Filed 7/13/26 P. v. King CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, A171968
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Alameda County
KAMAL LEON KING, Super. Ct. No. 23CR008025)
Defendant and Appellant.
Kamal Leon King pled no contest to the unlawful driving or taking of a
vehicle (Pen. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); all unlabeled statutory references are
to this code). The trial court sentenced King to two years of probation, with
conditions that he “[p]articipate in any program of counseling, education,
testing, or treatment prescribed by the probation department” and
“[c]omplete residential drug treatment as recommended by Center Point.”
King asserts these probation conditions are unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, and violate the separation of powers doctrine. We disagree and
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the morning of August 14, 2023, King was seen driving a pickup
truck with a visibly damaged door lock and a license plate that did not belong
to the truck. The following morning, King was seen towing a dump trailer
with the same truck. Both vehicles had been reported stolen. Investigators
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detained King and found multiple screwdrivers and vice grips in his
possession. King also appeared to be under the influence and told
investigators he had just finished using fentanyl.
King was charged with one count of unlawful driving or taking of a
vehicle (§ 10851, subd. (a)) and two counts of receiving a stolen vehicle
(§ 496d, subd. (a)). He pled no contest to the count of unlawful driving or
taking of a vehicle and admitted the aggravating factor of a prior prison term
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)).
On the matter of sentencing, the probation department recommended
that probation be denied. But in the event probation were granted, the
department requested a number of conditions, including the conditions that
King “[s]ubmit to such education, counseling, treatments, or tests as directed
by the Probation Officer” (“Condition 11”) and that he “[p]articipate in an
approved residential drug treatment program for at least three months”
(“Condition 14”).
At the sentencing hearing, and as relevant here, the trial court placed
King on formal felony probation for two years under various conditions.
Among other things, the court stated: “There will be all the standard
conditions including a four-way search clause. . . . [¶] He’s to report to his PO
within five days of his release. He’s not to leave the State of California
without the permission of the probation officer. Participate in any program of
counseling, education, testing, or treatment prescribed by the probation
department.”
Defense counsel then objected to the residential drug treatment
requirement proposed in Condition 14, asserting it seemed “open ended” to
the point of vagueness. Counsel expressed concerns that the length of the
program (specified only as a three-month minimum) could exceed the
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duration of probation and asked that a “definitive time period” be imposed
instead. The probation officer responded that King was being asked to
complete a residential program of a length recommended by Center Point,1
that King would likely be in treatment within the first 60 to 90 days of his
release, and that individuals generally did not spend more than six months to
a year in treatment. Defense counsel did not flat out object to the proposed
completion of “a residential program recommended by Center Point” but
pressed his concern that the condition as phrased allowed for the possibility
that 13 months into probation, King would receive a recommendation that he
complete a one-year program, which would then exceed the length of
probation and cause him to be in violation of its terms. In response, the
probation officer reiterated that drug treatment programs are generally “six
months tops.”
The trial court stated it could not imagine a probationer being deemed
to have not successfully completed probation in the scenario described by
defense counsel, and both the court and the probation officer agreed that
King would be able to raise an objection if such a situation arose. No further
dialogue occurred on this issue. Consistent with the discussions at the
hearing, the court wrote in the “Further Conditions” section of a standard
probation form (the “Probation Order”) that King was to “[c]omplete
residential drug treatment as recommended by Center Point.” In the “Drug
Conditions” section of the judicial form, the court checked only the box
1 King’s opening brief refers to Center Point as a “private entity” and
indicates the “organization and nature of Center Point and its private
treatment services” are not specified in the record on appeal. But King does
not counter the People’s response explaining that Center Point is a substance
abuse program that contracts with Alameda County. We note that at the
sentencing hearing, neither the parties nor the trial court expressed any
unfamiliarity with Center Point or the treatment services it offers.
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prohibiting King from using, possessing, and trafficking in narcotics or
dangerous drugs and from associating with any persons using or in any way
trafficking narcotics or dangerous drugs. Though the court left unchecked the
other box in the “Drug Conditions” section that reflected Condition 11’s
proposed requirement of education, counseling, treatment, or tests as
directed by the probation officer, neither side disputes on appeal that the
court orally included the terms of Condition 11 as part of its probation order.
(See, e.g., People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346 [where clerk’s
and reporter’s transcripts conflict, “the part of the record that will prevail is
the one that should be given greater credence in the circumstances of the
case”].)
DISCUSSION
King asserts the probation conditions ordering him to submit to such
education, counseling, treatments, or tests as directed by the probation
department (see trial court’s oral pronouncement referencing the language
used in proposed Condition 11 and in the Probation Order under “Drug
Conditions”) and to complete residential drug treatment as recommended by
Center Point (see proposed Condition 14 and the Probation Order under
“Further Conditions”) are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and
constituted an impermissible delegation of judicial authority.
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth
King argues his probation conditions were unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad because they did not inform him of what was required of him
and rendered him “completely at the mercy of the probation department and
private entity Center Point.” Because the trial court did not order a specific
type of counseling, education, or treatment, King contends these conditions
could include within their “broad sweep” any number of programs including
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financial counseling, mental or behavioral counseling, drug or alcohol
counseling, family counseling, or empathy training, among others. We are
not persuaded.
A constitutional challenge to a probation condition presents a question
of law that we review de novo. (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129,
1143.) “To survive a vagueness challenge, a probation condition must be
precise enough to provide the probationer with notice of what is required or
prohibited and allow the court to ascertain whether the probationer has
violated its terms.” (People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 901–902
(Smith).) In evaluating probation conditions, we consider their context and
employ common sense, giving terms the meanings that would appear to a
reasonable, objective reader. (People v. Rhinehart (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
1123, 1129.) We also consider any oral or written comments of the trial court
in clarifying the probation condition to determine if a challenged condition is
unconstitutionally vague. (Smith, at p. 902.)
Here, the probation conditions were certain enough to apprise King of
his obligations. True, the trial court began the sentencing hearing with the
statement that King would be required to “[p]articipate in any program of
counseling, education, testing, or treatment prescribed by the probation
department,” without further elaboration. But the probation report, the
subsequent discussions in court, and the written Probation Order all made
reasonably clear the court was not imposing a broad and undefined condition
for counseling, education, testing, or treatment. To the contrary, the only
condition in the Probation Order that literally mirrored such terms—though
the box was inadvertently left unchecked—was a drug-related condition. The
record contains no indication that programs separate from drug treatment on
topics such as financial counseling, mental or behavioral counseling, family
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counseling, or empathy training were being either requested or ordered. And
as the colloquy at the sentencing hearing and text of the Probation Order
otherwise confirm, the trial court agreed with the probation department’s
recommendation to require King’s completion of residential drug treatment
as recommended by Center Point.
King also challenges the residential drug treatment condition in the
Probation Order as lacking in adequate definition and specificity. In support,
King cites the holding in Smith that, given the significant liberty interests at
stake, it is for a court and not a probation officer to decide whether a
probationer must participate in a residential (as opposed to outpatient)
treatment program. In King’s view, this principle applies with “even greater
force” where the decision-making authority has been delegated to a private
entity such as Center Point. This contention is unavailing.
Importantly, the Probation Order makes clear that the trial court—not
Center Point—determined that King must complete residential drug
treatment. Moreover, King fails to present a cogent argument as to why the
residential drug treatment condition was insufficiently defined or specific.
(See People v. Benson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1078–1079, fn. 2 (Benson)
[appellant must supply the reviewing court with a cogent argument
supported with legal analysis and citation to the record to demonstrate
error].)
King additionally claims the challenged conditions are
unconstitutionally overbroad. However, his appellate briefing omits a
separate analysis of overbreadth principles, which generally relate to
whether a probation condition “closely tailor[s]” limitations on an individual’s
constitutional rights to the purpose of the condition. (See In re Sheena K.
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(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888, 890.) As such, we do not discuss it. (See Benson,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079.)
B. Delegation of Judicial Authority
King asserts the trial court impermissibly delegated judicial authority
to the probation department and Center Point, in violation of the separation
of powers doctrine, when it gave these entities “unfettered discretion” to
compel his completion of “any type” of counseling, education, testing, or
treatment for an “ill-defined” duration of time. We disagree.
The principles governing our analysis are well established. It is the
duty of the trial court to determine the nature of the requirements imposed
upon a probationer. (People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1359 .)
This judicial power cannot be delegated to nonjudicial officers under the
separation of powers doctrine. (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 902.)
Courts, however, are permitted to delegate to the probation department the
“specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement
the terms of probation,” so long as the order is not “entirely open-ended.” (In
re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 919 .)
As previously discussed, the Probation Order did not broadly authorize
the probation department to compel King’s submission to any type of
counseling, education, testing, or treatment. Nor was the order’s residential
drug treatment condition ill-defined. Indeed, between the parties’
discussions at the sentencing hearing and the terms set forth in the
Probation Order, King was apprised that he would be attending a residential
drug treatment program and its approximate duration (i.e., approximately
six months and not exceeding his term of probation). As such, the probation
conditions here were identical to those in other cases that have survived
claims of improper delegation of judicial authority. (See, e.g., People v. Penoli
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(1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307–308 [upholding delegation of authority to
probation department to unilaterally select a residential drug rehabilitation
program where no particular program was identified].)
DISPOSITION
We remand the matter and order the trial court to correct the written form
setting out the conditions of King’s probation to conform to the court’s oral
pronouncement at sentencing as explained above. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.
_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P. J.
_________________________
Rodríguez, J.
People v. King (A171968)
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