Filed 10/21/26 P. v. Hoffman CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086649
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCN462798)
v.
CURTIS LAVERN HOFFMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Anthony J. Campagna, Judge. Affirmed.
Irene A. Pai, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Michael T.
Murphy and James Spradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Curtis Lavern Hoffman of one count of felony
vandalism (Pen. Code,1 § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)) and he admitted a prior
strike conviction. The trial court struck Hoffman’s prior strike conviction and
placed him on two years of formal probation subject to several conditions,
with 88 days credit for time served.
On appeal, Hoffman contends the trial court erred in admitting
testimony about internet search results as proof of the damage amount, and
challenges five probation conditions as unconstitutional because they
impermissibly delegate judicial authority to the probation officer and are also
vague and overbroad.
First, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the Google search testimony as circumstantial evidence of the
value of the damaged door. Second, we reject Hoffman’s challenges to the
probation conditions as either forfeited or premature. We therefore affirm
the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 12, 2025, at approximately 5:00 p.m., E.C., the owner of an
automotive repair business received a security notification informing him
that motion had been detected inside his place of business. E.C. went to his
place of business to investigate the security alert. Upon arrival, E.C. noticed
the roll-up door was pushed in and “forced . . . open.” A battery rack was
placed in front of the door holding it open. The roll-up door had a “big tear on
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
specified.
2
the top” making it impossible to roll up. E.C. estimated the door was about
12 feet tall and 10 feet wide.
E.C. saw Hoffman walking nearby, believed he was a suspect, and
called the police department. A police officer responded to the auto repair
shop and contacted Hoffman across the street from the shop. Hoffman
admitted to the officer that he had kicked the door.
Hoffman testified at trial. He again admitted that he kicked the door
until it dislodged from the frame, then pushed it open with his shoulder and
used a battery rack to keep it propped open.
A jury convicted Hoffman of one count of felony vandalism causing
more than $400 in damages (Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)). Hoffman
admitted a prior strike conviction. At sentencing, the trial court struck
Hoffman’s prior strike conviction and granted two years of formal probation
subject to several terms and conditions, which Hoffman accepted without
objection.
DISCUSSION
Evidentiary Challenge
Hoffman contends that E.C.’s testimony regarding his internet search
for cost estimates to replace the damaged door was both inadmissible hearsay
and insufficient to prove the damage amount. We conclude that E.C.’s
testimony was nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of replacement value and
that it, together with other substantial evidence, supported the jury’s
findings. We, therefore, find no abuse of discretion.
A. Additional Background
After opening statements, the parties and the court, outside the
presence of the jury, discussed whether E.C. could testify to the cost of
replacing the damaged door based on his own internet research and
3
knowledge. The prosecution informed the trial court that E.C. had conducted
his own internet research and estimated the replacement value of the door to
be approximately $5,000. The defense objected. The trial court explained
that in People v. Portillo (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 577 (Portillo), the court
allowed testimony based on online price listings concluding it was not for a
hearsay purpose because it was offered to establish circumstantial evidence
of market value. The trial court further explained that testimony regarding
out-of-court statements from an expert about the cost of repair “is absolutely
hearsay” but, relying on Portillo, differentiated it from testimony based on a
witness’s own internet research which could be admitted as circumstantial
evidence to prove the value of the door.
The trial court then conducted an Evidence Code, section 402 hearing.
E.C. testified that he researched the cost of replacing the damaged door by
entering the door’s measurements, type, and zip code into Google. From
those search results, he “got a base idea” that replacing the door would cost
between $4,000 and $6,000. E.C. also explained that based on his
observations and experience welding, he did not think the door could be
repaired because it was torn at points where it bent and the metal in those
areas was too thin to weld, making the door inoperable.
During cross-examination, E.C. stated he did not know the brand of the
door or the material it was made from but believed it to be metal. He
explained he did not recall the exact dimensions or search terms he used in
his Google search. He further stated that he looked at list prices for similar,
manual roll-up doors to get an “average cost of door replacement.” He
acknowledged that he only researched replacement costs, not repair costs,
and that he later obtained a professional proposal to give to his landlord.
4
The prosecution urged the court to allow E.C.’s testimony because it
was based on his independent internet research and his experience in
welding not on hearsay. The defense renewed its hearsay objection arguing
that reading “things off websites” is hearsay because it is no different from
calling someone and asking for an estimate. The trial court explained that
the defense’s concerns went to the weight of the evidence rather than
admissibility and could be addressed through cross-examination in front of
the jury. The court ruled that E.C.’s testimony regarding his internet
research was admissible as non-hearsay circumstantial evidence of value.
In the presence of the jury, E.C. testified that based upon his training
and experience, the door could not be repaired because the damaged metal
was too thin to weld. He further stated that he conducted a Google search to
determine the cost of replacing the door. E.C. explained that he input the
type of door and measurements to get an idea of the replacement cost. Upon
his review of the search results, he estimated the cost of replacing the door
was between $4,000 and $6,000.
During cross-examination, E.C. acknowledged he did not recall the
exact words he entered into the search bar or the dimensions of the door. He
explained he arrived at the estimated cost of $4,000 to $6,000 by averaging
the price of the door plus labor to replace it.
On redirect, E.C. explained that the cost of just the door without labor
was approximately $3,000 to $4,000.
B. E.C.’s Testimony was Circumstantial Evidence of Value
1. Legal Principles
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse
of discretion and will not disturb it on appeal unless the trial court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that
5
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th
1048, 1069.)
Hearsay is “evidence of a statement that was made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth
of the matter stated.” (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) “Except as provided by
law, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.” (Id., subd. (b).) However, out-of-court
statements may be admitted for a nonhearsay purpose—i.e., to establish
something other than the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.
(People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 987, overruled on other grounds in Price
v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.)
Every person who maliciously defaces, damages, or destroys “any real
or personal property [that is] not his or her own” is guilty of vandalism.
(§ 594, subd. (a).) Vandalism may be punished as a felony when “the amount
of defacement, damage, or destruction is four hundred dollars ($400) or
more.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) If the amount of defacement, damage, or
destruction is less than $400, it is punishable as a misdemeanor.
(Id., subd. (b)(2).) The value of the damage is thus an element of the offense.
(In re Kyle T. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 707, 717 (Kyle T.).)
Section 594 does not specify a method for proving the amount of
property damage, but courts interpreting the statute have noted a correlation
with principles of restitution. (People v. Jimenez (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 602,
609 (Jimenez).) For example, in In re A.W. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 941 (A.W.),
“the court observed how section 594’s requirement to ‘prove the amount of
“defacement, damage, or destruction[ ]” . . . include[d] the cost of repairing or
replacing the vandalized property.’ ” (Jimenez, at p. 602 quoting A.W., at
p. 950.) Citing Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 308 (Luis
M.), the court in A.W. “found analogous California Supreme Court’s
6
interpretation of another restitution statute that permitted consideration of
repair costs.” (Jimenez, at p. 609, citing A.W., at p. 950.) “The core principle
relied upon by these and other courts is that there must be a ‘ “factual nexus”
between the amount sought and the evidence of [the defendant's] actual
conduct.’ ” (Jimenez, at p. 609, quoting A.W., at p. 948.)
2. Analysis
The trial court relied on Portillo to conclude that E.C.’s testimony
regarding his Google research was not hearsay because it was offered as
circumstantial evidence to prove the value of the door and he was not
testifying about something someone else told him. We agree with the trial
court that E.C.’s testimony was admissible as nonhearsay.
In Portillo, the court considered testimony from the manager of a
warehouse facility where a theft occurred. (Portillo, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 583.) The manager testified to the prices of the stolen product listed on
three retailers’ websites. (Ibid.) The defendants challenged the manager’s
testimony as inadmissible hearsay because they alleged it was offered for the
truth of the stolen product’s value. (Ibid.) The court reasoned that “evidence
of a retail price for a stolen item, whether based on an online listing or a
brick-and-mortar store price tag, is admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of
showing that a retailer is advertising the item for a specified price in the
marketplace. This price, in turn, is circumstantial evidence of the fair
market value of the item.” (Ibid.) The court explained that the “jury need
not decide the truth of whether a specific retailer would sell the item for the
advertised price or the value the retailer places on the item.” (Ibid.)
Therefore, the Portillo court concluded that the “online prices were
admissible as circumstantial evidence of the fair market value” of the stolen
item. (Ibid.)
7
We agree with the analysis in Portillo and similarly find the pricing
information E.C. testified to was admissible. Here, the prosecution had the
burden of proving the damage amount and introduced E.C.’s testimony as
circumstantial evidence of the value of the door replacement, not for its truth.
(See Portillo, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.)
Relying on People v. Morgan (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 935 (Morgan),
Hoffman contends that the Google search results are hearsay because the
“relevance of the words hinged on the truth of them.” (Id. at p. 942.) In
Morgan, the out-of-court statement at issue was a phone call answered by a
police officer while executing a search warrant in which the caller asked for
drugs from the defendant. (Id., at p. 939.) The Morgan court concluded the
caller’s statement was hearsay because the statement was relevant only if
the caller actually wanted drugs, making the truth of the statement a
“necessary part of the inferential reasoning process,” but found it fit within a
hearsay exception. (Id., at pp. 943–944.) Similarly, Hoffman contends, the
search results here are only relevant “to supply a dollar value for the damage
to [E.C.’s] door” and are therefore hearsay and do not fit within any hearsay
exception.
Here, however, whether or not the retailers E.C. found online would
have sold him a door for the advertised price, the mere fact that the doors
were advertised for that price is circumstantial evidence of their fair market
value. (Portillo, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 583.) Thus, whether the
representations were “true” is not the relevant question. As the trial court
explained, concerns regarding accuracy and reliability of E.C.’s testimony go
to the weight of the evidence, not its status as hearsay. (See ibid.) Defense
counsel did, in fact, cross-examine E.C. as to his inability to recall the exact
search terms, the lack of a specific quote, and his uncertainty about the
8
material of the door. Therefore, the trial court properly admitted E.C.’s
testimony and allowed the jury to accord it the proper weight. The court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting E.C.’s testimony of his Google search
results as circumstantial evidence of value.
C. The Evidence Presented at Trial is Sufficient to Support Hoffman’s Felony
Vandalism Conviction
Hoffman contends that his felony vandalism conviction should be
reversed or reduced to a misdemeanor because the Google search results “did
not establish the fair market value of replacing the damaged door” and as a
result the record lacked substantial evidence from which the jury could
reasonably infer the value of the damaged door. Based on our review of the
record we conclude there is ample evidence to support the conviction.
When we assess the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal
conviction, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (People v.
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1212.) Under that standard, “ ‘ “we review
the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v.
Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 144.) “ ‘Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.’ [Citation.] However, ‘[a] reasonable inference may not be based on
suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise,
conjecture, or guesswork; a finding of fact must be an inference drawn from
evidence rather than a mere speculation as to probabilities without
evidence.’ ” “ ‘ “ ‘By definition, “substantial evidence” requires evidence and
not mere speculation.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Grant (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 323, 330.)
9
At trial, Hoffman admitted that he kicked the door until it dislodged
from the frame, then pushed it open with his shoulder and used a battery
rack to keep it propped open. The jury viewed several photographs of the
damaged door from multiple angles including images of the door forced open,
from inside the building, and a top view of the “big tear.” E.C. testified that
the damaged door was a commercial roll-up door approximately 12 feet tall
and 10 feet wide. He described the damage to the door as a “big tear on the
top” which prevented the door from rolling up. E.C. also testified to his
experience working with metals and welding. He explained that the
damaged metal on the door was too thin to weld and needed to be replaced.
E.C. also testified that after inspecting and measuring the door, he conducted
a Google search using the door’s measurements, type, and location. After
reviewing a “majority” of the search results, he concluded that the cost of
replacing the door would be approximately $4,000 to $6,000 including labor
and $3,000 to $4,000 for the door alone. We conclude the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury’s factual finding that the value of the damage to
the door met or exceeded $400.
Hoffman relies on Kyle T. for the proposition that the required proof of
the cost of damage to support a felony vandalism conviction requires
“competent, substantiated, specific evidence with proper authentication and
foundation.” In Kyle T., the court concluded that substantial evidence did not
support a juvenile court’s finding that a minor’s graffiti caused $400 or more
in damage to city-owned property. (Kyle T., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 713–
718.) At trial, a police officer testified to the amount of damage by relying on
a “graffiti cost removal list,” which “set[ ] forth a generic, one-size-fits-all
removal cost of $400 for every incident of graffiti on City-owned property . . .
regardless of the particulars of a given incident, such as the graffiti’s
10
dimensions, the type of material used in creating the graffiti, the nature of
the surface on which the graffiti was written, and the method and manpower
employed for cleaning up the graffiti.” (Id., at p. 714, fn. omitted.) In
concluding that the generic graffiti cost removal list forming the basis of the
officer’s testimony was insufficient, the Kyle T. court emphasized that the
prosecution failed to introduce photographs of the damage into evidence. (Id.,
at pp. 711, 715–716.)
While it is true that the Kyle T. court rejected generalized estimates of
damage, the facts here are different. Here, several photographs of the
damage to the door were admitted into evidence for the jury to assess, and
the prosecution did not rely on any sort of generic list reflecting a
“mechanistic flat rate” for all types of door damage. (Kyle T., supra,
9 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) Instead, E.C.’s replacement estimate was based on
the specific dimensions, type, condition, and even geographic location of the
door.
In sum, adequate evidence supports Hoffman’s conviction for felony
vandalism. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
Probation Conditions
Next, Hoffman contends that five of his imposed probation conditions
should be stricken as unconstitutional because they impermissibly delegate
judicial authority to the probation officer and are vague and overbroad. We
find Hoffman’s various arguments forfeited, unpersuasive, and unripe.
A. Legal Principles
The trial court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to
foster rehabilitation and reformation of the defendant and protect the public.
(§ 1203.1, subd. (j); Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313,
319.) Because probation conditions foster rehabilitation and protect public
11
safety, they may infringe on the constitutional rights of a defendant, who is
“not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other
citizens.” (People v. Peck (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 351, 362.) But where a court
imposes a probation condition that regulates conduct that is “not itself
criminal,” the condition must be reasonably related to the defendant’s crime
or to future criminality. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121
quoting People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent).)
Generally, challenges to probation conditions must be raised in the trial
court, or they are forfeited. (People v. Brand (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 861, 867
(Brand).) However, failure to raise a constitutional issue in the trial court
does not necessarily forfeit the issue for review on appeal. (In re Sheena K.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888–889 (Sheena K.).) A defendant may advance a
facial constitutional challenge that does not require scrutiny of individual
facts and circumstances but instead requires only the review of abstract and
generalized legal concepts. (Id., at p. 885.) We review constitutional
challenges to probation conditions de novo. (Id., at pp. 888–889.)
B. Analysis
Hoffman did not object to any of the imposed probation conditions
below. On appeal, he challenges five of the conditions as unconstitutional
because they impermissibly delegate judicial authority to the probation
officer and are vague and overbroad. To the extent Hoffman makes facial
challenges to the conditions’ constitutionality, he did not forfeit these limited
issues on appeal. (Brand, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 867–868.) We
therefore address Hoffman’s constitutional challenges only to the extent that
they “ ‘present “pure questions of law that can be resolved without reference
to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court.” ’ ” (Sheena
K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.)
12
The conditions at issue require that, if directed by a probation officer,
Hoffman: (1) “comply with a curfew” (condition 6e); (2) “[o]btain [the
probation officer’s] consent before leaving San Diego County” and obtain the
“court’s and [probation officer’s] written consent before moving out of state”
(condition 6l); (3) “[p]articipate and comply with any assessment program”
(condition 6r); and (4) “attend and successfully complete [an] Anti-Theft-IF
counseling program approved by the [probation officer]” (condition 7d).
Additionally, Hoffman is to “[p]articipate in treatment, therapy, counseling,
or other course of conduct as suggested by validated assessment tests”
(condition 7b).
1. Challenge to Delegation of Judicial Authority
Hoffman argues the five probation conditions are an improper
delegation of judicial authority. The Attorney General responds that
Hoffman forfeited the argument and, alternatively, that the conditions are
valid.
To begin, we agree with the Attorney General that Hoffman’s assertion
that the conditions are an improper delegation of judicial authority is
forfeited. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 235 (Welch).) To the extent
Hoffman had concerns about the court’s delegation of authority to the
probation officer, he could have objected and asked the trial court to address
those concerns when the condition was imposed. By accepting these
probation terms without objection, Hoffman deprived the trial court of the
opportunity to narrow or modify the condition if appropriate. The purpose of
the forfeiture rule is to avoid precisely this situation—where an objection
would have permitted the trial court to address the concern or make a better
record to support the court’s decision. (See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at
p. 881.)
13
Nevertheless, even if we were to exercise our discretion to consider the
claim, we would conclude that the challenged conditions are a reasonable and
appropriate delegation of authority. The court is statutorily required to
delegate authority over probationers to probation officers. (§ 1203.1,
subd. (j).) While a condition cannot be entirely open-ended, a “court may
leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many
details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation.”
(People v. O'Neil, (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358–1359 (O’Neil).) Here,
the curfew condition is not impermissibly open-ended because it limits the
discretion of the probation officer to the type of supervision—whether to
implement the curfew option and if so, the level of supervision—for what
hours. That discretion is permissible under section 1202.8, subdivision (a),
which states, "Persons placed on probation by a court shall be under the
supervision of the county probation officer[,] who shall determine both the
level and type of supervision consistent with the court-ordered conditions of
probation." (§ 1202.8, subd. (a).)
Similarly, the travel condition requiring Hoffman to obtain the
probation officer’s consent to leave the County and before moving out of state
is not impermissibly open-ended because it limits the officer’s discretion to
two specific situations—leaving the County and moving out of state. People
v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 406 (Moran) [“Imposing a limitation on
probationers’ movements as a condition of probation is common, as probation
officers’ awareness of probationers’ whereabouts facilitates supervision and
rehabilitation and helps ensure probationers are complying with the terms of
their conditional release.”].)
Additionally, because “[t]he trial court is poorly equipped to
micromanage selection of a [particular] program” (People v. Penoli (1996)
14
46 Cal.App.4th 298, 308 (Penoli)), it may properly exercise its discretion to
determine a general type of programming while leaving it to the probation
officer to specify the details after further examination and assessment.
(O’Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1358–1359.)
Hoffman relies on People v. Smith for the proposition that “a court may
not delegate to a probation officer the authority to impose significant liberty
restraints on a probationer.” (People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897
(Smith).) In Smith, the trial court imposed a condition that the defendant “
‘participate in any treatment/therapy/counseling program, including
residential, as directed by the probation officer.’ ” (Id. at p. 901.) The Smith
court agreed with the defendant that the condition violated separation of
powers because it “delegate[d] to the probation officer the discretion to decide
whether [the defendant] must attend a residential program, as opposed to an
outpatient program.” (Id. at p. 903.) Though the trial court had
acknowledged the defendant needed some form of treatment for substance
abuse, Smith noted the trial court did not require the defendant attend a
residential treatment program. (Ibid.) “Nor did the probation report specify
residential treatment.” (Ibid.) Smith reasoned, “[g]iven the significant
liberty interests at stake, a court—not a probation officer—must make the
decision to require a defendant to attend residential treatment.” (Ibid.)
Smith thus addresses a facial challenge to a specific probation
condition that delegates to the probation officer the decision whether the
defendant will be required to complete a residential treatment program.
Here, Hoffman does not suggest that the probation officer has the option of
selecting a residential treatment program, or any program that would
similarly impinge on his liberty interests. We thus find Smith does not assist
Hoffman.
15
2. Constitutional Vagueness Challenge
Hoffman also contends that conditions 6r, 7b, and 7d, which require
him to participate in programs, are unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, he
argues that condition 6r is facially vague because it allows the probation
officer to direct him to participate and comply with “any assessment
program,” but does not define “assessment” or the type of program. As to
condition 7b, Hoffman contends that the requirement that he “participate in
treatment, therapy, counseling, or other course of conduct as suggested by
validated assessment tests,” is vague because it “is triggered by ‘suggestions’
” and does not define who validates or administers the test. Hoffman also
objects to condition 7d which, among other things, requires him to
successfully complete an anti-theft counseling program, as being vague.
In addition to the general reasonableness requirement, a probation
condition “ ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is
required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has
been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness.”
(Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) Probation conditions are given
“ ‘ “the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.” ’ ” (In re
I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261.)
Hoffman does not provide legal authority to support his facial
vagueness argument as to these three challenged conditions and we therefore
deem the issue forfeited. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)
[requiring that assertions of law in a brief be supported by citation to
legal authority]; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 (Stanley)
[“[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on
the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may
treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.”].)
16
In any event, the record does not demonstrate that Hoffman is
currently subject to any of the three conditions that he challenges for
vagueness. Because he is not currently subject to these conditions, his
vagueness challenge is premature. In the future, if he is directed by a
probation officer to comply with these conditions in a manner that does not
give him sufficient information to discern what conduct is required, he may
challenge the manner in which the condition has been implemented.
(§§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1), 1203.3, subd. (a); see People v. Keele (1986)
178 Cal.App.3d 701, 708 [trial court retains jurisdiction to review probation
officer’s actions].) We, therefore, reject Hoffman’s vagueness challenge.
3. Constitutional Overbreadth Challenge
Lastly, Hoffman contends that the five conditions are overbroad
because they impinge on his constitutional rights and are not narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
Again, Hoffman registered no objection to these conditions in the trial
court. As a result, he has forfeited, for purposes of appeal, any constitutional
challenge to these conditions as applied to him. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th
at pp. 888–889.) We therefore will not consider the challenge to the extent
that Hoffman attempts to rely on the record of conviction to assert that these
conditions are overbroad as applied to him.
A constitutionally overbroad condition is one that restricts a
defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights to a greater degree than
necessary to achieve the condition’s purpose. (People v. Olguin (2008)
45 Cal.4th 375, 384.) The overbreadth doctrine requires that probation
conditions be tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state
interest in reformation and rehabilitation. (In re Victor L. (2010)
182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910.) A “ ‘facial challenge’ ” on overbreadth grounds,
17
“does not require scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances [related to
the defendant] but instead requires the review of abstract and generalized
legal concepts” as would apply to any probationer. (Sheena K., supra,
40 Cal.4th at p. 885.) In other words, a facial overbreadth challenge asserts
that a particular condition is overbroad, without relation to a defendant’s
specific rehabilitative needs as evidenced in the record of conviction, and is
thus “invalid as a matter of law.” (Ibid.)
The five challenged conditions are not unconstitutional on their face.
As to condition 6l which requires Hoffman to obtain consent to leave the
County, there are circumstances where the state has legitimate interests to
infringe upon constitutional rights of travel, such as to supervise
rehabilitation. (See Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 406 [“Imposing a limitation
on probationers’ movements as a condition of probation is common, as
probation officers’ awareness of probationers’ whereabouts facilitates
supervision and rehabilitation and helps ensure probationers are complying
with the terms of their conditional release.”].)
Similarly, the conditions calling for Hoffman’s participation in
programs “if directed,” such as conditions 6r, 7b, and 7d, are not overbroad.
Even if the court could be more specific in its order, that does not necessarily
render a condition overbroad. (See Penoli, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 308
[“Desirable as such a narrowing of the probation officer’s discretion might be,
however, we are not prepared at this time to hold that its absence constitutes
prejudicial error.”].) Moreover, an analysis of the relationships of these
conditions to the State’s interests would require us to look to the facts of this
case, and such a factual analysis is best reserved for the trial court to
“ ‘encourage development of the record and a proper exercise of discretion.’ ”
(Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.) Therefore, this challenge does not
18
present a pure question of law, and Hoffman forfeited his challenge by failing
to object below. We further note that Hoffman did not provide legal authority
in his opening brief to support his facial overbreadth argument as to
conditions 6r, 7b, and 7d and we therefore deem the issue forfeited for this
reason as well. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204 (a)(1)(B) [requiring that
assertions of law in a brief be supported by citation to legal authority];
Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 796.)
With respect to condition 6e requiring Hoffman to “comply with a
curfew if so directed by the [probation officer],” the Attorney General
acknowledges that this condition does not appear to be reasonably related to
Hoffman’s offense. However, Hoffman did not object to this condition below
and he has therefore forfeited any challenge to the condition as applied to
him. Curfew is not facially an improper condition of probation. (See People v.
Nassetta (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 699, 707 [struck curfew condition on applied
grounds, not because condition was inherently unconstitutional].) Moreover,
we reject Hoffman’s overbreadth challenge because the record does not show
that he is currently subject to any curfew. Thus, his challenge to this
condition is premature. If, in the future, Hoffman is directed to comply with
a curfew, he may raise any objections to the curfew at that time.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
KELETY, J.
20