Filed 10/16/26
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
THE PEOPLE, C102003
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 20FE004111)
v.
MARTIN LACKEY-GARCIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Winn,
John P., Awoniyi, Bunmi O., and Sawtelle, Ernest W., Judges. Affirmed.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence and
Ismah Ahmad, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Defendant Martin Lackey-Garcia was charged with murder and attempted murder
after stabbing multiple people at a mental health facility. Before trial, Lackey-Garcia’s
competence to stand trial was called into doubt, and psychologists were appointed to
evaluate him. (Pen. Code, §§ 1368, 1369.) 1 During the competency hearing, Lackey-
Garcia asked to testify on his own behalf, but the trial court deferred to defense counsel’s
* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified
for publication with the exception of part II of the Discussion.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
decision that Lackey-Garcia should not testify. Lackey-Garcia was found competent, and
after representing himself at trial, was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to life
in prison without the possibility of parole plus 30 years to life.
On appeal, Lackey-Garcia contends that he was unconstitutionally denied the right
to testify at his competency hearing; that there was insufficient evidence to support the
trial court’s competency determination; and that the court erred in instructing the jury that
the doctrine of unreasonable self-defense was not available when a defendant’s belief in
the need for self-defense is entirely delusional. We are unpersuaded by these contentions
and affirm.
BACKGROUND
I.
In 2020, Lackey-Garcia sought treatment at a wellness center in Sacramento
County that provided outpatient mental health care (the Center). During one of his initial
visits, he stabbed four people with a kitchen knife. Two of the victims, Eileen Stanwick,
who was a case worker, and Paul McIntyre, a volunteer, died from their wounds.
An amended information charged Lackey-Garcia with two counts of murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); counts one and two) and two counts of attempted murder (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 664; counts three and four). It alleged as a special circumstance for counts one
and two that Lackey-Garcia committed multiple murders. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) The
information further alleged as to all counts that Lackey-Garcia personally used a deadly
and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and that he had suffered a prior strike
conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subd. (b)) that also qualified as a prior serious
felony (§ 667, subd. (a)).
Before trial began, defense counsel expressed a doubt as to whether Lackey-
Garcia was competent to stand trial. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that he was
competent. The court also permitted Lackey-Garcia to represent himself at trial. We
2
discuss these proceedings in more detail below in connection with Lackey-Garcia’s
challenge to the competency determination.
II.
The trial began in June 2024 and took place over the course of 10 trial days.
Dozens of witnesses testified for the People, and more than 30 testified for the defense.
Lackey-Garcia was among the witnesses who testified, and he admitted that he
stabbed each of the victims. He also claimed to have stabbed and killed a fifth victim,
whose body he believed police had removed as part of a cover-up. He asserted that he
had acted in self-defense because he believed the Center staff were part of a law
enforcement conspiracy to harm or kill him.
Lackey-Garcia and certain defense witnesses testified that he had been in and out
of the criminal justice system and had received sporadic care for mental health issues
since at least 2015. At some point when in prison, he was diagnosed with bipolar
disorder. A state corrections psychiatrist who treated Lackey-Garcia from 2015 to 2018
diagnosed him with schizoaffective disorder, which the psychiatrist described as a “non-
specific working diagnosis,” different from schizophrenia.
While housed in a mental health program during a period on parole, Lackey-
Garcia began to feel like people were following him and hacking his phone. He began
always carrying a knife and was eventually returned to jail in 2018 for possessing the
knife while in the program.
After being released for the knife possession, Lackey-Garcia was arrested and
jailed for a separate incident in 2019 or 2020. While in custody, he believed that a series
of confidential informants was placed in his cell and that they were warning him about
danger he would face when he was released. He also believed law enforcement was
“sending [him] messages.” He represented himself in defending those charges, and they
were eventually dismissed. He described how, after being released, he continued having
strange encounters that reinforced his belief that people were trying to set him up for
3
crimes and that he was being followed by law enforcement. The encounters were
“terrifying [him] to death.”
Lackey-Garcia described becoming increasingly fearful as various perceived
connections from his time in jail kept reappearing as he went about his daily life through
January 2020. For instance, while staying at a homeless shelter, he became convinced
that the district attorney was there. After about 16 months, he called a resource
navigation service and asked for help because he was “ ‘being followed.’ ” The service
directed him to the Center.
Lackey-Garcia attended an orientation at the Center in late February 2020. When
he arrived, he perceived everyone to be “speaking in code.” He spoke with Stanwick, a
case worker for the Center, and said he needed to talk to someone because he was being
followed by the district attorney, the police, or “the cartel[].” She told him to sign in.
After the orientation, he told staff he needed medication and to see a doctor because he
was afraid he was “going to get killed.” A rehabilitation mentor at the Center advised
Lackey-Garcia that she needed to go help a client with an oxygen tank. Lackey-Garcia
understood this as a threat or a “subliminal[]” message that “something’s going to happen
to [him], like [he’s] getting close to being killed.”
A few days later, Lackey-Garcia returned to the Center. He met with the same
rehabilitation mentor he had previously spoken with, in her office. The mentor became
uncomfortable and concerned when Lackey-Garcia began raising his voice and not
making sense. According to Lackey-Garcia, he was “freaking out” because he felt the
mentor was antagonizing him and not listening to his fears that the DEA and CIA were
trying to kill him. The mentor surreptitiously emailed several coworkers to come help.
Upon seeing Stanwick walk by the office, the mentor stopped her and asked her to come
speak with Lackey-Garcia. Stanwick agreed, and the mentor left and walked to the break
room.
4
According to Lackey-Garcia, he asked Stanwick for medicine and explained that
“people [kept] following [him] around everywhere.” She told him he would have to wait
two months to get medicine. Lackey-Garcia responded, “ ‘Okay. You’re a cop.’ ”
“ ‘Now you’re sending me a message about what’s been going on.’ ” “ ‘Now I’m
considering this as a threat. You’re making a threat.’ ” “ ‘I need you to tell me what’s
going on. Are these people going to try and kill me?’ ” As he kept questioning
Stanwick, she “just sat there and stared at [him].”
Lackey-Garcia then drew a 12-inch kitchen knife. He again demanded that
Stanwick tell him what was going on because, he testified, “ ‘I’m in fear of my life.’ ”
“ ‘I’m afraid to be in this room with you right now.’ ” “ ‘I’m even more afraid to walk
outside because I don’t know what’s going to happen to me.’ ” As he continued along
these lines, Stanwick “just looked at [him] and she didn’t say anything.” At that point, he
knew he was “either going to end up dead, in jail, or something, something was going to
happen” while at the Center. Lackey-Garcia felt that Stanwick had “attacked [him]
mentally” and was “threatening [his] life” based on “law enforcement’s …
recommendations.” He stabbed Stanwick repeatedly.
According to Lackey-Garcia, victim Paul McIntyre then came into the office and
“grabbed [him] from behind.” McIntyre was a volunteer peer guide at the Center, and he
was blind. Feeling McIntyre on his back, Lackey-Garcia swung the knife behind him and
then, while McIntyre was standing and grabbing him, pushed the knife in further.
McIntyre fell to the ground and did not respond when Lackey-Garcia asked him, “ ‘Why
did you come in here?’ ” Lackey-Garcia concluded that McIntyre had been the one to
call him to come in for orientation, and as he looked down at McIntyre, Lackey-Garcia
berated him, repeating, “ ‘You set me up.’ ” McIntyre said he was sorry, and Lackey-
Garcia then asked him, “ ‘Where are the people who asked you to do this? Where are the
people who asked you to set me up?’ ”
5
Another victim, an administrative assistant at the Center, testified to a different
version of events following Stanwick’s stabbing. Upon hearing a woman scream, the
assistant ran from her desk to the office. She saw Lackey-Garcia standing over Stanwick,
pinning her against a wall as he struck her. The assistant “grabbed” or “pulled” him off
Stanwick, who fell to the ground, having been killed by the stab wounds. Lackey-Garcia
then “threw [the assistant] in the corner on the ground” and started striking her. She did
not realize she was being stabbed until she started seeing blood on her face. She
remained on the ground and screamed for help. Lackey-Garcia stopped attacking her and
ran from the office. After Lackey-Garcia was gone, the assistant saw McIntyre come to
the doorway of the office. Just as he reached the door frame, Lackey-Garcia came back,
“ran straight towards [McIntyre,] and stabbed him” twice. Lackey-Garcia then ran out
again. McIntyre grabbed his neck area and asked whether he had been stabbed, before
falling over. McIntyre died from his wounds.
Lackey-Garcia, for his part, testified that the assistant entered the office after he
had already stabbed McIntyre. He said that she could see he had a knife in his hand but
still “blitzed” him and started hitting him from behind. Lackey-Garcia turned and started
swinging his knife at her as she fought back. Eventually she turned around and ran.
Lackey-Garcia left the office and then encountered four staff members, whom he
accused of wanting to “ ‘jump’ ” him and enjoying torturing people. The staff did not
move, and he decided not to give in when “something in [his] head” told him to “kill
everybody.” Instead, he moved toward a nearby exit door, convinced that the staff
members were “working with the cops” and “were trying to kill [him].”
Lackey-Garcia further testified that he walked through the door, which led to a
courtyard, where he saw a man start to orchestrate an attack behind him. He rushed the
man and stabbed him in the chest. This man never appears on the courtyard video
surveillance footage, and there was no evidence that this victim existed. Lackey-Garcia,
6
however, claimed throughout the proceedings that he stabbed this purported attacker and
that the surveillance video had been altered to erase him.
According to Lackey-Garcia, as he was stabbing the man, the director of the
Center came and “grabbed [Lackey-Garcia] from behind.” “As soon as he attacked …
from behind, [Lackey-Garcia] swung” the knife at him, slicing him on the wrist. When
the director started to run, Lackey-Garcia followed him and stabbed him in the back.
The courtyard surveillance video played at trial depicted a different version of
events. The Center director, who was summoned to respond to the disturbance, is shown
walking across the courtyard and looking inside a door to the office area. He quickly
stepped back from the door and stumbled to the ground as Lackey-Garcia went through
the same door holding a knife in his fist. As the director started to push himself back up,
Lackey-Garcia took a large windup, plunged the knife into the director’s back, and then
sliced the director’s wrist as the director fled. Lackey-Garcia then ran around the
courtyard for a few seconds as everyone present dispersed. Both the director and the
administrative assistant suffered extensive injuries but survived after being hospitalized.
Lackey-Garcia was eventually arrested and when asked why he did what he did,
he told the police that he acted in self-defense, stating: “ ‘Because you guys came after
me. You set me up. They were cops. They were law enforcement.’ ”
After one day of deliberating, the jury found Lackey-Garcia guilty on all counts
and found the weapon enhancements and special circumstance true. In a bifurcated trial,
the trial court found the prior conviction true. The court later sentenced Lackey-Garcia to
life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder convictions, consecutive to
two years for the weapon enhancements, plus 28 years to life for the attempted murder
convictions.
Lackey-Garcia timely appealed.
7
DISCUSSION
I.
We first consider Lackey-Garcia’s challenges to the trial court’s competency
determination.
A.
“ ‘ “Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal
defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent.” ’ ” (People v. Sattiewhite (2014)
59 Cal.4th 446, 464; see § 1367, subd. (a).) Section 1367 provides that a “defendant is
mentally incompetent … if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental
disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or
to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).)
That provision “is consistent with the federal standard” (People v. Bertsch and Hronis
(2026) 19 Cal.5th 183, 228 (Bertsch)), which asks whether the defendant “ ‘has sufficient
present ability to consult with his [or her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and whether he [or she] has a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him [or her]’ ” (id. at pp. 226-227, quoting Dusky v. United
States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402).
“Penal Code section 1368 requires that criminal proceedings be suspended and
competency proceedings be commenced if ‘a doubt arises in the mind of the judge’
regarding the defendant’s competence (id., subd. (a)) and defense counsel concurs (id.,
subd. (b)).” (People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 231.) “When a doubt exists as to the
defendant’s mental competence, the court must appoint an expert or experts to examine
the defendant.” (Ibid.) At the time of Lackey-Garcia’s competency proceeding, as now,
a defendant’s incompetence to stand trial must be established by a preponderance of the
8
evidence. (Former § 1369, subd. (f); § 1369, subd. (c)(3); Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th at
p. 229.) 2
If the defendant is found competent, criminal proceedings resume. (§ 1370,
subd. (a)(1)(A).) If he or she is found incompetent, proceedings remain suspended, and
the defendant is committed for treatment designed to restore competence. (Former
§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B); § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C); see People v. Waterman (1986)
42 Cal.3d 565, 568.) That commitment may be to a Department of State Hospitals
facility, to another treatment facility, or placement on outpatient status. (Former § 1370,
subd. (a)(1)(B)(i); § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C)(i); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1600.) Those
charged with a violent felony, including homicide, must go to a facility with a secured
perimeter or a locked and controlled treatment facility, unless the court finds placement
on outpatient status would not pose a danger to public health or safety. (Former § 1370,
subd. (a)(1)(D)-(F); § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(F)-(H); see § 667.5, subd. (c) [defining
“ ‘violent felony’ ”].) The statute requires periodic progress reports, starting within
90 days of commitment. (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1).) Whenever competence is restored, the
defendant is returned to court and criminal proceedings resume. (§ 1372; Waterman, at
p. 568.)
2 After Lackey-Garcia’s competency hearing, section 1369 was amended to provide that,
“[i]f neither party objects” to the expert’s competency report, “the court may determine
the competency of the defendant based on” the report. (§ 1369, subd. (c)(1); see
Stats. 2024, ch. 646, § 3.) The amendments further state that, “[i]f either party objects to
any competency report and requests a hearing, the court shall hold a hearing to determine
competence … .” (§ 1369, subd. (c)(2).) And “[i]f counsel for the defendant waives the
right to a jury trial and the prosecution consents, … the hearing shall be heard by the
court. Otherwise, a determination of the defendant’s competency to stand trial shall be
decided by a jury.” (§ 1369, subd. (c)(4).)
9
B.
In late 2020, about seven months after the initial charges were filed, Dr. Robin
Hemenway Baker, a psychologist, was appointed to evaluate Lackey-Garcia’s mental
competence to stand trial, apparently after defense counsel declared a doubt as to his
competence. Dr. Hemenway Baker interviewed Lackey-Garcia in February 2021 and
submitted a report of her examination and findings. Dr. Hemenway Baker found that
Lackey-Garcia had “a mental disorder, most likely a Bipolar mood disorder” but opined
he was competent to stand trial. She observed that, “[a]lthough Mr. Lackey-Garcia
reported paranoid and possibly delusional ideas, he did not maintain any systematic, fixed
beliefs.” She stated that, during their interview, Lackey-Garcia was initially
“uninterruptable as he ranted” about what he perceived as a rigged judicial system, but
his complaints “impressed as a dramatic and intentional attempt to present as
psychiatrically disturbed.” As the interview progressed, his speech relaxed, and his
thought process became “clear and linear.” On a test of legal knowledge, Lackey-
Garcia’s score raised concerns that he was making little effort to demonstrate his actual
legal knowledge and may have been intentionally answering questions incorrectly. On
another assessment, his score was “strongly suggestive of feigned symptoms.”
Dr. Hemenway Baker said Lackey-Garcia correctly identified the criminal charges
and their meaning and maximum penalty; he also had a realistic appraisal of the strength
of the evidence against him. When asked if he would be able to communicate with
counsel, he said, “ ‘I guess I could.’ ” In his “uncooperative moments,” Lackey-Garcia
expressed anger with his previous and current attorneys and about delays in receiving
discovery. Dr. Hemenway Baker concluded that “[h]is behavior in [the] interview
demonstrated that he does have the capacity to calmly discuss his case and to take in and
consider an alternate viewpoint, although he may at times choose not to.”
In November 2021, the trial court granted Lackey-Garcia’s motion to represent
himself. In doing so, the court found that he “does understand the nature and objects of
10
the proceedings clearly.” Thereafter, Lackey-Garcia filed various motions, primarily
regarding discovery issues.
At a trial readiness conference in February 2022, the trial court questioned
Lackey-Garcia’s competence to represent himself at trial and appointed another
psychologist, Dr. Janice Nakagawa, to evaluate him. Dr. Nakagawa tried to meet with
Lackey-Garcia on five occasions, but he consistently refused.
Lackey-Garcia also refused to appear for a hearing in June 2022, where it was
reported that he had recently had an “outburst” with his investigator, causing deputies to
respond. The trial court issued an extraction order to secure Lackey-Garcia’s presence.
After discussing various discovery-related issues with him, the court decided it was
necessary to revoke Lackey-Garcia’s self-represented status. The court explained that,
based on Dr. Hemenway Baker’s report, there were “clearly some significant mental
health issues” present and that Lackey-Garcia’s “comments today play into that, talking
about conspiracies, people altering reports.” The court stated that it would be a “total
travesty of justice” for Lackey-Garcia to represent himself at trial.
In December 2022, Lackey-Garcia became “[b]elligerent” during a hearing in
which he accused court staff of “malicious[ly]” deleting portions of a motion he had
filed. He was excused from the courtroom, and the hearing continued in his absence.
Defense counsel lodged a “challenge” under section 1368, citing Lackey-Garcia’s
“inability to work with counsel,” and the trial court, based on its observations at the
hearing, agreed that a doctor should be appointed to assess Lackey-Garcia’s competence.
Defense counsel requested the appointment of a psychiatrist qualified to diagnose
individuals like Lackey-Garcia, who, in counsel’s words, could appear competent and
“say the right words, but in fact not fall within the purview of being able to assist in a
defense.” The court suspended the criminal proceedings and appointed a psychiatrist,
explaining that it was “obvious that the same type of delusions [the court had] witnessed
for the past year [we]re still present with Mr. Lackey-Garcia.”
11
Lackey-Garcia refused to meet with the psychiatrist, and at a February 2023
hearing, the trial court reappointed one of the original psychologists, Dr. Nakagawa, to
assess his competence. In urging a reappointment for the purpose of an actual evaluation,
rather than just a review of mental health records, defense counsel reiterated that he had
“no doubt” that Lackey-Garcia knew what was going on and how the court process
worked. But according to counsel, “the issue” was that Lackey-Garcia “doesn’t
comprehend the defense and how to assist in his defense.”
In May 2023, Dr. Nakagawa returned a report declining to opine on Lackey-
Garcia’s competency because he was still refusing to be interviewed. The trial court
requested that she make a further attempt and then provide an opinion based on past
records. Lackey-Garcia continued to refuse to meet with her.
In August 2023, Dr. Nakagawa submitted a report providing what she described as
a “compromised” opinion regarding Lackey-Garcia’s competence, given her inability to
interview him. She based her report on existing records and input from defense counsel
on Lackey-Garcia’s behavior. Defense counsel told her that the investigator had reported
concerns with Lackey-Garcia’s mental health, calling him “ ‘very volatile’ ”; that
Lackey-Garcia had repeatedly admitted the crimes; and that he exhibited “possible
delusional thinking” in his insistence that he had killed a third person (a fifth victim) who
had never been found and that defense counsel was providing ineffective representation
by not having found that supposed victim.
Dr. Nakagawa opined that, despite “a paucity of current mental health
documents,” there were data supporting that Lackey-Garcia was suffering from “Serious
Mental Illness (SMI).” In her opinion, the available data further supported that Lackey-
Garcia’s “refusal to cooperate stems not from simple recalcitrance or obstreperousness,
but is rather due to mental health issues that negatively impact his ability to cooperate,
with underlying paranoia as a possible symptom.” Dr. Nakagawa found it of “critical
note” that the present doubt concerning Lackey-Garcia’s competency was “raised not by
12
the defense attorney, but by the judge.” Based on the available information, she
concluded, “it appears Mr. Lackey-Garcia evidences a compromised ability to understand
criminal proceedings, as they pertain to him, and he is unable to assist counsel in a
rational manner.” Dr. Nakagawa thus found him incompetent.
With a different judge presiding, the trial court held a competency hearing in
October 2023. Three witnesses testified for the defense, beginning with Dr. Nakagawa,
who testified consistently with her recent report. Dr. Nakagawa stated that she was
confident in her opinion that Lackey-Garcia was incompetent but acknowledged that it
was “compromised” by the lack of a direct interview with him. She said that in reaching
her opinion she paid particular attention to the fact, as relayed by defense counsel, that a
judge had personally declared a doubt as to Lackey-Garcia’s competence—something she
described as “extremely rare.”
Lackey-Garcia’s mother testified that her son’s mental health had recently
worsened, stating that he “thinks people are following him,” “gets paranoid,” and
“[v]erbally gets upset with the littl[est] things.” She also testified that her jailhouse
conversations with him were rarely calm unless they were discussing her granddaughter.
A sheriff’s deputy who had been present for some of Lackey-Garcia’s previous
court appearances described his behavior as “explosive” and “argumentative” toward his
attorney; the deputy said that there seemed to be an “issue of conflict” every time
Lackey-Garcia came to court. She also testified that Lackey-Garcia appeared “very
intelligent” and meticulous and sounded “like he knows what he’s talking about” in his
arguments. When asked whether he appeared able to work with his attorney, the deputy
answered that it appeared “he refuses to work with his attorney, which means it’s a
choice.”
After defense counsel rested, Lackey-Garcia asked: “Am I going to get a chance
to testify? This is my trial, right?” His counsel responded, “No,” and the trial court
thanked counsel. Lackey-Garcia then said: “I should have a right to testify in my own
13
defense. This is my trial.” Defense counsel maintained that, in the competency
proceeding, “the decision whether or not Mr. Lackey-Garcia testifies rests solely with
counsel” and that he did not intend to call Lackey-Garcia as a witness. The court noted
counsel’s position and admonished Lackey-Garcia not to interrupt.
The People then called their sole witness, Dr. Hemenway Baker, who testified
about her February 2021 evaluation in which she found Lackey-Garcia competent to
stand trial. Dr. Hemenway Baker acknowledged that other practitioners had previously
diagnosed Lackey-Garcia with mental health issues but stated that, during her interview,
she did not see symptoms on which she would base such a diagnosis. She also testified
that she “absolutely would not” express an opinion on Lackey-Garcia’s present
competency, given the significant passage of time since she evaluated him.
The People also played audio recordings of two jail visits between Lackey-Garcia
and his mother the week before the competency hearing. During the first visit, Lackey-
Garcia told his mother about his plans for the upcoming hearing, including “trying to get
my attorney fired and … held in contempt … and get my pro per status back.” He
explained to her the importance of lodging objections “for appeal purposes,” because “if
you don’t object or you don’t invoke the law or you don’t write a writ of mandate[, t]hey
say you waived your rights.” He also discussed his expectation that he would be found
“competent to stand trial” and his belief that he could not be sent to an “insane asylum”
“because they don’t have a psychologist or psychiatrist … report.” During the 45-minute
conversation mostly discussing personal matters, Lackey-Garcia spoke calmly and
coherently; he raised his voice for a little over one minute in unexplained frustration with
his mother’s continued mentioning of certain numbers. The second visit, which lasted
about six minutes, largely consisted of Lackey-Garcia and his mother both yelling and
arguing about his approach to the competency proceedings.
At the People’s request, the trial court took judicial notice of two motions Lackey-
Garcia had filed in February 2022 when he was representing himself: a motion to
14
dismiss based on alleged Brady violations and a motion to continue due to discovery
delays. Both motions were handwritten and supported by a notice of motion, declaration,
and points and authorities with full case citations.
After a brief recess, the trial court ruled that Lackey-Garcia was competent to
stand trial. The court found that he likely had “a bipolar disorder” but found him capable
of understanding the nature of the proceedings and able to rationally assist defense
counsel. The court found that the contents of his self-filed motions showed that Lackey-
Garcia understood the relevant substantive and procedural issues in his case and that his
recorded conversations with his mother contradicted the assertion that he could not have
calm conversations. From his tone of voice and manner of deliberating with his mother
about whether he should prefer to be deemed incompetent or go to trial, the court found
Lackey-Garcia to be “particularly sophisticated” and “able to understand, able to
strategize, and able to execute on that strategy.” The court stated: “I believe the issue is
whether or not he has the capacity to cooperate, but not whether or not he’s willing to
cooperate in fact.” Based on its finding that Lackey-Garcia was competent, the court
reinstated criminal proceedings.
At a hearing shortly thereafter, the trial court granted Lackey-Garcia’s request to
resume representing himself.
C.
Lackey-Garcia contends that his federal and state constitutional rights were
violated when the trial court permitted his counsel to overrule his request to testify at the
competency hearing.
“ ‘[I]n both civil and criminal matters, a party’s attorney has general authority to
control the procedural aspects of the litigation and, indeed, to bind the client in these
matters.’ ” (People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 969 (Masterson).) “The attorney
may not, however, bind the party as to certain fundamental matters.” (Ibid.) In a
criminal case, a defendant “has a right to testify over the objection of his or her counsel.”
15
(People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 860 (Allen).) But “what applies to a criminal
case does not necessarily apply to a competency proceeding.” (Masterson, at p. 969.)
That is because a “competency proceeding, although certainly related to the underlying
criminal case, is not itself a criminal action.” (Ibid.) “ ‘[R]ather, it is a special
proceeding.’ ” (Ibid.) Unlike a criminal trial, the purpose of which is to adjudicate a
defendant’s guilt, the “sole purpose of a competency proceeding is to determine the
defendant’s present mental competence, i.e., whether the defendant is able to understand
the nature of the criminal proceedings and to assist counsel in a rational manner.” (Id. at
p. 971; see also People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 698.) In view of this limited
and particular scope, “the defendant necessarily plays a lesser personal role in the
proceeding than in a trial of guilt.” (Masterson, at p. 971; see also Medina v. California
(1992) 505 U.S. 437, 452 [discussing California’s competency scheme and explaining
that, after a doubt is declared, “the defendant may be prevented from making decisions
that are normally left to the discretion of a competent defendant”].)
Consistent with this principle, our state high court has repeatedly upheld
limitations on defendants’ decision-making authority in competency proceedings. For
example, a defendant is not entitled to make the “fundamental decision” whether a
competency proceeding should be held. (Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 971 [noting
contradiction in arguing that “ ‘a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or
intelligently “waive” his [or her] right to have the court determine his [or her] capacity to
stand trial’ ”].) At such a hearing, moreover, the defendant’s attorney retains the
authority to make decisions concerning numerous aspects of the proceedings. For
example, in People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, the state Supreme Court determined
that a defendant’s attorney could validly waive the trial authorized by section 1369 and
submit the competency determination on the expert reports. (Id. at pp. 904-905.) The
court explained that nothing in its precedents “preclude[d] a defense attorney from
waiving a jury, forgoing the right to present live witnesses, and submitting the
16
competency determination on the psychiatric reports filed with the court.” (Id. at p. 904;
see also People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1169 [similar]; Bertsch, supra,
19 Cal.5th at pp. 229-230; cf. People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 804-805 [when
doubt about defendant’s competence is declared, “defendant is not deprived of effective
assistance if defense counsel overrides defendant’s desire to present only evidence and
argument of competence”].)
In People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, the California Supreme Court indicated
in dicta (id. at p. 494) that an attorney could waive a defendant’s privilege against self-
incrimination, explaining that while the privilege is under the defendant’s personal
control in certain circumstances, it is not in the context of a competency proceeding (id.
at pp. 495-496). The court saw as “obvious” that “if counsel represents a defendant as to
whose competence the judge has declared a doubt sufficient to require a section 1368
hearing, [counsel] should not be compelled to entrust key decisions about fundamental
matters” to his or her client. (Id. at p. 495; see also Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
pp. 971-972, 974 [discussing Samuel]; cf. People v. Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at
pp. 694-699 [no federal constitutional barrier to state requiring defendant to be
represented by counsel at competency hearing notwithstanding defendant’s desire for
self-representation].)
And in Masterson, the California Supreme Court held that “counsel has authority
to waive entirely a jury trial [regarding competency] over [a] defendant’s objection,” and
that “includes within it lesser authority” to agree to a jury of only 11 people. (Masterson,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 967; see id. at pp. 969, 974.) The court reasoned that, in a trial of
guilt, a defendant’s express objection to an 11-member jury could very well override
counsel’s contrary view. (Id. at p. 972.) But it did not in the context of a competency
proceeding. (Id. at pp. 972-973.) “The same considerations” that led the court “to
conclude that counsel need not entrust key decisions to the client also compel the
conclusion that the client may not veto those same decisions. Whether or not the client
17
objects, counsel must be allowed to do what counsel believes is best in determining the
client’s competence.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 697
[“ ‘[w]hen the evidence indicates that the defendant may be insane it should be assumed
that he [or she] is unable to act in his [or her] own best interests’ ”].)
Applying Masterson, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division Two
held in People v. Bell (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1071 (Bell) that these principles of
attorney control extend to giving counsel authority to override a defendant’s desire to
testify at a competency hearing. (Id. at pp. 1074-1075, 1086.) In that case, the trial court
permitted the defendant to testify at a competency hearing, over his counsel’s objection,
and the jury found the defendant competent to stand trial. (Id. at p. 1075.) On appeal
following his conviction, the defendant argued that the trial court had erred in allowing
him to testify. (Id. at p. 1074.) The court of appeal agreed, reasoning that a defendant
“has a due process right not to be tried while he [or she] is incompetent,” and as in
Masterson, “counsel is in the best position to determine” whether a defendant whose
competence has been called into question “should testify in order to protect this right.”
(Id. at p. 1085.)
Although Bell involved a different factual scenario—unlike here, defendant Bell
was permitted to testify over the objection of his lawyer—we find its analysis applicable
to the question before us. As explained above, our state high court has consistently
distinguished competency proceedings from criminal trials, emphasizing that, when a
doubt about a defendant’s competence has been declared, as here, it is unclear whether a
defendant is able to make knowing and voluntary decisions to protect his or her rights.
Given that circumstance, the court has permitted counsel to make decisions essential to
the conduct of the proceedings—including whether to even have an adversarial hearing or
to put on any oral testimony at all. Lackey-Garcia provides no persuasive reason why
counsel with authority to waive altogether an adversarial hearing may not also make the
determination whether a defendant, whose competency is in doubt, will testify. We thus
18
agree with Bell that counsel retains the authority to override a defendant’s expressed
desire to testify at a competency proceeding.
Lackey-Garcia urges us not to follow Bell but to instead adopt the view of the
concurring and dissenting opinion in that case, which would have held that a defendant
has a state and federal due process right to testify over the objection of counsel. (Bell,
supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087 (conc. & dis. opn. of King, J.).) That opinion relied
principally on our state high court’s decision in Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, which
considered whether defendants facing the prospect of civil commitment under the
Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) have a due process
right, under both the federal and state constitutions, to testify at their commitment
proceedings over counsel’s objection. (Bell, at pp. 1087, 1089-1092 (conc. & dis. opn. of
King, J.).) In Allen, the court applied the multi-part balancing test developed to evaluate
constitutional due process claims, as set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S.
319 and related decisions interpreting the state constitution. (Allen, at pp. 862-868 &
863, fn. 14; see Medina v. California, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 442-443 [describing
Mathews test].) Under that framework, the Allen court concluded that prospective
committees possessed a due process right to decide whether to testify. (Allen, at pp. 869-
870.) The concurring and dissenting opinion in Bell likewise applied the multi-part test
in Mathews, reasoning that defendants in competency proceedings have significant
liberty interests at stake, including the possibility of involuntary commitment,
stigmatization associated with confinement in a state hospital, and the administration of
unwanted psychotropic medication; that allowing a defendant to testify mitigates risks of
erroneous outcomes; and that both the state’s interests and the defendant’s dignitary
interests are furthered by allowing the defendant to decide whether to testify. (Bell, at
pp. 1090-1093 (conc. & dis. opn. of King, J.).) Balancing these considerations, the
concurring and dissenting opinion concluded that defendants have a due process right to
19
make the decision whether they will take the stand on their own behalf. (Ibid. (conc. &
dis. opn. of King, J.).)
We appreciate these concerns about a defendant’s liberty and dignitary interests,
but we are ultimately unpersuaded by the Bell concurring and dissenting opinion’s
analysis. As an initial matter, with respect to Lackey-Garcia’s claim under the federal
constitution, we note that the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly rejected reliance on the
Mathews v. Eldridge framework when considering a federal due process challenge to
procedures in state competency proceedings. (Medina v. California, supra, 505 U.S. at
pp. 442-443; see also People v. Ary (2011) 51 Cal.4th 510, 520-521 [applying Medina to
claim that allocating burden of proof to defendant in retrospective competency hearing
violated federal due process clause].) Moreover, even though a defendant deemed to be
incompetent for trial faces the possibility of an involuntary commitment, much like a
person committed as a sexually violent predator (see former § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i);
§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C); Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 858), there remain important
differences between the two types of proceedings. (Bell, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1084-1085; cf. Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 368 [rejecting analogy
between civil commitment and competency proceedings because, inter alia, they
“address entirely different substantive issues”].) Importantly, in the context of a
competency proceeding, a doubt has been declared about the defendant’s ability to make
decisions concerning the protection of his or her rights and the conduct of trial. In that
setting, our Supreme Court has made clear that greater decision-making authority resides
with the defendant’s attorney, as we have explained above. (See People v. Blackburn
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1121 [“[c]rucial to … reasoning” in Masterson was fact that
competency hearing occurs only after a prima facie showing of incompetence is made,
and in that context, “it is sensible that counsel’s decisions may trump the defendant’s”];
Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 802, 807 [noting “no competence issue was
raised” in regard to defendant in Allen].) It is also significant that a defendant in a
20
competency proceeding has an important interest not only in avoiding involuntary
commitment but also in not being tried while incompetent. (People v. Stanley, supra,
10 Cal.4th at p. 806 [terming “false” the belief that defendant has only one interest in a
competency proceeding and noting defendant’s interest both in not being tried while
incompetent and “equally important interest in not being sent to a mental institution with
his criminal case unresolved, if he is competent”].) This countervailing due process
concern also distinguishes the present circumstance from Allen and persuades us that the
Bell majority correctly held that defendants in competency proceedings lack a right to
testify in the face of an objection by counsel.
Our state Supreme Court’s decision in Guardianship of Waite (1939) 14 Cal.2d
727, on which Lackey-Garcia also relies, does not lead us to a different result. In that
case, the court deemed it prejudicial error for the trial court to have refused to allow a
prospective conservatee in a guardianship proceeding to testify, explaining that “[i]t is
difficult to conceive of a situation in which a party has a greater right to, or need for, his
[or her] own testimony than in the type of proceeding considered [t]here.” (Id. at p. 730.)
That case did not involve a competency proceeding, where the limited question to be
addressed is whether a defendant is able to proceed to trial; rather, the proceeding in
Waite addressed the ultimate question at issue of whether the subject’s “right to control
her own person and affairs” could be removed. (Ibid.) Further, in Waite, counsel for the
prospective conservatee affirmatively requested that she be allowed to testify, and “the
only reason assigned by the court for refusing to permit her” to do so “was that it did not
want to hear any evidence except medical testimony.” (Id. at p. 729.) Given the very
different circumstances in Waite, we conclude that the state high court’s precedents on
competency proceedings are more on point.
We are also unpersuaded by Lackey-Garcia’s reliance on United States v.
Gillenwater (9th Cir. 2013) 717 F.3d 1070. In that case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant has a right to testify in a competency
21
proceeding that only the defendant can personally waive. (Id. at pp. 1077-1081.) The
court’s reasoning rested substantially on a defendant’s right to testify at a criminal trial.
(Id. at pp. 1077-1081 & fn. 6; see also id. at p. 1077, fn. 5 [although competency
proceedings may have “the veneer of being protective in nature, they are nonetheless a
step along the path to a criminal trial”].) As we have explained, however, our state
Supreme Court has consistently drawn a distinction between criminal trials and
competency proceedings, and it has determined that the respective allocations of
decision-making authority in the two proceedings are different. (See People v.
Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1127 [“defendants whose competence has been called
into doubt necessarily exercise a lesser degree of control over proceedings than
defendants whose competence has not been called into doubt”].)
Finally, Lackey-Garcia’s citation to People v. Harris (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 984
does not assist his arguments. In Harris, the First District Court of Appeal addressed,
among other things, a claim that defendants have a due process right to be present at their
competency hearings. (Id. at p. 993.) The court held that, even assuming such a right
existed, the defendant there had not demonstrated prejudice from his absence. (Ibid.)
The court then observed that it seemed the defendant’s real complaint was that his
attorney had proceeded to prove his incompetence without giving him the opportunity to
testify in support of his competence. (Ibid.) It stated: “We would agree with appellant
that, at a minimum, when defense counsel seeks to prove defendant’s incompetence over
his or her objection, and the defendant expresses the desire to testify that he or she is
competent, counsel should permit defendant to so testify, unless the court separately
determines that the defendant is incompetent to do so.” (Id. at pp. 993-994.) This
statement was dictum, because the defendant in Harris never asserted a desire or intent to
testify at his competency hearing. (Id. at p. 994, fn. 4.)
For all these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing
counsel to decide whether Lackey-Garcia would testify at the competency proceeding.
22
D.
We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination
that Lackey-Garcia was competent to stand trial.
As explained above, a defendant is incompetent for trial if “as a result of a mental
health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the
nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a
rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a); People v. Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 464.)
“When the defendant puts his or her competence to stand trial in issue, the defendant
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she lacks
competence.” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 871 (Mendoza), citing former
§ 1369, subd. (f).) We review a trial court’s competency determination for substantial
evidence. (Mendoza, at p. 871.)
Lackey-Garcia challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the
second prong of the competency standard: that he was able to rationally assist counsel in
presenting a defense. He principally contends that the trial court lacked a reasonable
basis for rejecting Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion that he was incompetent at the time of the
competency hearing.
We are not persuaded. While it is true that Dr. Nakagawa was the only expert to
opine on Lackey-Garcia’s competency at the time of the hearing, the trial court was not
required to accept her conclusion. Courts “have long recognized the propriety of
rejecting even unanimous expert opinion” of incompetency. (In re R.V. (2015)
61 Cal.4th 181, 215-216.) And here, there were ample reasons for the trial court to deem
Lackey-Garcia competent to stand trial notwithstanding Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion to the
contrary.
To begin with, Dr. Nakagawa herself acknowledged that her opinion was
“compromised” by the fact she was unable to interview Lackey-Garcia. It is well
established that “[t]he value of an expert’s opinion depends upon the quality of the
23
material on which the opinion is based and the reasoning used to arrive at the
conclusion.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31-32.) For instance, our state
Supreme Court upheld a verdict of competence, notwithstanding two expert opinions to
the contrary, where those opinions were “tenuous” and were based, respectively, on a 15-
minute interview of the defendant and no interview. (Id. at pp. 29-32.) Here, too, a fact
finder could reasonably give less weight to Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion based on her
inability to interview Lackey-Garcia.
While Dr. Nakagawa testified that she was nonetheless “confident” that Lackey-
Garcia was not competent to proceed to trial, she did not elaborate on the basis for such
confidence either in her testimony or in her report. The report briefly summarized what
she described as a “paucity” of mental health records, which noted signs of paranoia,
hallucinations, and depression and which recited previous diagnoses of schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. But the report contained
no analysis of how these symptoms or diagnoses “negatively impact[ed] [Lackey-
Garcia’s] ability to cooperate,” as she ultimately concluded. Dr. Nakagawa herself
acknowledged on cross-examination that the inability to interview a defendant makes it
difficult to evaluate his or her understanding of the court process. And as further brought
out on cross-examination, Dr. Nakagawa was initially so disinclined to render an opinion
without being able to interview Lackey-Garcia that she informed the trial court that she
could not offer an opinion on his competency.
The other cited basis for Dr. Nakagawa’s eventual incompetency opinion was her
understanding that a judge, rather than defense counsel, had been the one to raise a doubt
about Lackey-Garcia’s competence to stand trial. The record, however, does not support
this understanding. A judge did raise the question of whether Lackey-Garcia was
competent to continue representing himself—and initially appointed Dr. Nakagawa to
evaluate him for that purpose. But in doing so, the judge noted, “The issue isn’t your
general competency. The issue is your competence to represent yourself in a serious jury
24
trial.” Nearly one year later, after reappointing counsel for Lackey-Garcia, the same
judge agreed with defense counsel that an expert needed to be appointed to assess
Lackey-Garcia’s competence to stand trial, but that was in response to defense counsel
raising a section 1368 challenge. In any event, we do not see why the identity of the
person raising a doubt would necessarily bear on an expert’s evaluation, as that
evaluation would seem to depend on facts concerning the defendant’s behavior and
history and the expert’s specialized training.
Further reason to discount Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion lies in the fact that the only
psychologist to actually interview Lackey-Garcia, Dr. Hemenway Baker, concluded that
Lackey-Garcia was competent to stand trial, albeit two years earlier. Our high court has
said that, while a significant lapse of time “does diminish the probative value of the
expert’s opinion and testimony to some extent,” a reasonable fact finder can still “draw
inferences concerning [the] defendant’s competency at the time of the competency trial”
from that opinion and from the defendant’s statements to the expert. (Mendoza, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 880, italics omitted.) That is to say, “evidence that predates [the] hearing
may legitimately provide substantial evidence on the competency issue before the fact
finder[].” (Id. at p. 881.) Even without Dr. Hemenway Baker being able to opine on
Lackey-Garcia’s present mental competence, the trial court could reasonably consider her
prior evaluation—complete with a personal interview and the administration of
psychological assessments—in weighing the strength of Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion.
We also disagree with Lackey-Garcia’s assertion that Dr. Nakagawa’s opinion was
“the only probative evidence” of his present mental state offered at the competency
hearing. To the contrary, the recordings of Lackey-Garcia’s jailhouse conversations with
his mother supported the conclusion that he “retained the ability, when he wished, to
engage in rational discussions regarding daily life and various personal matters” and
regarding the crimes and his defense strategies. (Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 881-
882.) This evidence—which Lackey-Garcia’s appellate briefs do not mention—also
25
tended to support Dr. Hemenway Baker’s view that his reluctance to calmly discuss his
case and consider an alternate viewpoint “were matters of choice, not an incapacity
caused by mental illness.” (Id. at p. 882; see People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 29
[“An uncooperative defendant is not tantamount to an incompetent one”].)
Lackey-Garcia also emphasizes trial counsel’s statements that his client was not
capable of assisting in his defense and the prior judge’s concerns about Lackey-Garcia’s
ability to continue to represent himself. While “defense counsel will often have the best-
informed view of the defendant’s ability to participate in his defense” (Medina v.
California, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 450), Lackey-Garcia directs us to no factual descriptions
of his conduct offered by his counsel—only general ascriptions of an inability to assist in
the defense, which the trial court was free to weigh alongside the other evidence.
Moreover, the prior judge’s comments that it would be a “total travesty” for Lackey-
Garcia to represent himself at trial were, as discussed above, not expressions of doubt
about Lackey-Garcia’s competence to stand trial. And while Lackey-Garcia notes that
the trial judge who made the competency determination had not presided over prior
proceedings in the case, that is not a basis to question the court’s ruling. “Competency
proceedings commonly are assigned for hearing to a judge different from the one who
initiated them by declaring a doubt [citation],” and trial judges are fully equipped “to
preside over such hearings whether or not they have some prior personal experience of a
defendant’s in-court behavior.” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 133-134.)
Based on the record before us, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s determination that Lackey-Garcia was competent to stand trial. (Mendoza,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 871.)
II.
Next, we turn to Lackey-Garcia’s challenge to the jury instruction on unreasonable
self-defense.
26
At trial, the court instructed the jury on self-defense, including on imperfect self-
defense, with respect to both the murder and attempted murder charges.
At the People’s request, and over Lackey-Garcia’s objection, the trial court added
the following pinpoint instruction: “Purely delusional acts are excluded from the scope
of unreasonable self-defense. Unreasonable self-defense, as a form of mistake of fact,
has no application when the defendant’s actions are entirely delusional.”
Lackey-Garcia contends that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to give this
pinpoint instruction because, he maintains, there was no substantial evidence that his
belief in the need to use deadly force was entirely based on a psychotic delusion.
“Murder is defined as ‘the unlawful killing of a human being … with malice
aforethought,’ [citation] while manslaughter is defined as ‘the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice’ [citation].” (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237,
252.) A “ ‘finding of malice may be precluded, and the offense limited to manslaughter,
even when an unlawful homicide was committed with intent to kill’ [citation]
‘ “ ‘ … when a person kills in “unreasonable self-defense”—the unreasonable but good
faith belief in having to act in self-defense [citations].’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.)
“[I]mperfect self-defense ‘obviates malice because that most culpable of mental states
“cannot coexist” with an actual belief that the lethal act was necessary to avoid one’s own
death or serious injury at the victim’s hand.’ ” (Ibid.) “A defendant charged with murder
is entitled to an instruction on imperfect self-defense if there is substantial evidence to
support the theory.” (Ibid.)
Likewise, “[a]n attempted killing based upon an unreasonable belief in the need
for self-defense obviates malice, which requires an actual belief that the lethal act was
necessary to avoid death or serious bodily injury. [Citation.] Thus, an attempted killing
committed because of an unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense is attempted
voluntary manslaughter, not attempted murder.” (People v. Ibarra (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1081.)
27
In People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 130, our state Supreme Court
considered “whether the doctrine of unreasonable self-defense is available when belief in
the need to defend oneself is entirely delusional.” The court held it was not, explaining
that unreasonable self-defense is “a form of mistake of fact” and “has no application
when the defendant’s actions are entirely delusional.” (Id. at pp. 136-137, approving
analysis in People v. Mejia-Lenares (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1437.) It reasoned that a
“defendant who makes a factual mistake misperceives the objective circumstances. A
delusional defendant holds a belief that is divorced from the circumstances. The line
between mere misperception and delusion is drawn at the absence of an objective
correlate.” (Elmore, at p. 137.) This rule “does not prevent the defense from presenting
evidence of mental disease, defect, or disorder to support a claim of unreasonable self-
defense based on a mistake of fact. A defendant who misjudges the external
circumstances may show that mental disturbance contributed to the mistaken perception
of a threat, without presenting the jury with the same question it would confront at a
sanity trial.” (Id. at p. 146.) That is to say, “defendants who mistakenly believed that
actual circumstances required their defensive act may argue they are guilty only of
voluntary manslaughter, even if their reaction was distorted by mental illness. But
defendants who contend they killed in self-defense because of a purely delusional
perception of threat must make that claim at a sanity trial.” (Ibid.)
Recently, in People v. Chang (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 532, 537, the Fifth District
Court of Appeal concluded that “[t]he objective correlate” referenced in Elmore “must at
least conceivably relate to a reasonable need for self-defense.” In Chang, the defendant
“suffered from delusions that he was being pursued by CIA agents who intended to harm
or kill him.” (Ibid.; see id. at p. 540.) When law enforcement officers attempted to pull
him over during a chase, he immediately began firing at them. (Id. at pp. 537-538.) On
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by refusing to give an imperfect
self-defense instruction based on his claim that he “honestly, if unreasonably, believed he
28
needed to use force to protect himself from the police, because they were affiliated with
the CIA and were seeking to kill him.” (Id. at pp. 542-543.) Specifically, the defendant
argued that “merely the pursuit by and presence of” the officers who pulled him over
qualified as a sufficient objective correlate to require giving the instruction, noting that
the officers “ ‘were real’ ” and “ ‘were really pursuing’ ” him. (Id. at p. 546.) The
appellate court rejected this argument because, prior to his firing on the officers, “there
simply was no objective correlate to suggest [the] defendant’s life was being threatened
by the police.” (Ibid.) The court observed that, “[i]n virtually any case, there will be
something objective that exists in the world with which a defendant is interacting.”
(Ibid.) For instance, in Elmore, “there actually was a woman sitting at the bus stop, and
she actually stood up, raised her hands, and attempted to walk away.” (Ibid.) But “[i]t is
not sufficient to point merely to any objects or actions that exist in the real world. The
objective correlate—whether an object or an action or some combination thereof—must
directly correlate to a threat in such a way that it could plausibly translate into the need
for self-defense, even if, in that particular case, a jury might judge that self-defense was
not reasonably necessary.” (Id. at p. 547.) The court concluded that the officers “had not
acted in any way to suggest to an objective observer that they might harm [the] defendant
before he began shooting at them,” and the defendant had not identified any “fact that
would objectively correlate to a plausible need for self-defense.” (Id. at pp. 547-548.)
Because the defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense “was solely a delusion within
[his] mind based on his subjective belief that the officers were CIA agents who wanted to
kill him,” no imperfect self-defense instruction was warranted. (Id. at p. 548.)
This case does not involve the failure to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense
but rather the trial court’s decision to add a pinpoint instruction consistent with the rule in
Elmore. “Pinpoint instructions relate particular facts to a legal issue or pinpoint the crux
of a defendant’s case.” (People v. Zemek (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 313, 346.) “They are
required to be given upon request when there is evidence supportive of the theory … .”
29
(People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 824; see Zemek, at p. 346 [“ ‘Parties are
entitled to legally correct and factually warranted pinpoint instructions, should they
request such additional instruction’ ”].) “A party is entitled to a requested instruction if it
is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Evidence is ‘[s]ubstantial’ for this
purpose if it is ‘sufficient to “deserve consideration by the jury,” that is, evidence that a
reasonable jury could find persuasive.’ [Citation.] At the same time, instructions not
supported by substantial evidence should not be given. [Citation.] ‘It is error to give an
instruction which, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the
facts of the case. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033,
1049-1050.) Claims of instructional error are reviewed de novo. (Zemek, at p. 346.)
Here, we conclude there was sufficient evidence that Lackey-Garcia’s belief in the
need for self-defense was founded solely on delusion. As explained above, there was
significant evidence that Lackey-Garcia’s attacks were based on his belief that people at
the Center were in a conspiracy with law enforcement and, for that reason, he needed to
kill them to protect himself. For example, Lackey-Garcia testified about his belief that
Stanwick was an agent of law enforcement and that her silence when interacting with him
amounted to a threat or warning that caused him to stab her to death. Lackey-Garcia felt
that Stanwick had “attacked [him] mentally” and was “threatening [his] life” based on
“law enforcement’s … recommendations.” Likewise, he was persuaded that McIntyre
approached him as part of a set up. And when he was arrested, he told law enforcement
that he acted to defend himself “ ‘[b]ecause you guys came after me. You set me up.
They were cops. They were law enforcement.’ ” This and other evidence adduced at
trial provided an adequate basis for a reasonable jury to find that Lackey-Garcia’s actions
lacked any objective correlate. (See People v. Chang, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 537
[“Defendant’s belief that all peace officers were working on behalf of the CIA to kill him
is clearly a delusion, not just a mistake of fact”].) Accordingly, the evidence in the
record was sufficient to put the question to the jury whether Lackey-Garcia’s belief in the
30
need for self-defense was based purely on delusion. And because the trial court did not
err in giving the pinpoint instruction, we need not address Lackey-Garcia’s argument that
the instructional error, considered in combination with the prosecutor’s closing
arguments, was prejudicial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J. *
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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