Filed 10/6/26 P. v. Law CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Lassen)
THE PEOPLE, C103787
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 2025-
v. CR0091405)
JULIA STEPHANIE LAW,
Defendant and Appellant.
On April 14, 2025, the Lassen County District Attorney charged defendant Julia
Stephanie Law with possession of methamphetamine, a controlled substance, after two
prior drug related convictions in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11395,
subdivision (b). (Statutory section citations that follow are to the Health and Safety Code
unless otherwise stated.) The complaint also alleged defendant had been convicted of
robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211, a strike within the meaning of Penal Code
section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and section 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(c).
On April 16, 2025, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to the
charge of a violation of section 11395 and admitted two prior convictions of a violation
of section 11377(a). Defendant elected to participate in a drug treatment program
pursuant to Proposition 36 and section 11395 of the Penal Code.
On May 14, 2025, the trial court found defendant unsuitable for a drug treatment
program and sentenced her to 16 months in prison.
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Defendant has filed a timely appeal.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it found her unsuitable
for Proposition 36 rehabilitation when it had not ordered and considered an evaluation by
a drug addiction expert as required by Penal Code section 11395, subdivision (d)(1)(B).
The People agree.
We reverse the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In April 2025, a sheriff’s deputy answering a theft call found defendant, who was
on parole at the time, sitting in a vehicle. Although a search of defendant’s person did
not reveal any contraband, there was a small bag containing what was later determined to
be methamphetamine on the seat where defendant had been sitting.
On April 14, 2025, defendant was charged as noted above. with felony possession
of a controlled substance after two or more prior drug-related convictions under section
11377. (§ 11395, subd. (b)(1).) It was further alleged defendant suffered a prior strike.
(Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.)
Two days later, defendant pled guilty to the possession count and admitted the two
prior section 11377 convictions. The parties agreed that defendant would undergo
treatment under Proposition 36. (Prop. 36, as approved by voters Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5,
2024) (Prop. 36).) At the People’s request, the trial court dismissed the prior strike
allegation. Defendant waived time for sentencing. The matter was continued a month to
obtain a presentence report and a “Prop. 36” “assessment.” The minute order from the
hearing states the “Matter [is] referred to Probation for PSIR, Prop 63, and a Prop 36
assessment pursuant to 1210.1 PC.”1
1 The Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 is also known as Proposition
36 (Prop. 36, as approved by voters Gen. Elec. Nov. 7, 2000) (2000 Prop. 36), and it is
codified in Penal Code section 1210.1.
2
The May 2025 probation report detailed defendant’s drug habits, including her use
of methamphetamine starting at the age of 16. During an in-person interview, defendant
asked to be discharged from parole and said she was “ready for change to better her life.”
Defendant also submitted a written statement explaining that she wanted “to be there” for
her children, who were young adolescents. Despite a “great childhood,” her romantic
relationship as an adult had been “terrible” and “abusive.” Despite her many “hardships”
with addiction, she now wanted to attend treatment and then go to school.
The report detailed defendant’s “extensive” criminal history as an adult, including
13 misdemeanors and two felonies, including a 2017 conviction for second degree
robbery (a serious felony) with a two-year prison sentence. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 1192.7,
subd. (c)(19).) In addition to two probation violations, defendant had 20 parole violations
since being placed on parole in 2019. Defendant had been referred to substance abuse
programs five times since 2020 but had “absconded.” The report opined, “Despite
numerous opportunities for rehabilitation through supervised release, defendant has
consistently failed to comply with the terms of supervision” and “demonstrate[d] a lack
of commitment to rehabilitation and a disregard for the Court’s leniency.”
A separate Penal Code section 1210.1 eligibility report found defendant unsuitable
for relief under that provision for similar reasons. It also found her ineligible due to her
prior robbery conviction.
At the sentencing hearing on May 14, 2025, defense counsel argued that, despite
defendant’s “terrible” history on parole, defendant was now “ready to take treatment
more seriously.” Counsel noted that section 11395 “presume[s] that the person go to
treatment.” However, the probation department had misunderstood the court’s order for a
“Prop. 36” assessment and erroneously evaluated defendant under Penal Code section
1210.1, instead of the more recent section 11395.
The trial court disagreed, noting that the court’s minute order stated the evaluation
was to be under Penal Code section 1210.1. The court further noted that they could
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“discuss[ ]” defendant’s “amenability or suitability” for treatment, but there were no
“resources” for an addiction specialist, meaning “they mandate ... something that can’t be
complied with.”
The prosecutor suggested that they “still proceed[ ]” and defer sentencing so
defendant could go to a treatment program. If defendant was successful, then her
conviction would be dismissed under section 11395.
The court responded that section 11395, subdivision (b)(2) prohibits a jail or
prison sentence “unless the Court determines that [defendant] is not eligible or suitable
for treatment.” The court was concerned that, over the past five years, defendant had
“blown” five opportunities to attend substance abuse treatment. That history strongly
suggested to the court that defendant was “unamenable” to the treatment contemplated in
section 11395.
As to defendant’s suitability for treatment, defense counsel argued that relapse was
“typical[ ]” for those suffering from substance abuse. Here, however, defendant had
demonstrated that she was likely to succeed because she planned for trade school, had not
previously participated in an in-patient program, and wanted to be a better role model for
her daughter.
After a brief recess, the trial court found defendant was not suitable for treatment
under section 11395. The court acknowledged that defendant’s prior treatment may not
have been “substantial.” Still, she had a pattern of addiction and increasingly serious
criminal behavior as an adult, despite being offered five referrals to substance abuse
programs. The court sentenced defendant to prison for 16 months (the low term).
Defendant timely appealed. She did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.
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DISCUSSION
As earlier set forth, defendant asks us to remand the matter because the trial court
erroneously determined she was ineligible for treatment under section 11395 without the
benefit of the required report from a drug addiction expert and the People agree.
Section 11395, known as the “Treatment-Mandated Felony Act,” was enacted as
part of Proposition 36, which was approved by voters in November 2024. (§ 11395,
subd. (a); Prop. 36, § 7.) The statute gives repeat hard drug possession offenders the
option of participating in drug and mental health treatment. (§ 11395, subds. (a), (b)(2),
(c), (d)(1)(A), (d)(2); Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 2024) text of Prop. 36, § 3, subd.
(a)(4).) The individual must plead guilty or no contest to again possessing a hard drug,
admit the alleged prior qualifying convictions, waive time for sentencing or judgment,
and agree to participate in treatment. (§ 11395, subd. (d)(1)(A).) If he or she
successfully completes treatment, the defendant’s plea “shall not constitute a conviction
for any purpose.” (Ibid.)
As relevant here, such individuals are “not [to] be sentenced to jail or prison ...
unless a court determines that the person is not eligible or suitable for treatment.”
(§ 11395, subd. (b)(2).)
The statute further states that, “Upon or subsequent to arraignment for a violation
of this section, and at the request or with the consent of the defendant or their attorney,
the court shall order a drug addiction expert to conduct a substance abuse and mental
health evaluation of the defendant.” (§ 11395, subd. (d)(1)(B).) The evaluation may be
based on an interview of the defendant or others with relevant knowledge, and can
include “medical records, criminal history, prior treatment history, and records pertaining
to the current offense.” (Ibid.) The expert “shall” submit a report of the evaluation to the
court and the parties. (Ibid.)
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We review de novo the trial court’s interpretation of the statute as allowing it to
find defendant unsuitable for treatment without first obtaining the drug addiction expert
report. (See People v. Fouse (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1145; see also Robert L. v.
Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 900 [a reviewing court applies the same principles
that govern statutory construction when interpreting a voter initiative].) Our task is to
determine the electorate’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. (Smith v. Superior
Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83.) We turn first to the language of the provision, giving
the words their ordinary meaning. (Ibid.) We construe the language “ ‘in the context of
the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme [in light of the electorate’s
intent].’ ” (Robert L., at p. 901.) If the statutory language is unambiguous, the plain
meaning controls and consideration of extrinsic sources to determine the electorate’s
intent is unnecessary. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist.
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 919.)
Given section 11395’s clear language, we need not look beyond the statute itself to
discern the electorate’s intent. As the statute makes clear, immediately upon or after
arraignment for violating the statute, and either at the request or with the consent of the
defendant or their attorney, the trial court “shall” order a drug addiction expert
evaluation, and that report “shall” be submitted to the court and the parties. (§ 11395,
subd. (d)(1)(B).)
It is true that the statute gives the trial court discretion to determine that a
defendant is ineligible or unsuitable for treatment. (§ 11395, subd. (b)(2).) However, by
requiring the trial court to order the drug addiction expert evaluation and report when a
defendant wants or consents to it, the electorate has signaled that it intends for the trial
court to have the benefit of the expert’s report before determining a defendant’s
suitability for treatment. While the trial court has the discretion ultimately to decide that
a defendant is unsuitable for treatment once the court considers the drug addiction
expert’s evaluation, the expert’s evaluation must come first. This is consistent with the
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statute’s goal of preferring treatment and rehabilitation services for persons addicted to
drugs who qualify under the statute over incarceration.
Here, defendant agreed to treatment per section 11395 as part of her plea to
violating the statute. She admitted her prior qualifying convictions and waived time for
sentencing. After entering her plea, she did not object when the trial court continued the
matter to obtain a “Prop. 36” “assessment,” indicating, at a minimum, that she consented
to a drug addiction expert evaluation and report as mandated by section 11395. The trial
court abused its discretion when it decided, notwithstanding the statutory provisions, that
defendant was unsuitable for treatment before obtaining the necessary report.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
/s/
HULL, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
ROBIE, J.
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