Filed 8/18/26 P. v. Kazemi CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B342179
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA107058)
v.
JALAL KAZEMI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph J. Burghardt, Judge. Affirmed.
Bird Rock Law Group, Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
Jalal Kazemi, through his appointed attorney, seeks
reversal of his criminal conviction on the sole ground that the
trial court erroneously refused to declare a second doubt
regarding his competency to stand trial. We now affirm the
judgment, because Kazemi’s conduct following his first
competency evaluation did not present a substantial change of
circumstances or new evidence that required revisiting
competency.
I.
A.
In February 2023, the People charged Kazemi with a single
count of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code
section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and included a special allegation
that Kazemi personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon in
violation of Penal Code section 969f. (Further unspecified
statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Kazemi pleaded not
guilty and was convicted after an October 2024 jury trial.
At trial, the victim, Richard Calabro, testified for the
People. While Calabro jogged in Santa Monica, Kazemi drove a
car through an intersection, almost hitting Calabro. Calabro
yelled, “It’s a fucking stop sign.” Calabro continued on, reached
the sidewalk, and saw the same car turn and drive towards him.
The front bumper of the car hit Calabro’s ankle, and Calabro
jumped backwards.
Four percipient witnesses testified for the People. They
testified consistently with each other and corroborated Calabro’s
description of events: an argument occurred between a jogger
and the car’s driver in the intersection, the car turned and
accelerated towards the jogger, the jogger jumped out of the way,
and the car hit a wall.
2
Kazemi testified in his defense. He claimed Calabro was
the aggressor. Calabro had banged on Kazemi’s stopped car with
his fist. Calabro cursed at Kazemi, and Kazemi replied, “when
you see a car, stop.” Calabro approached and grabbed Kazemi’s
neck, shoulders, and shirt through the open car window. Calabro
tried to pull Kazemi out of the car. Kazemi removed his hands
from the steering wheel to push Calabro away. During the
struggle, Kazemi’s foot moved off the brake. Calabro held the
steering wheel and steered the car, while Kazemi pushed on the
accelerator. Calabro jumped to the side, the car went over the
curb, a front tire popped, and an airbag went off, injuring
Kazemi.
B.
Having summarized the trial evidence for context, we
recount the proceedings regarding Kazemi’s competency that are
central to this appeal.
In January 2024, at a pretrial conference, defense counsel
declared a doubt regarding Kazemi’s competency to stand trial.
She cited her conversations with Kazemi, as well as a report she
solicited from Robin Rhodes Campbell, Ph.D. The court reviewed
a portion of Dr. Campbell’s report and concluded “the opinion of a
mental health professional that [Kazemi is] not competent raises
a doubt.” The court suspended criminal proceedings and
transferred the case to the mental health division for competency
proceedings.
The mental health division appointed Dr. Karine Shakib-
Beltran to evaluate Kazemi’s competency, and she found him
competent. She met Kazemi face-to-face and evaluated him
using a “structured competency screening instrument” and
through a clinical interview. In her 12-page report, Dr. Shakib-
3
Beltran described how Kazemi presented “some non-bizarre
delusions of a grandiose and persecutory nature,” but she had
insufficient information to determine whether Kazemi
definitively suffered from a mental disorder because Kazemi
refused to participate in psychological testing. Kazemi reported
potentially delusional thoughts including that the police, fire
department, prosecutor, and judge were all “in on it” and working
against him in the case, that he had been an advisor to President
Trump, and that his ex-wife and son were stealing from him. The
majority, if not all, of his persecutory thoughts were “associated
with this case.” Dr. Shakib-Beltran stated that anxiety or
concern over his fate could account for Kazemi’s “ostensibly
outlandish” thoughts, especially since he was 67 years old with
no prior criminal history. There was “insufficient information to
determine that Mr. Kazemi [was] in fact experiencing delusional
disorder, which is a type of psychotic disorder whose main
symptom is the presence of one or more delusions. Mr. Kazemi’s
behaviors are not supported by a psychotic disorder, such as
schizophrenia, because he does not have the disorganization in
thought and speech in addition to the delusions. They are also
not supported by a mood disorder, such a[s] bipolar disorder,
because he does not have the requisite mood instability.” There
was also insufficient information to support a personality
disorder.
Kazemi understood and could converse about the criminal
justice system, the role of case participants, the People’s burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the charges he faced.
While Kazemi’s personality and strenuous belief in his innocence
could make him “a challenging client,” “Kazemi demonstrated an
ability to rationally cooperate with counsel to construct his
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defense.” He remained “amenable to redirection” even if “no
amount of psychiatric treatment w[ould] change his obstinate
approach, attitude, and character.” Any difficulty working with
defense counsel would be “volitional and/or personality driven as
opposed to due to an underlying mental health condition.” And
Kazemi’s fatalistic desire to have his case proceed stemmed “from
a place of frustration as opposed to delusions.” Dr. Shakib-
Beltran believed “Kazemi’s personality may make him, at times,
unwilling to rationally cooperate with his counsel; though he is
not unable to do [so] as a result of any mental illness or disorder.”
Dr. Shakib-Beltran concluded, as to Kazemi, there was
“insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of
competence.” His behavior and personality aside, there was no
impairment of Kazemi’s ability to understand the proceedings
against him or assist counsel.
In March 2024, the mental health division found Kazemi
competent to stand trial based on Dr. Shakib-Beltran’s report,
reinstated criminal proceedings, and transferred the case back to
criminal court.
On June 11, 2024, just three months later and two days
before jury selection was scheduled, defense counsel and the
prosecution appeared at an “add on” hearing. Defense counsel
again raised a doubt about Kazemi’s competence to stand trial,
believing he suffered schizophrenic delusions and could not
rationally assist in his defense. Kazemi was not present when
counsel declared this doubt, and counsel advised Kazemi would
object to her pursuit of further competency proceedings. Counsel
recounted additional statements Kazemi had made to her the
prior day as the basis for her doubt. These included (1) a higher
authority had mandated to his defense attorney that he be
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convicted; (2) he had $165 million but would not hire private
counsel; and (3) his ex-wife and son tried to steal or had stolen
$500,000 from him. Counsel also recounted how, in the past,
Kazemi had said “the FBI and CIA have cornered him to work for
them and he’s considering it,” and that Kazemi had recently
reiterated those statements. Counsel conceded, however, that his
supposed connections to the U.S. government were addressed in
the prior competency report but challenged the report’s
conclusions about them. Counsel then added, “this is not new”
and Kazemi “said this all along, but he reiterated it yesterday
that he does believe that all the parties involved, including the
firefighters, the police officers, are all colluding with the five
witnesses against him in a conspiracy to frame him.” Counsel
stated Kazemi also believed the court was “in on it, and that is
one of the reasons that he would not stipulate to a bench trial,”
but, again, Kazemi’s suspicions were not new and Kazemi “might
have made the same decision before he was found competent, but
we never discussed the option.”
The court asked counsel whether there had been
decompensation since the determination of competency. Counsel
responded, “everything that I’ve witnessed is what I’ve told you.
So I have a doubt, but I’ve always had a doubt. I do think this is
new information that for me is more evidence of the doubt that
I’ve always had.” The court summarized its hesitation towards
declaring a further doubt, stating the new information offers “just
sort of more support for your original belief” and that “nothing
. . . indicate[s] that he has decompensated.” The court asked
counsel if she wanted to be heard further. Counsel said, “no.”
The court declined to declare a new doubt.
6
Six days later, on June 17, 2024, stand-in defense counsel
raised another doubt about Kazemi’s ability to rationally assist in
his defense. By this time, a jury had been selected, and trial was
supposed to commence. But Kazemi’s attorney of record was ill,
necessitating stand-in counsel and postponement of trial. At the
June 17 hearing, stand-in counsel proffered the following
statements from Kazemi as support for declaring a doubt: (1) a
juror was a government plant; (2) he has $165 billion and is a
biblical figure, so whether he goes to prison may not matter; (3)
he has been recruited by the FBI and CIA; (4) he is physically
present today but his presence is elsewhere; and (5) he refused to
sign releases for the defense to evaluate his medical records.
Kazemi interrupted stand-in counsel’s presentation to seek
removal of counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d
118 (Marsden). During the Marsden hearing, Kazemi described a
disagreement with his counsel about mental health diversion and
the Dr. Shakib-Beltran report. He believed the report, which
deemed him competent, described him positively, while his
attorney believed the report said negative things about him.
Kazemi asked to see the report, and his counsel showed him the
second page. Kazemi responded, “this is not the same report,”
and counsel showed him the first and last pages of the report to
prove that it was. Kazemi then stated, “I can understand all
those things. I’m not a child. Those reports can be — for lack of
a better word — can be manipulated. I did not object — but I told
her, and I objected to it. I really, really resented the way that she
was doing this.” They then discussed various options for how the
case could proceed. Kazemi also discussed the merits of the
prosecution.
The court denied the Marsden motion.
7
After the Marsden hearing, the court returned to the
competency matter, found nothing caused it to believe Kazemi
had decompensated since the previous competency finding, and
refused to declare a doubt. “The concerns that have been raised,”
the court stated, “are just more examples of — if they’re accurate
— they’re more examples of delusional thought and [a] delusional
thought process that were present at the time when he was found
competent.”
On June 20, 2024, the court declared a mistrial due to the
original defense counsel’s unavailability. Kazemi sought the
appointment of a new attorney and mentioned chain of custody
issues regarding his car that he wanted to discuss with his
attorney. The court advised Kazemi to raise the issue at the next
court date.
On July 23, 2024, the next court date, Kazemi made
another Marsden motion. Issues of competency and mental
health were not discussed, and the motion was denied.
On September 26, 2024, Kazemi again brought a Marsden
motion. Kazemi discussed disagreements he had with his counsel
over defense strategy. Kazemi articulated several strategies he
had proposed. At this hearing, counsel again mentioned
hesitations with Kazemi’s competence and her interest in
providing jurors with evidence of how Kazemi had, years ago,
suffered a condition necessitating brain surgery, but Kazemi
would not sign a medical release to obtain records. The court
denied the Marsden motion.
On October 1, 2024, after the first day of voir dire in what
would be Kazemi’s trial, and outside the presence of both
potential jurors and Kazemi, defense counsel again expressed a
doubt about Kazemi’s competence. Kazemi had told counsel he
8
was fine with going to prison because he was a prophet and that
is where prophets go. Counsel could not have a coherent
exchange with Kazemi after court the prior day, and believed
Kazemi’s delusions factored into his decision-making. Counsel
also challenged Dr. Shakib-Beltran’s report, which was the basis
for finding Kazemi competent, noting it indicated Kazemi refused
to complete psychological testing as part of that competency
evaluation and questioning its couching of some of Kazemi’s
beliefs as “possible albeit highly improbable.” Counsel believed
Kazemi’s incompetency drove all his poor decisions in the case
and, if restored to competence, he would have accepted mental
health diversion.
The court again declined to declare a doubt. It found there
was not a sufficient change in circumstances or anything new in
terms of decompensation since the original competency finding.
On October 2, 2024, after the close of the People’s case-in-
chief, defense counsel moved for a mistrial due to Kazemi’s
incompetence. The trial court denied the motion for the same
reasons it had previously declined to declare a doubt. Kazemi
then elected to testify. He indicated his agreement that he could
testify only about the relevant issues, could not speculate, and
had to remain within the constraints of the evidentiary rules. He
then clarified with the court that he could testify about what
happened before the incident, and advised he wanted to recreate
how the accident occurred with a toy car.
Kazemi’s testimony spanned two court days. He mentioned
his business background involving lucrative contracts. He briefly
mentioned, at his counsel’s prompting, that the CIA and FBI
looked into hiring him for his skillsets and had investigated his
past “under [his] employment.” He detailed his prior brain injury
9
and surgery, showing the scars to the jury. He described his view
of the incident with Calabro and how Calabro was the actual
aggressor. Twice he mentioned rhetorically that he should be
believed unless he was insane.
After the defense rested, defense counsel again doubted
Kazemi’s competency and the trial court again declined to declare
a doubt. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
On November 12, 2024, the court sentenced Kazemi.
During Kazemi’s allocution, he sought to disprove the
prosecution’s trial argument that he had lied. He discussed his
work background, which included contracts with the government
and private business dealings involving oil sales and billions of
dollars, to establish he was not a liar. He acknowledged, “the
case ha[d] already gone to the jury. But I resent the fact that
people destroy people — destroy their lives just for an ounce of
progress in their career. They have no idea of what they’re doing
with the people’s life. And that’s the sad thing about it. I’m not a
liar.” At this point, defense counsel interrupted the allocution to
again declare a doubt about Kazemi’s competency. Counsel
stated: “I’m sorry — but anyone who would choose to go to prison
for over a year over — just from the comfort of their home getting
on Zoom and attending a video therapy appointment, there’s
something wrong. And I think that’s even more evidence that he
is not competent now. He wasn’t competent before. I’ll submit on
that. I just — I really don’t think he’s competent.”
The court again declined to declare a doubt: “The court
does not find a sufficient change in circumstances. I understand
the defense position that he’s always been incompetent, but the
court does not find a sufficient change in circumstances. I’m not
disputing the fact that there are some mental health issues there.
10
And that’s why I’m going to be sentencing him to the low term —
at least that’s my initial indication before listening to the People.”
The court then sentenced Kazemi to the low term of two
years in state prison. Kazemi timely appeals.
II.
Kazemi’s appellate counsel argues the trial court erred
when it declined Kazemi’s trial counsel’s multiple requests,
following the first competency proceeding, to declare a new doubt
about Kazemi’s competency to stand trial.
Federal and state law “prohibit[ ] the state from trying or
convicting a criminal defendant who is mentally incompetent.”
(People v. Bertsch and Hronis (2026) 19 Cal.5th 183, 226–227
(Bertsch); accord, People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 230
(Rodas).) It is a defendant’s burden to show he lacks competence,
by a preponderance of the evidence, because the law otherwise
presumes competence. (Bertsch, at p. 229.) To do so, a defendant
must establish that “ ‘as a result of a mental health disorder or
developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand
the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the
conduct of a defense in a rational manner.’ ” (Id. at p. 227,
quoting § 1367, subd. (a).) Only the latter prong, assisting
counsel, is at issue here.
The decision whether to reinstate competency proceedings,
though, “is fundamentally different from the initial decision to
institute competency proceedings. Mere doubt about a
defendant’s competency is insufficient, since the court has
already gone beyond the identification of doubt and determined
that defendant is not incompetent.” (Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th
at p. 236.) Accordingly, “ ‘ “ ‘[o]nce a defendant has been found
competent to stand trial, a second competency hearing is required
11
only if the evidence discloses a substantial change of
circumstances or new evidence is presented casting serious doubt
on the validity of the prior finding of the defendant’s
competence.’ ” ’ ” (Bertsch, at p. 233; accord, Rodas, supra,
6 Cal.5th at p. 231 [trial court “may rely” on prior competency
finding unless “ ‘ “presented with a substantial change of
circumstances or with new evidence” casting a serious doubt on
the validity of that finding’ ”]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d
1115, 1153.)
The inquiry is fact specific. (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p.
235.) Neither “ ‘substantially duplicat[ive] evidence’ ” of that
considered at the original competency proceedings nor “ ‘evidence
of relatively minor changes in the defendant’s mental state’ ” is
enough. (Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 233, quoting Rodas, at
pp. 234–235.)
Further, a trial court may consider its own observations of
the defendant when “ ‘determining whether there has been some
significant change in the defendant’s mental state. This is
particularly true when . . . the defendant has actively
participated in the trial.’ ” (Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 233.)
“ ‘An uncooperative defendant is not tantamount to an
incompetent one.’ ” (Id. at p. 228.) “ ‘More is required than just
bizarre actions or statements by the defendant to raise a doubt of
competency’ [citation], or ‘counsel’s unparticularized assertion
that defendant’s condition had deteriorated, with no explanation
of how it had done so.’ ” (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th
367, 409–410.) “[G]eneral assertion[s] of defendant’s worsening
condition and inability to cooperate with counsel [are] inadequate
to justify [a] second hearing.” (People v. Medina (1995)
11 Cal.4th 694, 734; accord, Buenrostro, at p. 410 [“Trial counsel
12
offered only unparticularized assertions and brief descriptions of
isolated incidents that, in his view, reflected a ‘deepening’ of
defendant’s inability to understand the legal proceedings and
cooperate with counsel”]; Bertsch, at p. 236 [expert opinion of
incompetency insufficient to declare second doubt if no evidence
of changed circumstances or new evidence]; People v. Weaver
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 952–953 [same].)
“We review for substantial evidence the trial court’s finding
of no substantial change of circumstances and no new evidence
casting serious doubt on the initial competency determination,
and we review its decision not to reinstate competency
proceedings for an abuse of discretion.” (Bertsch, supra,
19 Cal.5th at p. 233.)
Substantial evidence supports the court’s determination
that Kazemi had not shown a substantial change in his
circumstances or new evidence that casts a serious doubt on the
initial competency determination. The circumstances and
evidence Kazemi’s counsel identifies on appeal do not compel the
opposite conclusion.
Dr. Shakib-Beltran’s report serves as our benchmark. (See
Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 234.) Dr. Shakib-Beltran
considered purportedly delusional statements during her initial
competency evaluation. This includes Kazemi’s statements, of a
grandiose or persecutory nature, that his family had stolen from
him, that the court, case participants, and witnesses were all “in
on it” and working against him, and that he had worked with
high levels of the government, like President Trump.
Kazemi’s asserted later statements do not sufficiently tread
new ground. For instance, statements about the FBI and CIA
being interested in Kazemi as an employee or about his
13
purported wealth were akin to other grandiose statements Dr.
Shakib-Beltran had considered. So were his unadorned
comparisons of himself as a criminal defendant enduring
prosecution to a biblical figure or prophet destined for prison,
which also fit Dr. Shakib-Beltran’s view of Kazemi as fatalistic.
(See People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33 [newly reported
statements that defendant had “large amounts of money,” was
“born in Spain,” and “was a god,” as well as defendant’s
statement that “the President and Governor were conspiring
against him, and that the conspirators would be beheaded,” were
insufficient to require declaring a new doubt as “[m]ore is
required than just bizarre actions or statements”]; Bertsch, supra,
19 Cal.5th at p. 236 [a refusal to assist counsel based on religious
revelations “ ‘did not necessarily bear on [defendant’s] competence
. . . , or reflect a substantial change of circumstances or new
evidence casting serious doubt on the validity of the prior finding
of defendant’s competence’ ”].)
Other conduct Kazemi’s counsel mentions on appeal, like
disagreements over whether to waive his constitutional right to a
jury trial based on a perception that case participants were
biased against him or Kazemi’s refusal to seek mental health
diversion, was also insufficient to trigger a second competency
proceeding. Dr. Shakib-Beltran had already addressed Kazemi’s
suspicions about the court and the criminal justice system and
had found Kazemi would be “a challenging client,” but it was due
to his belief in his own innocence and reflective of his personality,
not a reflection of incompetency due to a mental health condition.
Also, Kazemi has not shown how those refusals to acquiesce in
trial counsel’s desired defense strategy evinced a new inability,
rather than a continued unwillingness, to assist counsel. (See
14
Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 228 [“ ‘uncooperative defendant is
not tantamount to an incompetent one’ ”].)
As the People note, Kazemi was able to advocate for himself
at various points throughout the prosecution, including at several
Marsden hearings. The trial court thus had several opportunities
to view Kazemi and compare his behavior from before and after
the competency proceeding, and evidently concluded there had
not been a significant change. (Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp.
233, 235 [trial court observations are evidence bearing on
whether to order a second competency hearing].)
Kazemi’s appellate counsel contends one of the Marsden
hearings instead supported declaring a doubt as to competence.
Counsel points to Kazemi’s belief that trial counsel had
manipulated Dr. Shakib-Beltran’s report, relayed during the
June 17 Marsden hearing. During that June 17 hearing, Kazemi
expressed frustration with his counsel and the mental health and
competency proceedings generally. He provided the example of a
disagreement he and counsel had over the report as well as case
strategy. Kazemi himself viewed the report as positive because it
deemed him competent and, among other things, indicated he
was intelligent. He viewed his attorney as wielding the report to
suggest he had mental health issues that cast him in a negative
light. His claim of “manipulation,” then, can be viewed as a
colorable claim of cherry picking evidence. Kazemi, moreover,
was able to describe, as that June 17 hearing continued, his
version of events of the alleged crime. And in a subsequent
Marsden hearing, Kazemi was again able to describe his version
of events, as well as specific defense strategies he wanted to
analyze. In light of this, we do not believe the isolated comment
regarding a disagreement with counsel constitutes evidence that
15
casts a serious doubt on the original competency proceeding or
presents a substantially changed circumstance. (See People v.
Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 798 [“his steadfast contention”
that the victim was “responsible reflected an ability to formulate
a defense to the charges against him”].)
Kazemi’s appellate counsel contends a trio of cases
establish the trial court should have declared a second doubt due
to Kazemi’s conspiratorial, persecutory beliefs.
In the first case, Rodas, the Supreme Court found the trial
court’s refusal to declare a doubt was error, but under different
circumstances than presented here. (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 232.) The defendant there had been previously confined under
a mental health conservatorship and found incompetent at two
previous criminal proceedings and at the outset of the current
proceeding. (Id. at p. 224.) The defendant had been deemed
incompetent in the current proceeding because of
schizophrenia causing delusional beliefs, fragmented thought
processes, and rambling speech consisting of nonsensical “word
salad.” (Id. at pp. 224, 232.) He was only restored to competency
through involuntary medication. (Id. at pp. 225–226, 237.) And,
said the reports on this defendant, only involuntary medication
would maintain his competency. (Id. at pp. 226, 237.) When the
trial court later learned the defendant had stopped taking his
medication and was again speaking to his counsel in “word
salad,” there was pivotal evidence of changed circumstances that
required declaration of a new doubt. (Id. at pp. 232, 235.)
On the other hand, Kazemi’s mental health division
evaluation found him competent. Kazemi did not need to be
restored to competency like the Rodas defendant, and he did not
abandon a treatment necessary to maintaining his competency.
16
Nor did Kazemi share the Rodas defendant’s most troubling
symptoms. The Rodas defendant’s speech, when compromised,
was unintelligible and of no assistance to counsel. (Cf. People v.
Easter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 226, 243 [newly developed “word
salad” manner of speech can denote incompetence].) Kazemi did
not exhibit this behavior; rather, he could communicate with
counsel and the court and could convey his version of events at
trial.
Reliance on People v. Tejeda (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 785 is
similarly misplaced. There, the defendant was found
incompetent twice during the proceedings due to delusions that
the government controlled his brain. (Id. at pp. 788–790.) He
had been restored to competence based on his perceived ability to
compartmentalize that delusion from his defense. (Id. at p. 787.)
He then testified at trial about that very delusion. This
presented the same issue as Rodas: the trial court had evidence
that the basis for his restoration to competency no longer held,
and the appellate court found it was error not to declare another
doubt. (Id. at p. 791.) Here, again, Kazemi was found competent,
and there was no crucial guarantor of competency that suddenly
disappeared.
Nor is People v. Leelu (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1023
instructive. The appellate court there found no prejudicial error
in failing to appoint a second mental health expert, pursuant to
section 1369, after the defendant was found incompetent and
committed to a state hospital. (Id. at p. 1026.) Any error was
harmless because of the “overwhelming evidence” defendant was
incompetent, including that she was irrational, incoherent, not
understandable in conversation, unable to perceive others’
meaning, and claimed her attorney was the Canadian Senior
17
Minister of the Interior and the parties involved in the case had
harassed her. (Id. at pp. 1026, 1032.) The court had no occasion
to discuss the showing necessary to merit a second competency
hearing.
In sum, counsel’s proffers were insufficient to require a
second competency hearing. (Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p.
235.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
SCHERB, J.
We Concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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