Filed 9/10/26 P. v. Hudson CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089136
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CR-22-000659)
v.
STEVIE ALEXANDER HUDSON II,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Robert B.
Westbrook, Judge.
Law Offices of Marsanne Weese, Marsanne Weese, and Rose Mishaan for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Galen N. Farris, Robert
Gezi, and Meghan Cox, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In 2021, appellant Stevie Alexander Hudson II was stopped by a sheriff’s deputy
for driving at night with an inoperative headlight. During the stop, appellant appeared
agitated, and the deputy called for backup. When ordered to do so, appellant refused to
exit his vehicle, and he was arrested for resisting a peace officer. His vehicle was taken
into custody and searched. Three firearms, over 3,000 rounds of ammunition, and
hallucinogenic mushrooms were discovered.
Appellant moved to suppress this evidence, contending that his detention was
unconstitutionally prolonged and that the search of his vehicle violated the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The trial court denied the motion to
suppress, which appellant appeals.
We reject appellant’s arguments. The traffic stop was lawfully initiated, and the
deputies had legitimate safety concerns that justified any brief extension of the detention.
Appellant’s vehicle was properly impounded after he was lawfully arrested, and a valid
inventory search was conducted. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial.
BACKGROUND
I. The Traffic Stop.
This incident occurred late one night in September 2021. At the suppression
hearing, the parties stipulated that the deputies lacked a warrant.
The encounter was captured on body-worn cameras. A defense witness compiled
the footage into a single synchronized video, which was admitted into evidence at the
suppression hearing. We have independently reviewed the footage.
The traffic stop was initiated when Deputy Domingos observed appellant’s vehicle
being operated without a working forward headlight. Domingos activated the emergency
lights on his patrol vehicle as appellant’s vehicle entered a Starbucks parking lot.
Appellant drove his vehicle into the drive-thru lane, and he placed an order. Appellant
then waited in the drive-thru line behind another car. Domingos stopped his patrol
2.
vehicle behind appellant’s vehicle in the drive-thru lane, and Domingos contacted
appellant, who remained seated in his car.
Deputy Domingos observed a large amount of clutter inside appellant’s vehicle,
which caused him concern that weapons could be hidden beneath the clutter. He also
found appellant to be hostile and verbally abusive. Based on his training and experience,
Domingos believed the circumstances posed a risk to officer safety and he requested
backup. Domingos began writing a traffic citation for the headlight violation.
Deputies Fuentes and Callahan arrived on scene. Deputy Domingos was still
writing the citation. Fuentes and Callahan waited at the driver’s side of Domingos’s
patrol vehicle while Domingos continued working on the citation from the passenger
side. Callahan observed that appellant appeared aggravated, angry, and argumentative
about the traffic stop. He saw appellant repeatedly look back toward the deputies and
then into his own vehicle, which Callahan considered “abnormal” behavior. Fuentes
observed appellant making “sudden” movements while seated in the driver’s seat, and
appellant appeared argumentative.
II. The Arrest.
It was nighttime, the deputies did not know what was inside appellant’s vehicle,
and appellant appeared agitated. The deputies decided to have appellant exit his vehicle
for officer safety purposes. The deputies repeatedly ordered appellant to exit his vehicle,
but he refused. The deputies forcibly removed appellant from the vehicle. Appellant
resisted their efforts, and Deputy Callahan deployed a taser. After falling to the ground,
appellant continued to resist until the deputies were able to handcuff him. He was
arrested for resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer in violation of Penal Code
section 148, subdivision (a)(1).1
1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
3.
III. The Inventory Search of Appellant’s Vehicle.
Because appellant’s vehicle was in the drive-thru lane, Deputy Domingos decided
to tow it. The vehicle was first moved out of the drive-thru lane and into the Starbucks
parking lot. Pursuant to department policy and Vehicle Code section 22651,
subdivision (h)(1),2 the vehicle was towed to a storage facility. The sheriff department’s
policy authorized an inventory search of the vehicle—including all compartments, items,
and locked containers—prior to towing in order to protect the owner’s property and to
shield the department from potential false claims of theft.
Prior to towing, deputies conducted an inventory search of appellant’s vehicle in
the Starbucks parking lot. The search revealed three firearms, over 3,000 rounds of
ammunition, and hallucinogenic mushrooms. One of the firearms was located in a
backpack in the back seat behind the driver’s seat.
IV. The Motion to Suppress.
Appellant was charged with one felony count of possession of an assault weapon
(§ 30605, subd. (a); count 1), one misdemeanor count of carrying a loaded firearm
(§ 25850, subd. (a); count 2), and one misdemeanor count of resisting, delaying, or
obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 3).
Following a preliminary hearing, appellant was held to answer. Appellant filed a
motion to suppress under section 1538.5. He argued that his vehicle had been searched
without probable cause, and his detention had been unconstitutionally prolonged. The
prosecution filed a written opposition.
The motion was heard in August 2023, and the trial court denied it in a written
order. The court concluded that the deputies had removed appellant from his vehicle for
officer safety, which was objectively reasonable. The subsequent search of the vehicle
2 Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (h)(1), permits a peace officer to remove
a vehicle if an officer arrests the driver for an alleged offense and that person is taken into
custody.
4.
was justified because appellant had been arrested and his vehicle needed to be towed
away.
V. The Change of Plea and Sentencing.
After his motion to suppress was denied, appellant pleaded no contest to
misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) and carrying a loaded firearm (§ 25850,
subd. (a)). In December 2024, the trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and
placed appellant on informal probation for 12 months.
We turn to the arguments on appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion to Suppress.
According to appellant, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He
asks that we reverse the denial of his motion and order suppression of the evidence that
was discovered during the search of his vehicle.
Appellant raises two arguments. First, he contends that his detention was
unconstitutionally prolonged. Second, he asserts that the search of his vehicle was
unlawful because it was not supported by any exception to the warrant requirement.
We reject appellant’s arguments and affirm the denial.
A. The standard of review.
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we rely on the trial court’s express
and implied factual findings, provided they are supported by substantial evidence. We
independently determine whether the search was constitutional. (People v. Brown (2015)
61 Cal.4th 968, 975; People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 979.)
B. An overview of the applicable law.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures by government actors. (U.S. Const., 4th
Amend.) This right is enforceable against the states through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125.)
5.
A warrantless search or seizure is presumed unconstitutional, and the government
bears the burden of establishing that its action fell within an exception to the warrant
requirement. (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1156.) Whether a seizure is
reasonable is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. (South Dakota v.
Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 373; People v. Rogers, supra, at p. 1160.) The
impoundment of an automobile constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. (Miranda v. City of Cornelius (9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 858, 862.)
II. Appellant’s Detention Was Not Unconstitutionally Prolonged.
A traffic stop may last no longer than reasonably necessary to address the traffic
violation and attend to related officer-safety concerns. (Rodriguez v. United States
(2015) 575 U.S. 348, 354; People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 936–937 (Ayon).)
There is no fixed time limit; the detention remains lawful so long as the officers
diligently pursue the traffic investigation and any legitimate safety issues that arise.
(Rodriguez, at p. 354; Ayon, at p. 937; People v. Vera (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1086–
1087.)
Appellant contends that his detention was unconstitutionally prolonged. Relying
primarily on Ayon and People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577 (plur. opn.)
(McGaughran), he argues that the deputies unlawfully extended the stop beyond the time
needed to address the headlight violation. We disagree. This case is materially
distinguishable from Ayon and McGaughran.
In Ayon, officers promptly completed the traffic-related tasks but then
unconstitutionally detained the defendant for over 18 minutes while waiting for and
deploying a narcotics dog on a matter unrelated to the stop. (Ayon, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 938, 944.) In McGaughran, the officer initiated a traffic stop but, instead of
issuing the warning he normally would have given for that infraction, prolonged the
detention to conduct unrelated warrant checks. (McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at
pp. 581, 585–586.)
6.
In the present matter, Deputy Domingos lawfully stopped appellant for driving at
night without a functioning forward headlight. (Veh. Code, § 24400, subds. (a) & (b).)
Almost immediately upon contact, appellant appeared agitated. He refused to remove the
keys from the ignition, stating he needed to retrieve the drink he had just ordered. He
accused Domingos of “fucking ridiculous” conduct and declared, “It’s all you’re fucking
doing is looking for an excuse to fucking turn it into something else.” When Domingos
asks whether appellant is on probation or parole, appellant responds sarcastically, asking
“Do I look like I’m on probation or parole?”
While still actively writing the citation, Deputy Domingos called for backup due
to appellant’s immediate hostile and agitated demeanor, and the large amount of clutter in
the vehicle that reasonably raised concerns about a readily accessible weapon. Backup
arrived in less than two minutes. Appellant periodically leaned out of his window while
the deputies remained near Domingos’s patrol vehicle. Less than nine minutes after the
stop began, the deputies ordered appellant multiple times to exit his vehicle. He refused.
Appellant was forcibly removed from his vehicle. Appellant resisted the entire time,
struggling with the deputies, and he was tasered. After falling to the ground, he
continued to resist before he was eventually handcuffed.
Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when Deputy Domingos
asked him about his parole status. Such a question is only “ ‘negligibly burdensome’ ”
and reasonably related to officer safety. (U.S. v. Ramirez (9th Cir. 2024) 98 F.4th 1141,
1144.)
Once he was lawfully stopped for the traffic violation, the deputies were permitted
to order appellant to exit his vehicle. Such an order does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. (Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 412; Pennsylvania v. Mimms
(1977) 434 U.S. 106, 111, fn. 6.)
Unlike Ayon and McGaughran, the passage of time here was not the product of the
deputies pursuing an unrelated investigation. The body-worn camera footage confirms
7.
that the deputies never abandoned the citation process. Rather, any brief extension of the
stop was a direct and reasonable response to legitimate officer-safety concerns created by
appellant’s hostile demeanor, the clutter in his vehicle, and the totality of the
circumstances. Appellant’s own statements and conduct contributed to the tense
atmosphere. Ayon and McGaughran are distinguishable. Appellant’s arguments—that
his refusal to cooperate and agitated demeanor could not justify the detention—are
without merit. On this record, this detention was not unconstitutionally prolonged.
III. The Search of Appellant’s Vehicle Was Constitutional.
In his second claim, appellant asserts that the warrantless search of his vehicle was
unlawful. He contends that the prosecution failed to present any evidence that justified
the search.
Respondent raises the forfeiture doctrine, asserting that appellant failed to do
enough to preserve for appeal any argument that the deputies did not lawfully impound
appellant’s vehicle and/or that the search was not done in good faith or pursuant to
standardized policies. Respondent also contends that this claim fails on its merits.
We need not resolve the parties’ disputed points regarding the forfeiture doctrine.
Instead, this claim fails on its merits. Consequently, we focus on appellant’s substantive
assertions. As we explain below, we determine that the deputies conducted a valid
inventory search of appellant’s vehicle after lawfully impounding it following his arrest.3
We therefore conclude the search was constitutional.
3 Because the search was justified as a valid inventory search, we need not address
the automobile exception, which appellant briefly mentions. (See People v. Lopez (2019)
8 Cal.5th 353, 372.) This exception to the warrant requirement is inapplicable here. The
trial court correctly determined that the search was a valid inventory search conducted
after appellant’s lawful arrest and the lawful decision to impound and tow his vehicle
from the drive-thru lane.
8.
A. The vehicle was lawfully impounded.
Appellant contends that the deputies did not lawfully impound his vehicle, arguing
that the “community caretaking” doctrine did not justify the tow because his vehicle was
not disabled, abandoned, illegally parked, or posing an immediate hazard to traffic. He
argues that the deputies merely moved his vehicle to the Starbucks parking lot and there
was no valid basis for impoundment. He primarily relies on two opinions: (1) Virgil v.
Superior Court (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 127 (Virgil); and (2) People v. Williams (2006)
145 Cal.App.4th 756 (Williams).
The community caretaking doctrine permits officers to impound a vehicle without
a warrant to protect public safety or private property, such as when a vehicle is disabled,
abandoned, or presents a hazard to traffic. (See South Dakota v. Opperman, supra,
428 U.S. at pp. 368–369; Halajian v. D & B Towing (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1, 15.)
If officers are authorized to impound a vehicle, a warrantless inventory search of
the vehicle pursuant to a standardized procedure is constitutionally reasonable. Inventory
searches are an established exception to the warrant requirement because they serve
important administrative and caretaking functions rather than investigatory ones.
(Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371 (Bertine); South Dakota v. Opperman,
supra, 428 U.S. at pp. 372–373.) Nonetheless, it is well established that “an inventory
search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating
evidence.” (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4.)
When an inventory search is conducted based on a decision to impound a vehicle,
our focus must be on the purpose of the impound because an inventory search conducted
pursuant to an unreasonable impound is itself unreasonable. (Williams, supra,
145 Cal.App.4th at p. 761; People v. Aguilar (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1053.) A
police officer is not required to adopt the least intrusive means. (Bertine, supra, 479 U.S.
at p. 374.) However, the action taken must nonetheless be reasonable because
9.
reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. (Florida v. Jimeno (1991)
500 U.S. 248, 250.)
Appellant’s cited authorities do not establish a constitutional violation in this
matter. In Virgil, the defendant was arrested, but other passengers in his vehicle could
have taken charge of his car. Had the defendant been given an opportunity, police
custodial care of the car would not have been required. As such, an inventory search of
that car was deemed unconstitutional. (Virgil, supra, 268 Cal.App.2d at pp. 132–133.)
In Williams, the defendant’s vehicle was legally parked in front of his residence
with proper registration. The defendant had a valid driver’s license and there was no
reason to believe the defendant was not in lawful possession of the car. In short, there
was no need for impoundment. (Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 762.)
In contrast to Virgil and Williams, the decision to impound appellant’s vehicle was
imminently reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. The deputies lawfully
arrested appellant and took him into custody. Because appellant was in custody, the
deputies were statutorily authorized to remove his vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 22651,
subd. (h)(1).)
Appellant was alone when he was taken into custody, and there is no evidence that
anyone else was willing and able to take possession of his vehicle. Appellant’s vehicle
was stopped in the drive-thru lane of an operating Starbucks. It was late at night.
Appellant’s vehicle could not remain in that location unattended because it was blocking
the drive-thru lane. Thus, removing the vehicle was justified. The deputies moved the
vehicle into the parking lot prior to towing, which was a practical and appropriate
response to the situation. Because the deputies’ actions were reasonable, no
constitutional violation occurred.
B. This was a valid inventory search.
Appellant further argues that, even if the impoundment was lawful, the search was
not a valid inventory search because it was not conducted in good faith or pursuant to
10.
standardized policies. He contends that the deputies merely used a ruse to search his
vehicle. We disagree.
The deputies conducted an inventory search in the Starbucks parking lot prior to
towing. Deputy Domingos made it clear at the suppression hearing that his department
had a policy regarding inventory searches. Under the policy, the deputies were
authorized to search all compartments, items, and locked containers to both protect the
owner’s property and to shield the department from false claims of theft.
Nothing in the record reasonably supports appellant’s claim that this search was
pretextual or a “ruse” to discover incriminating evidence. Instead, the deputies took
control of appellant’s vehicle pursuant to express statutory authority after he was validly
arrested. The trial court impliedly credited Deputy Domingos’s testimony, expressly
finding that the subsequent search was justified as an inventory search pursuant to the
need to tow the vehicle from the Starbucks drive thru. We will not disturb the court’s
credibility findings. (See People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 979.)
Because the inventory search followed a lawful impoundment and served
recognized administrative objectives, it did not require a separate showing of probable
cause. (Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 371.) The reasonable inferences to be drawn from
this record is that the inventory search was conducted for legitimate caretaking reasons—
to secure and document the vehicle’s contents—rather than as a pretext for an evidentiary
search. Nothing in the record reasonably suggests otherwise. Accordingly, we reject
appellant’s assertion that this search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Appellant’s claim fails.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress is affirmed.
11.
LEVY, J.
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
GUERRA, J.
12.