Filed 9/14/26 P. v. Johnson CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B343685
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA087078)
v.
ALONZO BERNARD JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael Villalobos, Judge. Affirmed.
Joanna Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephen D. Svetich, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Alonzo Bernard Johnson, who is currently serving a three-
strike prison sentence, appeals after the trial court resentenced
him under Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, § 3), codified as Penal Code section 1172.75 (formerly
section 1171.1).1 The court struck Johnson’s six one-year prior
prison term enhancements under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b), reducing his aggregate sentence from 95 years to
life to 89 years to life. Johnson contends the court abused its
discretion when it declined to strike his prior strike convictions
and sentencing enhancements. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Facts
On August 6, 2012, Johnson entered the home of 79-year-
old Carol Gibson and confronted her in the kitchen.2 He struck
her across the side of her face with a phone, hitting her so hard
that she “went flying” into the sink. Johnson demanded Gibson’s
money and jewelry and struck her across the other side of her
face.
Johnson grabbed Gibson, pushed her into the bedroom, and
shoved her face down on her bed. He hit her on the head again,
called her profane names, and demanded her money and jewelry.
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective
January 1, 2022, section 1171.1 was renumbered to section
1172.75 with no change in text. (Assem. Bill No. 200 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)
2 Like both parties, we derive the underlying facts regarding
the offenses against Gibson from the opinion on Johnson’s direct
appeal. (See People v. Johnson (April 16, 2018, B278183)
[nonpub opn.].)
2
Gibson saw that Johnson was holding a knife, and she urged him
to leave because her grandchildren were on their way. He told
her to shut up, called her more names, and told her that he would
cut her and kill her. He struck Gibson’s face repeatedly with a
closed fist.
Johnson then got on top of Gibson and held a cord in his
hand. He told her to put her hands behind her back, but she
resisted. The attack stopped only when Gibson’s grandson
arrived, at which point Johnson grabbed jewelry from Gibson’s
dresser and fled. Gibson sustained a subarachnoid hemorrhage,
a nasal fracture, and a ruptured eardrum.
Two months earlier, Johnson entered the home of 79-year-
old Justina Malovrazich when Malovrazich was in her backyard.3
Malovrazich walked into the kitchen and saw Johnson coming
out of her bedroom. Malovrazich asked, “ ‘What are you doing in
my bedroom?’ ” Johnson replied, “ ‘Well, I found something,’ ”
and showed Malovrazich a jewelry box he had taken from her
jewelry collection. Johnson said he did not take anything else,
and then he left the home. Malovrazich discovered Johnson had
stolen her most expensive jewelry, including her diamond
wedding ring and a Rolex watch.
3 Johnson’s opening brief does not include the required
summary of the evidence at trial regarding the offense involving
Malovrazich. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(2)(C)
[appellant’s opening brief must “[p]rovide a summary of the
significant facts], 8.360(a).) On our own motion, we take judicial
notice of the third volume of the reporter’s transcript from the
record of Johnson’s direct appeal (case No. B278183) which
contains Malovrazich’s testimony at Johnson’s trial. (Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
3
B. Conviction and Sentence
In 2016, a jury convicted Johnson of first degree robbery of
Gibson (§ 211; count 2), kidnapping of Gibson to commit robbery
(§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 3), and first degree burglary of
Malovrazich (§ 459; count 5).4
As to counts 2 and 3, the jury found true the allegations
that Johnson personally inflicted great bodily injury on Gibson,
who was 70 years of age or older (§ 12022.7, subd. (c)), and that
Johnson personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon to
commit the offenses (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). As to count 5, the
jury found true the allegation that another person, who was not
an accomplice, was present in Malovrazich’s home when Johnson
committed the burglary (§ 667.5, subd. (c)).
Johnson waived his right to a jury trial on, and the trial
court found true, the allegations that Johnson had served three
prior prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)) and had three prior
serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)). The court also found
true the allegations that Johnson had four prior strike
convictions under the “three strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), including first degree burglary in 1985,
first degree robbery in 1987, rape in 1987, and attempted robbery
in 1999.
After denying Johnson’s Romero motion5 to strike his prior
strike offenses, the court sentenced Johnson as a third striker
offender to an aggregate term of 95 years to life.
4 The jury acquitted Johnson of first degree burglary of
Gibson (§ 459; count 1) and second degree burglary of Sierra
Madre Methodist Old Church on August 5, 2012 (§ 459; count 4).
5 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero).
4
For count 3 (kidnapping of Gibson), the court imposed
55 years to life in prison, consisting of an indeterminate term of
life with a minimum term of 31 years (§ 1170.12, subd.
(c)(2)(A)(iii)), plus five years for the great bodily injury
enhancement, one year for the weapon enhancement, 15 years for
the three serious felony convictions, and three years for the three
prior prison terms.
For count 5 (burglary of Malovrazich), the court imposed a
consecutive term of 40 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life
(§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)(ii)), plus 15 years for the three prior
serious felony convictions. The court struck the three one-year
prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)), in the
interests of justice (§ 1385).
For count 2 (robbery of Gibson), the court imposed and
stayed a sentence of 54 years to life, consisting of 30 years to life
(§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)(iii)), plus five years for the great bodily
injury enhancement, one year for the weapon enhancement,
15 years for the three serious felony convictions, and three years
for the three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)).
On appeal we affirmed the judgment but modified the
sentence to reflect the correct number of presentence custody
credits. (People v. Johnson (April 16, 2018, B278183) [nonpub.
opn.].)
C. Section 1172.75 Resentencing
In 2022, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified Johnson as a person eligible for
resentencing under section 1172.75, which invalidated certain
one-year prior prison enhancements under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b). The trial court appointed counsel for Johnson.
5
On December 8, 2023, Johnson filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.75. He asked the court to strike
the now-invalid section 667.5, former subdivision (b),
enhancements. After multiple continuances, Johnson filed a
second petition on December 10, 2024, asking the court to also
vacate his original sentence and conduct a full resentencing.
Johnson specifically requested that the court strike his
prior strikes under section 1385, subdivision (a), and Romero. He
also asked the court to apply a change in the law enacted since
his original sentencing: Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.), which amended section 1385, governing the dismissal of
certain enhancements in the interest of justice (Stats. 2021,
ch. 721, § 1). He argued the new law required the court to give
“great weight” to the following mitigating circumstances in his
case: (1) multiple enhancements applied to his sentence,
(2) application of the enhancements resulted in a sentence over
20 years, (3) his offense was connected to mental illness, (4) his
offense stemmed from childhood trauma, and (5) his prior
convictions were over five years old (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)-(E),
(H).) Based on those mitigating circumstances, he asked the
court to dismiss all his enhancements, namely the serious felony,
great bodily injury, and weapon enhancements.
In support, Johnson submitted a 2024 resentencing report
from social worker Regina Robles, a 2017 CDCR mental health
treatment plan, CDCR classification scoresheets, CDCR
disciplinary history, certificates from various CDCR programs,
and a 2015 psychological assessment from psychologist Dr. Haig
Kojian.
According to the documents, Johnson had “an extensive
history of mental illness” and an intellectual disability. He was
6
“plagued with significant problems from early childhood,”
including suffering physical abuse and having substance abuse
issues, which “contributed to a history of being unable to do well
from a young age.” In 2017, while Johnson was incarcerated, he
was hospitalized for 10 days due to suicidal ideation. Johnson’s
prison record did not show any rules violations, and beginning in
2020, Johnson lowered his security level classification from a
level “III” to a level “II.” Johnson also completed numerous
rehabilitative programs while incarcerated.
The People opposed any reduction in Johnson’s sentence
beyond dismissing the six one-year prison prior enhancements.
They argued a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.
At the outset of the January 6, 2025 resentencing hearing,
the trial court indicated that it had “review[ed] the full petition
that [Johnson] filed on December 10th with all the attached …
exhibits,” the court file, the probation report, the previous
sentencing, and the evidence from trial, including photographs.
The court acknowledged its obligation to conduct a full
resentencing and noted, “[T]here have been many changes to the
law ... that give[] the ability of the court to dismiss or strike
enhancements.”
Starting with the Romero motion, the court concluded it
had “the authority to strike strikes and impose something less
than a third strike sentence” under section 1385 and Romero.
The court also noted that “the Legislature [did] not … ma[k]e any
fundamental change” to the three strikes law, and the court was
still “bound to consider all the factors that apply to a third strike
sentence.”
As to the Romero factors, the court explicitly considered
Johnson’s criminal history, the underlying facts of the offenses
7
involving Gibson, Johnson’s record in prison, his childhood
trauma, and his mental health condition. The court found
Johnson was “a violent career criminal.” Further, the offenses
committed against Gibson were “egregious,” and Johnson’s case
was “one of the worst cases that [the court] ever did a trial on.”
Because Johnson’s “record and the circumstances of the offense
… far outweigh[ed] any issues that [Johnson] may have had
regarding mental illness or childhood trauma,” the court denied
Johnson’s Romero motion.
Turning to the enhancements, the court considered the
relevant enumerated mitigating circumstances under section
1385, subdivisions (c)(2)(B) through (E) and (H). The court also
considered Johnson’s age (62 at the time of resentencing),
disciplinary record, record of rehabilitation, and low risk
assessment score. But the court concluded that “all of those
things … d[id] not mitigate the danger that he pose[d] if he was
released from prison” and “a dismissal of [the] enhancements
would endanger public safety.” The court specifically emphasized
Johnson’s criminal history and the violent present offenses, again
noting Johnson’s case was “one of the worst cases [the court] ever
tried.”
The court struck Johnson’s six prior prison enhancements
but declined to strike his remaining enhancements and prior
strikes. Johnson’s new aggregate sentence is 89 years to life.
Johnson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.75 and Standard of Review
Effective 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 “retroactively
invalidate[d] prison prior enhancements imposed pursuant to
8
section 667.5, [former] subdivision (b), except those that were
based on a conviction for a sexually violent offense.” (People v.
Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 368; accord, People v. Rogers
(2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 348, fn. 5 (Rogers).)
Senate Bill No. 483 also added former section 1171.1, now
section 1172.75, “establish[ing] a mechanism to provide affected
defendants a remedy for those legally invalid enhancements.”
(People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380.) Section
1172.75 instructs the CDCR or country correctional
administrator to “identify those persons in their custody
currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement” under section 667.5, subdivision (a). (§ 1172.75,
subd. (b); see Burgess, at p. 380.) “If the court determines that
the current judgment includes [such] an enhancement ... the
court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c); see Burgess, at p. 380.)
“ ‘[S]ection 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely
that the trial court strike the newly “invalid” enhancements.’ ”
(Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 359.) The resentencing
“shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed
as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement,
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety,” and
further, resentencing “shall not result in a longer sentence than
the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
Additionally, the sentencing court “shall apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) “The
9
court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not
limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of
the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether
age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
We review a trial court’s sentencing determinations in a
section 1172.75 resentencing proceeding for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Lua (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 472, 476.)
However, where the appeal raises a question of law, we review
the court’s decision de novo. (Id. at p. 477.)
B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining To
Strike Johnson’s Prior Strike Convictions
1. Governing law and standard of review
The court has “authority at a resentencing proceeding
under … section 1172.75 to exercise its discretion pursuant to
section 1385, subdivision (a) … and Romero to strike prior
convictions that qualify as strikes under the ‘Three Strikes’ law.”
(Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 345, fn. omitted; see
Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.)6 To decide whether to
exercise its discretion to dismiss a prior strike conviction, “a trial
6 The California Supreme Court recently declined to address
“whether trial courts may strike prior strike offenses pursuant to
... [Romero] and section 1385, subdivision (a) at a section 1172.75
resentencing.” (People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025)
18 Cal.5th 838, 854, fn. 5.)
10
court must consider whether, ‘in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the [sentencing] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part.’ ” (People
v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 252-253, citing People v. Williams
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
“[T]he three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing
norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart
from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its
decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong
presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing
norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony); see Rogers, supra,
108 Cal.App.5th at p. 358.)
“[A] court’s failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction
allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of
discretion standard.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374;
accord, People v. Dain, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 257-258.) A trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless the party attacking the
sentence shows the ruling was “so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, at p. 377;
accord, People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 430.) “ ‘ “In the
absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have
acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will
not be set aside on review.” ’ [Citations.] ... ‘ “An appellate
tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its
judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” ’ ” (Carmony, at
pp. 376-377.) The very limited circumstances under which the
11
appellate court will find an abuse of discretion include where the
court is unaware of its discretion to strike a prior conviction; it
considers impermissible factors; or, it produces an arbitrary or
patently absurd result. (Id. at p. 378.) Only under
“ ‘extraordinary’ ” circumstances does the court’s failure to strike
a prior conviction constitute an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 378;
accord, People v. Finney (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1034, 1040.)
2. The court did not abuse its discretion
Johnson contends the trial court “misunderstood” the law
when it observed at the sentencing hearing that “the Legislature
has not really made any fundamental change” to the three strikes
laws. To begin with, the court’s observation that there have not
been recent changes to the three strikes laws was reasonable.
(See People v. Dain (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 235, 253 [although
“sentencing laws in general” have recently changed, “the Three
Strikes law itself has not changed”].)7 Further, contrary to
Johnson’s contention, the court’s remark does not suggest it
ignored changes since Johnson’s original sentencing to the
mitigating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.423,8
that as of March 14, 2022 require consideration of whether a
defendant’s history of childhood trauma (rule 4.423(b)(3)) and
mental illness (rule 4.423(b)(4)) were factors in the commission of
his crimes. Johnson incorrectly asserts the court here “focus[ed]
solely on the facts of the current crimes and Johnson’s criminal
history.”
7 By contrast, the court observed the Legislature has recently
made significant changes to the sentencing schemes for various
enhancements.
8 Further rules references are to the California Rules of
Court.
12
In denying Johnson’s Romero motion, the court stated it
had reviewed Johnson’s “full” motion and its exhibits, which
included documentation regarding Johnson’s childhood trauma
and mental illness. Moreover, the court expressly considered the
mitigating particulars of Johnson’s background and character,
namely that Johnson “suffer[ed] childhood trauma,” had “drug
and alcohol addiction issues,” had “deficiencies in education,” and
had “a mental illness or disorder.” The court also considered
Johnson’s mitigating circumstances relevant to the postconviction
factors in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3), which include a
defendant’s “disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation …
while incarcerated.” The court noted Johnson completed
rehabilitative programs in prison and was “trying to be
educated.”
Nevertheless, the court believed the circumstances of
Johnson’s present felonies and prior convictions “far outweigh”
any mitigating circumstances “regarding mental illness or
childhood trauma or drug addiction.” The court described the
present offenses against Gibson as “egregious,” “vicious,” and one
of the worst cases the court had tried. As the court explained,
Gibson “was beaten to a pulp” and suffered serious injuries, both
physical and psychological. The court remarked that had
Gibson’s grandson not come home, it was “very likely that
[Johnson] would have killed her.”
Regarding Johnson’s prior convictions, the court observed
that Johnson committed first degree burglaries in 1981, 1983,
and 1985. In 1986, Johnson raped and robbed an “elderly
woman” and was sentenced to 13 years in prison. In 1993, within
a month of his release from prison, Johnson committed a petty
theft with a prior and was sentenced to two years in prison. In
13
1995, 1998, and 2007, Johnson was in and out of prison for
committing second degree burglary, attempted robbery, and petty
theft with a prior, respectively. Johnson was released from
prison in 2010 and committed the present offenses in 2012 while
on parole. Based on that history, the court reasonably concluded
Johnson “was in and out of prison most of the 80’s and 90’s” and
was “a violent career criminal.”
Due to Johnson’s violent present offenses involving Gibson
and his criminal history, the court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that Johnson was not outside the spirit of the three
strikes law. (See People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843,
857 [no abuse of discretion in denying Romero motion where trial
court found the circumstances of the current offense were
“ ‘reprehensible’ ” and the court “gave primary weight to
Defendant’s extensive criminal history,” which reflected “a career
criminal who is unable to remain out of prison for more than a
few years at a time”]; People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
608, 640 (Brugman) [“Due to his continuous history of criminal
conduct, [defendant] ‘appears to be “an exemplar of the ‘revolving
door’ career criminal to whom the Three Strikes law is
addressed.” ’ ”].)
Johnson also contends the court failed to give
individualized consideration to the proper sentence for count 5,
the first degree burglary of Malovrazich. He asserts the court
repeatedly referred to the “brutal nature of the crimes against …
Gibson as a basis for its sentencing decision” but did not discuss
the facts underlying the charge as to Malovrazich, which
“involved no use of violence and no resulting injury.”
The trial court has the discretion under the three strikes
law “to dismiss a prior conviction allegation with respect to one
14
count but not another.” (People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490,
492-493.) “In many cases, ‘the nature and circumstances’ of the
various felonies described in different counts will differ
considerably. A court might therefore be justified in striking
prior conviction allegations with respect to a relatively minor
current felony, while considering those prior convictions with
respect to a serious or violent current felony.” (Id. at p. 499.)
However, in arguing that the court should have treated the
burglary of Malovrazich differently in ruling on the Romero
motion because of the facts of that offense, Johnson does not cite
any evidence from the trial with respect to the offense. Rather,
he cites only a brief recitation about the offense in Dr. Kojian’s
psychological assessment, which noted that when Malovrazich
confronted Johnson in her home after he had stolen her property,
he apologized and walked out, and Malovrazich was not injured.
This second-hand account in a psychological report does not give
the full picture of the facts of the offense involving Malovrazich.
Malovrazich’s trial testimony shows she was an especially
vulnerable victim (she was 79 years old) when she was present as
Johnson burglarized her home and stole her jewelry. The court
was entitled to consider these troubling facts that showed a
pattern by Johnson of preying on elderly women. (See People v.
Mendoza, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 857-858 [court acted
within its discretion in denying defendant’s Romero motion based
in part on fact that victim was particularly vulnerable due to his
mental disability].)
Although the court did not explicitly refer to the underlying
facts of count 5, it was not required to state its reasons for
declining to exercise its discretion to dismiss a prior strike
conviction. (In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550 [“While a
15
court must explain its reasons for striking a prior [citations], no
similar requirement applies when a court declines to strike a
prior”]; accord, Brugman, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 637.)
Where, as here, the record is silent, “ ‘[e]rror may not be
presumed.’ ” (People v. Czirban (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073,
1097.) Rather, “ ‘a trial court is presumed to have been aware of
and followed the applicable law.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.; accord, Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [“Where the record is silent” in a case
involving a Romero motion, the court is presumed to have
correctly applied the law].) Thus, we reject Johnson’s argument
and conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
Romero motion with respect to any of the counts.
C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining To
Strike Johnson’s Prior Serious Felony, Great Bodily Injury,
and Weapon Enhancements
At the time of Johnson’s original sentencing, “the court was
prohibited from striking the prior serious felony enhancement.”
(People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 333.) Effective 2019,
Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) removed this
prohibition. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1, 2; Cota, at p. 334.)
Additionally, effective 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 amended
section 1385 by adding subdivision (c). Subdivision (c)(1) of
section 1385 provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, the court
shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by
any initiative statute.” Subdivision (c)(2) provides: “In exercising
its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and
afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove
that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to
(I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
16
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” (See People
v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032.) “ ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” (§ 1385, subds. (c)(2); see rule 4.428(c).) As
relevant here, mitigating circumstances include the following:
“[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case,” “[t]he
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over
20 years,” “[t]he current offense is connected to prior
victimization or childhood trauma,” and “[t]he enhancement is
based on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (§ 1385,
subds. (c)(2)(B)-(E), (H).) We review the denial of a motion to
dismiss an enhancement pursuant to section 1385 for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298;
accord, Brugman, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 638.)
Johnson contends the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to dismiss the enhancements because the court
“erroneously focus[ed] on the facts of the 2012 crimes against
Gibson and Johnson’s failure to reform before committing them.”
Johnson contends the court should have focused on his prison
record, his low risk assessment in prison, his age, and his mental
health issues. We are not persuaded.
In declining to strike the enhancements, the court found
that “dismissal of [the] enhancements would endanger public
safety.” The court considered the nature of Johnson’s offenses
against Gibson as well as his criminal history. The court noted
that even though Johnson had served a substantial 13-year
sentence for his prior rape and robbery, “he got out and shortly
17
thereafter he committed [the] brutal attack” against Gibson. The
court concluded that “somebody who would do that again so
violently … [is] a threat to the community if ever released.” (See
People v. Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 299 [resentencing
court did not abuse its discretion in finding dismissal of
enhancement would endanger public safety where defendant’s
present offense involved “ ‘incredibly harmful and dangerous
conduct’ ”].)9 Where, as here, the court “finds that dismissal of an
enhancement ‘would endanger public safety,’ ... the court need
not consider the listed mitigating circumstances” under section
1385. (Mendoza, at p. 296; accord, People v. Anderson (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 577, 601 [section 1385, subdivision (c)(2),
“requires the court to consider whether dismissal of an
enhancement ‘would endanger public safety,’ in which case the
court need not consider the listed mitigating factors at all”].) The
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s request to
9 Counsel for Johnson (correctly) argued for the first time at
oral argument that, contrary to what the trial court stated,
Johnson did not commit the offense against Gibson “shortly” after
his release from his 13-year sentence; Johnson was paroled in
1993 and committed the offense against Gibson 19 years later.
Johnson forfeited the argument based on this factual error by
failing to make it in the trial court or in his opening brief on
appeal. (See People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 710, fn. 5
[failing to raise an issue before oral argument forfeits the issue];
People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 990; People v.
Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 110, fn. 13.) In any event, the
timing of Johnson’s second violent attack on an elderly woman is
not necessary to the court’s determination that Johnson posed a
threat to public safety.
18
dismiss the enhancements on the ground that doing so would
endanger public safety.
As with the Romero motion, Johnson also contends the
court abused its discretion by not individually considering count
5, the crime against Malovrazich. We reject his argument for
similar reasons. “[N]o particular language was required for the
trial court to decline to dismiss … the … enhancements.” (People
v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157.) “Section 1385,
subdivision (a), requires a trial court to state its ‘reasons for the
dismissal ... orally on the record,’ but there is no similar statutory
requirement when a court denies a request to dismiss an
enhancement.” (Ibid.) “Absent evidence to the contrary, we
presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it.”
(People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.)10
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J. FEUER, J.
10 Johnson compares his case to People v. Hayde (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 587, but that case is inapposite, as it concerns a
defendant’s petition under section 1170.91, which allows veterans
to seek resentencing based on mental health conditions related to
their military service. (Hayde, at p. 590.)
19