Filed 9/28/26 P. v. Jordan CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A173323
v.
MAURICE DON JORDAN, JR., (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. VCR194365)
Defendant and Appellant.
Maurice Don Jordan, Jr. was sentenced to 41 years to life
in prison in 2009 following his conviction for second degree
murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. (People v. Jordan
(May 17, 2011, A126859) [nonpub. opn.] (Jordan I).) He filed a
motion to dismiss certain enhancements to his sentence under
Penal Code section 1172.75, which retroactively invalidated
certain sentence enhancements for defendants like Jordan, and
for resentencing under section 1172.1.1 The trial court dismissed
the enhancements and reduced Jordan’s sentence to 15 years to
life in prison. Jordan now appeals, arguing the trial court’s
stated reasons for not reducing his sentence further were an
abuse of discretion. He also argues the abstract of judgment
should be corrected by deleting a reference to a restitution fine
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
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imposed at his original sentencing and updating his credit for
actual time served. The People concede error on the last two
points. We agree with Jordan that some of the trial court’s
reasons for rejecting further relief were improper and agree with
both parties that the abstract of judgment must be modified as
Jordan requests. We will therefore reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
“After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of
second degree murder and one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, based on an incident involving himself,
his brother Marco Glaude, and victim Roderick Anderson.
[Citation.] Defendant and Anderson engaged in a physical fight
after Anderson or one of Anderson’s friends made what defendant
considered to be a disrespectful comment about defendant’s
girlfriend. [Citation.] Although the eyewitness testimony was
conflicting as to whether defendant or Glaude fired the shots that
killed Anderson, the prosecution’s theory at trial was that Glaude
shot Anderson after defendant ordered Glaude to get defendant’s
gun and kill Anderson, thus making defendant liable as an aider
and abettor.” (People v. Jordan (Feb. 13, 2020, A158832)
[nonpub. opn.] (Jordan II).)
After the jury trial, the trial court found true the
allegations that Jordan had three prior convictions within the
meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b) and one prior strike
conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
2
The trial court further found that one of Jordan’s convictions was
a strike pursuant to section 1170.12.
The trial court sentenced Jordan to the middle term of two
years on the unlawful possession of a firearm count, doubled to
four years because of one of his prior convictions. He received
one-year enhancements for two of his other convictions under
section 667.5, which the trial court ran consecutively for a total of
six years. The trial court imposed 15 years to life for the murder
count, again doubled because of his strike. The trial court added
a consecutive five-year enhancement under section 667,
subdivision (a). The end result was a determinate term of six
years in prison, with a consecutive 30 years to life plus five years.
(Jordan I, supra, A126859.) The trial court also imposed a
$10,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b).
In January 2019, Jordan filed a petition for resentencing
under what is now section 1172.6. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10
[amending and renumbering former § 1170.95 as § 1172.6].) He
claimed “that he was prosecuted ‘under a theory of felony murder
or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine,’ and that he could no longer be ‘convicted of 1st or 2nd
degree murder because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188
and 189, effective January 1, 2019.’ ” (Jordan II, supra,
A158832.) This court affirmed the denial of his petition because
Jordan was prosecuted as an aider and abettor, not under the
felony murder rule or natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (Ibid.)
3
In December 2024, while proceedings to dismiss Jordan’s
two one-year enhancements under section 1172.75, subdivision
(a) were already underway, Jordan filed a motion through
counsel asking the court to dismiss the enhancements and also to
exercise its discretion to recall and resentence him under section
1172.1. In support of the latter argument, Jordan provided
evidence that the jury trial for Glaude began shortly after
Jordan’s trial concluded. Glaude accepted an offer from the
prosecutor during his trial and pleaded guilty to voluntary
manslaughter. Glaude was sentenced to seven years in prison. A
defense investigator sent Jordan’s appellate attorney a letter in
February 2011. He related that the prosecutor in Glaude’s case
had said she made the plea offer to Glaude when she learned that
fragments removed from Anderson suggested that Anderson had
been shot by friendly fire in addition to being shot by Glaude.
The investigator said the prosecutor inferred that Glaude had a
self-defense claim and that Dr. Thomas Gill, who performed the
autopsy on the victim Anderson, had botched the cause of death
or at least gotten things wrong. The investigator also said in his
letter that Dr. Gill was well known as a very incompetent
pathologist. The investigator reaffirmed the contents of the letter
in a December 2024 declaration.
The district attorney’s office sent Jordan’s trial counsel a
letter in August 2011. The district attorney’s office said that it
was complying with its obligation under Brady v. Maryland by
notifying Jordan’s counsel that Dr. Gill was the subject of
multiple media reports and providing a disc containing discovery
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about Dr. Gill. The district attorney’s office also said it had Dr.
Gill’s employment records and would not oppose a motion seeking
a court order for their release.
Jordan argued in his section 1172.1 motion that this
evidence showed that the prosecution had violated his
constitutional rights to discovery and due process. He also
pointed out the disparity between his sentence and Glaude’s.
Jordan relied on this evidence, as well as prison disciplinary
records, an impact and remorse letter he signed, and letters from
supporters, to ask the court to vacate his murder conviction and
impose judgment on the lesser included offense of manslaughter,
in addition to dismissing his sentence enhancements as section
1172.75 required. He also asked the court to make other
adjustments to his sentence to yield a 17-year determinate term.
The People did not file a written opposition. After several
continuances, the trial court held a hearing on Jordan’s motion in
May 2025 with Jordan appearing by video pursuant to the court’s
order. The trial court heard argument from both sides, as well as
a statement from Jordan personally.
The trial court began its announcement of its decision by
saying that as to Jordan’s request to revisit the murder
conviction, “I don’t think that it’s my place in the universe to
revisit what the jury did, which has been run up the [a]ppellate
flagpole a couple times in terms of the finding of responsibility for
the murder. I don’t think that for a number of reasons that have
already been argued, I should be revisiting and modifying that
finding.” But the trial court found it “pretty clear” that “a
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number of things happened” after Jordan’s trial, which created
considerable doubt for the court about how Jordan’s case would
have been resolved had the information been known. The trial
court said it would not modify the murder conviction. But it
dismissed the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements, struck
Jordan’s prior conviction under Romero2, and made other changes
so that his sentence was reduced to an indeterminate term of 15
years to life in prison and he could be considered for parole.
Jordan said he appreciated the trial court’s action but
reiterated that his constitutional right to due process had been
undermined. His counsel fleshed out Jordan’s concerns by
summarizing the evidence concerning Dr. Gill and the possibility
that Anderson was struck by friendly fire. The trial court said it
understood Jordan’s concerns and it was a factor in its analysis.
But the trial court said it respected and would defer to the justice
system’s findings about the way Jordan’s case had been handled.
It reiterated that it had struck Jordan’s strike, over the People’s
objection, to “find some equitable middle place for all of this,” but
it deferred to the judicial process “in that other regard” because it
had been litigated twice.
DISCUSSION
I. Resentencing Under Section 1172.1
“Section 1172.1 ‘is a statutory exception to the general rule
that “ ‘once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence
has begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or
modify the sentence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th
2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
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1165, 1170 (Craig).) “[A]s amended effective January 1, 2024,
section 1172.1, subdivision (a), authorizes the court to recall a
sentence and resentence the defendant on its own motion ‘at any
time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original
sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority
or case law.’ ” (Ibid.) “Section 1172.1 does not authorize the
defendant to initiate the recall and resentencing process. The
statute states: ‘A defendant is not entitled to file a petition
seeking relief from the court under this section. If a defendant
requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is
not required to respond.’ (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).)” (Craig, at
p. 1171.)
Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(2) instructs a trial court,
when recalling and resentencing a defendant, to “apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in
law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as
to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” Trial courts may modify a defendant’s sentence to
reduce the term of imprisonment. (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A).) They
may also vacate a “defendant’s conviction and impose judgment
on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related
offense, whether or not that offense was charged in the original
pleading, with the concurrence of the defendant, and then
resentence the defendant to a reduced term of imprisonment.”
(Id., subd. (a)(3)(B).) The statute lists various postconviction
factors trial courts must consider when recalling and
resentencing a defendant. (Id., subd. (a)(5).) Those factors
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include “the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the
defendant while incarcerated” and “evidence that reflects that
circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that
continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.
Evidence that the defendant’s incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice includes, but is not limited to, evidence that the
defendant’s constitutional rights were violated in the proceedings
related to the conviction or sentence at issue, and any other
evidence that undermines the integrity of the underlying
conviction or sentence.” (Ibid.) A trial court “shall state on the
record the reasons for its decision to grant or deny recall and
resentencing.” (Id., subd. (a)(7).)
“We review the superior court’s decision whether to recall a
defendant’s sentence for abuse of discretion.” (Craig, supra,
117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1175.) “To establish an abuse of discretion,
a defendant must establish the court ‘act[ed] while unaware of
the scope of its discretion’ [citation], ‘considered impermissible
factors’ [citation], or made a choice ‘so irrational or arbitrary that
no reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (People v. Olea (2025)
115 Cal.App.5th 889, 902–903.)
A. Appealability
Before considering Jordan’s argument that the trial court’s
stated reasons for not addressing his constitutional argument
were improper, we must first consider the People’s contention
that the trial court’s order is not appealable.
“ ‘The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is
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expressly made appealable by statute.’ ” (Craig, supra,
117 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1171.) Section 1237, subdivision (b) allows
a defendant to appeal “[f]rom any order made after judgment,
affecting the substantial rights of the party.” The People argue
that because section 1172.1, subdivision (c) states that a
defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief under
that statute and the trial court declined to exercise its discretion
to recall Jordan’s sentence, the trial court’s order did not affect
Jordan’s substantive rights and is not appealable. The People
rely primarily on People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985,
991, 996, 999, which followed this rationale in holding that a trial
court’s order declining to exercise its discretion to recall a
defendant’s sentence was not appealable.
Although the People ignore them, two cases have held that
when a trial court takes concrete steps to consider a defendant’s
section 1172.1 petition instead of summarily denying it or
refusing to act on it (as in People v. Hodge and similar cases), the
resulting denial is appealable. (Craig, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1171–1175; People v. Olea, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at pp. 901–
902.) Thus, Craig, at page 1173, held a trial court’s order
denying a request for resentencing under section 1172.1 was
appealable after the trial court reviewed moving and opposition
papers; looked at documents and case history, including letters of
support, evidence of rehabilitation, and prison disciplinary
records; heard argument from counsel at a hearing at which the
defendant appeared remotely; and addressed the merits of the
petition instead of denying it as unauthorized. People v. Olea, at
9
page 901, held that a denial was appealable after the trial court
followed similar steps, including appointing counsel for the
defendant, ordering the release of subpoenaed records concerning
the defendant’s behavior and activities in prison, and setting a
contested hearing at which the defendant appeared remotely, the
court heard argument, indicated it reviewed the record, and
stated it believed the original sentence was just.
We agree with the rationale of these decisions. The record
here is somewhat muddied by the fact that Jordan added his
section 1172.1 request to an existing proceeding under section
1172.75. But the trial court nonetheless invited the People to
submit a response to Jordan’s motion raising section 1172.1, set a
hearing, ordered the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation to have Jordan appear remotely, and denied the
relief Jordan requested under section 1172.1. The trial court did
not sever the two portions of Jordan’s motion, state that the
section 1172.1 request was unauthorized, or summarily deny
Jordan’s request for relief under section 1172.1. This is thus not
a case like People v. Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pages 991,
999, where the trial court refused to consider a defendant’s
request at all.
The People argue that the trial court here simply declined
to exercise its discretion like the superior court in People v.
Hodge, citing the trial court’s remarks that it “should [not] be
revisiting and modifying” Jordan’s responsibility for murder. But
the trial court specifically commented on the “number of things”
that happened after Jordan’s trial, arose in Glaude’s case, and
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could have caused Jordan’s case to come out differently if they
had been known. We construe this as a reference to the
postconviction evidence concerning the reputation of the
pathologist on Jordan’s case and additional fragments in the
victim suggesting he was struck by friendly fire, which Jordan
discussed solely in relation to section 1172.1. The trial court then
modified Jordan’s sentence in significant ways, reducing it from
41 years to life in prison to 15 years to life in prison, while
rejecting his request to impose judgment on manslaughter
instead of murder. The trial court also said that Jordan’s
constitutional argument was “a factor that went into the
analysis.” These remarks express the trial court’s reasons for
denying Jordan’s request for recall and resentencing, just as
section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(7) requires. They indicate the trial
court’s modification of Jordan’s sentence was, at least in part, in
response to address his request under section 1172.1, not a
refusal to exercise its discretion on that request at all. The trial
court’s denial of the requested relief therefore affected Jordan’s
substantive rights and is appealable. (Craig, supra,
117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1175; People v. Olea, supra, 115
Cal.App.5th at p. 902.)
B. Merits
Jordan contends that the reasons the trial court gave for
denying further relief under section 1172.1 were improper. We
agree.
While not conclusive, Jordan’s postconviction evidence
about the additional findings in the autopsy suggesting the
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victim was shot by more than one person and the questions about
Dr. Gill’s competence is sufficient to raise a legitimate question
about whether the prosecution complied with its constitutional
duties to disclose favorable evidence to Jordan at the time of his
trial.
The trial court’s reasons for rejecting this evidence were
impermissible. The trial said it was not its place to revisit the
jury’s determination, even though section 1172.1 empowers the
trial court to do just that. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(3)(B) [when
resentencing, trial court may “[v]acate the defendant’s conviction
and impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense
or lesser related offense”].) When Jordan and his counsel raised
again the argument that the prosecution had violated his
constitutional rights, the trial court cited the fact that Jordan’s
case had been dealt with by the appellate courts several times,
apparently referring to Jordan I’s decision in Jordan’s direct
appeal and Jordan II’s decision in the appeal from the denial of
Jordan’s motion for resentencing under section 1172.6. But the
letters Jordan primarily relied on were written in February and
August 2011. This evidence could not have been available to
Jordan at the time of his original trial in 2009. Not surprisingly,
our opinion in his direct appeal did not mention such issues or
evidence. (See Jordan I, supra, A126859.) Nor did we consider
this evidence in Jordan’s appeal from the denial of his motion
under section 1172.6. (See Jordan II, supra, A158832.) Our
decision in that case turned only on the question of whether
Jordan was convicted of felony murder or murder under the
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natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Ibid.) Jordan’s
prior appeals therefore offer no logical or rational reason to reject
his request for relief based on the alleged violation of his
constitutional rights.
Although the trial court’s statements in response to
Jordan’s claims of constitutional violations suggest a
misunderstanding of section 1172.1, the trial court’s remarks
earlier in the hearing suggest it did nonetheless take that
evidence into account. As noted ante, before announcing Jordan’s
dramatically reduced sentence, the trial court referred to a
“number of things” that happened after Jordan’s case went to
trial that created considerable doubt for the court about whether
Jordan’s case might have been resolved differently if those things
had been known at that time. The court also said Jordan’s
constitutional claim was a factor in its analysis. These remarks
indicate the trial court already relied on Jordan’s constitutional
claims when it reduced Jordan’s sentence from 41 years to 15
years to life in prison.
“[W]hen ‘ “a trial court has given both proper and improper
reasons for a sentence choice, a reviewing court will set aside the
sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court
would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of
its reasons were improper.” ’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 843, 856.) There is such a reasonable probability
here, since the trial court seemed to feel constrained by the
verdict and prior appeals, and never appeared to grapple with the
gravity of the constitutional violations Jordan alleged, simply
13
referring to them as “a number of things [that] happened.” We
therefore agree with Jordan that a remand is warranted so that
the trial court can exercise its discretion again. The trial court
should explain its rationale regarding Jordan’s claims of
violations of his constitutional rights and whether or not those
claims justify a further reduction in Jordan’s sentence. We note
that our decision to remand the case should not be interpreted to
suggest any views about whether the trial court should or should
not further modify Jordan’s sentence. We express no opinion on
that question and leave it to the trial court’s proper exercise of its
discretion.
II. Restitution Fine
At Jordan’s original sentencing in 2009, the trial court
imposed the maximum restitution fine of $10,000 under section
1202.4, subdivision (b). Section 1465.9, subdivision (d) states,
“Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a
restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including
any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and
any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.”
The trial court did not mention a restitution fine when it
resentenced Jordan in 2025, but the abstract of judgment still
shows a $10,000 fine.
Jordan contends this restitution fine must be stricken from
the abstract, both because the fine imposed at the original
sentencing is now more than 10 years old and the trial court did
not orally impose a fine at the resentencing. The People agree
with the first rationale, as do we. Even if the trial court had
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reimposed a restitution fine, as section 1202.4 directed it to do,
such a fine would have been improper. (People v. Salstrom (2025)
117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600–601, review granted on another issue
and further action deferred Mar. 11, 2026, S289903.) Allowing
the trial court to reimpose a restitution fine would penalize
Jordan for seeking resentencing and defeat the purpose of section
1465.9, subdivision (d). (Salstrom, at p. 601.) On remand, the
abstract of judgment should be corrected to delete the reference
to the $10,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision
(b).
III. Custody Credits
Jordan finally argues that the abstract of judgment must
be corrected to properly reflect the amount of credit for actual
time served to which he is entitled. He points out that the trial
court did not recalculate his time served and the abstract of
judgment still reflects the same number of days served as when
he was originally sentenced in 2009. Like the People, we agree
that the trial court should have recalculated Jordan’s actual time
served when it resentenced him. (People v. Buckhalter (2001)
26 Cal.4th 20, 29 [when resentencing a defendant, trial court
must update the calculation of actual time served, whether before
or after sentencing and in jail or prison]; People v. Dean (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 391, 397 [Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, not trial court, is responsible for calculating post-
sentence credits other than actual time served].) On remand, the
trial court should recalculate his actual time served and instruct
15
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to calculate
any additional credits to which Jordan may be entitled.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is reversed. The matter is remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.
People v. Jordan (A173323)
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