Filed 9/16/26 P. v. Lawrence CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E085776
v. (Super.Ct.No. SWF025676)
JAMES EDWARD LAWRENCE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. F. Paul Dickerson III,
Judge. Affirmed.
Three Strikes Project, Stanford Law School, Michael S. Romano, and Milena
Blake, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Britton B. Lacy, Assistant Attorney General, and Christopher P. Beesley,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
James Edward Lawrence appeals after the trial court resentenced him under Penal
Code section 1172.75. (Unlabeled statutory references are to this code.) On appeal,
Lawrence contends that his sentence violates the state and federal constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and/or unusual punishment. He also argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by declining to dismiss some of his prior strike convictions under
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) and section 1385.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In May 2008, Lawrence entered the mini-mart of a gas station and demanded
money from the store clerk.1 (Lawrence I, supra, E050482.) Lawrence had one hand in
his pocket and pretended to be holding a gun. (Ibid.) Lawrence left the gas station on
foot and was apprehended in a nearby field. (Ibid.) Law enforcement found $66
scattered along the path that Lawrence had taken. (Ibid.)
In 2010, a jury found Lawrence guilty of one count of second degree robbery
(§ 211). (Lawrence I, supra, E050482.) In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found that
Lawrence had served two prior prison terms (former § 667.5, subd. (b)) and suffered one
prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and seven prior strike convictions
(§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)). (Lawrence I, E050482.) All seven prior strike convictions
were from a single proceeding in North Carolina in 1984, when he was 19 years old. He
1 We summarize the facts of the 2008 offense from our prior unpublished opinion in
Lawrence’s direct appeal. (People v. Lawrence (Nov. 17, 2010, E050482) [nonpub. opn.]
(Lawrence I).)
2
pled guilty to seven counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Although the
convictions arose from a single proceeding, the offenses occurred on six different dates
(with two on the same date): October 17, 1983, January 13, 1984, January 23, 1984,
January 30, 1984, and February 1, 1984, and two on January 25, 1984. (Lawrence I,
E050482.) Lawrence was sentenced to 35 years in state prison for those seven
convictions and was paroled after serving eight years of the sentence.
Lawrence moved to dismiss six of the prior strikes under section 1385 and
Romero. (Lawrence I, supra, E050482.) The trial court denied the motion. The court
sentenced Lawrence to 31 years to life in state prison, consisting of 25 years to life on the
robbery count under the three strikes law, five years for the prior serious felony
enhancement, and one year for one prior prison term enhancement.
Lawrence appealed. In an unpublished opinion, we affirmed the judgment but
directed the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to correct certain clerical errors.
(Lawrence I, supra, E050482.) Lawrence argued that the trial court abused its discretion
by declining to dismiss the prior strikes, because all seven of them arose from one
proceeding that occurred 24 years earlier. (Ibid.) We rejected the argument, reasoning
that even though the convictions arose from a single proceeding, the seven robberies were
committed on six different dates and did “not represent a single transaction.” (Ibid.) As
to the remoteness of the strikes, we reasoned that Lawrence’s criminal conduct continued
after those convictions. We noted that he was “either incarcerated or on parole or
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probation supervision for almost all of the [subsequent] 24 years” preceding the 2008
offense. (Ibid.)
In 2014, Lawrence petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.126, the then-
new procedural mechanism by which a third-strike offender serving an indeterminate life
term could seek resentencing if their third strike was not a serious or violent felony.
(§ 1170.126; People v. Lawrence (Feb. 26, 2015, E061931) [nonpub. opn.] (Lawrence
II).) The trial court denied the petition, and Lawrence appealed. (Lawrence II,
E061931.) We affirmed the denial in an unpublished opinion. (Ibid.) We concluded that
Lawrence’s current conviction of second degree robbery rendered him ineligible for
resentencing under section 1170.126 because second degree robbery is a violent felony
(§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9)). (Lawrence II, E061931.)
In 2023, the trial court recalled Lawrence’s sentence under section 1172.75. The
court struck the now-invalid prior prison term enhancement, immediately resentenced
Lawrence to 30 years to life in state prison, and set the matter for a full resentencing
hearing.
Before the resentencing hearing, Lawrence again moved to dismiss his prior
strikes under Romero and section 1385 and to strike or dismiss the five-year prior serious
felony enhancement. Lawrence attached to the motion a copy of his 1984 plea agreement
for the seven convictions in North Carolina, along with a copy of the indictment for the
first of the seven offenses. The indictment alleges that Lawrence stole $195 and two
packs of cigarettes from The Smart Shop and that he used a .22-caliber handgun.
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The probation report for Lawrence’s sentencing in 2010 included a summary of
Lawrence’s criminal history between the robbery convictions in 1984 and the current
offense in 2008. In August 1992, Lawrence was released on parole for the sentence that
he was serving for the 1984 convictions. In April and May 1993, his parole was revoked.
He was again released on parole in July 1993, and he was convicted the following month
in North Carolina of one felony count of escape from prison, with the disposition for that
conviction listed as unknown. In September 1993, parole for the 1984 convictions was
discharged, and Lawrence was placed on parole for the escape conviction. That term of
parole was revoked once in 1994 and again in 1996. In early 1997, Lawrence was again
paroled, and parole was discharged in April 1997. In September 1999, he was convicted
in California of one felony count of second degree burglary (§ 459) and sentenced to six
years in state prison. Lawrence was released on parole in 2004, and parole was
discharged in 2005. (Lawrence I, supra, E050482.) In April 2007, he was convicted of
one felony count of transportation of controlled substances. (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11352, subd. (a).) He was granted drug treatment probation for three years. (Lawrence
I, E050482.) Lawrence completed a residential treatment program in December 2007 but
violated probation again in May 2008 by committing the current offense.
In Lawrence’s Romero motion, he stated that the gas station clerk who was
working when he committed the current offense testified at trial that Lawrence said “‘that
he wanted the money out of the register.’” According to the clerk, Lawrence said that he
“‘doesn’t care how much it is, he just wants the money.’” Lawrence acknowledged in the
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motion that the clerk gave Lawrence money from the register because the clerk was
frightened.
In the motion and at the resentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that the
court should dismiss the prior strikes in the interest of justice because (1) the robbery was
less egregious than other robberies in that Lawrence was not armed, did not use violence
or physical force, and did not resist arrest; (2) the prior strikes are about 40 years old; and
(3) Lawrence has already served 17 years in prison, where he has not violated the law and
has instead participated in numerous programs, including substance abuse recovery,
anger management, and victim impact.
Lawrence addressed the court at the resentencing hearing. He provided detail
about the programs that he has participated in while incarcerated, and he described the
job training that he has received and the work that he has done while in prison. Lawrence
said that he was “very sorry for how [he] acted,” and he explained that he is now “a
different person,” with alcohol and drugs no longer a part of his life.
The People argued against dismissal of the prior strikes and the prior serious
felony enhancement. As to the strikes, the People argued that Lawrence did not “fall
outside the spirit of the three strikes law,” because he had “back-to-back convictions for
serious offenses” since 1984 and performed poorly while previously on parole and
probation.
The trial court denied Lawrence’s motion in its entirety. With respect to the prior
strikes, the court explained that the 2008 robbery “was serious,” describing it as follows:
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Lawrence “demanded money from the cashier. And while making the demand, he had
his hand in his pocket, as if he had a firearm. The poor hapless cashier, who was
obviously afraid, gave the defendant money out of the cash register.” The court
described Lawrence’s criminal record in detail and opined that Lawrence’s criminal
history made him “a poster boy for why the three strikes law was drafted in the first
place.” With respect to Lawrence’s future prospects, the court found them “mixed, at
best,” noting that despite the certifications that Lawrence obtained while “in prison, he
nonetheless has been in and out of state prison for much of his life and was continuing to
violate all manner of laws until he was convicted and sent to state prison in this case.”
The trial court resentenced Lawrence to 30 years to life in state prison, consisting
of a third-strike sentence of 25 years to life for the robbery and five years for the prior
serious felony enhancement.
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of the Romero motion
Lawrence contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to dismiss the prior strike convictions under section 1385 and Romero. We disagree.
A trial court may, “in furtherance of justice,” strike a prior conviction under the
three strikes law. (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530.) When
the court recalls a sentence under section 1172.75, the court conducts a “‘full
resentencing’” (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 361) and may consider a
new Romero motion to dismiss prior strikes (id. at p. 364). In considering whether to
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dismiss a prior strike, the trial court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of [the defendant’s] background, character, and prospects,
the defendant may be deemed outside the [three strikes law’s] spirit, in whole or in part,
and hence should be treated as though [the defendant] had not previously been convicted
of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 161.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a Romero motion for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 (Carmony).) The “trial court does not
abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377)
The trial court considered the relevant factors, including Lawrence’s future
prospects and the nature and circumstances of his current offense and his prior
convictions. The current offense of second degree robbery is a violent offense. (§ 667.5,
subd. (c)(9).) Lawrence pretended to be holding a weapon when he demanded that the
store clerk give him money, which caused the clerk to be afraid. The seven prior strike
convictions were for robbery with a dangerous weapon.
Moreover, the prior robberies occurred on six separate dates over a four-month
period in 1984 when Lawrence was 19 years old. He served eight years in prison for
those crimes. After he was released, his parole was revoked twice before he was
convicted, just one year after his initial release, of escaping from prison. And Lawrence
8
also was subsequently convicted of other crimes (burglary and transporting controlled
substances), served another prison sentence, and violated the terms of parole and
probation numerous times, including by committing the current offense. Thus, for most
of the period from 1984 to 2008, Lawrence was either in prison or on parole but
continued to offend. Moreover, given how poorly Lawrence performed whenever he had
previously been on parole, it was reasonable for the trial court to find that Lawrence’s
future prospects were “mixed, at best.” Given those circumstances, we cannot say that
the trial court’s decision was “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could
agree with it.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
In arguing to the contrary, Lawrence contends that the trial court’s decision should
be reversed for “the exact same reason” that People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
1007, 1032 concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s
Romero motion. Lawrence does not explain what similarities exist between the cases. In
any event, Dryden is distinguishable. Dryden’s conclusion was based in part on the fact
that the defendant’s current offense “resulted from a late-night, spontaneous altercation”
that bore no similarity to the defendant’s prior strikes. (Id. at p. 1031.) In contrast,
Lawrence’s current offense of robbery is the same as all seven of his prior strikes.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by declining to dismiss the prior strikes.
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II. Cruel and/or unusual punishment
Lawrence contends that his sentence of 30 years to life violates the state and
federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and/or unusual punishment.2 We are not
persuaded.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits imposition of
“cruel and unusual punishments.” (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) “The Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids
only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” (Harmelin v.
Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 1001; Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 30-31
(Ewing); People v. Wilson (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 128, 167 (Wilson).) “This
proportionality principle is narrow when applied in noncapital cases.” (Wilson, at p. 167;
Ewing, at p. 20.)
The California Constitution affords greater protection than its federal counterpart
and prohibits infliction of “[c]ruel or unusual punishment.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17,
italics added; People v. Haller (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092.) Application of the
state constitutional prohibition must be analyzed separately from application of its federal
analogue. (People v. Carmony (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1085.) A punishment
violates the state constitutional proscription of cruel or unusual punishment “if, although
2 The People contend that Lawrence forfeited the constitutional challenge by failing
to object on that basis in the trial court. We agree that the argument is forfeited. (People
v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720 (Baker); People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463,
507, fn. 8.) We nevertheless exercise our discretion to address the merits of the argument
to forestall any possible claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Baker, at p. 720.)
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not cruel or unusual in its method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is
inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human
dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 (Lynch), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in People v. Caddick (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 46, 51-52; People v.
Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 (Dillon), superseded by statute on another ground as
stated in People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 683, fn. 4.) In reviewing an
indeterminate sentence such as Lawrence’s, we evaluate whether the maximum term
passes constitutional scrutiny independent of whether or when Lawrence may be eligible
for parole. (Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 724; Lynch, at pp. 416-417.)
Lynch set forth an analytical framework consisting of three methodological
“‘techniques’” to analyze the disproportionality of a sentence. (Baker, supra, 20
Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) We (1) examine “‘the nature of the offense and/or the offender,
with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to society,’” (2) “compare the
challenged punishment with punishments prescribed for more serious crimes in our
jurisdiction,” and (3) “compare the challenged punishment to punishments for the same
offense in other jurisdictions.” (People v. Johnson (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 253, 296-297;
Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 425-427.) Unconstitutional disproportionality can be
established by any one of the three techniques. (Baker, at p. 723; People v. Mendez
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 47, 64-65.)
We independently review whether a sentence constitutes cruel and/or unusual
punishment under either the state or the federal constitution, and we view any underlying
11
disputed facts in the light most favorable to the judgment. (Wilson, supra, 56
Cal.App.5th at pp. 166-167.)
Lawrence contends that his sentence is disproportionate under all three of the
Lynch techniques. We disagree.
In evaluating the first technique (the nature of the offense and the offender), we
“consider not only the offense in the abstract—i.e., as defined by the Legislature—but
also ‘the facts of the crime in question’ [citation]—i.e., the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense in the case at bar, including such factors as its
motive, the way it was committed, the extent of the defendant’s involvement, and the
consequences of [the defendant’s] acts.” (Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 479.) We
analyze “the particular person before the court, and ask[] whether the punishment is
grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s individual culpability as shown by such
factors as [the defendant’s] age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, and state of
mind.” (Ibid.; Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.)
Lawrence contends that his criminal history is “entirely nonviolent” and that in the
current offense “no weapons were used, no one was physically injured, and no property
was lost or damaged.” The argument is not persuasive. Lawrence was convicted of
second degree robbery, which is a violent felony. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9); Lawrence II,
supra, E061931.) And although no one was physically injured in the current offense,
Lawrence effectuated the robbery by pretending that he had a gun in his pocket. The
cashier was afraid and believed that he was being threatened with a real gun.
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Moreover, Lawrence has an extensive record of violent crime. It begins in 1984,
when he suffered seven strike convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon. The
indictment for one of those offenses alleged that he used a .22-caliber handgun in
committing the offense. Between 1984 and Lawrence’s commission of the current
offense in 2008, his criminal conduct continued. He suffered several additional felony
convictions for burglary, escape from prison, and transportation of controlled substances,
and he repeatedly reoffended upon release from custody and while on parole or
probation. In the 24 years between the 1984 strike convictions and the current offense,
Lawrence never went more than two to three years without a conviction or parole or
probation violation, unless he was incarcerated. Based on the nature of the offense and
Lawrence’s criminal history, we cannot say that the sentence of 25 years to life for the
robbery conviction is “so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it
shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (Lynch,
supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424.)
To support his argument to the contrary, Lawrence relies primarily on People v.
Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134 (Avila), which held that an aggregate three strikes
sentence of 39 years to life for convictions of attempted robbery and attempted extortion
constituted cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the state constitution. (Id. at
pp. 1138-1139.) In Avila, the defendant committed the same crime against two separate
individuals on separate dates: The defendant demanded that vendors selling fruit near a
particular freeway off-ramp pay him rent, and he smashed or stomped on their fruit when
13
they refused. (Id. at p. 1139.) The defendant had suffered strike convictions 40 years
earlier, and his most recent felony conviction was a 10-year-old drug possession crime
that was subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor. (Id. at p. 1148.)
Avila is distinguishable. Unlike the crimes in Avila, Lawrence’s current offense is
classified as a violent crime. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9).) In addition, Lawrence was on
probation when he committed the current offense and spent most of the preceding 24
years either incarcerated or on probation or parole. Since his 1984 strike convictions, he
did not have anything close to a 10-year period without any record of criminal conduct.
For the second Lynch technique, Lawrence argues that his sentence is
disproportionate as compared to less severe sentences imposed for more serious offenses
such as murder, rape, and child molestation. The comparisons are not apt, because
Lawrence is being punished as a recidivist. As this court explained in People v. Romero
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1433, the second Lynch technique “‘is inapposite to three
strikes sentencing because it is a defendant’s “recidivism in combination with current
crimes that places [the defendant] under the three strikes law. Because the Legislature
may constitutionally enact statutes imposing more severe punishment for habitual
criminals, it is illogical to compare [the defendant’s] punishment for [the] ‘offense,’
which includes [the defendant’s] recidivist behavior, to the punishment of others who
have committed more serious crimes, but have not qualified as repeat felons.”’”
With respect to the third Lynch technique, Lawrence argues that California’s three
strikes law is among the harshest recidivist sentencing schemes in the nation. Even
14
assuming for the sake of argument that Lawrence is correct, that fact does not compel the
conclusion that Lawrence’s sentence is cruel or unusual.3 (People v. Romero, supra, 99
Cal.App.4th at p. 1433; People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1516.)
Lawrence’s challenge to his sentence under the Eighth Amendment fares no better.
The United States Supreme Court has twice held that indeterminate life sentences
imposed under California’s three strikes law did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. In Ewing, the court upheld a 25-years-to-life sentence for felony grand theft
(shoplifting three golf clubs) with prior robbery and burglary convictions. (Ewing, supra,
538 U.S. at pp. 28-31.) In the companion case of Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S.
63, the court upheld two consecutive 25-years-to-life sentences for two counts of petty
theft with a prior conviction (stealing less than a total of $200 worth of videotapes on two
separate occasions) with three prior convictions for first degree burglary. (Id. at pp. 66,
77.)
Lawrence does not explain how Ewing and Andrade are distinguishable from his
own case in any way that favors him. And we see no such distinction. On the contrary,
unlike the theft convictions in Ewing and Andrade, the second degree robbery conviction
for which Lawrence was sentenced to 25 years to life is classified as a violent felony.
(§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9) [robbery is a violent offense]; see also § 667.5, subd. (c)(1)-(24)
[theft is not a violent felony].) And Lawrence suffered seven prior strike convictions for
3 Because we assume for the sake of argument that Lawrence is right about the
harshness of the three strikes law, we deny Lawrence’s request that we take judicial
notice of a survey of robbery laws in other states.
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committing robberies with a dangerous weapon. All of those circumstances make
Lawrence’s Eighth Amendment challenge weaker than the ones rejected in Ewing and
Andrade.
For similar reasons, the only case that Lawrence relies on to support his Eighth
Amendment challenge—Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277—is inapposite. In Solem,
the defendant was sentenced under a recidivist statute to life without the possibility of
parole for a nonviolent felony (“uttering a ‘no account’ check”). (Id. at pp. 279, 281,
303.)
For all of these reasons, we conclude that Lawrence’s sentence of 30 years to life
does not violate the federal or state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and/or
unusual punishment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
FIELDS
J.
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