Filed 7/23/26 P. v. Lee CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065687
v. (Super. Ct. No. 21HF0335)
JAMES RYAN LEE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Robert A. Knox, Judge. Affirmed.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Namita Patel, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
Defendant James Ryan Lee was charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol causing great bodily injury under Vehicle Code section
23153(a) and alleged a related enhancement under Penal Code section
12022.7(a). Before trial, Lee moved to suppress evidence from a warrantless
blood draw under Penal Code section 1538.5(a)(1)(A). The trial court denied
the motion on the basis that the prosecution had proven exigent
circumstances such that the police officer could order a warrantless blood
draw without offending the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The jury convicted Lee of driving under the influence of alcohol
causing great bodily injury.
Lee appeals from his conviction on grounds that (1) the trial court
erred by denying his motion to suppress and (2) denial of his motion to
suppress constituted prejudicial error. We conclude that police staffing
shortages caused by COVID-19, the time necessary to obtain a warrant,
reliance on Lee’s agreement to a breath test, distancing protocols, and other
factors justified the trial court’s finding of exigency. We also conclude that,
even if the trial court did err by denying Lee’s motion to suppress, the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
At about 11:40 p.m. on April 3, 2020, Officers Jacob Baskin and
Frederick Hsu of the Irvine Police Department (IPD) were dispatched to a
two-car traffic collision at the intersection of Red Hill Avenue and MacArthur
Boulevard. A witness, Angelina Smith, described how a red Ford Mustang
zoomed past her at an estimated 100 miles per hour, ran a red light, and
collided with a white Dodge Challenger in “an explosion of glass.”
2
When the officers arrived at the scene, Carlos Mancilla Medina
lay unconscious in his Challenger, his legs propped up on his driver’s seat as
he breathed “deep, agonal breathing.” The white Dodge Challenger had
sustained moderate to major damage to the front passenger side, while the
red Mustang had sustained major front end damage. The damage to the
vehicles was consistent with the witness’s description of the collision. Baskin
used a breaching tool to break the window of the Challenger. The fire
department arrived and, with Officer Baskin’s assistance, extricated Medina
from the Challenger.
While Officer Baskin was helping Medina, Lee was removed from
his vehicle and emergency medical services loaded him onto a gurney.
Turning his attention to Lee, Officer Baskin peered into the red Mustang saw
a small green cylindrical plastic container, a type often used to hold cannabis,
on the Mustang’s floorboard. Just before Lee was loaded onto an ambulance,
Officer Baskin detected an odor of alcohol on Lee’s breath and recalled that
Lee had slurred speech.
Officers Baskin and Hsu went to the hospital where Lee and
Medina had been taken. Baskin immediately went to the trauma room in
which Lee was being treated. Baskin, suspecting that Lee had been driving
under the influence, questioned and examined him. Lee admitted to Officer
Baskin that during the course of the evening he had consumed five or six
shots of Hennessy, a distilled spirit, and felt their effects. Lee also admitted
he had smoked a “blunt” of marijuana the prior morning. Officer Baskin
observed that Lee exhibited objective signs of intoxication, including slurred
speech, watery bloodshot eyes, and poor perception of time. Officer Hsu also
observed that Lee had slurred speech and his eyes were red and bloodshot. At
3
that time, Officer Baskin performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test
on Lee, and Lee displayed all six of the HGN test’s indicia of intoxication.
Based on all of those indicia of intoxication, as well as the
circumstances of collision, Officer Baskin concluded that Lee had been
driving under the influence when the collision occurred. Officer Baskin placed
Lee under arrest. Earlier, Lee had agreed to a breath test, and so Officer
Baskin walked out to his patrol car to retrieve the breath machine. When he
returned to Lee’s room, he was informed he could not administer the breath
test because hospital staff needed to intubate Lee and render him
unconscious.
Although Lee had not consented to a blood test, Officer Baskin
had a phlebotomist draw blood from Lee after he was unconscious. At no
point did Officer Baskin seek a search warrant.
Two analyses of that blood draw showed that, at about two hours
after the accident, Lee’s blood alcohol level was 0.133% and 0.138%.
Benzodiazepines and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) also were found in Lee’s
system. A forensic scientist given a hypothetical mirroring the facts of this
case concluded the hypothetical person was impaired for the purpose of
driving.
When Medina was admitted to the hospital, he was in critical
condition and placed in intensive care. Medina suffered injuries including
fractures to his spine, right femur, left shoulder blade, left clavicle, and face.
Lee suffered a concussion, fractures to his left and right wrists, a leg fracture,
and facial lacerations.
4
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lee was charged with one count of driving under the influence of
alcohol causing injury under Vehicle Code section 23153(a) (count 1), driving
with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more causing injury under
Vehicle Code section 23153(b) (count 2), and driving under the combined
influence of alcohol and drugs causing injury under Vehicle Code section
23153(g) (count 3). As to all three counts, it was alleged that Lee had inflicted
great bodily injury under Penal Code section 12022.7(a).
Before trial, Lee moved to suppress the blood test evidence
pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5(a)(1)(A). After Officer Baskin testified
on the matter, the trial court denied Lee’s motion.
The jury convicted Lee on count 1 of driving under the influence
of alcohol causing injury and as to that count found to be true the allegation
of causing great bodily injury. The jury found Lee not guilty on count 3. The
jury announced that it was deadlocked on count 2, and the trial court
declared a mistrial on and later dismissed that count in the interest of
justice. The court sentenced Lee to formal probation for a period of five years.
Lee appeals his conviction on grounds that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
Under Penal Code section 1538.5(a)(1)(A), a defendant may move
to suppress as evidence anything obtained as a result of an unreasonable
search or seizure conducted without a warrant. A warrantless search is
presumed to be unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of
5
proving that the search was reasonable. (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th
691, 719.)
Our review is limited to the evidence presented at the hearing on
the motion to suppress. (People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1105,
fn. 2; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1644, fn. 5.) In
reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial
court’s factual findings when supported by substantial evidence. (People v.
Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 719.) We reconsider neither the weight to be
given to evidence nor the credibility of a witness’s testimony. (People v.
Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302.) We exercise our independent judgment
in determining whether, on the facts found by the trial court, the search was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Redd, at p. 719.)
II.
The Suppression Hearing
The trial court held a suppression hearing to consider Lee’s
motion. Officer Baskin was the only witness at the hearing.
A. Officer Baskin’s Testimony
Officer Baskin testified as follows:
Although he was a certified drug recognition expert, Officer
Baskin was serving regular patrol in April 2020. At the scene of the accident,
Officer Baskin first came into contact with Lee while he was being loaded
onto a gurney. Baskin smelled alcohol on Lee’s breath and saw a cannister
typically used for holding cannabis sat on the floorboard of Lee’s car. Officer
Baskin spoke with Lee for one or two minutes while Lee lay on the gurney. At
12:11 a.m., the ambulance transported Lee to the hospital, where the officers
arrived at 12:25 a.m.
6
At 12:37 a.m., Officer Baskin asked Lee what time it was, to
which Lee answered 1:30 a.m. Lee’s distorted perception of time indicated to
Officer Baskin that Lee had consumed drugs or alcohol. Lee admitted to
Officer Baskin that, starting at around 7:00 p.m. that night, he had
consumed five or six shots of Hennessy, a hard liquor. Officer Baskin then
conducted an HGN test. In an HGN test, an officer holds a stimulus between
twelve to fifteen inches from the subject’s eyes and passes it back and forth to
test whether the subject has any optical impairments. Lee’s eyes exhibited all
six indicia of intoxication which HGN tests provide, including “involuntary
jerking.”1 Officer Baskin did not have the opportunity to conduct other
sobriety tests because the hospital staff was “pressing” him about needing to
render Lee unconscious or intubate him.
When Officer Baskin arrived at the hospital, he did not believe
there was probable cause for a warrant. It was only at 12:58 a.m., after
speaking with Lee and administering the HGN test, that Officer Baskin
determined that he had probable cause to arrest Lee or to obtain a search
1 In a footnote in the appellant’s opening brief and in the
appellant’s reply brief, Lee contends the HGN test violated protocol because
Officer Baskin was not face-to-face with Lee when the test was conducted.
Lee did not object to evidence of HGN test results at the hearing on his
suppression motion. During trial, a forensic scientist testifying for the
prosecution, testified there could be some information gained from an HGN
test conducted on a subject who is lying flat or sitting so long as the subject
follows the stimulus using eyes only without moving the subject’s head. A
forensic toxicologist testifying for Lee testified that he was aware of no
literature permitting an HGN test on a subject lying flat and that conducting
a bedside HGN test created problems in detecting the clues. It was up to the
jury to weigh the conflicting expert testimony and decide whose testimony to
credit. (People v. Orey (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 529, 562; see CALCRIM No.
332.)
7
warrant. Officer Baskin placed Lee under arrest at that time. Six seconds
later, Officer Baskin called for a phlebotomist, who arrived at 1:32 a.m.
Officer Baskin did not seek a warrant because, between a forty-
minute round trip to the IPD station, ninety minutes to process the warrant,
and forty-five minutes for the phlebotomist to arrive, it would have taken
nearly three hours to obtain a warrant. No IPD officer could have covered
Officer Baskin or processed a warrant for him because COVID-19 depleted
the IPD staff to nine on-duty officers, Officer Hsu was responsible for
monitoring Medina, and the rest remained at the scene of the accident. As
such, Officer Baskin ordered the phlebotomist to perform one blood draw at
1:40 a.m.
During “pre-investigative” questioning, Officer Baskin had asked
Lee whether he would consent to a breath test or blood test.”2 Because Lee
had consented to a breath test, Officer Baskin left the hospital room to
retrieve his breathalyzer from his patrol car. It took Officer Baskin only a few
minutes to get the breathalyzer and return to Lee’s hospital room. However,
when Officer Baskin brought the breathalyzer into Lee’s room, hospital staff
told him he could not administer the breath test because they were going to
intubate Lee. Officer Baskin again asked Lee if he would submit to a blood
test; Lee said he did not want to be poked with needles and “I don’t want you
to give me Coronavirus.”
2 Under Vehicle Code section 23612 a person who drives a motor
vehicle is deemed to have given consent to a chemical blood or breath test for
purposes of determining blood alcohol content if that person is lawfully
arrested for specific Vehicle Code offenses. (Veh. Code, § 23612, subd.(a)(1).)
A person arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol must be given the
choice of a blood or breath test. (Id., subd. (a)(2).)
8
Hospital staff informed Officer Baskin that Lee was going to be
transferred. Due to COVID-19, the hospital had already imposed additional
precautions and distancing requirements between patients and hospital staff,
and Baskin was unsure whether COVID-19 protocols would bar him from
having access to Lee.
B. The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court concluded that Officer Baskin faced exigent
circumstances which allowed him to order a blood test without a warrant. In
reaching this conclusion, the trial court made the following findings:
First, Officer Baskin did not have probable cause to arrest Lee
after speaking with him at the hospital. Officer Baskin relied in good faith on
Lee’s consent to a breath test but was unable to perform the breath test
because the hospital unexpectedly intubated Lee.
Second, COVID-19 left IPD with a “skeleton crew.” Because every
IPD officer was responsible for the accident in some capacity, nobody could
cover Officer Baskin or process a warrant for him. The trial court specifically
noted that Officer Hsu was responsible for monitoring Medina and could not
abandon his post.
Third, the hospital staff were going to move Lee. Officer Baskin
had legitimate concerns about whether COVID-19 protocols would bar him
from accompanying Lee. If the hospital were to have denied him access, this
would have jeopardized Officer Baskin’s ability to order a blood draw.
Fourth, it would have taken nearly three hours for Officer Baskin
to obtain a warrant, by which time there would be no guarantee that he
would have access to Lee.
9
Fifth, Lee’s unconsciousness was a pressing medical emergency.
In treating Lee’s injuries, the hospital might have delayed a blood draw and
diminished the accuracy of the blood test.
III.
The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying
Lee’s Motion to Suppress
The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) A search performed without
a warrant is per se unreasonable, subject to a few well-delineated exceptions.
(Katz v. U.S. (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357.) One such exception is for exigency,
when officers are presented with “a compelling need to prevent the imminent
destruction of evidence, and there is no time to obtain a warrant.” (Missouri
v. McNeely (2013) 569 U.S. 141, 167 (Roberts, C.J., conc.).)
Exigency exists in DUI cases when, examined under the totality
of the circumstances, an officer with probable cause faces (1) dissipating BAC
evidence and (2) some other factor which creates pressing health, safety, or
law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant application.
(Missouri v. McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 143; Mitchell v. Wisconsin (2019)
588 U.S. 840, 854 (plurality opinion); see also Schmerber v. California (1966)
384 U.S. 757, 772.) We conclude, based on the trial court’s findings, that
exigent circumstances existed such that drawing blood from Lee without a
warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
In Schmerber v. California, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 768-769, an
officer arrived at the scene of an accident and observed several objective signs
of intoxication on the driver. These included the smell of alcohol on the
10
driver’s breath, bloodshot, watery, and glassy eyes, and “similar symptoms of
drunkenness.” (Id. at p. 769.) The officer took the driver to the hospital and,
as he received treatment for injuries he sustained in the accident, the officer
arrested him. (Id. at pp. 758, 770-771.) Despite the driver’s refusal, the officer
then directed a hospital physician to draw the driver’s blood and measure his
BAC. (Id. at p. 758.) This confirmed the driver’s intoxication. (Ibid.) The trial
court denied the driver’s motion to suppress the blood test evidence and the
driver was convicted. (Ibid.)
The United States Supreme Court, affirming the driver’s
conviction, concluded that the blood draw did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. (Schmerber v. California, supra 384 U.S. at p. 772.) It was
objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the dissipation of the
driver’s BAC threatened “destruction of evidence” vital to the investigation.
(Id. at p. 770, quoting Preston v. U.S. (1964) 376 U.S. 364, 367.) In addition,
as the driver’s injuries demanded that the officer drive him to the hospital,
the officer had no time to obtain a warrant. (Schmerber, at p. 771.) Finally,
because medical professionals performed the test according to standard
practice and the driver did not refuse “on grounds of fear, concern for health,
or religious scruple,”3 the test was reasonable. (Ibid.)
Here, the circumstances in which Officer Baskin ordered the
blood draw mirror Schmerber and satisfy the first prong of the Mitchell test.
As the trial court found, Officer Baskin did not have probable cause to obtain
a search warrant until 12:58 a.m. If Officer Baskin had sought a warrant at
3 Lee refused to submit to a blood draw over COVID-19 concerns,
but Lee does not raise this issue on appeal and has therefore waived it.
(People v. Rhoden (1972) 6 Cal.3d 519, 522-523, fn. 1.)
11
that time, he could not have ordered a blood draw until nearly three hours
later, around 4:00 a.m. Because BAC dissipates over time, the evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that such delay would have jeopardized any
BAC test’s accuracy.4
The trial court found substantial evidence of “special facts” which
support the second prong of the Mitchell test. The evidence at the
suppression hearing established that COVID-19 limited IPD’s patrol staffing
to nine on-duty officers at the time of the accident. Eight of the IPD officers
responded to the accident at Red Hill Avenue and MacArthur Boulevard.
Only two of eight officers did not remain at the scene: Officer Baskin and
Officer Hsu. Officer Hsu could not process the warrant because he was
responsible for monitoring Medina. Under the circumstances, for Officer
Baskin to have requested that a colleague cover or process the warrant for
him would have unreasonably strained IPD’s resources.
In concluding that the facts, as found by the trial court, support
denial of the suppression motion, we do not “creat[e], sub rosa, a rule that
exempts accident cases from the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry that
McNeely requires.” (People v. Meza (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 604, 612.) Nor do
we suspend the Fourth Amendment during times of emergency. (U.S. v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. of Mich. (1972) 407 U.S. 297, 320.) Rather, we narrowly
conclude that depletion of a police department’s personnel by extraordinary
circumstances and an emergency which diverts nearly all the department’s
resources may support a finding of exigent circumstances. (Cf. People v.
4 The trial court cited the Mitchell plurality’s conclusion that
officers may “almost always order a warrantless blood test” when “the
driver’s unconsciousness or stupor requires him to be taken to the hospital.”
(Mitchell v. Wisconsin, supra 588 U.S. at p. 857 (plurality opinion).) However,
Lee was not unconscious until well over an hour after the accident.
12
Meza, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp.606, 611-612 [finding no exigency where
only four officers remained at the scene of the accident, but the record made
no mention of whether the department had more officers available].)
The trial court also found that, given the hospital’s social
distancing policies, Officer Baskin reasonably assumed that COVID-19
protocols would prevent him from accompanying Lee after the hospital moved
him. The evidence at the suppression hearing supports the finding that the
hospital staff unequivocally informed Officer Baskin that they planned to
move Lee. Although the record does not indicate for certain that COVID-19
protocols would have barred Officer Baskin from accompanying Lee, we defer
to the trial court’s inference that Officer Baskin reasonably believed the
COVID-19 protocols posed a risk which would interfere with the
investigation. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673; People v.
Manderscheid (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 355, 357; Schmerber v. California, supra
384 U.S. at p. 770 [affirming based on what the officer “might reasonably
have believed”].)
Lee argues that Officer Baskin was not credible in his testimony
that it would have taken nearly three hours to obtain a warrant and that he
could have used the time available to him after arriving at the hospital to
work toward obtaining one. In reviewing an order denying a motion to
suppress we must accept the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility.
(People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979.) Because witness credibility is the
domain of the trial court, and Officer Baskin’s testimony was not inherently
improbable, we defer to the trial court’s finding that it would have taken
nearly three hours to obtain a warrant. (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371,
412, fn. 9; People v. Navarro, supra 12 Cal.5th at p. 302.)
13
Lee cites People v. Alvarez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 531, 537 for the
proposition that Officer Baskin’s testimony about the time necessary to
obtain a warrant was not credible and did not excuse the need for a warrant.
In Alvarez, peace officers were dispatched to a fatal car accident. (Ibid.)
Although the surviving driver showed no overt signs of having driven under
the influence, an officer performed an HGN test and noted “a faint jerking” in
the driver’s eyes. (Ibid.) After transporting the driver to the hospital as a
precaution, the officer smelled an odor of alcohol emanating from the driver,
who admitted to drinking a beer earlier that day. (Id. at pp. 538, 544.) After
the driver and officer talked for about fifteen minutes, the officer attempted
to conduct a breath test, but the driver was unable or unwilling to provide a
breath sample sufficient to generate a BAC readout. (Id. at pp. 538, 545.)
Once the officer told the driver that the officer wanted to obtain a
blood sample, the driver stopped responding and did not communicate with
hospital staff. (Alvarez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 538-539.) The officer
ordered a warrantless blood test, which yielded a 0.05 percent BAC as well as
traces of cocaine and THC. (Id. at p. 539.) At the suppression hearing the
officer testified it would have taken about 30 to 45 minutes to obtain a
telephonic warrant using the San Diego County electronic search warrant
program. (Id. at pp. 541, 545.) The officer also testified that getting a warrant
had not even crossed his mind at the time and he thought he could draw
blood without a warrant if the driver is unconscious. (Id. at pp. 545, 547.)
The Court of Appeal, reversing the judgment of conviction,
concluded that exigent circumstances were not present to permit a
warrantless blood draw from the driver. (Alvarez, supra 98 Cal.App.5th at p.
537.) Because the driver was conscious and available to the officer for about
ninety minutes and obtaining a warrant would only take thirty to forty-five
14
minutes, the court concluded that the officer had ample time to obtain a
warrant. (Id. at pp. 544-545.)
Lee asserts the contrast between the 30 to 45 minutes needed to
obtain an electronic warrant in Alvarez and Baskin’s testimony that it would
have taken nearly three hours for the IPD to get a warrant shows exigent
circumstances were not present here. But in Alvarez, the officer had the
option of using the San Diego County electronic search warrant program. At
the suppression hearing, no evidence was presented of any such program
available to Officer Baskin.
Lee argues that “Baskin clearly had probable cause for an arrest
before he left the scene of the accident” and therefore “it behooved him to
begin arranging for a chemical test as soon as possible.” We decline to
address the argument that Officer Baskin had probable cause to arrest Lee at
the accident scene because Lee did not raise it at the suppression hearing.
(People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 35, fn. 8; People v. McDowell (2012) 54
Cal.4th 395, 421.) Further, Lee simply makes that argument in passing and
does not support it with legal authority and reasoned argument. (People v.
Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 69, fn. 11; see People v. Stanley (1995) 10
Cal.4th 764, 793.)
Lee argues that Officer Baskin would have had enough time to
administer a breath test had he taken the breathalyzer with him to Lee’s
room at the hospital instead of leaving it in his patrol car. The record does
not reveal why Officer Baskin left the breathalyzer in the patrol car. Officer
Baskin testified that retrieving the breathalyzer was “quick” and only took
several minutes. Given that hospital staff had been pressing Officer Baskin
about the need to intubate Lee or render him unconscious, it is not certain
from the record whether Officer Baskin would have been permitted to
15
administer a breath test even if he had taken the breathalyzer with him to
Lee’s room after arriving at the hospital. We decline to conclude the few
minutes taken to retrieve the breathalyzer renders the blood test evidence
inadmissible.
Lee draws our attention to a recent case, People v. Castro (July 1,
2026, D085986) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2026 Cal.App. Lexis 403], which
concerned the legality of a blood draw from an unconscious driver-suspect
who was first contacted by police at a hospital several hours after an
accident. (Id. at pp. 2, 9-15.) Relying on Alvarez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
page 531, the Court of Appeal in Castro concluded the record did not support
a finding of exigent circumstances sufficient to excuse the police from
obtaining a warrant permitting them to draw blood from the suspect. (Id. at
p. 2.)
Although the facts of Castro are similar in several respects to
those of the present case, there are significant differences. Officer Baskin,
unlike the police officer in Castro, was at the accident scene but had contact
with Lee for only a few minutes before Lee was taken to the hospital. Officer
Baskin testified it would have taken nearly three hours to obtain a warrant;
in contrast, there was no such testimony from the officer in Castro. While in
Castro the police officer did not balance the time it would take to obtain a
warrant against other investigatory duties (Id. at p. 15), here, Baskin was
concerned that no other IPD officer would be able to cover for him or get the
warrant because COVID-19 had reduced IPD’s staff and Officer Hsu was
responsible for monitoring Medina. Baskin was unsure, due to COVID-19,
that he would have access to Lee after he was transferred to a different ward.
No similar testimony appears in Castro. The Castro court recognized that
whether a warrantless blood draw from a drunk driving suspect is reasonable
16
must be determined on a case-by-case basis based on the totality of
circumstances. (Id. at p. 7.) The totality of circumstances in the present case
which differ significantly from those of Castro, support the trial court’s
finding that exigent circumstances excused obtaining a warrant.
IV.
If the Trial Court Erred in Denying Lee’s Motion to
Suppress, the Error Was Harmless
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Although we conclude that the Fourth Amendment did not bar the
introduction of blood test evidence at trial, we determine that even if the trial
court erred in denying Lee’s motion, the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. When an appellant contends that the trial court’s error was
of a constitutional dimension, we may affirm for harmless error only if the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86.) Under this
standard, reversal is required when there is a “reasonable possibility” that
the error might have contributed to the verdict. (People v. Aranda (2012) 55
Cal.4th 341, 367.)
To convict Lee, the prosecution had to prove that Lee drove “under
the influence of any alcoholic beverage.” (Veh. Code § 23153(a).) As such, the
prosecution presented the jury with evidence that Lee had (1) exhibited overt
and objective signs of intoxication which included smelling of alcohol and not
knowing the correct time, (2) admitted to consuming Hennessy (a hard
liquor), (3) driven erratically and ran a red light, and (4) displayed indicia of
intoxication in an HGN test.
Officer Baskin testified that Lee exhibited objective signs of
impairment, including an odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and watery
17
bloodshot eyes. Officer Hsu also observed that Lee had slurred speech and
red and bloodshot eyes. (E.g., Baker v. Gourley (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1263,
1264 [“a jury in a court of law could certainly conclude in a criminal
prosecution that a driver was intoxicated based on such indicia as slurred
speech and an unsteady gait without a valid chemical test”]; People v. Wilson
(1985) 176 Cal.App.3d Supp.1, 9; People v. Warlick (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
Supp. 1, 8.) Lee admitted to Officer Baskin that he had consumed five or six
shots of Hennessy starting at 7:00 p.m. and that he had felt the effects of
alcohol. Lee also admitted he had smoked marijuana that morning. The HGN
test showed that Lee’s eyes exhibited all six indicia of intoxication. A
physician who treated Lee at the hospital diagnosed him as having toxic
encephalopathy, which the physician attributed to alcohol use. In light of this
evidence, the evidence that Lee ran a red light at about 100 miles per hour
suggests significant impairment.5 (See People v. Stockman (2020) 56
Cal.App.5th 1093, 1098 [reaffirming that a jury may consider evidence of
reckless driving to determine whether a defendant was intoxicated].)
Lee isolates each piece of evidence of intoxication and argues no
single one was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Regardless of whether any single piece of evidence establishes guilt beyond a
doubt, the sum total of the evidence does. (See People v. Aranda, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 367.)
Officer Baskin testified that in his opinion Lee was impaired by
alcohol and unable to safely drive a motor vehicle. When asked what stood
5 Lee argues the witness who testified that he had driven over
100 miles per hour was not an expert on speed. No objection was made to that
testimony. Whatever the exact speed might have been, Smith’s testimony
that a red car (Lee’s car) sped past her, ran a red light, and struck a white car
is sufficient to constitute evidence of impairment.
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out in his investigation that help him reach his opinion, Baskin did not
mention the results of the blood test. Officer Hsu testified that, based on his
interactions with Lee at the accident scene and at the hospital, one of the
causes of the collision was Lee driving under the influence.
Lee argues that “an error in admitting plainly relevant evidence
which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot . . . be
conceived of as harmless,” so the trial court’s admission of blood test
evidence, if error at all, must be prejudicial error. (Chapman v. California,
supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) If the trial court erred, the blood test evidence was
not “highly prejudicial” to Lee in light of the overwhelming evidence that Lee
was driving under the influence. (Id. at p. 24; see People v. Meza, supra, 23
Cal.App.5th at pp. 612-613.) To conclude that any admission of relevant
evidence is prejudicial would be nearly tantamount to adopting the per se
error rule rejected in Chapman. (Chapman, at pp. 21-22.)
Considering this compelling evidence that Lee was driving under
the influence, we conclude any error in denying Lee’s suppression motion and
admitting evidence of the blood test was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
SERVINO, J.
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