Filed 8/18/26 P. v. Jones CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089240
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF196953A)
v.
NATHANIEL JONES,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Tiffany E.
Organ-Bowles, Judge.
Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, David A. Lowe and
Cameron M. Goodman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Nathaniel Jones was convicted by jury trial of three counts of attempted
carjacking, and a single count of assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a
felon, and misdemeanor resisting arrest. On appeal, he contends (1) the evidence was
insufficient to support one of his attempted carjacking convictions, (2) the trial court
erred by admitting highly prejudicial evidence, and (3) the trial court erred by finding his
prior conviction for gang participation constituted a prior strike conviction within the
meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Penal Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d)),1 and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). The People
concede the error as to Jones’s third contention but otherwise disagree. We vacate the
true findings on the prior strike conviction and a prior serious felony conviction, remand
for retrial or resentencing, and in all other respects, affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On January 26, 2024, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information,
charging Jones with attempted carjacking (§§ 664/215, subd. (a); counts 1 through 3),
assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 4 and 5), possession of a firearm by a
felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 6), and misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1); count 7). As to counts 2 through 5, the information alleged that Jones
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and, as to counts 2 and 3, that he
personally used a firearm during the commission of a crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The
information further alleged that Jones had suffered a 2015 conviction for active
participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) which qualified as a prior
strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and a serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). The information also alleged numerous circumstances in
aggravation. (§ 1170, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.)
During trial, Jones filed a motion for judgment of acquittal (§ 1118.1), as to all
counts, which was denied by the trial court. Subsequently, on May 17, 2024, the jury
found him guilty as charged on counts 1 through 4, 6, and 7, and found true the firearm
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, except as otherwise noted.
2.
enhancements on counts 2 and 4. However, the jury did not reach a verdict, and the court
declared a mistrial, on the firearm enhancements on count 3 and the assault with a firearm
charge on count 5, which were dismissed on the prosecution’s motion. Jones had a
bifurcated trial on the prior conviction and sentencing allegations, in which the court
found true that he suffered a prior strike and a prior serious felony conviction, and
numerous circumstances in aggravation.
On June 26, 2024, the trial court sentenced Jones to a total term of 27 years,
4 months, as follows: on count 2, the upper term of nine years, plus a consecutive 10-
year firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b), plus a
consecutive five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement; on counts 1 and 3,
consecutive terms of one year eight months, one-third the middle term; and on count 7,
one year, to be served concurrently with the term on count 2. The court imposed and
stayed the following: as to count 2, an upper-term, 10-year firearm enhancement
pursuant to section 12022.5, subdivision (a); on count 4, four years, plus an upper-term,
10-year firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.5, subdivision (a); and on
count 6, six years.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The People’s Case
The First Incident - Counts 3 and 5
On November 11, 2023, at approximately 9:40 p.m., Sarah H. and her teenage
daughter, Haylie H., were riding bikes near their home, in Bakersfield. Sarah observed
two men fighting in the road and heard a female screaming, and Haylie heard yelling and
fighting. Sarah and Haylie rode their bikes home, got in their car, and drove back to the
scene to see if anyone needed help. Sarah called 911 while driving.
Once they returned to the scene, Haylie observed one of the men who was fighting
stop fighting, get into a car, and quickly drive away. The remaining man, Jones, began
“attacking cars” which included him running up to a truck that was driving by and
3.
kicking it. Jones quickly and angrily approached Sarah’s car on the passenger side,
where Haylie was sitting. Sarah reversed her car because Jones “was trying to attack
[her] car.” Jones continued to approach the passenger side of the vehicle, raised his
hands, and Sarah and Haylie believed they saw a gun. Haylie screamed to Sarah that
Jones had a gun, and Sarah placed the car in drive and swerved around Jones to avoid
hitting him. Sarah drove to a nearby supermarket and waited until she felt it was safe to
return home, because the incident occurred near her residence and she was still afraid.
The Second Incident – Counts 2 and 4
A short time later, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Nadia Q. was driving with her two
friends, Kristopher B. and Riley S., near the same area where the first incident occurred.
Nadia observed Jones and two females leave the sidewalk and run into the middle of the
street she was driving on. Jones then stood in front of Nadia’s vehicle and she stopped
her car close enough to him that she could not see his legs. Nadia stated Jones then
extended his arms, pointed a firearm at her, and screamed at her to “get the f[**]k out of
the car.” Nadia then quickly reversed her vehicle, shifted to drive, “floored … the
pedal,” and drove around Jones to flee the scene. Kristopher called 911 while Nadia
drove to a fast food restaurant to await law enforcement.
The Third Incident – Count 1
Minutes after the second incident, Jessica M. drove near the same location with
her two children. Jessica observed three people stumbling into the street she was driving
on, which caused her to stop her car in the middle of the road. Jessica initially believed
the group was “roughhousing,” but soon noticed Jones crouched down and pointing what
appeared to be a gun at her. He then came to the hood of Jessica’s car, leaned forward,
and slammed both hands on the hood, which she interpreted as his intimidating her.
Jones then approached the driver’s side door and yanked the door handle more than once
as her children were screaming. He then used his hand to hit the rear driver door. Jessica
drove away and turned into an area to hide and call 911.
4.
Officers Apprehend Jones – Count 7
Bakersfield police officers found Jones and the two women within close proximity
to the area where the incidents occurred. Officers pointed their firearms at Jones and the
two women and ordered them to show their hands and get on the ground. At first, Jones
complied with the officers’ commands to get on the ground, but he did not stay down; he
got up and down twice, advanced toward officers, and made a third attempt to get up.
Jones was yelling throughout the time police were trying to arrest him and appeared to
ask if officers were going to shoot him.2
DISCUSSION
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Jones contends the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction on count 3
for attempted carjacking, and in conjunction with the prior denial of his motion for
acquittal, violated his due process rights. He argues the evidence presented did not prove
he had the specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive Sarah and/or Haylie of
their car by taking it from their immediate presence, against their will, with force or fear,
and that he committed a direct but ineffectual act toward that end. The People disagree,
as do we.
A. Additional Background
During trial, Haylie testified that she would not be able to tell if the gun was real
or not, and Jessica testified that she could not be sure what she had seen was a firearm.
Before closing arguments, Jones moved under sections 1118 and 1118.1 to dismiss all
charges and enhancements and specifically challenged the evidence on whether he
possessed a firearm. His counsel argued no firearm was ever recovered, and he did not
think any witness stated with confidence they saw a gun. The prosecution responded that
apart from witness Jessica, who was a little uncertain of what she observed, the other
2 One of the officers testified Jones said “[t]hat he wanted us to kill him.”
5.
witnesses provided direct testimony that a gun was involved in the incidents. The court
denied the motion, finding there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.
During deliberations, the jury asked the following question regarding count 3, the
attempted carjacking of Sarah and/or Haylie: “Count 3 – if we do believe that no firearm
was included, and no physical contact to the vehicle was made, or any command given,
does [it] negate the direct act of carjacking?” The trial court referred the jury to the
instructions on the elements of carjacking and attempt. The jury reached a guilty verdict
but was unable to come to a unanimous decision on the enhancement allegations for this
count.
B. Standard of Review
“ ‘ “The standard applied by a trial court in ruling upon a motion for judgment of
acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1 is the same as the standard applied by an appellate
court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction[.]” ’ ”
(People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 442.) In assessing a claim of insufficiency of the
evidence, we review “the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below
to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence, that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible and of solid value, from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66, overruled
on other grounds in People v. Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 120.) “ ‘We do not reweigh
evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility,’ ” and “ ‘presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.’ ” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215.) “ ‘Resolution of
conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.
[Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently
improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.’ ”
(People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118.) We may not reverse the judgment
6.
unless “it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
C. Analysis
We conclude from our review of the record that substantial evidence supports
Jones’s conviction for attempted carjacking.
Carjacking is defined as “the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession
of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from the person or
immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his or her will and with
the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of the
motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 215,
subd. (a).) An attempted crime “consists of two elements: a specific intent to commit the
crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.” (§ 21a.)
Jones insists that there was insufficient evidence to prove he intended to take
Sarah and Haylie’s vehicle through force or fear because there was no evidence he made
a demand for them to give him the keys or vehicle, nor substantial evidence that a gun
was used. He cites to People v. Gray (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 973 (Gray), for the
proposition there is insufficient evidence in the instant case that he intended to take the
car by force and fear, because he made no demand for the vehicle or car keys, and did not
try to open the car doors.
However, Gray does not support Jones’s argument. In Gray, the court concluded
that the owner or possessor of a vehicle may be deprived of possession not only when the
perpetrator physically forces the victim out of the vehicle, but also when the victim
remains in the car and the defendant exercises dominion and control over the car by force
or fear. (Id. at p. 985.) The Gray court found there was substantial evidence of the
defendant’s attempted carjacking because he threatened the victim with physical violence
by pretending to have a gun and demanding her keys. (Ibid.) Gray does not create a
limitation that there must be a demand for the keys in an attempted carjacking, nor that
7.
pointing a real or fake gun, on its own, is insufficient to show attempted carjacking. In
making this assertion, Jones views the evidence in a fashion that is both factually narrow
and most favorable to his defense. However, that is not the applicable standard on
appeal. In determining whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellate court must view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence
of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Staten
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 460.)
The testimony of Sarah and her daughter Haylie demonstrated Jones’s intent to
take their car and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission. The evidence
showed that after the man Jones was fighting with got into a car and sped off, Jones
began approaching cars in an attacking manner and angrily approached Sarah and
Haylie’s car twice, while raising what they believed at that time to be a gun, to Haylie.
Haylie testified that she was scared and believed she could get shot. Sarah testified she
put her car in drive, swerved around Jones to avoid hitting him, and then drove to a local
market until it was safe for her to go home.
Moreover, the jury could reasonably have concluded based on all the evidence
presented at trial in the light most favorable to the judgment—including that Jones
attempted two additional carjackings in less than an hour after this first incident—that he
intended to take Sarah’s vehicle against her will by use of fear or force. (See People v.
Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1020–1021 [sufficient evidence supported an attempted
robbery conviction where the defendant robbed others on the same date, before and after
the challenged attempted robbery].)
On appeal, the court will not attempt to determine the weight of the evidence.
Rather, we will decide only whether upon the face of the evidence it can be held that
sufficient facts could not have been found by the jury to warrant the inference of guilt.
Here, the jury could readily infer from the entire sequence of events that Jones attempted
8.
to get into Sarah and Haylie’s car. Substantial evidence supports the judgment of
conviction and reversal is not warranted.
2. Jones’s Prearrest Statements
Jones contends that the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code
section 352, and thus violated his due process rights, by declining to exclude his prearrest
statements in which he told police to “shoot him” because the evidence was cumulative
of other evidence admitted and was substantially more prejudicial than probative. He
further argues there is no forfeiture, and he preserved the alleged evidentiary error on all
the arguments raised on appeal, by opposing the prosecution’s motion in limine and
arguing the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. In the
alternative, Jones contends the failure to preserve the issue constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. We conclude that the issue is forfeited, and Jones was not
prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to preserve the issue.
A. Additional Background
At a hearing on pretrial motions in limine, the prosecution moved to admit Jones’s
prearrest statements as admissions of a party opponent (Evid. Code, § 1220). The
prosecution’s motion in limine stated while officers were trying to apprehend Jones, he
yelled to police “y’all are going to have to kill me” and “f[**]k that, they gonna have to
kill me.” Defense counsel argued the statements should be excluded pursuant to
Evidence Code section 352 because they were prejudicial and testimony would suffice to
show that Jones failed to comply with orders with respect to the resisting count. Defense
counsel then stated, “[w]e don’t need statements that he’s requesting to be shot,” but did
not seek to exclude any reference to Jones questioning if he was going to be shot. The
prosecution argued the statements were relevant to show Jones resisted police in count 7,
and to show consciousness of guilt. The court noted the “limited evidence” before it and
stated “at this time[,] absent some other showing” it was going to grant the prosecution’s
motion to admit Jones’s prearrest statements that officers were going to have to kill him.
9.
Also, during the motions in limine hearing, the trial court ruled on defense
counsel’s request for an order that the record show, as to any in limine motion, no further
objection shall be required to preserve the issue for appeal. The court denied the request
and stated to defense counsel, “I do expect both counsel to pay attention to the
proceedings and make sure that objections are appropriately made at the appropriate
times, okay.”
During trial, the prosecution moved to admit People’s Exhibit 6, Bakersfield
Police Officer Quentin Croney’s body camera footage, and People’s Exhibit 6A, the
corresponding transcript. The judge asked defense counsel if he had any objection to the
admission and he responded “Submitted, Your Honor” and the evidence was admitted.
During trial, the jury was shown People’s Exhibit 6, which was nearly six minutes
of body camera footage recorded prior to Jones’s arrest. The footage showed officers
arriving on scene, ordering Jones to get down, his getting up from the ground, against the
officer’s commands, and stating, as characterized in transcript, “You going to shoot me”
and “You going to shoot me?” Croney testified that prior to arrest, Jones said “he wanted
us to kill him” and “he wanted us to kill him and to shoot him.” In the prosecution’s
closing argument, references were made to Jones wanting officers to kill him to
demonstrate consciousness of guilt.
B. Analysis
i. Jones Has Forfeited His Appellate Claim.
Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a) prohibits reversal for the erroneous
admission of evidence unless “[t]here appears of record an objection to or a motion to
exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated to make clear the
specific ground of the objection or motion[.]” Our Supreme Court has instructed that, in
accordance with section 353, subdivision (a), “ ‘no “particular form of objection” is
required,’ ” but “ ‘the objection must “fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party
offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the
10.
evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond
appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.” ’ ” (People v. Valdez
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 130.)
First, Jones contends his counsel preserved the alleged evidentiary error on all the
arguments made on appeal, which includes many bases never raised in court, by opposing
the prosecution’s motion in limine to admit his statements and arguing they were
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. We disagree.
During the hearing on motions in limine, Jones’s counsel argued the prearrest
statements, in which Jones yelled “y’all are going to have to kill me” and “f[**]k that,
they gonna have to kill me” should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352
because the “full quotes are quite prejudicial” and with respect to the resisting arrest
charge, “that would be satisfied by testimony that he didn’t comply with orders.” Jones’s
counsel provided no other legal basis for why the statements should be excluded at trial.
When Croney’s body camera footage was admitted into evidence at trial, the transcript
characterized Jones’s statements as “You going to shoot me” and “You going to shoot
me?” Jones’s counsel did not object during trial to the proffered body camera footage,
nor to the transcript, nor to Croney’s testimony that Jones wanted officers to shoot him
and to kill him.
Generally, “ ‘ “when an in limine ruling that evidence is admissible has been
made, the party seeking exclusion must object at such time as the evidence is actually
offered to preserve the issue for appeal[.]” ’ ” (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th
1043, 1108.) However, in limine motions or argument on in limine motions can, in some
cases, be sufficient to preserve an objection for appeal if a “ ‘sufficiently definite and
express ruling’ ” is made by the trial court. (Ibid.) An objection is preserved when the
motion in limine is “clearly and unequivocally denied” and the objection was
“specific…directed to an identifiable body of evidence, and …advanced at a time when
the trial judge could give fair consideration to the admissibility of the evidence in its
11.
context. (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 189 (Morris), disapproved on another
ground by People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.)
Here, when the trial court ruled on the prosecution’s motion in limine, the judge
qualified her ruling by stating the denial was being made “at this time” and was based on
the “limited evidence” before her. Defense counsel’s objection to the statements during
the motions in limine hearing was not advanced at a time when the court could give “fair
consideration,” because of the limited evidence before it. (Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at
p. 189.) Therefore, the pretrial objection was not preserved. Furthermore, the court
admonished both counsel to pay attention during the proceedings and object when
appropriate, when it denied defense counsel’s request that no further objections were
required to preserve the issue for appeal. However, when the prosecution moved to enter
the evidence during trial, the court asked defense counsel if he had any objection, and he
did not. Jones’s counsel failed to object during trial when the evidence was proffered,
and therefore, failed to preserve any alleged error under Evidence Code section 352.
Jones’s Evidence Code section 352 argument is therefore forfeited.
ii. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under the prevailing
professional norms, and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s shortcomings. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai),
as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 2, 2013).) “A reviewing court can begin an
ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry with either element and need not address both
elements if one is not satisfied.” (In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 88.)
“On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if
(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the
challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one,
12.
or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at
p. 1009.) “All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a
habeas corpus proceeding.” (Ibid.)
The record does not affirmatively disclose why Jones’s counsel did not object
under Evidence Code section 352 to the admission of the “shoot me” statements within
the body camera footage and transcript, or to Croney’s testimony as such. Even if his
counsel had no valid tactical reason for failing to object, Jones’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim must be rejected because he has failed to demonstrate a reasonable
probability the outcome of his trial would have been different absent his counsel’s
alleged shortcomings.
First, even if Jones’s counsel had objected to the admission of the “shoot me”
statements within the body camera footage, transcript, or testimony, it would not likely
have led to the exclusion of the evidence because the statements were highly probative of
Jones defying officers’ orders. (People v. Mendoza (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 924
[“counsel is not ineffective in failing to make an objection when the objection would
have likely been overruled by the trial court”].) Jones was charged with resisting arrest in
count 7 and his statements tended to prove his willful resistance, delay, or obstruction of
a peace officer. (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); In re Amanda A. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 537, 546
[section 148 is not limited to nonverbal conduct involving flight or forcible interference
with an officer’s activities].) Even if the statements were objected to as cumulative to
other evidence, they did not have to be excluded on that basis, particularly when the
statements were likely the best evidence of Jones’s actions and state of mind with respect
to consciousness of guilt. (People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 871 [“Evidence that
is identical in subject matter to other evidence should not be excluded as ‘cumulative’
when it has greater evidentiary weight or probative value.”].) Jones was not prejudiced
because even had counsel raised the objection, it likely would not have resulted in
13.
exclusion of the evidence, and therefore would not have resulted in a different or more
favorable outcome for Jones.
Additionally, the record is replete with evidence of Jones’s criminal actions that
night. With regard to the three attempted carjackings in counts 1 through 3, the assault
with a firearm in count 4, and the possession of a firearm by a felon in count 6—multiple
witnesses testified that Jones obstructed their path, came toward their cars, and
brandished what appeared to be a firearm. This is in addition to testimony that Jones
demanded Nadia get out of the car, and repeatedly yanked Jessica’s car door handle.
Further, each witness identified Jones through infield identification procedures conducted
shortly after the attempted carjackings. Jones’s counsel’s failure to object did not
adversely affect the outcome of his trial because of other overwhelming evidence of his
guilt. (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 280 [a defendant suffers no possible
prejudice from admission of evidence and any related ineffective assistance of counsel
claim fails where the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is overwhelming].)
iii. Harmless Error
Assuming, without deciding, that Jones’s counsel preserved the objection to the
admission of Jones’s “shoot me” statements and admission of such statements was error,
any such error was harmless. As discussed above, given the overwhelming evidence in
support of the finding that Jones was guilty, it was not reasonably probable that he would
have obtained a different result at trial had his prearrest statements to police been
excluded. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; People v. Doolin (2009)
45 Cal.4th 390, 448 [erroneous admission of evidence is harmless under Watson where
there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt].)3
3 Jones contends the purportedly erroneous admission of evidence violated his due
process rights and right to a fair trial. “ ‘[E]ven erroneous admission of evidence does
not offend due process unless it is so prejudicial as to render the proceeding
fundamentally unfair.’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1, 20; People v.
Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229 [a trial may be rendered fundamentally unfair
14.
3. Jones’s 2015 Conviction/Assembly Bill No. 333
Jones contends and the People concede that Assembly No. Bill 333 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 333) affects whether Jones’s 2015 gang conviction still
qualifies as a prior strike conviction and a prior serious felony conviction. They agree
that this court should vacate the true findings on the prior strike conviction and prior
serious felony conviction allegations, and remand for retrial under the current law. We
accept the People’s concession.
A. Additional Background
In the information, the prosecution alleged Jones had suffered a 2015 conviction
for active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) which qualified as a
prior strike conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–
(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)).
Jones agreed to a bifurcated court trial on the prior conviction allegations. At the
bifurcated trial, the prosecutor urged the court not to consider whether Assembly Bill
No. 333 invalidated the prior conviction such that the prior strike conviction and prior
serious felony conviction allegations could not be found true, contending the matter was
not before the court at that time. The court declined to consider the effect of Assembly
Bill No. 333 on the prior conviction and found true that Jones had suffered a prior strike
conviction and a prior serious felony conviction.
B. Analysis
Assembly Bill No. 333 applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction
qualifies as a serious or violent felony. (People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 608.)
In light of the parties’ agreement, and in accordance with current law as amended by
if there are no permissible inferences to be drawn from the evidence and the evidence is
“ ‘ “of such quality as [to] necessarily prevent[ ] a fair trial” ’ ”].) As explained above,
there were permissible inferences to be drawn from the challenged evidence; for instance,
Jones resisted arrest and was conscious of his guilt. Any possible error did not render the
trial fundamentally unfair.
15.
Assembly Bill No. 333, the true findings that Jones suffered a prior strike conviction and
a prior serious felony conviction are vacated and the matter is remanded. (Fletcher, at
p. 608.)
On remand, if the People decide not to retry the enhancements, or at the
conclusion of such a retrial, Jones will be entitled to a full resentencing. (People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“[W]hen part of a sentence is stricken on review, on
remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial
court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’ ”].)
The court has a “duty … to ensure that all components of [a] sentence are authorized by
the law and the facts at the time any new sentence is imposed.” (People v. Walker (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 198, 206).
DISPOSITION
The true findings on the prior strike conviction and prior serious felony conviction
are vacated and the case is remanded. On remand, the People may retry the prior strike
conviction and prior serious felony conviction allegations under the law as amended by
Assembly Bill No. 333. If the People do not retry the enhancements, or at the conclusion
of a retrial, the trial court shall conduct a full resentencing. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, Acting P. J.
GUERRA, J.
16.