Filed 6/23/26 P. v. Jaquez CA6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H053117
(Santa Cruz County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. F16367)
v.
OSCAR JAVIER JAQUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2010, Oscar Javier Jaquez pleaded guilty to four crimes committed when he
was 16 years old, and he was sentenced to a total of 58 years in prison. In 2024, asserting
that he was serving the functional equivalent of a life without parole (LWOP) sentence,
Jaquez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)
(Section 1170(d)). (Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)
The district attorney opposed, and the trial court denied the petition, ruling that
resentencing under Section 1170(d) was barred by Jaquez’s plea agreement and by the
availability of youthful offender parole.
Jaquez now appeals, and the Attorney General concedes that the trial court erred in
denying Jaquez resentencing under Section 1170(d). As explained below, we accept the
concession that the trial court erred in denying resentencing because of Jaquez’s plea
agreement and because Section 1170(d) authorizes resentencing for de facto LWOP
sentences regardless of the availability of youthful offender parole. However, we remand
to the trial court to consider in the first instance whether, apart from the availability of
youthful offender parole, Jacquez received a de facto LWOP sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Offenses
Jaquez was born in 1991 and later became a Norteño gang member. According to
the representation of the prosecution at the plea hearing, which Jaquez admitted, in
January 2008 Jaquez and another Norteño gang member challenged A.F., who appeared
to be a member of the rival Sureño gang, to a fight. When A.F. drove behind a gas
station, where the fight was to take place, Jaquez began to pull out a revolver. However,
apparently seeing the gun, A.F. drove away.
Soon afterwards, Jaquez encountered Servando Silonsochilt, a Sureño gang
member, and once again pulled out his gun. Jaquez then shot Silonsochilt in the arm.
Silonsochilt turned around and began to run, but Jaquez shot him twice in the abdomen,
and Silonsochilt staggered into oncoming traffic and was killed.
Jaquez was subsequently apprehended with a revolver, which matched the bullets
found at the crime scene. Police also recovered documents in Jaquez’s handwriting
expressing the desire to kill Soreño gang members with the revolver used to shoot
Silonsochilt in order to benefit the Norteño gang.
B. The Charges and Plea Agreement
In February 2008, a complaint charged Jaquez with murdering Silonsochilt (§ 187,
subd. (a); count 1) and two misdemeanors: exhibiting a firearm (§ 417, subd. (a)(2);
count 2) and disturbing the peace by fighting (§ 415, subd. (1); count 3). In connection
with the murder charge, the complaint also alleged personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b)-(d)).
In May 2010, Jaquez entered into a plea agreement. The district attorney filed an
amended information charging Jaquez with one count of voluntary manslaughter for
killing Silonsochilt (§ 192, subd. (a); count 1), one count of attempted murder of A.F.
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(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2), two counts of attempted murder of Silonsochilt (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 664; counts 3 and 4), and one count of conspiracy to commit assault with a
deadly weapon (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 245, subd. (a)(1); count 5). In connection with each
count, the amended information alleged personal use of a firearm (§§ 1192.7, 12022.5,
subds. (a), (d)) and committing offenses for the benefit of a street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)).
On the same day that the amended information was filed, Jaquez pleaded guilty to
all the counts and allegations in the amended information. In so doing, Jaquez
understood that his sentence “will be no more than 58 years.” He also agreed to waivers
of both appeal and collateral attack.
C. The Sentence
In June 2010, Jaquez was sentenced. The trial court imposed a total sentence of
58 years in prison. On the voluntary manslaughter count, the trial court imposed the
upper term of 11 years as well as 10 years each for the firearm and gang enhancements,
for a total of 31 years on this count. For the three attempted murder counts, the trial court
imposed one-third of the seven year middle term (two years four months) for the offense
itself and for one-third of 10 years (three years four months) each for the firearm and
gang enhancements, for a total of nine years for each of the three counts. Finally, the trial
court dismissed the conspiracy count.
D. Jaquez’s Parole and Resentencing Requests
In July 2023, Jaquez had a parole hearing under section 3051, which makes
defenders under 25 years of age at the time of an offense, and those under 18 years old
receiving LWOP sentences, eligible for parole after 15, 20, or 25 years. (§ 3051,
subds. (b)(1)-(4).) Jaquez was denied parole, but another parole hearing is tentatively
scheduled for July 2028.
In April 2024, Jaquez petitioned for rehearing under Section 1170(d). Relying on
People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard), Jaquez argued Section 1170(d)
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violates equal protection to the extent that it does not permit resentencing of juvenile
offenders serving de facto LWOP sentences. Jaquez also argued that he was eligible for
resentencing under Section 1170(d) because he was serving a de facto LWOP sentence,
he was under 18 at the time of the offenses, he had been incarcerated for 15 years, and he
was not convicted of a disqualifying offense. In addition, Jaquez filed a statement
describing his remorse and contended that he satisfied the requirements for resentencing
because he had no prior felony adjudications for assault or other crime involving a
significant potential for personal harm, his crime was committed with an adult co-
defendant, and he had demonstrated potential for rehabilitation. In particular, Jaquez
presented evidence that he dropped out of the Norteño gang, obtained his high school
diploma, took vocational classes, and enrolled in narcotics and alcoholics anonymous.
The district attorney opposed resentencing. He argued that Jaquez’s waiver of the
right to collaterally attack his plea barred resentencing, that there was no authority for
applying Section 1170(d) to determinate sentences, and that Jaquez was not sentenced to
a de facto LWOP sentence.
The trial court denied the petition for resentencing, though not on the grounds
urged by the district attorney. The court declined to consider whether the collateral attack
waiver barred resentencing. However, it held that section 1171, a statute not mentioned
by either party, barred resentencing. The trial court reasoned that, because the plea
agreement had reached “a fair and just result with a stipulated sentence,” Jaquez could
not be resentenced without rescinding the agreement and that section 1171 forbids
resentencing that rescinds a plea agreement. In addition, after observing that no prior
cases have held equal protection requires resentencing of determinate sentences, the trial
court ruled that Jaquez was not sentenced to a de facto LWOP sentence because he is
eligible for a youthful parole under section 3051.
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II. DISCUSSION
Jaquez argues that section 1171 does not bar resentencing because, contrary to the
trial court’s assumption, his plea agreement did not contain a stipulated sentence and that
equal protection requires resentencing under Section 1170(d) for juvenile offenders with
de facto LWOP sentences, whether or not youthful offender parole is available. In
response, the Attorney General concedes that section 1171 does not bar resentencing and
that equal protection requires resentencing under Section 1170(d) for de facto LWOP
sentences without regard to the availability of youthful offender parole.
After the briefing in this case was complete, in light of the Attorney General’s
interpretation of Section 1170(d) in the briefing submitted to the Supreme Court in
People v. Munoz, No. S290828, we requested supplemental briefing on whether
Section 1170(d) should be interpreted to apply to de facto LWOP sentences. In response,
both parties agreed that Section 1170(d) should be interpreted to do so.
As explained below, we agree that section 1171 does not bar resentencing, that
Section 1170(d) should be interpreted to permit resentencing of juvenile offenders with
de facto LWOP sentences, and that under Section 1170(d) the availability of youthful
offender parole does not affect whether an LWOP sentence has been imposed. However,
before considering these issues, we address an issue not reached by the trial court:
whether the collateral attack waiver in Jaquez’s plea agreement bars resentencing.
A. The Collateral Attack Waiver
In his plea agreement, Jaquez agreed to “waive any and all appellate rights” and
“[w]aive collateral attacks.” In light of this waiver the district attorney argued below that
Jaquez relinquished the right to collaterally attack his sentence by petitioning for
resentencing under Section 1170(d). However, the trial court did not reach this argument,
and the Attorney General has declined to advance it on appeal, reasoning that a waiver
reaching resentencing under Section 1170(d) would violate public policy. We agree with
the Attorney General.
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Since the Legislature enacted section 1016.8 in 2019 (Stats. 2019, ch. 568, § 1),
plea bargains that waive benefits subsequently conferred by future legislation are void as
against public policy: “A provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to
generally waive future benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions,
or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void
as against public policy.” (§ 1016.8, subd. (b).) The Legislature added Section 1170(d)
in September 2012 in Senate Bill No. 9 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess). (Stats. 2012, ch. 828,
§ 1.) Jaquez entered into his plea agreement and pleaded guilty in May 2010, more than
two years before the enactment of Section 1170(d). As a consequence, if the appellate
and collateral attack waiver in Jaquez’s plea bargain sought to waive the benefits later
conferred by resentencing under Section 1170(d), the waiver is now void as against
public policy.
B. Section 1171
Apparently sua sponte, the trial court ruled that section 1171 bars resentencing of
Jaquez, reasoning that his plea agreement stipulated to a 58 year sentence, which cannot
be reduced without rescinding the bargain. Jaquez argues that the trial court erred
because, in fact, he did not agree to a stipulated sentence. The Attorney General agrees
that the trial court erred for a different reason: Section 1171 does not bar resentencing
from modifying plea agreements. Both are correct.
First, in his plea agreement Jaquez did not agree to a stipulated sentence. In
explaining the agreement, the prosecutor initially stated that Jacquez “is going to be
sentenced to 58 years,” but then corrected himself and said that “as part of that
agreement, it will be no more than 58 years” and “can be less.” When the trial court
accepted the plea agreement, it understood that the agreement imposed a “lid” rather than
a stipulated sentence: In summarizing the terms of the agreement, the court stated that
“the charges will reach a maximum of 58 years,” not that Jaquez would be sentenced to
such a term. Thus, to the extent that the trial court’s ruling that section 1171 precluded
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resentencing was based on the premise that Jaquez had agreed to a stipulated sentence,
the premise was false.
Second, as the Attorney General recognizes, section 1171 does not bar
modification of plea agreements in resentencing. To the contrary, the section expressly
authorizes modification “after a plea”: It states that, absent a more specific statutory rule,
in a postconviction proceeding to modify a sentence pursuant to an ameliorative statute
“[t]he court . . . has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the defendant’s sentence,
including if it was imposed after a guilty plea.” (§ 1171, subd. (c)(2); see also id., § 1171,
subd. (a).) The statute then provides that a plea bargain may not be rescinded based upon
such modification: “Any change to a sentence shall not be basis for a prosecutor or court
to rescind a plea agreement.” (Id., § 1171, subd. (c)(3).) Thus, section 1171 expressly
authorizes trial courts to modify sentences imposed after a plea bargain and prohibits
rescission of bargains based on such modification.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that section 1171
barred resentencing because of Jaquez’s plea agreement.
C. De Facto LWOP Sentences
Under section 190.5, a juvenile offender may be sentenced to “confinement in the
state prison for life without possibility of parole” for committing murder in the first
degree with one or more special circumstances. (§ 190.5, subd. (b).) Although Jaquez
was not convicted of murder in the first degree and did not receive a formal LWOP
sentence under section 190.5, he contends that the 58-year aggregate sentence that he
received is a de facto LWOP sentence, and therefore he is entitled to resentencing under
Section 1170(d), which, under certain circumstances, provides for resentencing of
juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(5).) In the trial court,
Jaquez based this contention on precedent holding that Section 1170(d) violates equal
protection by not permitting resentencing of juvenile offenders with de facto LWOP
sentences. We need not consider the constitutionality of Section 1170(d) because we
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agree with the position taken by the parties in their supplemental briefs: namely, that
Section 1170(d) should be construed to apply to de facto LWOP sentences.
Section 1170(d) provides that, subject to certain restrictions, juvenile offenders
sentenced to “imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole” may petition for
recall and resentencing. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A); see also ibid. [requiring incarceration
for at least 15 years]; id., § 1170, subd. (d)(2)(B) [prohibiting resentencing where the
victim was tortured or the victim was a public safety official, a firefighter, or a state,
federal, or local law enforcement officer]; id., § 1170, subds. (d)(2), (5) [requiring certain
circumstances].) A defendant with a formal LWOP sentence under section 190.5 plainly
has been sentenced to “imprisonment for life without possibility of parole” for purposes
of Section 1170(d). However, Section 1170(d) does not refer to section 190.5 or any
other statutory provision imposing LWOP sentences. As a consequence, its use of the
term “imprisonment for life without possibility of parole” is also reasonably understood
to include individuals who have been sentenced to a term that, as a practical matter,
precludes them from obtaining parole—that is, a de facto LWOP.
This practical interpretation is supported by the legislative history of
Section 1170(d), which, as noted above, was enacted in September 2012 in Senate Bill
No. 9 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess). (Stats. 2012, ch. 828, § 1.) In reviewing case law
concerning LWOP sentences, the bill’s author quoted a decision holding that, for Eighth
Amendment purposes, a defendant had received “ ‘a de facto LWOP sentence because he
is not eligible for parole until about the time he is expected to die.’ ” (Assem. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended
May 27, 2011, p. 10, quoting People v. J.I.A. (2011) 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 141, 149, vacated
and remanded Oct. 12, 2012, S14841).) Thus, the Legislature appears to have intended
Section 1170(d) to be interpreted in a practical rather than technical manner to apply not
only to formal LWOP sentences but also to de facto LWOP sentences that effectively
render a juvenile offender ineligible for parole before they are expected to die.
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A practical interpretation of Section 1170(d) is also supported by constitutional
considerations. At least four Court of Appeal decisions have held that restricting
resentencing under Section 1170(d) to juvenile offenders with formal LWOP sentences is
irrational and violates equal protection. (People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650,
653; People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 450-454 (Sorto); People v. Bagsby
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1054-1061 (Bagsby); Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 631-634.) Other Court of Appeal decisions have disagreed. (People v. Baldwin
(2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978, 1002-1006; People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th
1058, 1075-1081, review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540.) Nonetheless, interpreting
Section 1170(d) to be limited to formal LWOP sentences plainly raises a serious
constitutional question, and it is well-established that statutes should be construed to
avoid constitutional questions where they are reasonably susceptible to a reasonable
alternative interpretation that do not raise such questions. (See, e.g., People v. Superior
Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 862 [“ ‘ “If a statute is susceptible of two
constructions, one of which will . . . raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions,
the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable
meaning of the language used, will render it . . . free from doubt as to its
constitutionality.” ’ ”]; People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 339 [“ ‘[A] statute must
be construed, if reasonably possible, in a manner that avoids a serious constitutional
question.’ ”].)
Accordingly, we conclude that Section 1170(d) should be interpreted to apply to
de facto as well as formal LWOP sentences.
D. Youthful Offender Parole
The trial court held that Jaquez was not serving a de facto LWOP sentence because
he is eligible for youthful offender parole under section 3051 and, in fact, already has
received a youthful offender parole hearing. We disagree. Youthful offender parole is
available to all juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences, whether formal or not. (§ 3051,
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subd. b)(4).) Moreover, the Legislature extended youthful offender parole hearings to
juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences in 2017, five years after enacting
Section 1170(d). (Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5; see People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834,
845.) In so doing, the Legislature did not indicate that it intended to end resentencing for
juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences under Section 1170(d), and, as the Supreme
Court has long recognized, “[a]bsent an express declaration of legislative intent, we will
find an implied repeal ‘only when there is no rational basis for harmonizing the two
potentially conflicting statutes.’ ” (Garris v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 477.)
Accordingly, in determining whether an individual was sentenced to “imprisonment for
life without the possibility of parole” under Section 1170(d), youthful offender parole
should be disregarded. (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App5th at pp. 447-448; Bagsby, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at p. 1061; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 628-629.)
However, because the trial court did not consider whether, despite the availability
of youthful offender parole, Jaquez’s determinate sentence is a de facto LWOP sentence,
we leave that issue for the trial court to consider in the first instance.
III. DISPOSITION
The order of March 17, 2025 denying appellant’s petition for resentencing is
reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
I CONCUR:
____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.
People v. Jaquez
H053117
DANNER, J.
I respectfully dissent. For the reasons explained by the majority, I agree that the
trial court erred in concluding that Penal Code section 1171 barred resentencing here.
Nevertheless, we review the court’s ruling, not its reasoning. If correct on any ground,
we affirm. (People v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123.)
I believe the reference to “imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole”
in section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) should, as a matter of text and legislative intent, be
read literally. (People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 622–626; People v. Ortega
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1263.) I further conclude that Jaquez has not carried his
burden of demonstrating that constitutional considerations dictate an expanded reading of
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A). (See People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th
1058, 1081, review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540.) As Jaquez is ineligible for relief
under section 1170, subdivision (d), I would affirm the trial court’s order.
______________________________________
Danner, J.