Filed 9/21/26 P. v. Krochman CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E085037
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF2103681)
JOHN ALEX KROCHMAN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jennifer Gerard, Judge.
Conditionally reversed, and remanded with directions.
Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Christine Y. Friedman and Paige
B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
After the trial court denied, defendant and appellant, John Krochman’s motion for
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a mental health diversion (MHD) (Pen. Code, § 1001.36 ), he pled guilty to one count of
felony vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)). As part of his sentence, the trial court
sentenced defendant to three years of formal probation with various domestic violence-
related terms and imposed a 10-year criminal protective order (the DV terms).
Defendant contends, the People concede, and we agree that the trial court
erroneously denied his motion for MHD because the court failed to explain its reasons for
denying the motion and, in doing so, may have applied the law incorrectly. We therefore
agree with the parties that defendant’s plea should be conditionally vacated, and the
matter remanded for a new MHD hearing. We also conclude that defendant’s sentence
must be conditionally vacated, which moots defendant’s challenges to the DV terms,
including the protective order. The judgment is therefore conditionally vacated.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged defendant with one count of felony vandalism (§ 594, subds.
(a), (b)(1)) after he destroyed over $100,000 worth of property in his family home a few
days after his ex-wife left with their five children.
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Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Defendant moved for a MHD on the ground that he suffered from severe alcohol
use disorder, which was a significant factor in his commission of the vandalism. After a
hearing, the trial court found that defendant had made a prima facie showing of eligibility
and suitability for MHD (§ 1001.36), and referred the matter to the Department of
Behavioral Health for a diversion assessment. An MHD clinical therapist recommended
an eight-point plan to address defendant’s mental health issues.
The People opposed defendant’s request for MHD. Among other things, the
People argued that defendant was not suitable for MHD because he failed to show that his
condition could be addressed through existing community resources and that he would
not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public if treated in the community (§
1001.36, subds. (b)(3), (b)(6)).
The trial court denied defendant’s request for MHD. The court found that
defendant was not suitable for MHD because he “would require much more supervision
than what would be afforded under [section] 1001.36.” The court was concerned that
defendant had “an inability to control” himself, even after being charged with felony
vandalism. The court was also concerned that diversion would lead to defendant being
released “with no probation, no law enforcement intervention in the event that he needs
it, and very little accounting of his person” because “[t]hat’s what [MHD] is . . . get the
treatment, but without that supervision.”
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Defendant later pled guilty to one count of felony vandalism. About two years
later, defendant moved for reconsideration of the court’s denial of his request for MHD
and moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied both requests.
The court then sentenced defendant to three years of formal probation with 60
days of custody credits and ordered him to pay restitution. As part of his probation, the
trial court imposed the DV terms, which included a 52-week batterer’s course, a $500
domestic violence fine, and a 10-year criminal protective order prohibiting him from
contacting his ex-wife, his sister-in-law, and four of his five sons.
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for MHD, (2)
denying his motion for reconsideration of that denial, (3) imposing the DV terms, and (4)
issuing the protective order. The People concede, and we agree, that the trial court
erroneously denied defendant’s motion for MHD. On that ground, we vacate defendant’s
plea and sentence, including the DV terms and the protective order, and remand for
further MHD proceedings. We therefore need not address defendant’s second, third, or
fourth contentions.
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A. MHD
MHD “allows the trial court to suspend criminal proceedings and potentially
dismiss the charges if the defendant successfully completes mental health treatment.
[Citation.] To grant diversion, the trial court must find that the defendant is both eligible
for diversion and suitable for a mental health program. [Citation.] ‘Defendants are
eligible if they have been diagnosed with a recognized mental disorder that was a
significant factor in the commission of the criminal offense with which they are charged.’
[Citation.] The trial court ‘shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Flareau (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 681, 689 (Flareau).)
“A defendant is suitable for diversion if ‘(1) in the opinion of a qualified mental
health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the
defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply
with treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an “unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety”’ as defined. [Citation.]” (Flareau, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p.
689.)
“But, even if the trial court finds that a defendant is eligible and suitable for
diversion, the court retains discretion to deny diversion. [Citation.] This has been
deemed ‘residual discretion.’” (Flareau, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 689.)
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The People correctly concede that the trial court made two clear errors in its
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analysis of whether defendant was suitable for diversion.
First, the trial court denied MHD in large part because defendant’s behavior
toward his ex-wife, sister-in-law, and children after he was charged in this case reflected
“an inability to control one’s self.” But, as the People acknowledge, when a trial court
considers public safety concerns in its suitability analysis, it is limited to assessing
whether the defendant is likely to commit a “super strike” offense if released on a MHD.
(See Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 896.) The trial court did
not consider that likelihood and, in any event, the People conceded defendant was
unlikely to commit a super strike.
Second, the trial court’s comments about a lack of accountability and oversight if
defendant were granted MHD reflects a misunderstanding of the MHD process. “A
person granted mental health diversion will be undergoing inpatient or outpatient
treatment [citation], and the statute requires ‘[t]he provider of the mental health treatment
program in which the defendant [is] placed [to] provide regular reports to the court, the
defense, and the prosecutor on the defendant’s progress in treatment’ [citation]. In
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The People also suggest the trial court erred by failing to consider section
1001.36’s purposes when denying defendant MHD. But the court must do so only when
denying MHD under its residual discretion, and it does not appear that the trial court did
so here. (Sarmiento v. Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 893 [“Where the court
chooses to exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons
should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why
diversion would not meet those goals”].) When deciding whether a defendant is eligible
and suitable for MHD, trial courts need not consider section 1001.36’s purposes or goals.
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addition, if the person ‘is performing unsatisfactorily in the assigned program [citation],’
or is charged with an additional offense or is engaging in criminal conduct during
diversion, the court must hold a hearing to determine whether to, inter alia, modify
treatment or reinstate criminal proceedings. [Citation.]” (People v. Calabar (2025) 117
Cal.App.5th 41, 58, fn. omitted.)
Here, for instance, defendant’s proposed treatment plan included weekly check-ins
with a case worker, monthly check-ins with the court, and mandatory drug testing. The
plan expressly stated that defendant’s case would be referred to criminal court if he did
not comply with his plan. The trial court thus incorrectly believed there would
effectively be no supervision and, in turn, denied defendant MHD based on “an incorrect
statement of the law.” (People v. Calabar, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.)
We therefore must reverse unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court
still would have denied defendant’s motion for MHD even if the court had applied the
law correctly. (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) We agree with the
People that the record does not so clearly indicate.
We therefore conditionally reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s
motion for MHD and remand with directions that the trial court reconsider the motion
under the proper criteria. (See People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 891-
892.) We agree with the parties that this conclusion moots defendant’s argument that the
trial court erroneously denied his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion
for MHD.
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B. DV Terms and Protective Order
The parties, however, contend that defendant’s remaining challenges to the DV
terms and the protective order are not moot. We disagree.
The DV terms, which include the protective order, are part of defendant’s sentence
imposed pursuant to his plea agreement. When, as here, we conditionally vacate a
defendant’s plea agreement and remand for further MHD proceedings, we necessarily
must conditionally reverse the defendant’s sentence. (See People v. Qualkinbush, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 892; People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 452; People v.
Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 640-641.) Defendant’s sentence, which we now reverse,
includes the DV terms and the protective order. Our reversal of his sentence thus moots
his challenges to both. (See People v. Rojas (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1301-1302
[appellant’s argument that trial court made sentencing errors held moot given remand for
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resentencing].)
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This opinion should not be construed as precluding defendant from raising
challenges to the DV terms and protective order, if reimposed on remand.
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IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is conditionally reversed. Defendant’s plea is
conditionally vacated and his sentence conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded
for the trial court to consider whether defendant is eligible and suitable for MHD. If the
court determines MHD is appropriate, it shall so order. If that occurs, the judgment is
reversed, and defendant’s guilty plea and sentence are vacated. If defendant successfully
completes diversion, then the court shall dismiss the charges. If the trial court again
denies defendant’s motion for MHD, it shall reinstate defendant’s plea, conviction, and
sentence.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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