Filed 9/8/26 P. v. Kruppe CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B345181
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA075130)
v.
MARY NOEL KRUPPE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer Peabody and Cheryl Lutz, under appointments by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
After Mary Noel Kruppe (defendant) was convicted of
murder and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, the
trial court imposed a sentence of 15 years to life for the murder
and stayed a six-year term pursuant to Penal Code section 6541
for the manslaughter conviction. At a resentencing at which the
court applied the recently amended version of section 654, the
court reaffirmed its decision to stay the vehicular manslaughter
conviction (rather than the murder conviction). Defendant
contends this was an abuse of discretion. It was not. We
accordingly affirm, but order corrections to the abstract of
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
I. Facts
On November 15, 2018, at approximately 7:00 p.m.,
defendant, while driving 13 to 14 miles per hour above the posted
55 mph speed limit, crossed the center divider line into oncoming
traffic and, without braking at all, slammed head-on into a
smaller vehicle being driven by Jessica Ordaz, resulting in fatal
injuries to Ordaz. Defendant had been drinking alcohol for
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 We summarize the evidentiary facts from our opinion
affirming defendant’s conviction. (People v. Kruppe (May 20,
2021, B305713) [nonpub. opn.].)
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several hours prior to the collision, and her blood alcohol content
was between two to three times the legal limit (that is, between
0.19 and 0.23 percent). Defendant was an elementary school
principal who had taught the students at her school about the
dangers of drinking and driving; what is more, a colleague and
friend with whom defendant occasionally socialized repeatedly
urged defendant to call a ride-share service to get home rather
than drive herself; defendant did not want to spend the extra
money. When arrested, defendant denied drinking that day.
II. Procedural Background
A. Charges and conviction
In the operative pleading, the People charged defendant
with (1) murder (§ 187, subd. (a)); and (2) gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a)).
A jury convicted defendant of both counts.
B. Original sentencing
On February 20, 2020, the trial court sentenced defendant
to a term of 15 years to life in state prison on the second-degree
murder charge. The court imposed a 10-year prison term on
the gross vehicular manslaughter charge, but stayed that
sentence under section 654.
C. Appeal
A different panel of this court affirmed the judgment on
direct appeal.
D. Writ proceedings resulting in a resentencing
that reduces gross vehicular manslaughter sentence
On October 5, 2022, the trial court held a new sentencing
hearing following writ proceedings in this court and reduced
defendant’s stayed term for the manslaughter conviction from 10
years to the midterm of six years in light of the changes made
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to section 1170 by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.).
(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
E. Proceedings to apply new version of section 654
at a further resentencing
Defendant appealed, contending her sentencing proceeded
in her absence and that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to argue she was entitled to the benefit of
the newly enacted Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Assembly Bill 518), which amended section 654. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 441, § 1.) We granted defendant’s request to treat the appeal
as a writ petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and
issued an order to show cause returnable before the trial court.
The parties agreed that resentencing was required, and both
sides submitted sentencing memoranda.
The trial court—presided over by the same judge who
presided over the original trial—held a resentencing hearing on
March 18, 2025, and reimposed the same sentence as before.
Specifically, the court imposed a sentence of 15 years to life for
attempted murder, while staying under section 654 the six-year
term for vehicular manslaughter. The court recognized that its
task, in applying the amended version of section 654, was to
decide “which is the most appropriate sentence . . . to stay
pursuant to . . . section 654.” The court acknowledged “all of the
work” that defendant “has done” to rehabilitate herself while in
custody and that those “honest and deep changes” would be
“something that the parole board will consider in the future,” but
determined that it would stay the vehicular manslaughter
sentence (rather than the murder sentence) in light of the
“particularly egregious” “facts of this case,” including that
defendant was a “school principal who regularly coordinated
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events to explain the dangers of [alcohol] consumption and
driving” “as well as the fact that she was warned not to drive that
day,” and the “horrific nature of the crash that took the victim’s
life.”
F. Appeal
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in staying the vehicular manslaughter sentence rather
than the murder sentence, such that she should be sentenced to a
determinate term of six years rather than an indeterminate term
of 15 years to life.3
“Section 654 precludes multiple punishment for a single act
or omission, or an indivisible course of conduct.” (People v.
Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 591; § 654.) Prior to the passage of
Assembly Bill 518, section 654 dictated that a court faced with
multiple sentences for multiple crimes involving the same act
was required to impose the longest potential term of
imprisonment, and to stay the shorter one(s). (Former § 654,
3 Defendant also points to errors in the abstract of judgment.
We see two. The abstract states that the “upper term” was
imposed for the vehicular manslaughter count, when the court
orally imposed the “midterm” sentence. That must be corrected.
The abstract reflects only 463 total actual custody credits (which
is the number of actual days of custody between defendant’s
arrest and the original sentencing), when the court calculated
that an additional total actual custody credits of 1,853 days
(which is the number of actual days of custody between the date
of the original sentencing to the date of resentencing on March
18, 2025). The abstract must be corrected to reflect the total
number of actual custody days from the time of arrest to the date
of the March 2025 resentencing—that is, 2,316 days.
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subd. (a); Stats. 1997, ch. 410, § 1.) Assembly Bill 518, effective
January 1, 2022, amended section 654 to give a trial court the
discretion to choose which of multiple sentences for the same
conduct to impose, and which to stay—including staying the
sentence that would result in the longer potential term of
imprisonment. (§ 654, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch.
441, § 1; People v. White (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1236; People
v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379.) We review this
sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. (People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847, superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730,
757.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion conferred by the
amended section 654 in imposing the 15-years-to-life sentence for
murder while staying the six-year gross vehicular manslaughter
sentence. The court explicitly noted that it had discretion, and
then explained why the aggravated nature of the offense and
defendant’s seemingly callous reasons for disregarding the
dangers she knew arose from drinking and driving outweighed
the rehabilitative efforts she had thus far made.
Defendant offers what boil down to two reasons why the
court erred.
First, she disputes the trial court’s characterization of the
facts of this case as “particularly egregious”, argues that her
“extraordinary efforts” in prison are “deserving” of a lower, fixed-
term sentence, and urges that the “seriousness of the crime alone
should not automatically outweigh the rest of the evidence.” At
bottom, defendant is asking us to reweigh the pertinent factors
and come to a different conclusion than the trial court did. This
is beyond our purview on abuse of discretion review. (People v.
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Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 365.) Relatedly, defendant suggests
that the court refused to consider her rehabilitative efforts in
prison, but the record refutes that suggestion.
Second, defendant argues that the court’s ruling rests on a
factual error—namely, the court noted that the crime was
particularly egregious, in part because defendant had been
“warned not to drive that day” (italics added), when the record
merely reflected that defendant’s friend had repeatedly urged
defendant not to drive herself home while intoxicated—but not
necessarily on the day of the fatal accident. As a threshold
matter, defendant has forfeited this error by not bringing it to the
trial court’s attention during the sentencing—when the court
could have accounted for it. (See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th
331, 356 [“we hold that complaints about the manner in which
the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates
its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal”].) Defendant responds that her trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for not objecting, but any deficiency in
performance for not objecting was not prejudicial. Although
defendant is correct that the record does not show that
defendant’s friend urged her to use ride share on that day, it is
clear from the court’s reasoning that what made the crime
egregious was not precisely when defendant was explicitly
advised against driving while drunk but that she had been so
advised repeatedly and nevertheless ignored that advice. There
is no basis for concluding that this minor factual error mattered
at all to the trial court’s decision. Counsel accordingly did not err
in not objecting, and the failure to do so was not prejudicial.
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DISPOSITION
The clerk of the superior court is instructed to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment to reflect (1) that the midterm
sentence was imposed for the vehicular manslaughter conviction;
and (2) 2,316 total days of custody credit, and to forward a
certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
MOOR
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