Filed 8/18/26 P. v. Huerta CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B342723
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA418807)
v.
NATHANIEL HUERTA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Benjamin Owens, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Nima Razfar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________
Nathaniel Huerta appeals the trial court’s order denying
his petition for vacatur of his manslaughter conviction and
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95
(subsequently renumbered as Penal Code section § 1172.6).1
Following an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the trial court
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Huerta could still be
convicted of murder under the current laws as a direct aider and
abettor, who either intended to kill or acted with implied malice.
On appeal, Huerta contends there was insufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s ruling. We conclude that substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Huerta aided and
abetted the murder with implied malice. We therefore affirm the
court’s order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Charges
An amended information filed on February 8, 2016, charged
Huerta with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and alleged gang
(§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(C) & (b)(5)) and gun enhancements
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d), (e)(1)).
B. Preliminary Hearing
The preliminary hearing was held on October 7, 2017.
Detective Brian Calicchia testified that on September 30, 2012,
he responded to a report of a homicide. When he arrived at the
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
scene, Detective Calicchia observed a north-south alleyway in
which there was a bicycle, a shirt, and several spent cartridge
casings. A person named Ever Marroquin had been shot, but
Marroquin had been transported from the scene to a hospital
before the detective arrived. Detective Calicchia canvassed the
area and located three surveillance cameras. The detective
reviewed the video and was able to locate a vehicle consistent
with the vehicle that witnesses at the scene described to him.
Detective Calicchia interviewed Horacheo Jones, who was a
friend of Marroquin’s and had been with him prior to the
shooting. The two had just separated and Marroquin was riding
away on his bicycle. Jones said he saw a white vehicle and that it
drew his attention because a rear passenger began opening the
door while the vehicle was moving. The vehicle stopped next to
Marroquin. A person got out of the back seat and punched
Marroquin, causing him to fall off his bicycle. The person then
shot a semi-automatic firearm at Marroquin while Marroquin
was on the ground. Jones described the vehicle as a boxy 1980’s
model with lightly tinted windows, possibly an Acura. The
shooter was a thin black male, approximately five feet eight
inches tall with a short fade haircut.
Detective Calicchia also spoke to Leanna Billman, who was
in a car with her husband or boyfriend when she heard several
gunshots. She saw a boxy white vehicle stopped in the road.
There was a male standing outside of the car. Billman saw him
shoot two or three additional rounds from a handgun in a
downward trajectory. Billman did not see Marroquin at first, but
she noticed him when they drove further down the street. He
was lying in the alleyway. Billman described the shooter as a
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thin black male, five feet eleven inches to six feet tall, with a dark
complexion.2
Detective Calicchia arrested Huerta in February 2013.
Huerta agreed to speak with Detective Calicchia after the
detective read Huerta his Miranda rights. Huerta said he had
been a member of the Barrio Mojados gang for six years and that
he went by the moniker “Wino.” Initially, Huerta denied being
involved in the shooting. Later, Huerta said he was the driver
and he had one front passenger and one rear passenger. The
detective showed Huerta a still photo of the suspect vehicle taken
from the surveillance video. Huerta said the vehicle in the still
photo was his car, a white 1990 Toyota Corolla. Huerta was
released.
On November 26, 2013, police arrested Huerta a second
time and placed him in a cell with a confidential informant.
Detective Calicchia listened to a recording of the conversation
and testified regarding its contents at the preliminary hearing.
Huerta told the informant that on September 30, 2012, he was
driving other gang members in his car when one of them exited
the vehicle and shot a rival Sur 13 gang member. Huerta said
they were driving to Hollywood to look for rival gang members
and happened upon the victim in their own territory. After the
shooting, Huerta drove home and cleaned his car. He wiped it
down for prints and made sure there was no blood and no
evidence in the vehicle. Huerta told the informant that he was in
2 As we discuss below, at the evidentiary hearing on
Huerta’s petition to vacate his manslaughter conviction and to be
resentenced, the trial court excluded, and did not consider
Detective Calicchia’s testimony regarding the statements made to
him by Jones and Billman.
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custody for murder. The informant asked if Huerta was the
driver. Detective Calicchia said Huerta responded, “ ‘Yeah, I was
the driver, but I didn’t shoot,’ something to that effect.” The
detective did not recall Huerta saying that he knew the shooter
was going to get out of the car and shoot the victim. Huerta did
not say that he encouraged the shooter to get out of the car and
shoot the victim. Huerta never said that he knew that the
shooter had a gun before the shooting.
Officer Jordan Ornelas, who had significant experience
with the local gangs and was assigned to monitor Barrio Mojados,
testified regarding the gang’s territory, signs and symbols, and
activities. Members of Barrio Mojados had engaged in narcotics
sales, illegal weapons possessions, assaults with a deadly
weapon, robberies, attempted murders, and murders. One of
their rivals was the Su Trece gang. One of Su Trece’s cliques was
located in Hollywood. Marroquin was a member of Su Trece.
Huerta was a self-admitted member of Barrio Mojados and had
tattoos associated with the gang.
The prosecutor introduced a certified minute order
reflecting that Jose Antonio Lomeli was convicted of murder on
July 17, 2009. The prosecutor also introduced a certified minute
order reflecting that Andres Prado was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter on January 8, 2011. Officer Ornelas opined that
Lomeli and Prado were Barrio Mojados members. The prosecutor
gave Officer Ornelas a hypothetical mirroring the facts of the
present case. Officer Ornelas opined that the shooting was done
in association with and for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
The officer’s opinion was based on his knowledge that when a
gang member commits a murder or a shooting of a rival gang
member, it instills fear in the community and in rival gangs.
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Other gangs will not want to confront them. It also increases the
reputation of the gang members who are involved in the crime.
The parties stipulated that on October 5, 2012, a coroner
performed an autopsy and concluded that the cause of
Marroquin’s death was multiple gunshot wounds.
C. Plea Colloquy and Sentencing
In a hearing held on February 9, 2016, the People amended
the information to add count 2, alleging voluntary manslaughter
(§ 192, subd. (a)) with associated gang (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(C))
and gun enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)(1)).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Huerta pleaded guilty to
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted the allegations that
he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), and that a principal discharged a
firearm in the commission of the crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)).
Huerta stipulated to a factual basis for the plea based upon the
police reports and the preliminary hearing transcript. The trial
court sentenced Huerta to six years for manslaughter, plus 20
years for the firearm enhancement, and stayed the gang
enhancement.
D. Section 1172.6 Petition
On October 25, 2022, Huerta filed in pro. per., a form
petition for relief pursuant to section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6).
The People filed a response on April 30, 2024, arguing that
the record of conviction showed Huerta was charged and
convicted as the driver and direct aider and abettor in a gang-
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motivated shooting. This was the only theory that the
preliminary hearing transcripts supported. The People attached
to the response the transcript of the plea colloquy and the
preliminary hearing transcript.
On May 20, 2024, Huerta filed a prima facie brief through
appointed counsel. Huerta argued that police reports and the
statements of officers relating the out-of-court statements of
declarants offered for the truth of the matter asserted could not
be considered at the prima facie stage. Huerta further argued
that his stipulation to the preliminary hearing transcript was not
a binding admission and could not be used to demonstrate that
he acted with malice. Huerta asserted that the record of
conviction did not eliminate the possibility that he could be tried
on a natural and probable consequences theory of murder or that
malice could not have been imputed to him based solely on his
participation in another crime. Huerta contended that there was
no evidence of his intent and no evidence that he knew the
shooter was armed or that the shooter planned to use violence.
At a prima facie hearing held on June 20, 2024, both
parties relied on the preliminary hearing transcript. The court
concluded that it could not find Huerta ineligible for prima facie
relief because the court would have to engage in impermissible
fact finding and make a credibility determination to do so. The
court concluded that under the circumstances it had no choice
other than to find Huerta prima facie eligible for relief, issue an
order to show cause, and conduct an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
On November 20, 2024, Huerta filed an evidentiary hearing
brief. Huerta argued that Detective Calicchia’s testimony
relaying the statements of percipient witnesses Jones and
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Billman was inadmissible hearsay. Huerta also objected to
Detective Calicchia testifying regarding statements that Huerta
made to the confidential informant as inadmissible hearsay.
Huerta asserted that the preliminary hearing transcript was not
a binding admission.
On December 13, 2024, the People filed an evidentiary
hearing brief. The People claimed that Detective Calicchia’s
testimony regarding Huerta’s statements to the confidential
informant demonstrated that Heurta was convicted as the driver
and an aider and abettor in a gang-motivated shooting.
At an evidentiary hearing held on December 13, 2024, the
trial court considered the preliminary hearing transcript except
for the testimony of Detective Calicchia relaying the statements
of witnesses Jones and Billman. Huerta chose not to testify on
his own behalf.
Defense counsel argued that Huerta’s statement to the
confidential informant that they were “ ‘looking for’ ” rival gang
members was not equivalent to a statement that he and his
companions were planning to shoot a rival gang member. There
was no indication in the record that Huerta knew there was a
firearm in his car. The prosecutor responded that in his
statement to the confidential informant Huerta mentioned a
motive for a murder, which was proof that Huerta intended to
kill.
The trial court denied the petition because the court found
that Huerta was an aider and abettor who acted with intent to
kill or with reckless indifference to human life. The court further
found that Huerta acted with implied malice.
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DISCUSSION
Huerta contends there is insufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s finding that Huerta could still be found guilty of
murder beyond a reasonable doubt because he intended to kill or
the court’s alternative finding that Huerta acted with implied
malice. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that Huerta could still be convicted beyond a
reasonable doubt as a direct aider and abettor of implied malice
murder.3
A. Legal Principles
1. Section 1172.6
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill 1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).)” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) As
relevant here, the bill eliminated murder liability predicated on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 188,
3 Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s implied malice finding, we decline to discuss the
court’s finding that Huerta intended to kill.
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subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2; People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707, fn. 1.)
“ ‘[N]otwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of
natural and probable consequences liability for second degree
murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to
aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the
person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of
another and acts with conscious disregard for life.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990 (Reyes).) “[A]
defendant may directly aid and abet an implied malice murder.
(See People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 588–591;
People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485,
499; People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 710–714,
(Powell); see also People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 979–
983.)” (Ibid.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95,
now section 1172.6, to provide a procedure for those convicted of
murder to seek resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)−(c).) If the
sentencing court determines the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and
hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder
conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At the evidentiary
hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder
. . . under California law as amended by the changes to [s]ection
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).)
“[A] trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is
reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Under this
standard, we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light most favorable to
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the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty [of murder under a still-valid theory] beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.)
We will not reverse unless there is no hypothesis upon
which sufficient substantial evidence exists to support the trial
court’s decision. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We
must “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People
v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The same standard applies
when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.”
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “An appellate court
must accept logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might have
drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
2. Implied Malice Murder
“Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing
is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ (People
v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143 (Knoller).)” (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) “[T]he defendant’s act must not merely be
dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must
‘ “involve[ ] a high degree of probability that it will result in
death.” ’ (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152; see ibid. [under
the objective component of implied malice, ‘ “ ‘dangerous to life’ ” ’
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means the same thing as a ‘ “high degree of probability that” ’ the
act in question ‘ “will result in death” ’]; People v. Cravens (2012)
53 Cal.4th 500, 513 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [‘Although an act that
will certainly lead to death is not required, the probability of
death from the act must be more than remote or merely
possible[ ]’].)” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.)
3. Direct Aiding and Abetting Implied Malice
Murder
“ ‘[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the combined
actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own
mens rea. ([People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122].) In
the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the
perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the
direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts
constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act.
Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider
and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the
life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea,
which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and
abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the
act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act,
knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in
conscious disregard for human life.’ [Citations.]” (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 990–991.)
In contrast, “ ‘[t]he natural and probable consequences
doctrine did not require that the aider and abettor intend to aid
the perpetrator in committing a life-endangering act . . . . What
was natural and probable was judged by an objective standard
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and it was enough that murder was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the crime aided and abetted.’ (Powell, supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at p. 711, fn. 26.)” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 990–991.)
B. Analysis
Huerta argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support
the finding that he knew the shooting was going to take place
before it occurred, and thus he could not have aided and abetted
the shooting, which was the life-endangering act. We conclude
there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to infer that
Huerta knew the perpetrator intended to shoot a rival gang
member.4
At the preliminary hearing, Officer Ornelas testified that
he was assigned to monitor the Barrio Mojados criminal street
gang. A criminal street gang is defined as “an ongoing, organized
association or group of three or more persons, whether formal or
informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission
of one or more [enumerated] criminal acts . . . having a common
name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal
gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f).) Officer Ornelas testified that
Huerta was a self-proclaimed Barrio Mojados member, and that
the officer believed Huerta to be a Barrio Mojados member.
Detective Calicchia testified that in 2013 Huerta told him he had
4 Huerta does not argue that he did not know a shooting
was a life-endangering act or that driving the perpetrator to
search for rivals to shoot did not aid and abet the shooting.
13
been a Barrio Mojados member for six years—i.e., since
approximately 2007.
Officer Ornelas stated that the Barrio Mojados gang’s
primary activities included assaults with deadly weapons,
attempted murders, and murders, among other crimes. The
prosecution introduced certified minute orders evidencing that
Barrio Mojados members had been convicted of murder in 2009
and voluntary manslaughter in 2011. Both convictions occurred
during the time that Huerta claimed he was a Barrios Mojados
member. As a Barrio Mojados member during that time and as a
long-standing member of the gang at the time of the shooting, it
is a reasonable inference that Huerta would be aware that his
fellow gang members engaged in a pattern of criminal conduct
involving firearms and violence that resulted in death and severe
bodily injury.
Given a hypothetical mirroring the facts of this case,
Officer Ornelas opined that the shooting was done in association
with and for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Officer Ornelas
testified that gangs shot and killed rivals to discourage other
gangs from confronting them and that individuals involved in
these shootings and killings would enhance their reputations.
Huerta told the informant that he and his companions were
looking for rival gang members. There is sufficient evidence
tending to show that Huerta and his companions were motivated
to shoot a rival gang member and that they were looking for
rivals with the intent to commit a shooting.
Huerta also told the informant that he was arrested for
murder. There was no evidence that Huerta told the informant
that he did not know the perpetrator intended to shoot or that he
tried to distance himself from the murder when speaking with
14
the informant, as one would likely do if surprised by the shooting.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Huerta acted with implied malice.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Huerta’s petition
for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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