P. v. Jimenez CA2/2

Filed 9/4/26 P. v. Jimenez CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B343188

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. VA064071)

LUIS EDDIE JIMENEZ, ORDER MODIFYING
OPINION AND
Defendant and Appellant. DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

NO CHANGE IN THE
JUDGMENT

THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on August 6,
2026, be modified as follows:

1. On pages 4 and 5, delete the paragraphs beginning “A
defendant who is no longer” (starting on page 4) and “It is
not enough for” (page 5) and insert the following
paragraphs after the heading “I. Applicable Law and
Standard of Review”:

“To establish eligibility to withdraw a guilty plea under
section 1473.7[, subdivision] (a)(1), a defendant must show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) ‘error damaging
[the defendant’s] ability to meaningfully understand,
defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or
sentence’ and (2) that the damage resulted in prejudice.
[Citations.]” (People v. Hernandez (Aug. 13, 2026,
S282186), ___ Cal.5th ___ [p. 9] (Hernandez).)

“In determining whether a defendant has established error
for purposes of section 1473.7[, subdivision] (a)(1), we focus
on the defendant’s subjective understanding at the time
they entered their guilty plea. [Citation.] We ask whether
the defendant has shown that they were unable to
‘meaningfully understand’ the immigration consequences of
their plea, or that their ability to ‘defend against’ or
‘knowingly accept’ those consequences was impaired.
[Citations.] ‘The key is the mindset of the defendant and
not what an objectively reasonable person would have
understood under the circumstances.’ [Citation.]”
(Hernandez, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___ [p. 11].)

“[C]ourts evaluating section 1473.7[, subdivision] (a)(1)
motions must look beyond the record of the plea and
consider the totality of the circumstances bearing on the
inquiry. [Citations.] Courts must engage in a case-specific

2
examination that involves assessing credibility and
weighing circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] While the
focus of the error inquiry is on the defendant’s subjective
understanding, a defendant’s bare assertion that they did
not understand the immigration consequences or the
options available to them to defend against those
consequences is insufficient to establish error; the assertion
must be corroborated by objective evidence. [Citation.]”
(Hernandez, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___ [pp. 12–13].)

2. On page 5, in the paragraph beginning “We independently
review the,” change “(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527.)” to
“(People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527.)”

3. On page 5, in the paragraph beginning “We independently
review the,” change “(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
320.)” to “(People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 320
(Espinoza).)”

4. On page 6, in the sentence beginning “(People v. Patterson”
in the paragraph beginning “Defendant has not shown
that,” change “Lopez I, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 712” to
“People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 712 (Lopez I),”
so that the full sentence reads:

(People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 889; see also
People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 712 (Lopez I)
[“The advisement that [defendant] may face certain adverse
immigration consequences was insufficient to inform [him]
that the conviction would subject [defendant] to mandatory

3
deportation and permanent exclusion from the United
States.”].)

5. On page 6, in the sentence beginning “(Mejia, supra,” in the
paragraph beginning “However, at the plea hearing,”
change “Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 861” to “People
v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 861,” so that the full
sentence reads:

(People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 861; contra
Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320 [defendant
demonstrated inability to meaningfully understand
immigration consequences by showing he only received a
“general advisement . . . that his conviction may have
immigration consequences” and was “never advised . . . that
pleading no contest to the charges at issue would result in
his deportation”].)

6. On page 11, delete the paragraph beginning “Under the
circumstances of this case,” and insert the following
paragraph after the paragraph beginning “Defendant
argues that the absence” (starting on page 10):

We also conclude that defendant’s case is distinguishable
from Hernandez, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___, in which the
California Supreme Court recently found that error had
been established under section 1473.7, subdivision (a).
Among other differences, in Hernandez, “there was no
mention of possible immigration consequences” during the
plea colloquy (Hernandez, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___ [p. 5]), and

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the defendant “required a Spanish-language interpreter for
all her court appearances” while her attorney did not speak
Spanish (Hernandez, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___ [p. 20]). Here,
in contrast, defendant, who spoke English and did not
require an interpreter, was orally advised by the prosecutor
that his plea “will” result in adverse immigration
consequences, which defendant indicated that he
understood. Moreover, defendant’s declaration contains no
facts suggesting his attorneys failed to advise him on the
immigration consequences or gave advice that was contrary
to the prosecutor’s clear advisement. Even if the record
supports defendant’s assertion that, like the defendant in
Hernandez, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___ [p. 1], he had come to the
attention of immigration authorities following a trip
abroad, “considering the totality of the circumstances”
(Hernandez, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___ [p. 2]), we conclude that
defendant has not met his burden to prove that his
conviction should be vacated under section 1473.7,
subdivision (a).

* * *

There is no change in the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.

____________________________________________________________
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J. RICHARDSON, J. GOORVITCH, J.

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Filed 8/6/26 P. v. Jimenez CA2/2 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B343188

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA064071)
v.

LUIS EDDIE JIMENEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Lisa S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.

Sabrina R. Damast for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Kathy S. Pomerantz,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________
Luis Eddie Jimenez (defendant) appeals the denial of his
motion to vacate his conviction. (Pen. Code, § 1473.7, subd. (a).)1
Because he has not met his burden of showing that he lacked a
meaningful understanding of the immigration consequences of
his plea, we affirm.
BACKGROUND2
I. Facts
Defendant has been a lawful permanent resident of the
United States since he was 20 days old. His mother and one of
his two siblings are U.S. citizens, as are his wife and adult son.
His other sibling is a lawful permanent resident.
In February 2001, defendant and another person were
arrested during a traffic stop. The arresting officers recovered a
total of 10.4 grams of methamphetamine from defendant’s person
and the car. Defendant “also had a scale and a pager and . . .
baggies on his person[.]”
II. Charges; Plea; Sentencing
Defendant was charged with possession for sale of a
controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 1) and
possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11377, subd. (a); count 2). The information also alleged that
defendant had been convicted of three prior felonies. (§§ 470
(forgery), 487h (grand theft); Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11370.1
(possession of a controlled substance while armed), 11378
(possession for sale).)

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2 Because there was no preliminary hearing, we draw these
facts primarily from the probation officer’s report.

2
The prosecution’s file reflects that, in March 2001, the
prosecution offered defendant a plea deal of three years in state
prison on count 1. Defendant countered with an offer for two
years in state prison, which the prosecution denied. The
prosecution’s notes did not contain information about other plea
offers made by either party.
Defendant chose to take the prosecution’s offer and pled no
contest to count 1. On his plea form, defendant initialed that he
“underst[oo]d that if [he was] not a citizen of the United States,
the conviction for the offense charged may have the consequences
of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or
denial of naturalization[,]” and had discussed the charges, facts,
possible defenses, and every item on the plea form with his
attorney. Defendant’s counsel averred that he “ha[d] explained
each of the above rights to . . . defendant[.]”
At the plea hearing, the prosecutor advised defendant that
“if [he was] not a citizen of the United States, [his] plea today will
result in [his] deportation, denial of amnesty, denial of reentry,
and denial of citizenship into the United States.” Defendant
indicated that he understood.
Pursuant to the terms of his plea, the trial court sentenced
defendant to three years in state prison. The remaining charges
and allegations were dismissed.

III. Section 1473.7 Motion; Ruling; Appeal
In April 2024, defendant filed a motion to vacate his
conviction pursuant to section 1473.7, subdivision (a), arguing
that the plea form’s advisement that he “may” suffer adverse
immigration consequences was insufficient because it did not
inform him of the mandatory immigration penalties caused by his

3
plea. In his declaration, defendant stated that “[t]he most
important consideration in taking the plea was protecting [his]
green card and remaining in the United States with [his]
family[,]” and that he would have been willing to accept a more
serious charge, more time in jail, or the risk of a jury trial to
avoid jeopardizing his immigration status.
Defendant had two counsel during the plea proceedings.
The first, Craig Purcell (Purcell), signed off on his plea form; the
second, John Williams (Williams), represented him at the plea
hearing. Defendant’s current counsel did not contact Purcell or
Williams to determine whether they advised defendant of the
mandatory immigration consequences of his plea. Defendant’s
counsel attempted to locate Purcell but found that he was
“retired” and had “not updated his bar profile” with current
contact information. She contacted the public defender’s office,
which did not have “any further information about how to locate
[Purcell].” Defendant’s counsel discovered that Williams’s “last
known address was the public defender’s office in Yorba Linda”
and that he had been “inactive from the bar for 14 years.”
Defendant’s counsel made no further efforts to locate Purcell or
Williams.
In October 2024, after hearing argument, the trial court
denied the motion to vacate defendant’s conviction. Defendant
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A defendant who is no longer in custody may file a motion
to vacate a conviction that “is legally invalid due to prejudicial
error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or

4
potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or
sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) To show “prejudicial error”
under section 1473.7, “a person need only show by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) he did not ‘meaningfully
understand’ or ‘knowingly accept’ the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences of the plea; and (2) [prejudice, i.e.,
that] had he understood the consequences, it is reasonably
probable he would have instead attempted to ‘defend against’ the
charges.” (People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 862
(Mejia).)
It is not enough for a defendant to simply declare that he
would not have entered the plea had he understood it would
require his deportation; he must provide objective evidence to
corroborate such an assertion. (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th
510, 530 (Vivar); People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 715
(Lopez I).) “Objective evidence includes facts provided by
declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s
immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence
of the charges the defendant faced.” (People v. Espinoza (2023)
14 Cal.5th 311, 321 (Espinoza).)
We independently review the denial of a section 1473.7
motion. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527.) Where, as here, the
trial court’s factual findings “ ‘derive entirely from written
declarations and other documents,’ . . . no deference is owed” the
trial court and “ ‘it is for the appellate court to decide, based on
its independent judgment, whether the facts establish
prejudic[ial] [error] under section 1473.7.’ ” (Espinoza, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 320.)

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II. Analysis
Defendant has not shown that he did not meaningfully
understand the immigration consequences of his plea. The
advisement in the plea form, which notified defendant that his
conviction “may have” negative immigration consequences, is
deficient. (People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 889; see also
Lopez I, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 712 [“The advisement that
[defendant] may face certain adverse immigration consequences
was insufficient to inform [him] that the conviction would subject
[defendant] to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion
from the United States.”].)
However, at the plea hearing, the prosecutor orally advised
defendant that his plea “will” result in deportation, denial of
amnesty, denial of reentry, and denial of citizenship, and
defendant said that he understood that consequence. This
colloquy establishes that defendant “meaningfully underst[oo]d”
and “knowingly accept[ed]” the mandatory immigration
consequences of his plea.3 (Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p.
861; contra Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320 [defendant
demonstrated inability to meaningfully understand immigration
consequences by showing he only received a “general
advisement . . . that his conviction may have immigration
consequences” and was “never advised . . . that pleading no
contest to the charges at issue would result in his deportation”].)
The oral advisement also distinguishes the 2001 plea hearing
from defendant’s prior felony plea in 1998, at which he was

3 This conclusion renders moot defendant’s alternative
arguments.

6
advised that his conviction “could result in” negative immigration
consequences.4
Defendant cites several cases in which appellate courts
have reversed the denial of a section 1473.7 motion even when
the court or prosecution orally advises the defendant about the
mandatory immigration consequences of his plea. These cases
establish that “depending on the surrounding circumstances[,]”
an oral advisement “is not a categorical bar to relief” under
section 1473.7. In them, the defendants provided evidence that
their counsel had provided conflicting or inadequate advice which
led the defendants to disregard or misunderstand the oral
advisement. (People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1175
(Curiel) [“ ‘A proper advisement by the court does not foreclose
the possibility of relief when counsel provides inaccurate or
incomplete advice regarding immigration consequences.’ ” (italics
added)]; see also, e.g., People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
950, 960–961 [the defendant established “error impeding [his]
ability to understand and knowingly accept the consequences of
his no-contest plea” by “attest[ing] his attorney did not inquire
into his immigration status or discuss ‘all of the immigration
consequences of my conviction’ ” and proffering contemporaneous
notes showing his public defender “advised only of unspecified,
‘potential’ immigration consequences”]; People v. Lopez (2021) 66
Cal.App.5th 561, 578 (Lopez II) [“both trial counsel and
[defendant] agree there was no discussion of” mandatory
immigration consequences, and the record showed that “trial
counsel’s review of the [plea] form with [the defendant] was . . .
brief and pro forma”]; People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th

4 The record does not contain a transcript of defendant’s
other prior felony plea hearings.

7
998, 1001–1003 [the defendant’s declaration and his plea
counsel’s testimony showed that counsel never asked about the
defendant’s immigration status and led him to believe that if he
avoided jail time he would avoid deportation].)
Defendant’s appeal is distinguishable. Apart from his
conclusory declaration that “[a]t the time . . . , [he] did not
understand that taking the plea would guarantee the loss of [his]
green card[,]” defendant provides no reason to believe that plea
“counsel provide[d] inaccurate or incomplete advice regarding
immigration consequences.” (Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p.
1175; see also People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 17 [“A
defendant’s assertion as to his . . . state of mind is not accepted at
face value by courts evaluating a section 1473.7 motion. Such
assertions must be corroborated with objective evidence.”].)
Defendant bears the burden of “show[ing] by a
preponderance of the evidence” (Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at
p. 862) that an “error damag[ed] [his] ability to meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or
potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or
sentence” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant has not done so
here. His declaration is silent as to whether he was inadequately
advised with regard to immigration consequences, or whether
other “surrounding circumstances” caused him to misunderstand
the clear oral advisement he was given at the plea hearing.
(Lopez II, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 577.) And the absence of
declarations from either of defendant’s plea attorneys, while not
itself fatal to his appeal, inures to his detriment. Absent claims
of error or misunderstanding supported by objective evidence, we
cannot overlook the clear oral advisement defendant received at
the plea hearing.

8
Defendant raises two additional counterarguments. First,
he argues that the oral advisement was defective because it did
not specifically advise him that his conviction would “render[]
him ineligible for adjustment of status, asylum, and cancellation
of removal[,]” “subject[] him to mandatory immigration
detention[,]” or cause him to be excluded from admission to the
United States. Defendant cites, and we have found, no authority
requiring an exhaustive advisement of every immigration
consequence. (See Lopez I, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 712
[reversing denial of section 1473.7 motion where the advisement
“was insufficient to inform [defendant] that the conviction would
subject him to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion
from the United States”].) Defendant was advised that his
conviction “will” result in deportation, denial of amnesty, denial
of reentry, and denial of citizenship. This sufficiently informed
defendant of the serious and mandatory immigration
consequences of his plea. (See People v. Gutierrez (2003) 106
Cal.App.4th 169, 174 [advising the defendant that “he would be
denied reentry” is functionally equivalent to advising that “he
would be excluded from the United States.”].)
Second, defendant argues that plea counsel erred by failing
to pursue a negotiated plea to a greater offense with the same or
greater sentence that would not have had immigration
consequences. The record is unclear on this point, as it contains
neither plea counsels’ notes nor declarations regarding the
negotiation process. And the prosecution’s notes do not show
amenability to an immigration-safe plea deal. The prosecution’s
rejection of defendant’s counteroffer (for one fewer year in prison)
could, as defendant argues, “indicate[] that the prosecution’s
priority was obtaining a lengthy prison sentence” and that a plea

9
to more prison time “would have been attractive to [the]
prosecutor.” But it does not necessarily demonstrate that the
prosecution was open to pursuing alternative charges or an
immigration-safe plea.
Defendant argues that the absence of evidence of any
attempt to “plea upwards” supports his contention that his plea
counsel never attempted to pursue an immigration-safe plea deal.
However, the cases defendant cites for this proposition all
involved affirmative evidence of plea counsel’s failure to seek an
immigration-safe plea. (See, e.g., People v. Bautista (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 229, 237–238, 242 [defendant showed that he “may
have been prejudiced by the [plea] attorney’s failure to
investigate, advise, and utilize defense alternatives” by, among
other things, submitting a declaration from plea counsel that
“ ‘[t]he possibility [of seeking an immigration-safe plea deal]
never entered [his] mind’ ” and he thus “ ‘never advised [the
defendant] that an upward plea . . . would carry a stiffer prison
sentence yet would not result in deportation’ ”; People v.
Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 908 [reversing denial of a
section 1473.7 motion when the defendant’s plea “counsel [did]
not remember raising [defendant’s] immigration status in plea
bargaining, and her [contemporaneous] notes confirm this. Her
notes and memory also confirm that she learned [defendant] was
a legal permanent resident only when they discussed the
consequences of the plea, after he stated he would take it, and
after her counteroffers. This suggests that counsel failed to
bargain creatively with the prosecution in a manner that
considered immigration consequences.”].) While defendant need
not proffer the exact kinds of evidence submitted in Bautista or

10
Manzanilla, he must do something more than simply point to the
absence of evidence of an immigration-safe plea offer.
Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that
defendant has not met his burden to prove that his conviction
should be vacated under section 1473.7, subdivision (a).
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.
GOORVITCH
We concur:

________________________, Acting P. J.
CHAVEZ

________________________, J.
RICHARDSON

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