Filed 7/6/26 P. v. Kindle CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F088770
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF193990A)
v.
IRA RUSSEL KINDLE, JR., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Charles R.
Brehmer, Judge.
Stephen M. Lathrop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Dina Petrushenko and
Matthew A. Kearney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Following a court trial, defendant Ira Russell Kindle, Jr., was convicted of murder,
felon in possession of a firearm, and felon in possession of ammunition. The trial court
imposed a sentence of 50 years to life, plus five years. Kindle raises a single issue on
appeal: whether the court failed to adequately advise him about his right to a jury trial
such that his waiver of a jury trial was not knowingly and intelligently made. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Around 1:00 a.m., a Bakersfield police officer heard gunshots at a convenience
store and went to investigate. When the officer arrived, he found victim
Christopher Pudwill near the store with gunshot wounds and no signs of life. The
gunshot wounds were fatal. A police investigation placed Kindle and his friend
Keith Hamilton at the scene. Further, a security video appears to show (among other
things) Kindle shooting Pudwill as Pudwill was approaching the convenience store.
Further, GPS data from Kindle’s ankle monitor placed him at the convenience store at the
time of the shooting. During a police interview, Kindle initially denied involvement but
eventually admitted that he had shot Pudwill because he had a negative history with
Pudwill, including recent threats of violence.
On August 15, 2024, the Kern County District Attorney filed an amended
information that in part1 charged Kindle with four felonies: first degree murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a);2 count 1); conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1);
count 2); felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3); and felon in
possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 4). With respect to count 1, the
amended information alleged as an enhancement that Kindle personally discharged a
firearm which caused death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). With respect to counts 3 and 4, the
amended information alleged that Kindle had prior felony convictions under
1 Hamilton was also charged with felonies in the amended information.
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
sections 261.5, subdivision (c), 422, 245, subdivision (a)(4), and 290.012, subdivision (a).
For count 1, the amended information alleged that Kindle’s prior section 422 conviction
was a strike prior for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and constituted a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)). Numerous
enhancements under California Rules of Court, rules 4.421(a) and 4.421(b) were alleged
for all counts.
Also on August 15, 2024, Kindle waived his right to a jury trial and instead
elected to have a court trial. The trial court, the prosecutor, Kindle, and Kindle’s counsel
engaged in the following colloquy concerning waiving the right to a jury trial:
“THE COURT: In regard to Mr. Kindle, was there a decision by
Mr. Kindle, his counsel, and the People as to whether or not he wishes to
have all decisions, other than circumstances in aggravation and strike
priors, tried to the jury or to waive jury?
“[COUNSEL]: Based upon my discussion with Mr. Kindle, he has
indicated he would like to waive [a] jury on the case.
“THE COURT: Mr. Kindle, I’ll ask you about that in a second.
Okay?
What is the People’s position?
“[THE PEOPLE]: The People are in agreement. We would also be
willing to waive [a] jury as to Mr. Kindle.
“THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Kindle, I know you’ve had a chance to
speak to your excellent attorney about this in detail.
“You have an absolute right to a jury trial. You have a right to have
12 people make an independent decision after meeting and discussing the
case with each other, considering the evidence, the law that I give to them,
for them to decide whether or not the presumption of innocence is
overcome and you’re proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
“You have that right. That’s your right as a defendant. Do you wish
to waive that right and to try all the issues in the case to the Court? The
Court is me, the judge, in this particular case.
3.
Is that what you wish to do?
“[KINDLE]: Yes.
“THE COURT: Is that your final decision?
“[KINDLE]: Yes.
“THE COURT: Did you have any questions for your attorney or for
me about that?
“[KINDLE]: No.
“THE COURT: No? Okay.
“[COUNSEL]: You Honor, can I make one additional record on that
issue?
“THE COURT: Yes.
“[COUNSEL]: This was something that actually was brought up to
me by my client. It was at his request. We did have discussions regarding
the difference between a jury panel and the Court being the trier of fact in
this case. I do believe he is fully aware of the differences in a jury trial
versus a court trial.
“THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Kindle, do you want me to make a
decision after all the evidence as to whether or not the charges are proven
as opposed to the jury doing that?
“[KINDLE]: Yes.
“THE COURT: Okay. That’s what we’ll do. The People are in
agreement.”
Trial was conducted between August 22, 2024, and September 9, 2024. The trial
court found Kindle guilty on counts 1, 3, and 4, but not guilty on count 2. In part, the
court also found that the section 422 conviction was a strike prior and a prior serious
felony and that Kindle was guilty on some enhancements, but not guilty on others.
On October 8, 2024, the trial court struck the personal use of a firearm
enhancement pursuant to section 1385. For count 1, the court sentenced Kindle to a total
term of 50 years to life (25 years to life doubled by the strike prior under the
4.
Three Strikes law), plus five years (pursuant to the prior serious felony enhancement).
For counts 3 and 4, the court imposed the middle term of four years, but stayed both
counts pursuant to section 654.
On October 9, 2024, Kindle appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Parties’ Arguments
Kindle contends his waiver of the right to a jury trial was not knowingly and
intelligently made and thus, invalid. Specifically, Kindle argues the trial court failed to
advise him of his right to participate in the jury selection process and that the jury’s
verdict must be unanimous. Kindle also argues the court’s efforts to ensure the validity
of his waiver were inadequate because the court only elicited limited responses from him
and relied on the representations of defense counsel. Because the invalid waiver is a
structural error, Kindle avers the judgment must be reversed.
The People contend the record shows Kindle knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to a jury trial. The People emphasize Kindle’s experiences with the criminal
justice system and point out that the trial court discussed the consequences of a court
trial, confirmed with Kindle that he understood and wanted to waive his right, and heard
defense counsel’s representations regarding her discussions with Kindle. Under these
circumstances, the People aver that Kindle’s waiver was valid.
II. Legal Standard
The right to a trial by jury in a criminal case is a fundamental and absolute right
that is protected by the United States Constitution and the California Constitution.
(People v. Cannon (2025) 18 Cal.5th 497, 519; see also People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3
Cal.5th 151, 166 (Sivongxxay).) Criminal defendants “may waive this fundamental right
to a jury trial by a personal and express waiver in open court and by consent of both
parties.” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753 (Morelos); see Sivongxxay, at
p. 166.) A waiver of the right to a jury trial must be knowingly, intelligently, and
5.
voluntarily made. (Morelos, at p. 753; Sivongxxay, at p. 166; People v. Collins (2001) 26
Cal.4th 297, 305.) A waiver is “knowingly and intelligently” made if it is “ ‘ “ ‘ “made
with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.” ’ ” ’ ” (Sivongxxay, at p. 166; Collins, at
p. 305.) A waiver is “voluntary” if it was the product “ ‘ “ ‘ “of a free and deliberate
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” ’ ” ’ ” (Sivongxxay, at p. 166;
Collins, at p. 305.) In determining whether a waiver was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary, courts examine the totality of the circumstances that are unique to each case.
(Morelos, at p. 753; Sivongxxay, at p. 167.)
During a waiver colloquy, our Supreme Court has recommended that trial courts
advise defendants of the basic mechanics of a jury trial, including, but not limited to, the
facts that: (1) a jury is made up of 12 community members; (2) the defendant participates
in the jury selection process through his counsel; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously
agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if the defendant waives his right to a jury trial,
the judge alone decides his guilt or innocence. (Morelos, at p. 753; Sivongxxay, at
p. 170.) This recommendation, however, “is not intended to limit trial courts to a narrow
or rigid colloquy,” and “a trial court’s adaption of or departure from the recommended
colloquy in an individual case will not necessarily render an ensuing jury waiver invalid.”
(Sivongxxay, at p. 170.) Indeed, “the failure of a trial court to provide a specific
advisement does not mean there was not a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.”
(People v. Jones (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 420, 430.)
Our Supreme Court also recommended that trial courts take additional steps, as
may be appropriate, to ensure on the record that a defendant understands what the right to
a jury trial entails, such as: by asking whether the defendant had an adequate opportunity
to discuss the decision with his attorney, by asking whether counsel explained the
fundamental differences between a jury trial and a bench trial, or by asking the defendant
if he understands or has any questions about the right to a jury trial. (Sivongxxay, at
6.
pp. 169–170.) Ultimately, trial courts must consider a defendant’s individual
circumstances and exercise their judgment to ensure that a defendant’s waiver is
knowingly and intelligently made. (Morelos, at p. 753; Sivongxxay, at p. 170.)
We review de novo whether a defendant has adequately waived the right to a jury
trial. (See People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1660; see also People v.
Palmer (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 268, 280 [“We review the legal question of whether [a]
defendant’s constitutional rights were violated de novo.”].) If a criminal defendant was
improperly denied his right to a jury trial, the judgment must be reversed because the
error is structural and not subject to a harmless error analysis. (Collins, at p. 311; see also
People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1132–1133 [invalid jury trial waiver in a
civil commitment proceeding for a mentally disordered offender].)
III. Analysis
We agree with Kindle that the trial court did not advise him of two of the
four “jury trial mechanics” admonishments recommended by our Supreme Court—the
court did not advise Kindle that all 12 jurors must unanimously agree to convict him and
that he could participate through his counsel in the jury selection process. Nevertheless,
under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the record sufficiently demonstrates
that Kindle knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.3
First, the trial court understood that Kindle and his counsel had discussed “in
detail” waiving a jury. Kindle’s counsel expressly confirmed this fact and explained that
she had discussed the differences between a court trial and a jury trial with Kindle.
3 We note that our Supreme Court has found a knowing and intelligent waiver even
when the right to participate in jury selection (People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056,
1072–1074), the requirement of jury unanimity (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166–
169), or both (Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 753–757) were not expressly told to the
defendant. Therefore, the mere failure to advise Kindle of his right to participate in jury
selection and of the requirement of jury unanimity is not per se fatal and does not
automatically mandate reversal.
7.
Kindle’s counsel stated she believed Kindle was “fully aware” of those differences. After
having had detailed conversations with him, if defense counsel believed Kindle was
“fully aware” of, and thus understood, the differences, it is highly likely that defense
counsel explained that the jury had to unanimously agree to convict him and that she
would participate in the jury selection process.
Second, Kindle’s counsel informed the court that waiving a jury trial and having
the court decide Kindle’s guilt or innocence was not suggested by her but instead was
suggested by Kindle. The fact that Kindle himself, and not his counsel, was the person
who broached the subject of a court trial strongly suggests that Kindle understood the
basic mechanics of a jury trial and the differences between a jury trial and a court trial.
Third, Kindle had an extensive criminal history. The trial court specifically found
true the allegation that Kindle had been convicted of violating section 422, a serious
felony or strike. Further, the amended information alleged a total of five prior felony
convictions. Kindle’s California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System record
of arrests and prosecutions (rap sheet) confirmed these and revealed numerous
misdemeanor convictions. In particular, the rap sheet showed that for at least
three separate misdemeanor convictions Kindle expressly waived his right to a jury trial
before pleading nolo contendere. This criminal history is significant because it shows
that before this trial, Kindle had varied experiences with the criminal justice system that
resulted in convictions, and on at least three occasions, he waived his right to a jury trial.
These prior jury trial waivers make it extremely likely that the mechanics of a jury trial
were known by Kindle. (Cf. Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 167 [noting the
defendant’s prior criminal history indicated he understood the jury trial system]; People
v. Roles (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 935, 951 [same].)
Fourth, the trial court asked Kindle whether he had any questions about waiving a
jury trial, and Kindle responded, “No.” Kindle did not seek any clarification. (See
Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 755; Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 169–170.)
8.
Kindle also heard the interactions between his counsel and the court, and he was silent.
This means that Kindle did not disagree with, clarify, or attempt to add any caveats to
what the court said or what his counsel represented, including that she believed Kindle
was “fully aware” of the differences between a jury trial and a court trial.
Given the collective force of the above facts, we are satisfied that Kindle’s waiver
was knowingly and intelligently made. The record demonstrates Kindle had extensive
contacts with the criminal justice system as a criminal defendant. Prior to this case,
Kindle had suffered multiple felony and misdemeanor convictions, some of which
involved nolo contendere pleas in which he expressly waived the right to a jury trial. In
fact, Kindle was so familiar with the criminal trial process that he was the one who raised
the possibility of having a court trial. The trial court believed that Kindle had discussed
waiving a jury trial “in detail” with counsel, and Kindle’s counsel confirmed the
discussions and believed that Kindle was “fully aware” of the differences between a court
trial and a jury trial. In line with these representations, Kindle did not ask questions or
contradict his counsel or the court when given the opportunity to do so.
For us to conclude that Kindle’s waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made,
we would also have to conclude that Kindle was not properly informed of the mechanics
of a jury trial during the course of not one, but at least three, prior pleas and that Kindle’s
counsel incompetently failed to describe the mechanics of a jury trial, despite what was
described as full and in depth discussions. We cannot do so. Therefore, given these facts
and circumstances, we conclude Kindle waived his right to a jury trial with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it. (Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 753–757; Sivongxxay, supra, 3
Cal.5th at pp. 166–170.)
9.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HARRELL, J.
WE CONCUR:
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
FRANSON, J.
10.