding defendant’s gang participation was sufficient to
rebut the presumption that mental illness was a significant factor in the offenses, because
the “court failed to conform its discretionary decision with the primary purpose of the
diversion statute.” Finally, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion
because there was no substantial evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption with clear
and convincing evidence that defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the burglary.
The People contend substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination
there was no nexus between defendant’s mental illness and the offenses, based on
defendant’s admitted membership in a criminal street gang, as verified by the Board of
Parole Hearings in 2021 and shown by the 2017 gang-related assault on another inmate.
The People argue defendant’s gang connection was relevant to defendant’s theft of
firearms as a felon prohibited from possessing firearms. They explain that in 2015 and
2017 defendant was illegally found in possession of a firearm, and in the 2017 incident,
defendant was wearing gang colors. Accordingly, the People maintain the trial court
reasonably interpreted defendant’s theft of four firearms as caused not by his mental
disorders but rather his gang affiliation, and defendant’s claim that the trial court
speculated as to his gang affiliation at the time of the crimes amounted to no more than
disagreement with the court’s interpretation, which does not constitute abuse of
discretion.
The People rely on People v. Nelson (Mar. 5, 2026, B342722), petition for review
denied and opinion ordered depublished June 10, 2026, S296167, a case in which the
People argue the trial court found the defendant’s “depression and substance-abuse
disorder were not a significant factor in the commission of the charged offenses,” and
“implicitly rejected the findings of the mental health clinician” to the contrary.
7
We conclude there was not clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut the
presumption that mental illness was a significant factor in the offenses.
I
Legal Standards
The Legislature enacted Penal Code3 sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 to “authorize
trial courts to grant ‘pretrial [mental health] diversion’ to defendants diagnosed with
qualifying mental disorders.” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671,
677.) To be eligible for mental health diversion, a defendant must meet two
requirements. (Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 400 (Lacour).)
One, the defendant must have been diagnosed within the past five years with a mental
disorder identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders. (Lacour, at p. 400; § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) And two, the defendant’s
mental disorder must be a significant factor in the commission of the offense. (Lacour, at
p. 400; § 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
“Among the express purposes of the [diversion] program is to ‘[i]ncrease[]
diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and
reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.’ ” (Siam v.
Superior Court (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 67, 80, quoting § 1001.35, subd. (a).) Under
section 1001.36, subdivision (b), “[t]he court must ‘find a causal connection “unless there
is clear and convincing evidence that [the mental disorder] was not a motivating factor,
causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged
offense.” ([§ 1001.36], subd. (b)(2).)’ ” (People v. Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485,
490, italics added, quoting Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891.)
“[E]ligibility no longer turned on findings to the court’s ‘satisfaction.’ ” (Sarmiento, at
3 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
8
p. 891.) The statute “requires the court to ‘find that the defendant’s mental disorder was
a significant factor’ ” unless “ ‘clear and convincing evidence’ ” demonstrates otherwise.
(People v. Cabalar (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 41, 52.) And it is the prosecution’s burden to
provide clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption. (Gomez v. Superior
Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 688.)
Once a defendant meets the eligibility requirements, the trial court must then
determine whether a defendant is suitable for diversion using the four criteria outlined in
section 1001.36, subdivision (c): (1) A qualified mental health expert has determined the
defendant’s symptoms would respond to mental health treatment; (2) the defendant has
consented to diversion and waived the right to a speedy trial; (3) the defendant has agreed
to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion, and (4) the court has determined
“the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety … if treated
in the community.” (See Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 400-401.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on an application for mental health diversion for
abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. (Lacour, supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at p. 401.) A court abuses its discretion when it applies “the wrong legal
standard [citations] or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are
not supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440,
449.) “By definition, ‘substantial evidence’ requires evidence and not mere speculation.”
(People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851.)
In reviewing a trial court’s “finding that a fact has been proved by clear and
convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a
whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have
found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
p. 401.) In this context, we must determine “whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that [the defendant’s] mental disorder ‘was not a motivating factor, causal
9
factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.’ ”
(Id. at p. 402, italics added.) To answer that question, we review the record in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party “and give due deference to how the trier of fact
may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at pp. 401-402.)
II
The Trial Court’s Order Denying Mental Health
Diversion Lacked Substantial Evidence
Defendant’s mental health diagnosis created a presumption that his mental health
disorders were a significant factor in the commission of the offense. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (b)(2).) Beyond the presumption, the evidence before the trial court included the
opinion of Dr. Ali that the offenses occurred during a time when defendant’s “mental
disorder played a significant role in the commission of the charged offense[s].”
(Boldface omitted.) Because defendant’s mental health diagnosis gave rise to the
statutory presumption that his mental health condition was a significant factor in the
commission of the offenses, the court was required to find that his mental health
disorders were a significant factor and find him eligible for diversion, unless there was
clear and convincing evidence that his mental health disorders were not a motivating,
causal, or contributing factor in the offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2); Lacour, supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)
In denying diversion, the trial court found the record before it contained clear and
convincing evidence that overcame the statutory presumption that defendant’s mental
health disorders were a significant factor in commission of the offenses. The court stated
defendant’s mental health diagnoses were not a significant factor in the residential
burglary because defendant “chose to once again have himself in possession of a firearm”
and “this is something that [the court thought] being in a gang one often would need a
firearm because of the dangers that can be presented with that kind of life.”
10
The trial court’s finding was not supported by substantial evidence at the
heightened clear and convincing standard. “ ‘ “ ‘A finding of fact must be an inference
drawn from evidence rather than … a mere speculation as to probabilities without
evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Ramon, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 851.) Further, “ ‘ “ ‘[a]
reasonable inference … may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination,
speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Here, the trial
court’s speculation about defendant’s gang motivation for committing the burglary is not
evidence “ ‘from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable’ ”
that defendant’s mental health disorders were not a causal, motivating, or contributing
factor in the offense. (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 401-402.)
Missing from the trial court’s explanation for its finding that the presumption was
rebutted is evidence that defendant, while suffering from depression and self-medicating
with drugs and alcohol, would not have entered C.M.’s grandparents’ residence in that
condition while they were absent and stolen firearms. Instead, the trial court based its
ineligibility finding on defendant’s 2017 conviction involving firearm and gang-related
offenses, as well as the 2021 denial of parole referencing defendant’s firearm offenses.
Dr. Ali’s report, however, noted that defendant had dropped out of the gang while in
prison. Dr. Ali also found that testing supported a diagnosis of “[o]ther specified trauma
and stressor related disorder, [p]ersistent response to trauma with [posttraumatic stress
disorder]-like symptoms,” and added that, “[a]s such, [defendant] maintained a gun for
his personal protection.” (Italics added.) In other words, Dr. Ali found defendant
possessed a firearm because of his mental health disorders.
In addition, the trial court did not attempt to link the charge for driving a stolen
vehicle or the December 2023 assault to defendant’s supposed gang life. As to the
assault, the trial court simply pronounced this crime “as more of a beatdown than
anything else” without alluding to any evidence that defendant would not have engaged
in this conduct due to suffering from a mental disorder. As to eligibility for diversion
11
regarding the receiving stolen property charge, the trial court simply threw up its hands,
stating, “[A]s to auto theft, again, having denied the other two, there would be no way he
could do community-based treatment in any event,” which is not an eligibility
requirement but pertains to suitability. (See § 1001.36, subds. (b), (c).)
Finally, we note that the police reports the prosecution submitted in opposition to
defendant’s request for diversion record an “N” next to “[g]ang [a]ctivity” in case
No. 3396 (stolen car), case No. 5598 (burglary), and even case No. 604 (2023 assault).
The reports also record “no gang activity” in case No. 604 and “no gang involvement” in
case Nos. 3396 and 604. (Capitalization omitted.) Thus, the evidence in the record, as
opposed to speculation, contradicted the trial court’s gang-related explanation for its
finding of ineligibility.
Fundamentally, based on our review of the record, we find no evidence, clear and
convincing or otherwise, to overcome the statutory presumption that defendant’s mental
health disorders were a significant factor in his commission of the current offense.
(Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.) Nothing before the trial court showed
defendant “was not suffering symptoms” when he committed the offenses “or that [his]
mental health disorders were not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor in the
commission of the [offense].” (Gomez v. Superior Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
p. 688.) If anything, the record contained affirmative evidence indicating “mental
disorder played a significant role in the commission of the charged offense[s].”
(Boldface omitted.)
Even if the trial court did not credit Dr. Ali’s opinion, as we held in Lacour, “the
absence of evidence proving that [the defendant]’s mental disorder was a factor in the
commission of the offense[] is not substantial evidence supporting a finding by clear and
convincing evidence that [the defendant’s] mental disorder was not a factor in the
commission of the offenses.” (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 404.) As we also
held, “By finding that the statutory presumption had been overcome by the mere absence
12
of evidence demonstrating that [the defendant’s] mental illness was a factor in the alleged
offenses, the court effectively shifted the burden to [the defendant] to affirmatively prove
that [the defendant’s] mental disorder[s] contributed to the offenses.” (Ibid.) That is not
the showing required under the statute. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
The People ask us to adopt the reasoning in Nelson. Since the People filed their
brief, our Supreme Court has ordered the case depublished. (People v. Nelson, supra,
B342722, rev. denied, opn. ordered nonpub. Jun. 10, 2026.) Except in limited
circumstances not applicable here, it is improper to cite or rely on unpublished opinions.
(People v. Gray (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 285, 292, fn. 15, citing Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.1115(a) & (b).) Therefore, we do not address Nelson.
Considering the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we
conclude the record “lacks substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that [defendant’s] mental disorder[s] ‘[were] not a
motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to … defendant’s involvement in
the alleged offense.’ ” (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.) Because the court’s
finding that defendant is ineligible is not supported by substantial evidence, the court
abused its discretion by denying diversion on that basis. (Id. at p. 404; People v. Moine,
supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.)
We consequently reverse the trial court’s finding on defendant’s eligibility for
mental health diversion and remand for it to perform the remainder of the mental health
diversion analysis.
13
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment and remand for the trial court to reconsider defendant’s
mental health diversion application consistent with this opinion.
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
14