Filed 8/28/26 P. v. Lara CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B345190
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA072069)
v.
DANIEL JOSEPH LARA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from denial of a petition for recall and resentencing pursuant
to Penal Code section 1170 by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Larry P. Fidler, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert E. Boyce, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithney, Assistant Attorney General,
Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In this juvenile resentencing appeal, the defendant invokes People v.
Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard). Heard and its reasoning is likely
to be addressed by our Supreme Court in People v. Munoz (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 499, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828 (Munoz). In the
meantime, we agree with the approach of courts that have declined to follow
Heard. We therefore affirm the trial court.
Daniel Joseph Lara was convicted for crimes he committed as a
juvenile. He appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition under Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (d) (1170(d)).1 That provision authorizes juvenile
offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) to
petition for the recall of their sentences and resentencing.
Lara did not receive an LWOP sentence. And he will receive a parole
hearing by the time he is 42 years old under section 3051, which requires
“youth offender parole hearing[s]” for defendants like Lara. Nonetheless,
citing Heard, he argues his sentence of 40 years to life is the functional
equivalent of LWOP. He argues that the Legislature could not rationally
have allowed defendants actually sentenced to LWOP to petition for relief
under section 1170(d) while not permitting defendants sentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP to do so. He argues that section 1170(d)
violates the guarantee of equal protection of the laws provided by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 7 of the California Constitution.2
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise
stated.
2 Lara’s brief asserts that his challenge is under both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. But his only
2
Critically, he also argues—again, relying on Heard—that he is entitled
to raise this equal protection argument as a person sentenced to the
“functional equivalent” of LWOP even though he will in fact have a parole
hearing. His argument is that section 1170(d) focuses on the original
sentencing, not later developments. Since, he says, he was originally
sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP, he is entitled to invoke
section 1170(d) as a matter of equal protection, even though he has an
upcoming parole hearing.
Lara’s argument is derived from Heard. We respectfully disagree with
Heard and therefore reject Lara’s argument.
We follow those courts that have distinguished Heard on the following
basis. Contra Heard, section 1170(d) is focused on a defendant’s sentence at
the time the defendant files a section 1170(d) petition. It is not focused on
the sentence as it was originally imposed. Since they have the possibility of
parole, defendants entitled to a section 3051 parole hearing at the time they
petition for relief under section 1170(d) are not serving either the actual or
functional equivalent of LWOP (“life without the possibility of parole”). So,
even if the Legislature irrationally failed to extend section 1170(d) relief to
defendants serving the functional equivalent of LWOP while making such
relief available to defendants sentenced to LWOP (an issue we do not decide),
that distinction would not matter to defendants like Lara. Defendants like
Lara are entitled to parole hearings. They are not in any meaningful sense
argument for reversing the trial court’s denial of his petition is that the trial
court’s failure to allow him to petition for relief under section 1170(d) violated
his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, based upon
the rationale of Heard and cases that have followed Heard. To the extent
that Lara intended to assert a separate Eighth Amendment argument, we
deem that argument to have been forfeited by Lara’s failure to adequately
assert it. (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218–1219.)
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sentenced to LWOP, actually or functionally. Put differently, the equal
protection problem Lara identifies does not exist as to him.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Lara’s petition.
BACKGROUND
In 2012, a jury convicted Lara of three counts of attempted murder,
crimes he committed at age 17. (§§ 664/187, subd. (a).) The jury also found
true related firearm enhancement allegations. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) In
December 2012, Lara received concurrent sentences on each count of
attempted murder of 15 years to life plus 25 years for the firearm
enhancements, for a total aggregate sentence of 40 years to life, with 2,066
days credit for time served.3
Lara appealed, arguing that the sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, as it was
effectively a sentence of LWOP. In 2015, we affirmed the sentence, holding
that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment. We reasoned that Lara’s life
expectancy exceeded his minimum parole period by at least 19 years. At that
time, we declined to address whether the youth offender parole hearing
provisions of section 30514 would also insulate the sentence from an Eighth
3 The jury also found true that he discharged a firearm from a motor
vehicle (§ 12034, subd. (b)) and discharged a firearm in a grossly negligent
manner at a dwelling (§ 246.3). The trial court stayed the sentences on these
counts pursuant to section 654.
4 At the time we rendered this decision in Lara’s case, section 3051,
subdivision (b)(3) provided: “A person who was convicted of a controlling
offense that was committed before the person had attained 23 years of age
and for which the sentence is a life term of 25 years to life shall be eligible for
release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year of incarceration at
a youth offender parole hearing, unless previously released or entitled to an
4
Amendment challenge. (See People v. Lara (Sept. 17, 2015, B258181)
[nonpub. opn.] (Lara I).)
The California Supreme Court granted review and stayed the matter
pending its decision in People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).
Thereafter, in Franklin, the Supreme Court held that the availability of
youth offender parole hearings under section 3051 mooted Eighth
Amendment challenges similar to Lara’s. (Id. at p. 268.) The court vacated
our prior decision and remanded the matter for us to reconsider in light of
Franklin.
On remand, we noted that, under section 3051, Lara is eligible for a
youth offender parole hearing in the 25th year of his incarceration, when he
will be 42 years old. (People v. Lara (Oct. 5, 2016, B258181) [nonpub. opn.]
(Lara II).) Accordingly, we concluded that Lara’s sentence is neither LWOP
nor its functional equivalent, mooting his Eighth Amendment challenge.
In 2024, Lara filed a petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to
section 1170(d) and Heard. While the trial court assumed that it was bound
by Heard, the trial court nonetheless denied the petition, finding that a
sentence of 40 years to life was not functionally equivalent to LWOP because
Lara would be eligible for parole at age 57, at least 19 years before his life
expectancy of age 77.
Lara appealed the denial of his petition.
earlier parole consideration hearing pursuant to other statutory provisions.”
Later, the Legislature expanded the protections of section 3051 to youthful
offenders who committed crimes before attaining the age of 25.
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DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review Lara’s claims, which involve only questions of law, de novo.
(People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 485, 518.)
B. Equal Protection Challenges to Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)
Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) allows “a defendant who was under
18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the
defendant was sentenced to” LWOP and who “has been incarcerated for at
least 15 years” to petition the sentencing court for recall and resentencing.
There is no dispute that, as written, section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A)
does not apply to Lara. It applies only to juvenile offenders sentenced to
LWOP. Lara was not sentenced to LWOP. (People v. Olmos (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 580, 583.)
Heard, however, held that the federal and state constitutional
guarantees of equal protection require that juvenile offenders sentenced to
terms functionally equivalent to LWOP also have the right to petition for
section 1170(d) relief. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 633–634.)
Equally important, according to Heard, a defendant’s eligibility for a youth
offender parole hearing under section 3051 is irrelevant to the equal
protection analysis. (Ibid.) At least two other appellate courts have agreed
with Heard. (People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 454; People v.
Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1056.)
Other appellate courts, however, have disagreed with Heard or
substantially limited its holding. They have done so for varying reasons.
First, a number of courts have held that defendants sentenced to 50 years to
life or less are not serving the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence.
These courts have therefore concluded the equal protection problem identified
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in Heard does not apply to sentences of 50 years to life or less. (See, e.g.,
People v. Munoz, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 507 [observing that the
“minimum parole eligibility of Munoz’s sentence (50 years) ... is less than half
the defendant’s in Heard (103 years)”].)
Second, some appellate courts have found that the Legislature did not
act irrationally in granting resentencing relief in section 1170(d) to
defendants with LWOP terms but denying it to those with terms of 50 years
to life or less. (See People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1062,
review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540.)
Third, a number of courts have disagreed with Heard’s conclusion that
the availability of youth offender parole hearings under section 3051 is not
relevant to the equal protection analysis. They have reasoned that when a
defendant is eligible for a youth offender parole hearing that defendant is
not, functionally or otherwise, subject to an LWOP sentence—thus mooting
the equal protection problem identified in Heard. (People v. Isayev (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 1117, 1142, review granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860 (Isayev);
People v. Lara (Isaac) (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 484, 488, review granted Dec.
30, 2025, S294095 (Isaac); People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252,
1264, review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292070 (Ortega).)
As noted, our Supreme Court is set to consider these issues soon in
Munoz, supra, S290828.
C. Lara is Not Serving the Functional Equivalent of LWOP
We disagree with Lara that he is serving the functional equivalent of
an LWOP sentence for purposes of section 1170(d) or that the equal
protection problem identified in Heard exists in this case. In so concluding,
we agree with the reasoning of Isayev, Isaac, and Ortega.
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As he acknowledges, Lara will receive a youth offender parole hearing
under section 3051 during his 25th year of incarceration. That will happen
when Lara is 42 years old. Lara is therefore serving a sentence that includes
a meaningful opportunity for parole well within his expected lifetime.
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279–280.) As our colleagues in Division
Six have observed, when a defendant will have a parole hearing, “he is not
presently serving the functional equivalent of LWOP.” (Isaac, supra, 115
Cal.App.5th at p. 488.)
Lara’s argument relies on Heard. Heard reasoned that because section
1170(d) refers to the sentence to which the defendant “was sentenced,”
section 1170(d) is concerned only with the original sentence at the time it was
imposed. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 628–630.) Heard also found
that, because section 1170(d) is focused on the defendant’s original sentence,
the equal protection problem cannot be cured by subsequent changes to that
sentence. (Ibid.) Thus, in the view of Heard, the relevant equal protection
comparison is only between defendants who were explicitly sentenced to
LWOP and defendants who were originally sentenced to terms functionally
equivalent to LWOP. A defendant’s subsequent right to a parole hearing
under section 3051 is irrelevant to that analysis. (Ibid.)
We respectfully disagree with Heard on this point. We believe that its
analysis is incorrect at its first step. Section 1170(d) is designed to provide
relief based upon the sentence a defendant is actually serving at the time a
petition for relief is considered. It is not focused only on relief based upon the
sentence at the time it was first imposed, regardless of later developments.
As our colleagues in the Third District have observed, section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)’s focus “is the sentence being served at the time the petition
for recall and resentencing is filed, not whatever sentence may have been
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imposed at the original sentencing hearing.” (Isayev, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1142.) “The Legislature enacted section [1170(d)] to provide (certain)
juvenile offenders serving LWOP terms an avenue ‘to seek recall of their
sentences and resentencing to a term that includes an opportunity for
parole.’” (Ibid.) It would be inconsistent with that legislative intent “[t]o
conclude ... that the Legislature created a procedure for recalling and
resentencing juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP even if that sentence was
modified or vacated on direct appeal or via postconviction collateral attack.”
(Ibid.)
Moreover, we also agree with our colleagues in the Fourth District,
Division One, that the reasoning in Heard is inconsistent with our Supreme
Court’s directives in Franklin. Under Franklin, persons who initially receive
the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence, but then are later granted
the opportunity to pursue a parole hearing under section 3051 are, by
operation of law, retroactively deemed to be serving a sentence with the
possibility of parole. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279–280 [concluding
that possibility of parole mooted an Eighth Amendment challenge]; Ortega,
supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1265 [discussing Franklin].) Since section 3051
relief is retroactive, persons (like Lara) who have the opportunity for
meaningful parole relief through a parole hearing under section 3051 now
have an original sentence that is neither LWOP nor the functional equivalent
of LWOP. (Ortega, supra at p. 1265.) Thus, from either the angle of Isayev or
Ortega, we conclude that trial courts should consider whether a defendant is
entitled to a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 in deciding
whether that defendant is entitled to relief under section 1170(d).
Here, since Lara was serving a sentence with the possibility of parole at
the time he filed his section 1170(d) petition, he is not serving the functional
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equivalent of LWOP for purposes of section 1170(d). Even if section 1170(d)
irrationally fails to distinguish between actual and functional LWOP
sentences (an issue we do not decide), that distinction does not matter in
Lara’s case. That is enough to resolve Lara’s equal protection argument, and
with it this appeal.
Again, we note that these issues are currently pending before our
Supreme Court. In the interim, we do not find Lara’s equal protection
arguments persuasive. We therefore affirm the trial court.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
DAUM, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
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