Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Lara CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
THE PEOPLE, C103723
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CRF19-
v. 0002563-02)
CORBETT MAXWELL LARA,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2021, defendant Corbett Maxwell Lara pleaded guilty to multiple offenses,
including two counts of attempted murder. In 2024, he petitioned for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court denied the petition at the prima
facie stage, reasoning that Lara was ineligible for relief because his plea occurred after
the Legislature had eliminated liability for attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.
On appeal, Lara contends that the trial court erred because the law concerning
attempted murder was unsettled at the time of his plea. The People offer little, if any,
argument in response, and instead present an alternative basis for upholding the trial
court’s ruling: that the testimony from the preliminary hearing establishes that Lara is
ineligible for relief. We disagree with the People because the facts contained in the
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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preliminary hearing transcript do not foreclose relief as a matter of law. We therefore
reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on Lara’s petition.
BACKGROUND
On June 7, 2019, the People filed a complaint charging Lara and codefendant
Jesus Wilson with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murders of three
people, K.B., R.R., and A.R. (§§ 187, 664); residential robbery in concert as to each
victim (§§ 211, 212.5, 213, subd. (a)); assault with a deadly weapon, to wit a hammer, as
to A.R. and R.R. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); assault with a deadly weapon, to wit a hoe, as to
K.B. and R.R. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury
as to A.R. (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)); and first degree residential burglary (§ 459). The People
alleged as to certain counts that Lara: (1) personally inflicted great bodily injury on R.R.
and K.B., causing them to become comatose due to brain injury and to suffer paralysis
(§ 12022.7, subd. (b)); (2) personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit a
hammer (§ 12022, subd. (b)); and (3) personally inflicted great bodily injury on A.R.
(§ 12022.7).
At the May 2020 preliminary hearing, Officer Travis Braud testified that, on the
night of the incident in May 2018, he was called out to a residence in Shasta County.
When he entered, he saw K.B. lying in the fetal position, struggling to breathe. The
officer also saw R.R. seated on a couch and A.R. seated by the entrance. Blood coated
R.R.’s head and face, and A.R. had extreme swelling in both eyes.
Investigator Wesley Townsley testified that A.R. told him that she lived with R.R.
and K.B. A.R. said that, on the night of the incident, when she got home, there were
three other men present playing video games and drinking alcohol. A.R. had five shots of
alcohol and felt intoxicated. A.R. had a gap in her memory. She remembered walking
into the kitchen and seeing the time on the microwave; the next thing she remembered
was feeling something wet on her face, which was blood.
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Following the incident, a television and a camouflage-colored video game console
were missing from the victims’ residence. The police identified one of the men who was
at the home as Mercellus Janett. The police found a television underneath a blanket at
Janett’s residence. Janett’s father said he had never seen the television before.
Investigator Townsley assisted with the execution of a warrant at Lara’s house. Police
found a pair of shoes with soles matching footprints collected from the crime scene.
They also found a camouflage-colored video game console.
Investigator Regan Ortega testified that he spoke to Janett during the investigation.
Janett admitted to being involved in the incident with Lara and Wilson. Janett told
Investigator Ortega that the group was plotting to rob someone. Janett said they ran into
K.B. and R.R., and K.B. and R.R. invited them into their home to drink alcohol and use
cocaine. Janett said that after A.R. came home, he and A.R. were hanging out in A.R.’s
bedroom. A.R. heard screaming, so she went to see what was going on. Janett later
followed and saw A.R., K.B., and R.R. all unconscious. Lara was holding a hammer;
Wilson was holding a garden tool. Lara and Wilson told Janett that R.R. and K.B. tried
to fight them, so Lara and Wilson had to beat them up. According to Janett, Lara said he
hit each of the victims in the head with a hammer, and Wilson used the garden tool.
Janett also said that Lara told him he had to yank the hammer out of K.B.’s head. Janett
admitted to kicking A.R. when she started to wake up, and he also kicked R.R. in the
head.
Officer Jon Sheldon testified that Lara told him that he drank alcohol and
consumed cocaine that night before the fight broke out. Lara indicated that he threw the
hammer at K.B., stomped on his chest, and kicked him in the head. Officer Sheldon
testified that Lara appeared to be confusing the names of the victims during his interview.
Officer Sheldon said that Lara did not hit the other male victim in the head with a
hammer but admitted to “soccer kicking” him. Lara also admitted to punching A.R. and
kicking her in the stomach and head. Lara told Officer Sheldon that Wilson used a stick
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to hit K.B. and R.R. and that Wilson hit either K.B. or R.R. in the head with it. Officer
Sheldon initially testified that Lara did not know why the fight started, that Lara “woke
up to [A.R.] falling on him,” and that when this happened a fight was erupting. But after
referencing his report, Officer Sheldon testified that Lara told him that the victims started
throwing punches at him first, that the victims bragged about their abilities to fight, that
Lara had been pushed to the ground, and that at one point Wilson was fighting both K.B.
and R.R. at the same time.
For the purposes of the preliminary hearing, the parties stipulated that “the injuries
to [R.R.] [were] consistent with being hit in the head with a hammer, and the injuries to
[K.B.] [were] consistent with being hit in the head with a hoe, the garden hoe.” The
prosecutor and Lara’s counsel also stipulated that “on the night in question before the
altercation there was a Snapchat photo taken from the victim’s home that showed
Mr. Lara and Mr. Wilson sitting on the victim’s couch, and Mr. Lara appeared to be
passed out.”
On September 10, 2021, Lara pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of R.R. and
admitted the allegations under section 12022.7, subdivision (b) and section 12022,
subdivision (b) as to that victim. Lara also pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of
K.B. and admitted the section 12022.7, subdivision (b) allegation as to that victim. Lara
additionally pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery in concert and one count of assault.
The trial court sentenced Lara to an aggregate term of 24 years, which included nine
years for one of the attempted murder convictions and two years, four months for the
other.
On November 22, 2024, Lara filed a check-box petition seeking resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. As relevant here, the petition declared that “[a] complaint …
was filed against [Lara] that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of …
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine” and that Lara
“could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes
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made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.” The People opposed the
petition, arguing that, because Lara was arraigned and pleaded guilty after January 1,
2019, he was convicted under the present version of murder law and thus was ineligible
for relief. The People also argued that “the record of conviction itself demonstrates that
[Lara] was not convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine” because “he admitted personal infliction of great bodily injury as
to both attempted murder counts and use of a deadly weapon on the first attempted
murder count.”
The trial court denied Lara’s petition. It did not “believe [Lara was] eligible based
upon the fact that his plea was entered after the change in the law.”
Lara timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for murder liability. (People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 448-450.) Among other things, the enactment amended section 188 to
require that a principal convicted of murder “act with malice aforethought.” (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 2.) It further provided that malice “shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (Ibid.) It also added a procedure, now
codified in section 1172.6, to permit individuals convicted of murder under prior law to
request that their conviction be vacated and to seek resentencing. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 4; Curiel, at pp. 449-450.)
In 2021, the Legislature adopted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 775) to expressly allow those convicted of attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or manslaughter to seek resentencing under
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539,
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544, 548.) The Legislature enacted the provision to “clarif[y] that persons who were
convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the
natural [and] probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those
persons convicted of murder under the same theories.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1,
subd. (a).) The law took effect on January 1, 2022. (Coley, at p. 544.)
As amended (and as relevant here), section 1172.6 provides that a person
convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
may file a petition to have his or her conviction vacated when: (1) the charges filed
against the person allowed the prosecution to proceed on a theory of attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) the person was convicted of
attempted murder after trial or accepted a guilty plea in lieu of a trial at which he or she
could have been convicted of attempted murder; and (3) the person could not presently be
convicted of attempted murder because of changes to section 188 made effective
January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
After briefing on the petition, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine
whether the petitioner has made out a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) If
the petition and record “establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief,
the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)
If instead the petition shows a prima facie entitlement to relief, the court must issue an
order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the
burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioning defendant is guilty of
attempted murder under section 188 as amended. (Id. at pp. 708-709; § 1172.6,
subds. (c), (d)(1) & (3).) If the prosecution fails to carry its burden, the challenged
conviction and any accompanying allegations or enhancements must be vacated and the
petitioner resentenced on any remaining charges. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
A trial court’s inquiry into whether a petitioner has stated a prima facie case for
relief is “limited.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) The court takes the
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petitioner’s “ ‘ “factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding
whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were
proved.” ’ ” (Ibid.) The record of conviction necessarily informs the court’s inquiry.
(People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 563.) If the record contains facts refuting the
allegations in the petition, the court may make a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner. (Lewis, at p. 971.) A “petitioner who offers only conclusory allegations of
entitlement to relief under section 1172.6, in response to a record of conviction that
demonstrates the petitioner’s conviction was under a still-valid theory, has not, thereby,
made a prima facie showing.” (Patton, at p. 557.) But a trial court may “not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis,
at p. 972.) We review de novo a trial court’s decision to deny a section 1172.6 petition at
the prima facie stage. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
II.
Lara argues that the trial court erred in denying his section 1172.6 petition at the
prima facie stage because at the time he pleaded guilty to attempted murder, the law was
unsettled as to whether liability for attempted murder could still be premised on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Given this state of the law, Lara maintains
that he could have been prosecuted and convicted of attempted murder on a theory of
natural and probable consequences and that he is therefore not categorically ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6. We agree with this contention.
When Lara changed his plea in September 2021, before Senate Bill 775 took
effect, the Courts of Appeal were divided on whether Senate Bill 1437 had abrogated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a valid basis for an attempted murder
prosecution. (See People v. Alaybue (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 207, 222.) It was not until
Senate Bill 775 became effective in January 2022—several months after Lara pleaded
guilty—that the law expressly eliminated that possibility. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §§ 1,
subd. (a), 2; People v. Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 544.) It therefore would have
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been theoretically possible, at the time of Lara’s prosecution, for the People to proceed
against him under a natural and probable consequences theory of attempted murder.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in concluding that Lara’s plea to attempted murder after
the adoption of Senate Bill 1437, but before Senate Bill 775’s effective date, standing
alone, established his ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law.
The People offer little, if any, argument in response to Lara’s challenge to the trial
court’s rationale. They instead contend that Lara is ineligible for relief on the alternative
ground that the facts adduced at the preliminary hearing demonstrate, as a matter of law,
that Lara was a direct perpetrator of the attempted murders; that Lara, as to both victims,
“necessarily acted with intent to kill as a matter of law”; and that Lara thus “could not
have been convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”
As an initial matter, we note that the People did not submit the transcript of the
preliminary hearing as part of their response to Lara’s resentencing petition or ask the
trial court to deny relief on that basis. But even considering the hearing transcript, which
is in the record on appeal, the People’s argument is not persuasive.
We will assume without deciding that the officer hearsay testimony given at the
preliminary hearing can be considered at this stage of the proceedings. (See People v.
Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 557, fn. 2 [noting issue but declining to resolve it];
People v. Rodriguez (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1193-1196 [trial court may consider
hearsay evidence given by police officers at a preliminary hearing to deny a
section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage], review denied Apr. 15, 2026, S295404.)
Even taking into account all of the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, it does
not foreclose relief as a matter of law. While the preliminary hearing transcript contains
evidence that Lara attacked both victims, it does not preclude the possibility that the
requisite intent to kill was imputed to him from his codefendant, who, according to
evidence at the preliminary hearing, also participated in the assaults. This is not a case
where, for instance, the defendant was the sole perpetrator and thus necessarily could not
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have been convicted under a natural and probable consequences theory of liability. (See
People v. Love (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1280, 1288 [rejecting argument that “the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or any other theory of imputed malice could apply to
a sole perpetrator” because “these abrogated theories necessarily require a second
participant”].) As Lara asserts, his attempted murder convictions could have been
premised on “a now invalid theory that he aided and abetted an assault with a deadly
weapon and an attempted murder was the natural and probable consequence[] of that
offense.” (See People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449 [“[U]nder prior law, a
defendant who aided and abetted an intended assault could be liable for murder, if the
murder was the natural and probable consequence of the intended assault. [Citation.]
The defendant need not have intended the murder or even subjectively appreciated the
natural and probable consequences of the intended crime”].) The People ask us to infer
from the severity of the attack on one of the victims that Lara “necessarily acted with the
intent to kill as a matter of law.” But reaching this conclusion would require us to engage
in factfinding not permitted at the prima facie stage of the petition process. (See Patton,
at pp. 566-567.) Accordingly, we conclude that the record of conviction does not
conclusively refute the allegations in Lara’s section 1172.6 petition and he is thus entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on his petition.
III.
Last, we address undisputed clerical errors in the sentencing minutes and the
abstract of judgment. As the parties agree, the sentencing minutes from October 6, 2021
incorrectly state that Lara was found guilty of attempted murders that were “willful,
deliberate, and premeditated.” We direct the trial court to amend the minutes to delete
the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” language. As the parties also agree, the
abstract of judgment incorrectly lists Lara’s sentences for the two attempted murder
convictions as 15 years and four years, respectively. If, following proceedings on
remand, Lara’s attempted murder convictions are not vacated, the trial court shall amend
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the abstract of judgment to correctly state that his sentences for those two convictions are
nine years and two years, four months, respectively.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Lara’s section 1172.6 petition is reversed. The
case is remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order to show cause and to
hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition. The trial court shall amend the sentencing
minutes from October 6, 2021 to delete the language stating that the attempted murder
convictions were “willful, deliberate, and premeditated.” Further, if Lara’s attempted
murder convictions are not vacated following proceedings on remand, the trial court shall
correct the abstract of judgment to state that Lara’s sentences for the two attempted
murder convictions are nine years and two years, four months, respectively, and forward
a copy of the corrected abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
MAURO, J.
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