Filed 10/1/26 P. v. K.J. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B350532
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA107083)
v.
K.J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hector M. Guzman, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer Peabody and Richard B. Lennon, under
appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael Keller and Patricia Rosman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
K.J. pled no contest to organized retail grand theft.1 The
trial court sentenced her to probation. After completing
probation, K.J. petitioned to have the conviction reduced to a
misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b) and
expunged under Penal Code section 1203.4.2 The trial court
expunged the conviction but declined to reduce it to a
misdemeanor. K.J. now appeals, contending that the trial court
abused its discretion by not reducing her felony to a
misdemeanor. We reject that contention and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2022, K.J. and two accomplices filled a
shopping cart with items at a 99 Cents store and left without
1 California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b) directs courts to
“consider referring to” certain individuals “by first name and last
initial or, if the first name is unusual or other circumstances
would defeat the objective of anonymity, by initials only,” to
protect those individuals’ privacy. The list of people to whom this
rule applies includes “[p]ersons in other circumstances in which
personal privacy interests support not using the person’s name.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).) In this opinion, we refer to
defendant by first and last initials. (See Pen. Code, § 1203.425,
subd. (a)(3)(A).)
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
paying.3 Law enforcement apprehended them and found
additional stolen property in their car. K.J. and her accomplices
had committed several thefts of other stores earlier that day in
neighboring cities.
Based on these events, a felony complaint charged K.J. and
her two accomplices with felony organized retail grand theft
(§ 490.4, subd. (a); count 1) and grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a);
count 2). On September 24, 2023, K.J. pled no contest to count 1.
That same day, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence
and placed K.J. on two years’ formal probation on the conditions,
among others, that she serve one day in jail and perform
community service.
K.J. completed her probation and, in 2025, she petitioned
for dismissal of her conviction and for it to be reduced to a
misdemeanor. The People did not submit a written response to
the petition, but, at the hearing on the petition, opposed only the
reduction of the conviction to a misdemeanor.
On October 13, 2025, the trial court dismissed the
conviction under section 1203.4 but denied the request to reduce
it to a misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b). When
counsel asked why the trial court was denying the request, the
trial court answered, “This is clearly felonious conduct.”
DISCUSSION
K.J. contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying her petition to reduce her offense to a misdemeanor
because it failed to consider relevant factors. We disagree that
3 The facts underlying the offenses are from the probation
report.
3
the record affirmatively shows that the trial court did not
consider relevant factors.
Our Legislature classifies most crimes as felonies or
misdemeanors. However, some crimes involving conduct that can
vary widely in the level of seriousness are “wobblers,” chargeable
in the prosecutor’s discretion or punishable in the trial court’s
discretion as either felonies or misdemeanors. (People v.
Woodward (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 379, 389.) A violation of
section 490.4 for organized retail theft is a “wobbler” offense.
(§ 490.4, subd. (b).) Section 17, subdivision (b), gives a trial court
discretion to reduce a wobbler offense to a misdemeanor. (See
generally People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th
968, 974 (Alvarez).) In exercising its discretion, a trial court
should consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
defendant’s attitude toward the offense, the defendant’s behavior
and demeanor in court, and the general sentencing objectives in
the California Rules of Court, rule 4.410. (Alvarez, at p. 978.)
The trial court’s exercise of its authority is “an intensely fact-
bound inquiry taking all relevant factors, including the
defendant’s criminal past and public safety, into due
consideration; and the record must so reflect.” (Id. at pp. 981–
982.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a section 17,
subdivision (b), motion for abuse of discretion. The appellant has
the burden of affirmatively showing that the decision was
irrational or arbitrary. (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 974,
977; People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.) Absent such a
showing, we presume the trial court acted to achieve legitimate
sentencing objections. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
376–377; Alvarez, at pp. 977–978.)
4
Here, K.J. relies on the trial court’s statement that it would
not reduce the offense to a misdemeanor because “[t]his is clearly
felonious conduct” to show that the trial court failed to consider
relevant factors. She further points out that the trial court did
not mention that she had no prior record, that the theft did not
involve force or violence, that the goods were returned, and that
she was only 22 years old when she committed the offense.
Even absent specific comment on these factors, we disagree
that the trial court’s statement, albeit terse, affirmatively shows
it did not consider them. The statement confirms that the trial
court considered the circumstances of K.J.’s offense, which
included that she committed it with two accomplices and that it
was just one in a series of thefts she committed that day in
different cities. Also, the probation officer’s report was part of
the record and we presume the trial court read it, even if the
court did not refer to it at the hearing. (See People v. Almond
(1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 46, 50 [we assume court was fully
informed by proper means], disapproved on another ground in
People v. Doherty (1967) 67 Cal.2d 9, 15.) The report indicated
that after K.J. committed the at-issue theft, she was arrested for
grand theft and petty theft, committed in April 2023.4 As to
K.J.’s youth when she committed the offense, the report also
stated K.J.’s date of birth, and K.J. was at the sentencing
hearing. Thus, although the trial court did not specifically
address the Alvarez factors, the record nonetheless fails to
demonstrate it did not consider them.
4 We deny the Attorney General’s request that we take
judicial notice of Los Angeles Superior Court’s Criminal Case
Access public portal link to that case to show that K.J. pleaded no
contest in August 2023 to grand theft.
5
Further, we do not read Alvarez to require a trial court to
expressly consider all factors on the record, even if that might be
the better practice. And nothing in Alvarez suggests that the
general presumptions do not apply in cases involving section 17,
subdivision (b), namely that a court considered all relevant
factors and acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, in
the absence of an affirmative showing otherwise. (See, e.g.,
People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377; Evid. Code,
§ 664.) To the contrary, Alvarez cited those “precepts.” (Alvarez,
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977.) Accordingly, the record does not
support a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by
not reducing K.J.’s felony to a misdemeanor.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying K.J.’s petition under Penal Code
section 17, subdivision (b), is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
DELGADO, J.*
* Judge of the Santa Clara Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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