Filed 10/22/26 P. v. Hudson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yuba)
THE PEOPLE, C103022
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CRF2402563)
v.
MICHAEL LLOYD HUDSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Michael Lloyd Hudson threatened to kill a pastor who asked him to
stop cutting brush on church property. A jury convicted him of making a criminal threat.
On appeal, defendant contends his conviction must be reversed because it was not
supported by substantial evidence and the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the
lesser included offense of attempted criminal threat. We disagree and affirm. Statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
Defendant lived two houses away from the undeveloped side of the property of a
church. The victim, a pastor at that church, had “seen [defendant] around over the
years.”
Shortly before dark one evening, the victim drove his truck over to the
undeveloped side of the church’s property. He had noticed unauthorized piles of brush
accumulating there during the week and heard a chainsaw earlier that day. When the
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victim arrived, he found defendant and a woman sitting just outside the church gate. The
victim did not see a chainsaw. The victim rolled down his window and asked defendant
what he was doing. Defendant walked over, holding an approximately one-foot-long
metal flashlight in his hands. The woman remained seated by the gate, two or three feet
away from the front bumper of the victim’s truck and about five feet away from
defendant and the driver’s side window.
The woman and the victim gave differing accounts of the conversation that
ensued.
The woman, a friend of defendant, testified, “[s]ome of [the conversation] was
blocked out by the sound of the [victim’s truck] engine, but [she] could hear pretty much
everything.” From what she did hear, the victim was upset by their presence there.
Although defendant got “a little agitated,” as well, he did not raise his voice or threaten
anyone during their conversation. The victim left “right after” defendant told the victim
he and the woman would leave.
The victim testified defendant said he was “cutting on the brush and the piles.”
When the victim told defendant to stop cutting wood on church property, defendant
“started getting pretty loud[,] … visibly upset,” and using a lot of profanity. Defendant
ranted about wanting to kill code enforcement employees, sheriff’s deputies, and a
specific church member, telling the victim, “You tell [that member] I’ll kill him and his
family.” As he ranted, defendant paced around within a few feet of the victim’s truck
window and then ended up within “a foot or two” of the victim, still holding the
flashlight. At the close of his rant, defendant told the victim, “I’ll kill you.”
The victim further testified that he viewed the situation as “escalating rapidly” and
grew afraid for his own safety. As soon as defendant backed away from the truck enough
for the victim to reverse out without hitting defendant with his truck mirror, the victim
drove home. “Probably less than five minutes” passed between the threat and the victim
leaving. The victim was concerned for his safety the entire time.
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The next afternoon, the victim reported the incident to a sheriff deputy. When the
deputy asked the victim why he had not reported it earlier, the victim responded he was
afraid defendant would harm the victim and other church members and damage church
property.
That same day, deputies went to defendant’s house to look for him and found
defendant cutting brush inside of the fence on church property, “basically in the same
spot” the victim told the deputy defendant was the night before. The deputy asked
defendant about the threats, and defendant denied making them. Although initially “a
little calm,” defendant “started getting irate and angry” and raising his voice after the
deputy asked defendant if he knew the specific church member whom defendant
threatened to kill the previous night.
A jury convicted defendant of making a criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a)). Before
reaching this verdict, the jury requested readback from every witness and asked the court
for a definition of “immediate” as used in jury instructions stating the prosecution was
required to prove “the threat was so clear, immediate, unconditional, and specific that it
communicated to [the victim] a serious intention and the immediate prospect that the
threat would be carried out.”
In a bifurcated trial, the jury then found true several circumstances in aggravation
and a prior criminal threat conviction. The court found the prior conviction both a strike
and a prior serious felony and then sentenced defendant to six years.
Defendant timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant contends his conviction must be reversed because there was
insufficient evidence to show: (1) he harbored the specific intent that his statement be
taken as a threat, (2) his statement conveyed an “immediate prospect of execution,” and
(3) his statement actually caused the victim “to be placed in sustained fear” for his safety.
(§ 422, subd. (a)) Defendant further contends the trial court erred by not instructing the
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jury on the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threat. The People disagree
with all of these contentions, and so do we.
I. Substantial evidence issues
In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Bolin (1998)
18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
To prove a defendant made a criminal threat in violation of section 422, the
prosecution must establish all of the following: (1) the defendant “willfully threaten[ed]
to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person,”
(2) he made the threat “with the specific intent that the statement ... be taken as a threat,”
(3) the threat was, “on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, ... so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person
threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat,”
(4) the threat caused the victim “to be in sustained fear for their own safety” and (5) that
fear was “reasonabl[e]” under the circumstances. (§ 422; People v. Toledo (2001)
26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228 (Toledo).)
In determining whether a particular communication constitutes a criminal threat,
we consider the communication in light of its surrounding circumstances, including its
wording, defendant’s manner and actions in making the communication, and defendant’s
subsequent actions. (In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 860 (Ryan D.); People
v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 808.)
Defendant’s first argument is that the record shows he made his statement as part
of an emotional outburst and therefore without the specific intent that the victim take the
statement as a threat. But strong emotions do not inherently preclude the formation of a
specific intent to threaten. (See e.g. People v. Teal (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 277, 281.)
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And while it is true that “section 422 does not punish such things as ‘mere angry
utterances or ranting soliloquies, however violent,’ ” the section does punish emotional
communications made with the intent to instill fear. (Ryan D., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at
p. 861.)
Here, the record shows defendant said, “I’ll kill you” to the victim’s face, while
holding a one-foot-long metal flashlight and having moved close enough to the victim’s
open truck window that the victim could not back up without hitting defendant with his
truck mirror. Nothing in these circumstances shows that defendant intended for the
victim to take the “I’ll kill you” statement as anything less than a threat. We therefore
conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant had the requisite
specific intent.
Defendant’s next argument concerns the sufficiency of the evidence showing his
threat conveyed “an immediate prospect of execution.” (§ 422, subd. (a).) As used in
section 422, “immediate” refers to the victim’s understanding of the degree of
seriousness and imminence of defendant’s execution of the threat. (People v. Wilson,
supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 807.)
Here, the victim testified that when defendant made the threat, the situation was
“escalating rapidly” and defendant was “visibly upset.” Defendant was holding a
potential weapon and lingering close enough to the victim’s truck door that the victim
could not back out without hitting him. The danger defendant posed to the victim was
therefore demonstrably immediate at the time defendant made the threat.
The record also provides a basis from which a reasonable jury could conclude the
victim’s departure from the scene did not terminate the prospect of defendant executing
his threat. Defendant lived close to the church at which the victim was a pastor, had
access to a chainsaw, repeatedly used that chainsaw or other objects to cut wood on
church property before the threat, and continued to do so the day after the victim told him
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to stop. A day after the incident, the victim was still worried enough about the ongoing
danger defendant posed to report his threat to law enforcement.
Defendant argues his lack of any movement toward or attempt to use the flashlight
during and after the threat, the lack of detail in the threat, and the victim’s delays in
leaving and reporting the threat all suggest there was no immediate prospect of execution.
But defendant’s anger, sustained proximity to the victim while holding a potential
weapon, and ongoing ability to execute his threats to the victim and others all suggest
otherwise. In this context, we conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding
that defendant’s threat conveyed “an immediate prospect of execution.” (§ 422, subd.
(a).)
Defendant’s final argument against the sufficiency of the evidence concerns
section 422’s requirement the threat place the victim “in sustained fear” for his own
safety. A victim experiences sustained fear when his fear is more than “momentary,
fleeting, or transitory,” which – depending on the circumstances – can be shorter than a
single minute. (People v. Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156; People v. Fierro
(2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1349.)
Here, the victim testified he was afraid for his safety during the several-minute
span between defendant’s threat and the victim’s departure. The deputy who received the
victim’s report testified the victim said he was afraid of defendant and that this fear,
along with the victim’s fear of defendant harming other church members and church
property, caused the victim to delay in reporting the threat. Although defendant claims
the victim’s delays in leaving the scene and reporting the threat to law enforcement
effectively spoke louder than words, the jury was entitled to credit the testimonies of the
victim and the deputy. We therefore conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s
finding that defendant’s threat placed the victim “in sustained fear.” (§ 422, subd. (a).)
In sum, we find no issue with the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
defendant’s conviction.
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II. Instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threat
A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense when there is
substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude the defendant is guilty
of the lesser offense, but not the greater. (People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 704
(Wyatt).) “[T]he trial court is not required to ‘instruct sua sponte on the panoply of all
possible lesser included offenses.’ ” (Ibid.) When “ ‘there is no proof, other than an
unexplainable rejection of the prosecution's evidence, that the offense was less than that
charged,’ ” or the evidence supporting that theory is speculative at best, instructions shall
not be given. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 514 (Abilez); Wyatt, supra,
55 Cal.4th at p. 704.) We review a trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on a lesser
included offense de novo. (People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 501.)
A defendant commits the crime of attempted criminal threat when he has “a
subjective intent to threaten and … the intended threat under the circumstances [is]
sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear,” but does not meet one or
more of the remaining elements required by section 422. (People v. Chandler (2014)
60 Cal.4th 508, 516, 525 (Chandler); see §§ 21a, 422, 664.) This can occur when, for
example, a defendant acting with the requisite intent makes a threat that is objectively
sufficient and the victim receives the threat but, for whatever reason, is not actually
placed in sustained fear. (Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 231; see Chandler, supra,
60 Cal.4th at pp. 524-525.)
Defendant claims the victim’s delays in leaving the scene and reporting the threat
to law enforcement, as well as defendant’s failure to physically threaten, attack, or pursue
the victim, constitute substantial evidence that his threat did not place the victim in
sustained fear. But, unlike cases in which courts have found a duty to instruct on a lesser
included offense (see e.g. Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 235; People v. Walker (2015)
237 Cal.App.4th 111, 117), the record here contains no evidence corroborating
defendant’s interpretation of those delays.
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To the contrary, the victim gave consistent, unrebutted testimony that he was
afraid and stayed at the scene a few minutes only to avoid hitting defendant with his
truck’s mirror. The deputy also testified that a day after the threat, the victim said he was
afraid and delayed reporting because of it. And the delays themselves were quite small –
five minutes or less to leave the scene and less than a day to report. So, to find the victim
was not placed in sustained fear, the jury would need to both reject the victim’s and
deputy’s testimonies for an unexplained reason and speculate that the cause of the short
delays was a lack of fear. In such a situation, instructions on the lesser included offense
of attempted criminal threat are unwarranted. (Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 514; Wyatt,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 704.)
One last point regarding the lesser included instruction. Defendant claims the
jurors’ questions demonstrate their uncertainty about whether the victim was actually
placed in sustained fear. But the record does not support this claim. The record shows
the jury carefully evaluated the evidence by asking for readback from every witness and
sought clarification on a different element, whether the threat communicated a gravity of
purpose and an immediate prospect of execution. The questions do not suggest any
particular struggle with the sustained fear element or inclination to find the defendant
guilty of attempted criminal threat, if only the instructions for that offense had been
given.
In sum, the trial court was not required to instruct sua sponte on the lesser
included offense of attempted criminal threat.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, Acting P. J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
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