Filed 9/9/26 P. v. Laster CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085438
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(San Diego Super. Ct.
v. No. SCE414351)
RICKEY TYRONE LASTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Selena D. Epley, Judge. Affirmed.
Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C.
Cavalier and Nora S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Rickey Tyrone Laster was convicted by a jury of premeditated murder
following a shootout at a gas station. The victim started a fistfight that
ended when Laster was knocked to the ground. A few seconds later, the
victim shot at Laster, who had retreated to his car where he had stashed his
own gun. After an initial exchange of gunfire caused the victim to stumble
backwards and fall down, Laster shot him multiple times at close range.
Laster, who does not dispute that he killed the victim, challenges his
conviction on three grounds. First, he claims there was not enough time to
premeditate the killing, nor was there sufficient evidence that he shot the
victim in anything other than a spontaneous response. But premeditation
can occur in mere seconds, and several aspects of the killing indicate that
Laster exhibited this state of mind. Second, he asserts that the trial court
erroneously admitted evidence of his affiliation with a motorcycle club at the
time of the killing; however, this ruling was carefully circumscribed and not
so irrational that it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Finally, Laster’s
third allegation of error—that the prosecutor committed misconduct in
misrepresenting the law during his closing argument—has been forfeited.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
A jury convicted Laster of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true that he personally discharged a firearm to
proximately cause Joseph Curtis’s death (id., § 12022.53, subd. (d)) during
1 In accordance with the standard of review that applies to a claim of
insufficient evidence, we recite the facts of the offense in the light most
favorable to the judgment. (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88
(Morales).)
2
a shootout at a San Diego area gas station in August 2022. He was sentenced
to a total term of 50 years to life plus two years.2
The killing occurred around 9:40 a.m. at a gas station. A few minutes
earlier, Laster arrived at the gas station with Iliana F., a woman he was on
a first date with. Laster was driving Iliana’s Mitsubishi SUV. Iliana had
arranged to meet Curtis at the gas station so she could return his debit card
that she had borrowed.
Shortly after Laster and Iliana arrived, the two men got into an
argument that, as captured by a gas station security video, escalated when
Curtis punched Laster twice in the face. The scuffle continued off camera
and ended with Laster being knocked to the ground. Laster made his way
back to the Mitsubishi where, unbeknownst to Iliana, he had stashed a
handgun loaded with ten rounds. The video shows Curtis walking toward
Laster as he sat in the SUV, pulling his gun, and shooting a round in the
defendant’s direction.
Laster also fired at Curtis, which caused the victim to stumble
backwards out of the camera’s field of view.3 Approximately two seconds
later, Laster disappeared off camera with his gun pointed in Curtis’s
direction. Eleven seconds after he disappeared from the camera’s view—
and less than a minute after he was punched—Laster was captured by the
security camera walking back to the SUV and driving away. The physical
2 Laster was also convicted of one count of witness intimidation (Pen.
Code, § 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), which is not at issue in this appeal.
3 The camera was pointed toward a bank of gas pumps. Curtis’s car
was in front of gas pumps; the Mitsubishi was behind them. Because the
view into the Mitsubishi was obscured, the camera footage does not reveal
who fired first.
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evidence established that Curtis fired only one round before his gun jammed,
and that Laster fired all ten of his rounds in a downward direction toward
the victim.
Several bystanders heard or saw at least some of the gunfight. Five
witnesses said that Laster fired his rounds in two distinct bursts. Three
witnesses recalled Laster shooting Curtis between four and seven times while
approaching him after he stumbled. Two of these three witnesses stated that
Curtis was shot multiple times from just a few feet away and that he did not
appear to be holding a gun at that time. And one of these two witnesses told
the jury that Curtis reached his arm up toward Laster before he was shot.
Curtis suffered nonfatal gunshot wounds to left knee and big toe and a
fatal wound to his chest. The angle of the fatal shot was consistent with both
(1) the position of Curtis’s torso when he fired at Laster as captured in the
security video and (2) by being shot from above while sitting or kneeling on
the ground. A forensic pathologist testified that the kill shot would have
incapacitated Curtis within seconds, rendering him unable to walk or to
reach up with his arm.
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
1. Additional Background
Laster’s first date with Iliana came after he had tried for a month to
meet her in person. In the early morning hours before the killing, the two
spent time at the clubhouse of the 4 Horsemen motorcycle club, where Laster
was a prospective member. Despite having only “low-level” responsibilities
for the club, he told Iliana he would soon be its president. He frequently
shared on social media images of himself in his black leather motorcycle vest
4
that had the club patch sewn on its back (his “cut”). He also sent Iliana one
of these pictures before they met in person. The pair left the clubhouse
around 7:00 a.m. because they had to drop Iliana’s daughter off at school
and then return the debit card to Curtis.
For his part in the shootout, Laster claimed he acted in self-defense.
After being knocked down, Laster said he heard Curtis, whom he had never
met, tell Iliana, “ ‘He looked at me crazy. I’ll fucking kill this guy. I’ll kill
this [motherfucker].’ ” Laster told the jury that he wanted to drive away in
the Mitsubishi, but Curtis was walking toward him with his gun drawn and
was repeating his threats. According to Laster, Curtis fired first and he
responded by shooting all his rounds blindly from behind the open driverside
door of the SUV. He then ran over to where Curtis had fallen, saw the gun
next to him, and drove off.
2. There was sufficient evidence of premeditation.
Laster does not dispute that he killed Curtis, but challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to establish premeditation. He claims there
was not enough time for him to plan the killing, and that the eyewitnesses’
testimony was not reliable because portions of it contradicted facts otherwise
conclusively established. Accordingly, he contends that the killing was
necessarily a “rash, hasty response to being punched and chased with a gun”
that lacks the characteristics of premeditation and deliberation. For these
reasons, he requests that we either vacate his conviction or reduce it to
voluntary manslaughter.
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—
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that Sis, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which
a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” (Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 88.) In applying this standard,
we “ ‘ “ ‘presume[] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the
trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
First degree murder is an unlawful killing that is “willful, deliberate,
and premeditated.” (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a).) In this
context, “ ‘[d]eliberation’ refers to careful weighing of considerations in
forming a course of action; ‘premeditation’ means thought over in advance.”
(People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080 (Koontz).) “The “ ‘true test’ ”
of premeditation and deliberation “ ‘ “is not the duration of time as much as
it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great
rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Against this backdrop, we reject Laster’s contention that there was
insufficient time for premeditation. The critical moment in the altercation
occurred when Curtis stumbled backward out of the frame of the security
camera. Just prior to that moment, Curtis pursued Laster, whom he said he
wanted to kill, and then shot at him. If the jury believed Laster’s testimony
that Curtis drew his gun and fired first, which is consistent with the security
video footage, his theory of self-defense would have been reasonable if he had
killed Curtis at that time. (See People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th
1122, 1138–1139 [“Millbrook’s testimony that Manoa pulled out a gun and
that he thought Manoa was going to shoot him would have supported a
finding of self-defense”].)
But that is not the only way—or even the most reasonable way—to
view the evidence. For Laster, things changed once Curtis was repelled with
a burst of gunfire that did not include the kill shot. It was reasonable to infer
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that Laster knew Curtis had been rendered defenseless because he had been
knocked from his feet and was no longer able to fire for any of several reasons
supported by the evidence: because his gun was inoperable, because he had
dropped it, or because he had suffered a nonfatal gunshot wound. A rational
juror could find that it was in this moment when Laster, rather than trying
to summon assistance or leave the scene, came up with a plan to kill Curtis
while he had the upper hand. That this plan was hatched in the “matter of
[a few] seconds” did not preclude a finding of premeditation. (People v. Brito
(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 316, 324; accord People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117,
1127 [premeditation can occur in a “brief period of time”].)
As for whether premeditation actually occurred, we apply the approach
our Supreme Court has “generally found sufficient to sustain” that finding.
(Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 88–89, citing People v. Anderson (1968) 70
Cal.2d 15, 26–27.) We examine the record for three categories of evidence
indicative of premeditation and deliberation: (1) planning activity, (2) motive
to kill, and (3) a manner of killing consistent with this state of mind.
(Anderson, at pp. 26–27.) Although this approach “does not ‘define the
elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law of murder in
any way’ ” and is neither “normative nor exhaustive” (Morales, at p. 89),
a finding of premeditation will generally be upheld “when there is evidence
of all three types” or “at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of
(2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3)” (Anderson, at p. 27).
A review of the record reveals at least some evidence fitting into all
three categories. Taking them in turn, we agree with Laster that there was
no evidence of an overt plan to kill Curtis. But, as the People point out, the
fact that Laster brought a gun to the gas station supports an inference that
at some level, he “ha[d] considered the possibility” of a violent encounter.
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(See People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 624, 636, italics added [planning
established where defendant armed himself with a gun and killed a woman
he unexpectedly met later]; accord People v. Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th
102, 106, 122 [where defendant shot and killed a stranger, “the act of taking
a loaded weapon [into] a restaurant is evidence of preparation and planning
for involvement in a violent encounter”].)
There was also evidence fitting into the other two categories. Just
before the critical moment, Laster was beaten up by Curtis in front of a
woman he had just taken on a first date and whom he had tried to impress
by inflating his stature in the motorcycle club. Thus, the evidence suggests
Laster may have been motivated to kill Curtis not only because he had just
been beaten up, but also because he wanted to protect his reputation in
Iliana’s eyes. In addition, there were two aspects of the manner of killing
that were consistent with premeditation: he fired multiple shots at Curtis
while he was defenseless (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 369), and
shot at a vital part of his body from close range (Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th
at p. 1082).
Finally, we are unpersuaded by Laster’s suggestion that sufficient
evidence of premeditation was lacking because many of the eyewitnesses
did not see the punches that Curtis threw or that he also possessed and first
pulled out a gun. But some of the witnesses—including the ones who saw
Laster shoot Curtis at close range—acknowledged they did not see the entire
altercation, which would enhance their reliability and explain these perceived
gaps in their testimony. More importantly, jurors could believe all, some,
or none of a witness’s testimony and could choose what weight to give the
testimony they believed. (CALCRIM Nos. 226, 301, 302.) That is to say,
evaluating and weighing conflicting inferences to be derived from various
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witnesses’ testimony are quintessential jury functions. Just because no
one witness’s testimony paints an entirely comprehensive picture of the
altercation does not mean that jurors could not conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that Laster premeditated the killing.
B. Evidence Code Section 352
1. Additional Background
Although no gang enhancement was alleged, the People sought to
introduce evidence that Laster and Curtis were members of rival criminal
street gangs to prove, among other things, motive and intent. This evidence
included photographs of Laster in his motorcycle club cut while wearing
red—which was believed to be the color that represented his gang—and
while holding up four fingers. There were also pictures taken of inside the
clubhouse, which was painted red. Laster opposed this motion on relevance
and Evidence Code section 352 (section 352) grounds. In a ruling that spans
nine pages of the reporter’s transcript, the trial court excluded this evidence.
Over Laster’s objections, however, the court found that evidence of his
affiliation with the motorcycle club, including the pictures of him in his cut,
had “some relevance” and thus could be admitted so long as it did not suggest
the club was a criminal street gang. Accordingly, the court went through the
proffered photographs of Laster one-by-one and excluded those it thought
might be unduly prejudicial. The parties stipulated to the admission of six
photos from a search of the clubhouse.
During voir dire, which occurred before the court finalized its ruling
on the admissibility of this evidence, the court asked the prospective jurors
whether Laster’s affiliation with the club would impact their ability to be
fair and impartial. One potential juror who later was excused for cause
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responded, “Yeah, I was struck by the name of the club earlier in the
proceedings, not just now. It strikes me as a club I certainly wouldn’t want to
have anything to do with. And I have concerns about—about membership of
such a club of. I don’t know the club, but I do know what the name means.”4
The prosecution limited its examinations of witnesses about the club to
Laster’s affiliation with it, authenticating the pictures of him in his cut and
of the clubhouse, confirming that he and Iliana were there before the killing,
and describing the search of the clubhouse. During his closing statement, the
prosecutor argued that Laster was embarrassed at having been beaten up by
Curtis in part because he had bragged to Iliana about being a part of the
club, and “he’s a tough guy” who had to “atone” for the assault.
2. The limited admission of motorcycle club evidence was not an
abuse of discretion.
Laster argues that this evidence should have been excluded because it
was irrelevant or, in the alternative, was inadmissible under section 352. As
to the latter theory, he maintains that evidence of this affiliation “so closely
parallels that of gang membership [that] the prejudicial value was evident as
it only painted [him] as a ‘tough guy’ who needed ‘atone’ because he was
going to be president of this club.” He also claims that the unduly prejudicial
nature of the evidence is demonstrated by the prospective juror’s reaction to
the club’s name.
Laster’s allegations of error invoke the abuse of discretion standard
of review. (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1123 [relevance objection];
People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 961 [section 352 objection].) A trial
court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision “so irrational or
4 We infer that the juror was referring to the Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse (see Revelation 6:1–6:8).
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arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) We evaluate the erroneous admission
of evidence for prejudice under the “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” standard.
(People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340, 357, citing People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836–837 (Watson).)
Relevance is a “low bar” for evidence to clear (People v. Villa (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1052), as it need only have “any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove a disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action” (Evid. Code, § 210, italics added). Generally, all relevant
evidence is admissible (id., § 351), but a court “in its discretion may exclude
[relevant] evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the probability that its admission will ... (b) create a substantial danger of
undue prejudice” (id., § 352). “Undue prejudice ... occurs when the jury is
emotionally inflamed against a party without regard to the issues in the
case.” (Smalley v. Baty (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 977, 985.)
Although Laster’s affiliation with the club may not have had
overwhelming probative value, it was properly admitted. Taken together
with what he told Iliana about his stature in the club, this evidence was
relevant because it bore on Laster’s only defense theory—that he killed
Curtis in self-defense. As for whether it was unduly prejudicial, the court
carefully went through the evidence and thoughtfully considered the parties’
arguments for and against admitting it. Nothing about this process or the
result reached, which occurred after voir dire was completed, was patently
irrational or arbitrary as required to find an abuse of discretion. And even if
this evidence had been erroneously admitted, it would not be “reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to [Laster] would have been reached”
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absent the error (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 836) given the evidence of
planning activity, other sources of motive, and the manner of killing.
This brings us to People v. Memory (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 835
(Memory), on which Later relies heavily to argue that this evidence should
have been excluded. The defendants there, who were accused of stabbing
three people, belonged to a different motorcycle club. (Id. at pp. 848–849.)
As relevant here, the prosecutor wanted to use expert testimony to establish
that the club required its members to be violent when confronted and to carry
knives. (Id. at pp. 848–849, 852.) The court excluded the expert’s testimony
but, at the same time, “grant[ed] the prosecutor ‘a ton of latitude’ ” to elicit
this same evidence from other witnesses. (Id. at p. 852.) Even though none
of the witnesses provided the testimony the prosecutor sought, he was
permitted to argue and insinuate as if had been given. (Id. at p. 858.) The
court erred because it allowed the jury to consider what the Court of Appeal
stated was akin to “gang evidence” that was irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial. (Id. at pp. 858–864.)
The same result is not warranted here. In Laster’s case, the court did
not admit any evidence about his motorcycle club other than he was affiliated
with it and that he wore a club cut. As we read them, the prosecutor’s
comments about Laster needing to be a “tough guy” who had to “atone” for
being assaulted described how he sought to portray himself to Iliana, rather
than being an argument that he was a tough guy just because he was
affiliated with a motorcycle club.
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The jury was to consider whether Laster was provoked when deciding
what, if any, culpability attached to his actions. They were instructed that
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a murder could be reduced from first to second degree because “ ‘provocation
(the arousal of emotions) can give rise to a rash, impulsive decision, and this
in turn shows no premeditation and deliberation.’ ” (People v. Jones (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1001; CALCRIM No. 522.) Laster could be convicted
of voluntary manslaughter under a heat of passion theory in lieu of murder
if jurors found a provocation that “would have caused a person of average
disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion
rather than from judgment.” (CALCRIM No. 570.)
Neither theory permitted the jurors to consider whether the extent of
Laster’s response to the provocation was appropriate. (See People v. Beltran
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 949.) Yet the prosecutor’s closing argument appeared
to invite the jury to take this additional step.5 Laster contends for the first
time on appeal that these statements constitute prosecutorial misconduct.
Generally, such claims are forfeited unless there was a timely and
specific objection and a corresponding request for an admonition. (People v.
Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.) Laster relies on an acknowledged exception
to this rule, where an objection and request for an admonition would both
be futile (ibid.), arguing merely that “the misconduct was serious and any
admonition could not have cured the harm; the bell could not be unrung.”
5 As one example, the prosecutor argued that the jurors should consider
provocation but that Laster’s actions went “far beyond what any average
person would have done. It was not justified. It was not legal in any sense of
the law that has been instructed to you.” He would repeat these arguments
in the context of voluntary manslaughter by stating that jurors should
determine “whether a person of average disposition would have acted the
same way,” that they “couldn’t say that this is the way an average person
responds,” and that they had to “decide whether a person of average
disposition would have in the same situation reacted from that passion
and executed someone in broad daylight.”
13
We “must presume jurors follow instructions and obey admonitions”
(People v. Hem (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 218, 230), and thus, “[a] prosecutor’s
misstatements of law are generally curable by an admonition from the court”
(People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674 (Centeno)). Because Laster’s
conclusory argument on futility fails to establish that this is the “exceptional
case” where this remedy would have been ineffective (People v. Allen (1978)
77 Cal.App.3d 924, 935), the exception to the forfeiture rule does not apply.
Anticipating this result, Laster makes the alternative request that
we reverse his conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail
on this claim, Laster must show that counsel’s (1) “representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms
and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688; see id. at p. 687.) There is no prejudice
unless “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Id. at
p. 694.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective
assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was
asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).)
Here, Laster adopted the all-or-nothing strategy of attempting to
persuade the jury to acquit because he shot Curtis in self-defense. Defense
counsel may have made a tactical decision to ignore the issue the potential
misstatements of law because objecting to them or attempting to clarify
them would not help his client’s cause.
More importantly, Laster fails to show prejudice. The jury was
properly instructed that provocation is sufficient to reduce murder to
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voluntary manslaughter if it “would have caused a person of average
disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion
rather than from judgment.” “It has often been emphasized that arguments
of counsel ‘generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from
the court.’ ” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 676.) “When argument runs
counter to instructions given a jury, we will ordinarily conclude that the jury
followed the latter and disregarded the former.” (People v. Osband (1996) 13
Cal.4th 622, 717.) Indeed, the jury in this case was instructed on this point
just before closing arguments began. Therefore, on this record, we cannot
conclude that counsel’s failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance
and/or prejudicially affected the ultimate result. (See Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th
at p. 1009.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
RUBIN, J.
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