Filed 9/23/26 P. v. Laubhan CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B343975
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA396554)
v.
ROBERT LAUBHAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Shelly B. Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed.
Mordecai Garelick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
In 2013, the trial court sentenced defendant Robert
Laubhan to a 39-year-prison term for multiple crimes including
two attempted murders. In 2025, after a plenary resentencing
hearing, the resentencing trial court imposed the same 39-year-
prison sentence. On appeal, defendant’s appointed counsel filed a
brief identifying no issue and requesting Delgadillo review
(People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216). Defendant filed a
supplemental brief, principally arguing that the law has changed
since his original sentencing. Defendant has not demonstrated
error in the trial court’s exercise of its discretion and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On July 23, 2013, defendant pleaded no contest to the
following charges: two counts of assault with a firearm (counts 1
and 3); the personal use of a firearm within the meaning of Penal
Code 1 section 12022.5; possession of a firearm by a felon with two
priors (count 7); the attempted murder of Francisco Navarro
(count 8); and attempted murder of Julio Navarro (count 10). He
also admitted a firearm enhancement pursuant to 12202.53,
subdivisions (b) and (c) with respect to the attempted murders;
the gang enhancement as to all counts; and one prior conviction
pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) for attempted
carjacking; and that the attempted carjacking was also a strike
conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12). Defendant admitted another prior
conviction within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b) for
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377. Finally,
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2
defendant admitted a prior conviction within the meaning of
section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
At the hearing when defendant pleaded no contest,
defendant indicated he was pleading “freely and voluntarily”
because it was in his best interest. The prosecutor stated
defendant potentially faced a maximum term of 70 years. The
trial court found defendant entered into his plea knowingly and
voluntarily with an “understanding of the nature of the charge as
well as the consequences of” the plea. On July 23, 2013, the
original sentencing trial court sentenced defendant to an
aggregate 39-year sentence.
Thereafter, defendant requested resentencing pursuant to
sections 1172.75 and 1172.7. The People opposed the request and
argued defendant was convicted in 2006 of attempted carjacking,
in 2009 of possession of a controlled substance, in 2013 of
assaults with a deadly weapon, attempted murders, and
possession of a firearm by a felon (the offenses that are the
subject of the current resentencing), and in 2024 of being a
prisoner in possession of a weapon. The People argued defendant
thus remained a danger to the public.
At a hearing, defendant’s counsel requested the court stay
the five-year section 667, subdivision (a) prior. Counsel argued
although defendant “did appear to get into some trouble last year
and was convicted . . . of having a shank” for a “significant period
of time,” he had no violations while he was incarcerated. The
prosecutor contended although the trial court had discretion to
strike a section 667, subdivision (a) prior, the court should not do
so because defendant posed a danger to inmates and deputy
sheriffs by having a shank in prison.
3
On January 28, 2025, a different trial judge recalled
defendant’s sentence (the resentencing court) and resentenced
defendant to an aggregate 39-year term in state prison, the same
aggregate term the original sentencing court imposed. The court
acknowledged defendant had the right to a full resentencing. The
court recognized defendant had enrolled in some college courses.
The court, however, was concerned defendant was in possession
of a weapon while in custody. The court further noted defendant
has a long criminal history. The court emphasized defendant did
not show any insight into his conduct when he stated, “ ‘I got 39
years for just trying to scare some people.’ ” The court, however,
stated it would strike the gang enhancements on all counts.
Defendant appeals from the trial court’s January 28, 2025
minute order on resentencing “[p]ursuant to
1172.7(a)/1172.75(a).” The court sentenced defendant to the
following terms:
(1) For the attempted murder of Francisco Navarro (count
8), 14 years plus 20 years for the section 12022.53, subdivision (c)
firearm enhancement, and five years for the section 667,
subdivision (a)(1) prior. The court struck the section 12022.53,
subdivision (b) firearm enhancement, two section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancements, and the gang enhancement.
(2) For both assaults (count 1, count 3) the court sentenced
defendant to six years and stayed that sentence pursuant to
section 654. The court struck the section 12022.5 firearm
enhancement, the gang enhancement, the section 667,
subdivision (a)(1) enhancement, and two section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancements.
(3) For the felon in possession of a firearm (count 7), the
court sentenced defendant to a concurrent two-year term and
4
struck the gang enhancement, the section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
enhancement, and two section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancements.
(4) For the attempted murder (count 10), the court
sentenced defendant to 14 years to run concurrently. With
respect to count 10, the court struck the section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b) and (c) enhancements, the section 667,
subdivision (a)(1) enhancement, the gang enhancement, and two
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements.
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s counsel filed a brief identifying no issue and
requesting this court consider the case pursuant to People v.
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. Defendant filed a
supplemental brief stating he has “changed and matured.” If
given “consideration in regard[ ] to sentencing,” he contends he
“would never run afoul of the law again.” Defendant asserts he
suffered from severe physical and psychological trauma at the
time of his offense and he qualifies for relief under Assembly Bill
No. 124. Defendant also claims Senate Bill No. 81 precludes
imposition of multiple enhancements resulting in a term of over
20 years. Defendant argues he “suffered from double jeopardy.”
Pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 333, defendant also seeks relief
from the gang enhancement. Finally, he claims his plea was not
intelligent, knowing, and voluntary.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a)2 provides, with exceptions
not relevant here, that a sentence enhancement imposed
2Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides: “Any sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
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pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior to January 1,
2020 is invalid. 3 Pursuant to this statute, a defendant is entitled
to a full resentencing. (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
340, 361.) Here, the trial court held a full resentencing hearing
and exercised its discretion to sentence defendant again to
39 years.
We review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Lua (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 472, 476.)
Defendant shows no abuse of discretion. Assembly Bill No. 124
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) added subdivision (b)(6) to section 1170,
which indicates a trial court should impose a lower term if
psychological or physical trauma contributed to the crime. 4 The
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” (Pen. Code,
§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
3 Section 1172.7, subdivision (a), the other statute
defendant apparently cited in his request for resentencing,
does not appear relevant to defendant’s sentence. It provides:
“Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,
2018, pursuant to Section 11370.2 of the Health and Safety Code,
except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction of
violating or conspiring to violate Section 11380 of the Health and
Safety Code is legally invalid.” (Pen. Code, § 1172.75.)
4 Section 1170 states in pertinent part:
“(b)(1)(6) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and unless the court
finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order
imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The
person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
6
record does not support defendant’s assertion that physical or
psychological trauma contributed to the offense.
Defendant cites Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.),
which added section 1385, subdivision (c). Section 1385,
subdivision (c) sets forth criteria for evaluating whether to
dismiss an enhancement in the interest of justice. 5 Section 1385,
subdivision (c) does not require the dismissal of an enhancement
if the trial court concludes dismissal would not be in the interest
of justice. (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029.) Here,
defendant shows no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of his
request to dismiss the section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
enhancement where there was evidence defendant continued to
commit crimes while incarcerated. Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–
trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence.”
5 Section 1385 provides in pertinent part:
“(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except
if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative
statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision,
the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating
circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of
the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds
that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or
other serious danger to others. [¶] . . . [¶]
“(C) The application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed.”
7
2022 Reg. Sess.), also cited by defendant, amended section 186.22
to add new substantive requirements for gang enhancements.
(People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 394.) Although defendant
pleaded no contest to gang allegations, the court struck the gang
enhancements.
Finally, resentencing pursuant to 1172.75 does not
encompass a redetermination of the validity of defendant’s no
contest plea and does not raise double jeopardy concerns because
it is a voluntary proceeding initiated by defendant. (Cf. People v.
Flint (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 607, 618 [ameliorative sentencing
provision in section 1170.95 does not implicate double jeopardy
clause].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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