Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

P. v. Hurtado CA4/1

Filed 10/22/26 P. v. Hurtado CA4/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/22/26 P. v. Hurtado CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D086463

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD305501

v.

CARLOS R. HURTADO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Theodore M. Weathers, Judge. Affirmed.
Brad J. Poore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha
Cortina and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted Carlos R. Hurtado of assault with a deadly weapon
and felony vandalism. Hurtado contends there was insufficient evidence to
sustain the assault with a deadly weapon conviction because he did not use
the alleged deadly weapon, a throwing knife, in a manner that was capable of
causing or likely to cause death or great bodily injury. As to the felony
vandalism conviction, Hurtado asserts that the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury on misdemeanor vandalism as a lesser included offense. We
are not persuaded by either argument and affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At approximately 3:25 p.m. on November 12, 2024, a bystander called
911 to report that a man was chasing a maintenance worker with a knife
near Seaport Village. San Diego Harbor Police arrived on the scene to find
Hurtado walking around with a throwing knife wrapped in a red bandana in
his left hand. The victim, Felix Gonzalez, reported that Hurtado had thrown
his leaf blower in the bay and damaged his phone. The police took Hurtado
into custody, and the People charged him with assault with a deadly weapon

(count 1–Pen. Code § 245, subd. (a)(1);1 making a criminal threat (count 2–
§ 422); felony vandalism (count 3–§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1); battery (count 4–
§ 242); and robbery (count 5–§ 211).
A. Prosecution’s Case
1. Felix Gonzalez
Felix Gonzalez was working as a janitorial landscaper in Ruocco Park,
near Seaport Village, on November 12, 2024. He started his shift around 2:00
p.m. He was wearing an orange vest with a sweatshirt underneath.
Gonzalez was blowing debris with a “backpack” style leaf blower when
Hurtado approached and bumped into Gonzalez’s shoulder. Gonzalez asked
Hurtado, “could you move to the side or sit somewhere else so I could finish
my work?” but Hurtado just got closer. Gonzalez put the leaf blower down

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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and Hurtado started swinging at him, hitting him with a closed fist on the
left side of his jaw. Gonzalez had pepper spray in his vest pocket and sprayed
it at Hurtado. Hurtado got mad and threw Gonzalez’s backpack leaf blower

over a rock wall and into the water.2
Hurtado then reached inside a backpack that he was carrying and came
out with a six-inch knife and a red bandana in his left hand. Hurtado swung
the knife towards Gonzalaz, but Gonzalez turned and the knife hit him flat
against his back. Gonzalez said that when he first saw the knife, it was in a
case, or sheath, but that Hurtado pulled it out and it was not in the sheath
when he swung it at Gonzalez. The red bandana was wrapped around
Hurtado’s hand and part of the knife, but the top of the knife was exposed.
Later, during cross examination, Gonzalez testified that neither he nor his
clothes were cut when Hurtado hit him in the back with the knife and that
the knife was still in the sheath.
During the altercation, Gonzalez’s iPhone fell from his hand and
Hurtado picked it up. Gonzalez began following Hurtado at about 20 feet,
because he was scared of the knife, and asked him to give the phone back.
When the police arrived, Hurtado threw the phone on the ground. The screen
of the iPhone cracked, and it would no longer place calls. Gonzalez had to
purchase a new phone. He testified that the phone that broke was an iPhone
11 and that he had paid $450 for it. He did not specify the price of the
replacement phone.
Officers subsequently recovered the leaf blower from the bay. It was
full of sand and water and no longer worked.

2 Later, Gonzalez testified that Hurtado threw the leaf blower into the
water before he punched Gonzalez.

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2. The 911 Call
A dispatcher authenticated a recording of a 911 call that the San Diego
Harbor Police received at the time of the incident, and the prosecution played
the call for the jury. The caller, a sunglass vendor that was in the area at the
time of the attack, reported that a “maintenance guy” wearing a fluorescent
orange vest was yelling for help and that another individual with a knife was
trying to stab him.
3. Randy Bates
Randy Bates, the owner of the landscape business that Gonzalez
worked for testified as to the replacement cost of a backpack leaf blower. He
stated: “If you go buy one blower, it’s about 718 bucks. If you make a
purchase of 4 to 5,000 dollars’ worth of equipment, the price reduces down
[to] about $450.” Counsel then clarified that the replacement cost would be
either a high-end of $718 and a low-end of $450.
4. San Diego Harbor Police
a. Cole Magro
San Diego Harbor Police Officer Cole Magro arrived on the scene at
around 3:26 p.m. and saw a male subject carrying a sharp black object
wrapped in a red bandana in his left hand. He identified Hurtado as the
male that he saw. He said the object in his left hand was “a red bandana that
had a black blade or knife that was fixed that the bandana wrapped around,”
and explained that “fixed” meant that the knife did not fold.
b. Austin Loibl
San Diego Harbor Police Officer Austin Loibl also responded to the
scene around the same time. Officer Loibl participated in Hurtado’s arrest
and noted that he was compliant. Officer Loibl observed a knife and a red
bandana next to Hurtado’s left arm. Officer Loibl authenticated and the

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People showed the jury a video from his body worn camera at the time of
Hurtado’s arrest.
c. Naomi Marroquin
San Diego Harbor Police Officer Naomi Marroquin testified that, after
detaining Hurtado, officers found the black sheath, and another nearly
identical knife, in Hurtado’s backpack. Officer Marroquin identified a box of
evidence containing the red bandana, the black sheath, and the two black
knives. These items were displayed for the jury. The knives were made of
metal and their tips were sharp. The black sheath had more than one
opening to insert a knife and the prosecutor demonstrated for the jury that
the knives were easily inserted and removed from the sheath, such that they
could fall out if jostled.
B. Defense Case
Hurtado testified in his own defense. He said that he had left work
early that day because he was not feeling well, and that he went to the park
to practice throwing knives. The knives broke so he put them in his
backpack.
Later, he was walking through the park when he crossed paths with
Gonzalez. Gonzalez was blowing leaves and dust “all over the place.”
Gonzalez said, “If you don’t get the fuck out of here, I’m going to spray you in
the face with pepper spray.” Hurtado told Gonzalez that it was a public area
and that he would “have to put my hands on you” if Gonzalez sprayed him.
Hurtado tried to get away from Gonzalez and accidentally grabbed Gonzalez’s
phone while gathering his own belongings. When he realized, he tried to
throw the phone back to Gonzalez.
At first, Hurtado denied pulling the knife out but he then said, “I think
I did reach into my backpack and try to pull the thing – the knife out.”

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Hurtado maintained that Gonzalez had pepper sprayed him and that he was
just defending himself and trying to get away from Gonzalez.
C. Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Hurtado guilty on count 1, assault with a deadly
weapon, and found further that he personally used a dangerous and deadly
weapon, to wit, a knife, within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision
(c)(23). The jury also found Hurtado guilty of count 3, felony vandalism of
over $400. They found Hurtado not guilty on count 5, robbery, or the lesser
included offense of petty theft, and were unable to reach a verdict on the two
remaining counts. After polling the jury, the trial court declared a mistrial as
to counts 2 and 4.
The trial court sentenced Hurtado to a total term of three years, which
included the middle term of three years on count 1, and a concurrent middle
term of two years on count 3.
Hurtado filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Hurtado raises two arguments on appeal. First, he asserts that there
was insufficient evidence to support the conviction in count 1 because a knife
is not an inherently deadly weapon and, here, the evidence did not show that
he used the knife in a way that was capable of causing and likely to cause
great bodily injury or death. Second, he asserts that the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor
vandalism (value under $400.)
A. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Conviction for Assault with a
Deadly Weapon
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, . . . we
“examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is

6
reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People
v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215 (Houston).) “ ‘We do not reweigh
evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘We presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “[I]f the circumstances reasonably
justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because
the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary
finding.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
The substantial evidence standard of review is a deferential standard.
“ ‘When a trial court’s factual determination is attacked on the ground that
there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court
begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record,
there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will
support the determination.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998)
18 Cal.4th 667, 681.) An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
under the foregoing standards “bears an enormous burden.” (People
v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330.)
“The crime of assault with a deadly weapon has two components:
‘(1) the assault, and (2) the means by which the assault is committed.’ ” (In re
Raymundo M. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 78, 85 (Raymundo M.).) An assault is
an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent
injury on the person of another. (§ 240.) “[A]n assault can occur even when
the defendant makes no contact with the victim.” (Raymundo M., at p. 85.)
As used in section 245, subdivision (a)(1), a “deadly weapon” is any
object used in a way that is capable of producing and likely to produce death
or great bodily injury. (People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028.)

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“Some few objects, such as dirks and blackjacks, have been held to be deadly
weapons as a matter of law; the ordinary use for which they are designed
establishes their character as such. [Citation.] Other objects, while not
deadly per se, may be used, under certain circumstances, in a manner likely
to produce death or great bodily injury.” (Id. at p. 1029.) “ ‘Because a knife
can be, and usually is, used for innocent purposes, it is not among the few
objects that are inherently deadly weapons.’ ” (Raymundo M., supra, 52
Cal.App.5th at p. 86.)
Here, Hurtado contends that the evidence was not sufficient to prove
that he used the knife in a manner to qualify as a dangerous weapon under
section 345, subdivision (a)(1). His primary assertion in that regard is that
Gonzalez testified that the knife was covered in a sheath and therefore could
not cut him. However, the evidence on this point was mixed at best.
Gonzalez testified that Hurtado swung the knife at him, that he was
scared, and that he turned to run away from Hurtado. Gonzalez felt the
knife hit him against the back, but it did not cut his clothes or his person.
During cross-examination, Gonzalez agreed with defense counsel that the
knife was still in the sheath or cover. However, his testimony on this point
was not consistent.
At one point Gonzalez said that the knife was not in the sheath. At
another, he said that the bandana was wrapped around the knife, in
Hurtado’s left hand, but that the top of the knife was exposed. Later, on
cross-examination, and directly after agreeing with defense counsel that he
never got cut, Gonzalez also agreed that “the knife was still in the sheath,” or
“in the case.” Later still, Gonzalez said that he told the police that he
thought “the knife was still in the casing when I got hit because I didn’t get
cut,” but clarified that he meant “the red rag around [Hurtado’s] hand.”

8
Thus, it would have been reasonable for the jury to conclude that Gonzalez
simply meant that the knife was partially covered by something, perhaps the
bandana.
Along with Hurtado’s own testimony, the jury also heard the 911 call,
in which a witness said that an individual with a knife was trying to stab
Gonzalez, thereby suggesting that the knife was visible and that Hurtado
was using it in a manner that at least suggested he was trying to stab
Gonazlez. Several members of the San Diego Harbor Police also told the jury
that when they arrived, Hurtado had a knife in his left hand, with a bandana
wrapped around it. The sheath was in Hurtado’s backpack. This testimony
suggested further that the knife was not in the sheath when Hurtado was
swinging it in his left hand with the bandana. In addition, the prosecutor
presented the sheath to the jury, and Officer Marroquin indicated that it had
two openings in it. No witness testified that Hurtado was swinging around a
double sheath, or an object significantly larger than the knife itself.
Finally, when Hurtado testified, he admitted that he did “try” to pull
the knife out of his backpack. He asserted that he did so in self-defense, after
Gonzalez pepper sprayed him, and never mentioned leaving the knife in the
sheath or using it in a non-threatening manner.
Hurtado asserts there was testimony that the knife was black, and that
testimony suggests that the knife was in the sheath, but no one testified that
the blade was a color other than black (i.e., silver or shiny), and in any event,
the prosecution showed the knife and the sheath to the jury.
The jury was entitled to weigh the foregoing evidence and resolve any
conflicts. We do not do so on appeal. (Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1215.)
Under the applicable standard of review, and based on the entire trial court
record, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the

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knife was not in the sheath when Hurtado swung it at Gonzalez. Rather, the
bandana was wrapped around the handle of the knife (which Hurtado
testified was broken), in Hurtado’s left hand, and at least the top portion of
the knife was exposed.
In the context of the foregoing evidence, we must then consider
whether Hurtado swinging the knife, wrapped in a bandana with the top
exposed, constituted using it in a manner that it was capable of producing
and likely to produce death or great bodily injury. There is little doubt that
swinging the sharp end of a knife towards an individual could cause death or
great bodily injury. And the jury was entitled to credit the testimony of
Gonzalez, who said he was scared, and the 911 caller that said Hurtado was
trying to stab Gonzalez.
In Raymundo M., the court found that a juvenile raising a knife from
waist-high to head-high and then lunging towards the victim, who was 10 to
12 feet away, was sufficient to support a finding that the weapon was used in
a manner capable of and likely to produce death or great bodily injury.
(Raymundo M., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 87–88.) Likewise, here, had
Gonzalez not turned to run away from Hurtado, he may well have been
injured by the sharp end of the knife that Hurtado was swinging in his
direction. The fact that Gonzalez was not in fact injured, because of his own
defensive maneuver, is not dispositive. (See People v. Chance (2008)
44 Cal.4th 1164, 1173 [“assault may occur even when the infliction of injury
is prevented by environmental conditions or by steps taken by victims to
protect themselves”]; People v. Page (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1472
[discussing cases finding assault with a deadly weapon based on evidence of a
“hard, sharp, pointy thing that was used only to threaten, and not actually
used to stab”].)

10
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence
to support the conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. We reject
Hurtado’s assertion that he suffered a violation of his right to due process for
the same reasons.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Not Instructing the Jury on
Misdemeanor Vandalism
Hurtado next contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct
the jury on misdemeanor vandalism, a lesser, or necessarily, included offense
of felony vandalism. We review the alleged failure by the trial court to
instruct on an assertedly lesser included offense de novo. (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218.)
As the trial court explained, the only difference between felony and
misdemeanor vandalism is whether “the amount of defacement, damage, or
destruction is four hundred dollars ($400) or more.” (§ 594, subd. (b)(1).)
Accordingly, there is no dispute that misdemeanor vandalism is a lesser
included offense of felony vandalism. (See Sangha v. LaBarbera (2006)
146 Cal.App.4th 79, 89.)
The trial court initially proposed giving the instruction, because, as it
explained, “the jury could theoretically” decide that Hurtado did damage
Gonzalez’s phone but that the value was not $400 or more. Defense counsel
responded, “if the court feels it’s necessary, that is fine. But for the defense,
the vandalism charge is not the hill I’m going to die on.” Notably, the court
also discussed the fact that there were two vandalisms, the leaf blower and
the phone. Later, the prosecutor asked, “Did the court want the LIO (lesser
included offense) from vandalism still?” and the court responded,
“No . . . because you all agreed you don’t want it.” Defense counsel did not
dispute that characterization.

11
The trial court instructed the jury on felony vandalism using

CALCRIM No. 2900.3 It did not instruct the jury on misdemeanor
vandalism.
The People assert that Hurtado’s argument is barred under the
doctrine of invited error based on the foregoing exchange. Invited error
applies when “ ‘if counsel expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in
suggesting, resisting, or acceding to an instruction.’ ” (People v. Cooper (1991)
53 Cal.3d 771, 830.) Hurtado contends that counsel did not make a tactical
decision and merely acquiesced to the trial court. We will reach the merits of
Hurtado’s argument. But, as we explain, we conclude that there was not
substantial evidence to support the misdemeanor instruction and that any
error was harmless.
The court is required to instruct the jury on a necessarily included
offense when there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for the
lesser offense. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154–155.) Here,
there is no dispute the misdemeanor vandalism is a lesser, or necessarily,
included offense of felony vandalism, and that the only difference is the value
of the damage. There is also no dispute that the charges related to two

3 As given, CALCRIM No. 2900 states, in relevant part:
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People
must prove that:
1. The defendant maliciously damaged or destroyed
property;
2. The defendant did not own the property
AND
3. The amount of damage caused by the vandalism was
$400 or more.
Someone acts maliciously when he or she intentionally does a
wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent
to annoy or injure someone else.”

12
instances of vandalism, the leaf blower and the iPhone, and that either or
both could be used to meet the threshold amount of $400.
“[S]ection 594 does not itself specify a method for proving the amount of
property damage in a vandalism prosecution,” but courts have considered
statutory approaches for determining restitution when addressing sufficiency
of the evidence to support the $400 element of felony vandalism. (In re Kyle
T. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 707, 713.) In that context, the economic loss
associated with vandalism is typically based on the actual cost of repairing
the item when repair is possible, or the replacement cost if it is not. (Ibid.; In
re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1387.) And, as relevant here,
“multiple instances of misdemeanor vandalism can be aggregated to form a
single felony, unless ‘the evidence shows that the offenses are separate and
distinct and were not committed pursuant to one intention, one general
impulse, and one plan.’ ” (In re Arthur V. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 61, 69.)
Although the trial court stated that it was feasible that the jury “could
theoretically” find that the damage to Gonzalez’s iPhone was less than $400,
there was no evidence or testimony to that effect. The only evidence
presented to the jury regarding the amount of damage to the iPhone was that
it had cost Gonzalez $450, that it was rendered completely inoperable, and
that Gonzalez had to buy a new phone. Likewise, the only evidence
presented regarding the value of the damage caused to the backpack leaf
blower was that it was also rendered inoperable and that it cost a minimum
of $450 to replace.
Hurtado argues that Bates’s testimony could be read to conclude that
the replacement cost if buying in bulk was $718 minus $450. We disagree.
Bates clarified that the low-end was $450. Thus, the only evidence before the
jury was that each item cost at least $450 to replace. Hurtado also asserts

13
that the items were older than when first purchased, and therefore of lesser
value at the time the vandalism occurred. But that does not negate the fact
that the only evidence before the jury was that either item cost at least $450,
and that each of them had to be replaced. Moreover, while it may be common
knowledge that one can buy an older, used cell phone, there was no such
testimony regarding the leaf blower, a more specialized item. While the jury
could have found that either item was not vandalized, there was not
sufficient evidence from which it could find that either the iPhone or the leaf
blower was vandalized but that the value of the damage was less than $400.
In any event, even if there was evidence to support the instruction on
misdemeanor vandalism, we would conclude that any error in failing to give
it was harmless. “ ‘The erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included
offense generally is subject to harmless error review under the standard of
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, [836–837]. Reversal is required only if
it is reasonably probable the jury would have returned a different verdict
absent the error or errors complained of.’ ” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th
1179, 1267.) Under this standard, a defendant must demonstrate it is
“reasonably probable” the jury would have returned a more favorable verdict
if the omitted lesser instruction had been given. (Ibid.) Here, the evidence
regarding the leaf blower was largely undisputed. Hurtado threw the leaf
blower into the bay, the harbor police recovered it, it was rendered completely
inoperable, and the cost to replace it was at least $450. That evidence alone
was sufficient for the jury to find Hurtado guilty of felony vandalism.
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err by declining to
instruct the jury on misdemeanor vandalism, and that any error would have
necessarily been harmless as a result. As with the prior argument, Hurtado’s
due process rights were not violated for the same reasons.

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III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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