IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ANGELA HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
S282186
Fifth Appellate District
F076752
Kern County Superior Court
BF150639A
August 13, 2026
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Liu, Kruger, Evans, and
Danner* concurred.
Justice Corrigan filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
S282186
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
For a noncitizen criminal defendant who is considering
whether to enter a guilty plea, preserving the right to remain in
the United States is often a crucial consideration. Recognizing
this, the Legislature has sought to ensure that defendants
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of their
pleas. Penal Code, section 1016.5,1 requires courts, before
accepting guilty pleas, to advise defendants that a criminal
conviction may have serious immigration consequences. (Id.,
subd. (a).) Section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1)
(section 1473.7(a)(1)) authorizes courts to vacate convictions
when a defendant shows “prejudicial error damaging [their]
ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or
knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration
consequences of a conviction or sentence.”
This case concerns a section 1473.7(a)(1) motion brought
by Angela Hernandez, a long-time lawful permanent resident of
the United States who seeks to withdraw her guilty plea to two
controlled substance charges. Two years after entering the plea,
Hernandez traveled to Mexico. Returning home to California,
she presented herself to immigration authorities at the airport,
who detained her and initiated removal proceedings against her.
Hernandez claims that she did not understand that pleading
1
All further unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
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guilty would make her subject to deportation. She claims that
if she had understood this, she would have attempted to
negotiate a different plea or taken her case to trial.
The trial court denied Hernandez’s motion. The court
concluded that her attorney had “properly advised” her
“regarding the immigration consequences of entering a plea” —
a conclusion based largely on Hernandez’s initials next to the
immigration consequences advisement on her plea form and her
attorney’s signature under a preprinted statement on the same
form attesting that he had explained the immigration
consequences to her. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
On independent review, we reverse. When ruling on a
section 1473.7(a)(1) motion, a court should consider the totality
of the circumstances and focus on the defendant’s subjective
understanding. Evidence that a defendant received the
immigration consequences advisement required by section
1016.5 before entering their plea is relevant, but not dispositive.
Courts rely on defense counsel to ensure that defendants
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of a
plea and can make informed decisions whether to accept those
consequences. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we
hold that Hernandez has established prejudicial error that
damaged her “ability to meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences” of her convictions. (§ 1473.7(a)(1)).
I. BACKGROUND
In 2013, Kern County Sheriff’s deputies arrested
Hernandez outside a store in Delano. In Hernandez’s car were
five trash bags full of marijuana. The trash bags had been
placed there by a confidential informant who had recruited
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Hernandez to transport them from a nearby vineyard.
Hernandez was charged with one count of unlawful
transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code § 11360, subd.
(a)) and one count of unlawful possession of marijuana for sale
(id., § 11359). Hernandez pled guilty to both crimes as charged.
Hernandez is a citizen of Mexico. She immigrated to the
United States when she was 19 years old. When she entered her
plea, she was 55 years old, had lived in the United States for 36
years, and had been a lawful permanent resident for over 20
years. Her “whole family” lived in the United States. She was
married and had five children, all either United States citizens
or lawful permanent residents, and 14 grandchildren, two of
whom she cared for several times a week. Her mother was
deceased and her father lived in California. She had no prior
criminal record.
The parties appear to agree that Hernandez’s guilty pleas
to the controlled substance charges exposed her to mandatory
removal and exclusion from the United States and rendered her
ineligible for almost all forms of immigration relief.
In connection with her plea, Hernandez signed a form
titled “Felony Advisement of Rights, Waiver, and Plea Form.”
The form was printed in English and contained a long list of
advisements. Among them was a modified version of the
immigration consequences advisement required by section
1016.5, in which the word “will” was substituted for the
statutory “may” and additional language was added. (See id.,
subd. (a) [“If you are not a citizen of the United States, you are
hereby advised that conviction of the offense for which you have
been charged may have the consequences of deportation,
exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States” (italics
added)].) The form’s advisement read: “ALIEN STATUS: I
understand that if I am not a Citizen of the United States, my
guilty or no contest plea will result in my deportation, exclusion
from admission to the United States, and denial of
naturalization under the laws of the United States.
Deportation is mandatory for some offenses. I have fully
discussed this matter with my attorney and understand
the serious immigration consequences of my plea.”
Hernandez’s initials appeared on a line next to this paragraph.
At the bottom of the plea form, just above Hernandez’s
signature, was a preprinted declaration stating that she had
read, understood, and initialed each item on the form. The form
also contained two preprinted statements, one signed by her
retained attorney, J.M. Irigoyen, and the other signed by a
Spanish-language interpreter. Irigoyen’s stated, as relevant
here, that he had reviewed the form with his client, had
“explained any possible immigration consequences that may
result from this plea,” and was satisfied his client understood
“these things.” The interpreter certified that they had
translated the “entire form” into Spanish for the defendant, who
had stated that she “understood the contents of the form.”
At the bottom of the form was a preprinted paragraph
titled “Court’s Findings and Order,” which stated, as relevant
here, that “the defendant’s plea(s) and admission(s) are freely
and voluntarily made with an understanding of the nature and
consequences thereof.” The trial court judge signed and dated
the order.
Irigoyen appeared on behalf of Hernandez for the first and
only time at her change of plea hearing. (At her other
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appearances, including her sentencing, she was represented by
a different attorney who was handling some appearances for
Irigoyen at the time.) During the brief plea colloquy, there was
no mention of possible immigration consequences. Irigoyen
informed the court that Hernandez was pleading “straight up to
both charges.” He noted that the district attorney had offered
“local time” and that the court had indicated a sentence of 180
days. In response to a series of yes/no questions from the trial
court, Hernandez orally confirmed that she wanted to enter a
plea on those terms, had completed the plea form, understood
the form, and did not have any questions. Irigoyen requested
that the court set the case for sentencing several weeks out so
that Hernandez could spend Christmas at home, to which the
district attorney assented.
The probation office recommended a sentence of probation
and indicated that if “additional sanctions” were required in the
future, the “low term” of two years would be “warranted.” At
sentencing, the court imposed three years’ probation with 180
days in county jail, in accordance with its indicated sentence.
The court advised Hernandez that if she left the United States,
she was to “maintain contact with probation by mail” and she
was “not to reenter the United States without proper
authorization.” Hernandez ultimately served only 27 days in
jail.
About two years after her conviction, while still on
probation, Hernandez obtained permission from the probation
department to make a trip to Mexico. On her return, she
presented herself for entry to immigration and customs officials
at Los Angeles International Airport, who detained her,
confiscated her lawful permanent resident card, and initiated
removal proceedings against her.
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Hernandez filed a habeas corpus petition in the trial court,
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. She asked the court
to allow her to withdraw her plea and to reinstate the original
charges so that she could defend against them with the benefit
of an accurate understanding of their immigration
consequences. She alleged that Irigoyen had advised her to
plead guilty as charged and that he did not inform her of the
immigration consequences of doing so or of possible defenses or
alternative pleas.
Before the court ruled on her habeas corpus petition,
Hernandez successfully completed probation. At Hernandez’s
request, the court then converted her petition to a petition under
section 1473.7 — which had taken effect very recently — and set
the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
The evidentiary hearing was conducted by the same judge
who took Hernandez’s plea. Irigoyen had died not long before
Hernandez filed her habeas corpus petition, and Hernandez was
the only witness at her hearing. Hernandez testified that
Irigoyen had told her that she “had to plead guilty” and had not
told her that she would almost certainly get deported if she did
so, even though she had informed him that she was a noncitizen.
She testified that if she had known that mandatory deportation
was a consequence of her plea, she would have gone to trial
because she did not “want to be sent to Mexico.”
On cross-examination, Hernandez acknowledged that she
had signed the plea form containing the immigration
consequences advisement but testified that she did not
remember reviewing the form with Irigoyen. The district
attorney asked the interpreter to read the advisement to
Hernandez, who volunteered, “Never was I told that. Never.” In
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response to further questioning, Hernandez admitted that her
initials appeared next to the advisement on the form. She
testified that she remembered “signing some documents,” but
that Irigoyen had never read the immigration consequences
advisement to her or told her that she “could possibly be
deported.” When asked to explain how her initials and
signature got on the form, she testified: “Well, because if he’s
my attorney and he’s telling me, ‘Sign here, initial here,’ I’m
going to sign.” Hernandez further testified that she did not
remember an interpreter reading the form to her or the court
asking if she understood everything in the form. She explained,
“I was really nervous then too.”
The district attorney then had the court interpreter read
Hernandez the transcript of the portion of her plea colloquy in
which she responded “yes” when asked whether she had read
and understood everything in the plea form and “no” when asked
whether she had any questions. Hernandez testified, “. . . I
never thought that it would be anything like that, like
deportation.”
Responding to questions about her interactions with
Irigoyen outside of court, Hernandez testified that he did not
speak Spanish and that the only time she had spoken to him
with an interpreter was in court on the day of her hearing.
Hernandez’s new attorney had been unable to obtain Irigoyen’s
case file, and Hernandez’s testimony was the only evidence of
her out-of-court interactions with Irigoyen.
The trial court denied relief. The initial order purported
to deny Hernandez’s habeas corpus petition, even though the
court had, by its previous order, converted the petition to a
petition under section 1473.7. Hernandez moved for
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reconsideration, arguing that the court had failed to consider
whether she had shown that she was unable to meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the
immigration consequences of her plea — the showing required
under section 1473.7(a)(1). In response, the trial court issued a
new order denying the petition under section 1473.7 for
substantially the same reasons it gave in its initial order, citing
to habeas corpus cases in support of its ruling. The court
concluded: “[F]rom the record of the plea and sentencing, it does
appear that Mr. Irigoyen properly advised Ms. Hernandez
regarding the immigration consequences of entering a plea. Her
claims now appear to be ‘post hoc assertions’ that are
contradicted by the record of the plea.”
Hernandez appealed, the Court of Appeal affirmed, and
we granted review and ultimately transferred the case to the
Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of our opinion in
People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510 (Vivar). The Court of
Appeal again affirmed and we again granted review, later
transferring the case for reconsideration in light of our opinion
in People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311 (Espinoza).
The Court of Appeal affirmed for a third time in a divided,
unpublished opinion. The majority read the advisement on the
plea form as clearly informing Hernandez that her plea “would
result in her deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, and denial of naturalization under the laws of the
United States.” It also accorded deference to the trial court’s
“implied finding” that Hernandez’s testimony “lacked credibility
in light of the contemporaneous record of her plea.” It concluded
that Hernandez had failed to show that she “did not
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences” of her
plea.
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The dissent observed that the trial court had focused on
whether Hernandez “was adequately advised” rather than on
“her subjective understanding of the immigration
consequences.” The dissenting justice would have concluded
that Hernandez’s testimony about her lack of understanding
was sufficiently corroborated by objective evidence, particularly
“the fact that she obtained permission from probation to travel
to Mexico and returned on an international flight, which
subjected her to the scrutiny of immigration officials at Los
Angeles International Airport.” He would have held that
Hernandez did not “meaningfully understand the adverse
immigration consequences of her plea.”
We granted review for a third time and now reverse.
II. DISCUSSION
To establish eligibility to withdraw a guilty plea under
section 1473.7(a)(1), a defendant must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, (1) “error damaging [the
defendant’s] ability to meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences of a conviction or
sentence” and (2) that the damage resulted in prejudice. (Ibid.;
see id., § 1473.7, subd. (f)(1) [standard of proof].)
In considering Hernandez’s appeal of the trial court’s
denial of her section 1473.7(a)(1) motion, we independently
review the evidence in the record. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 526–528.) Because the trial court had the opportunity to
observe Hernandez when she was giving her testimony, we defer
to its factual findings to the extent that they turn on its
assessment of Hernandez’s credibility. (Id. at pp. 527–528.) We
also accord deference to findings based on the trial court’s
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observations of Hernandez during the plea proceedings because
the judge who heard Hernandez’s section 1473.7(a)(1) motion
was the same judge who took her plea. (Vivar, at p. 528.) But
we do not defer to those findings that are based on written
materials, since we are similarly situated to the trial court when
interpreting a “cold record.” (Ibid.) And we may “ ‘ ‘reach a
different conclusion [from the trial court] on an independent
examination of the evidence . . . even where the evidence is
conflicting” ’ ” and the trial court’s conclusions are based in part
on its assessment of “ ‘ “the credibility of witnesses [it] heard
and observed.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 527.) Ultimately, it is for us to
decide, exercising our independent judgment, whether the
evidence, taken as a whole, establishes “prejudicial error”
damaging Hernandez’s ability to meaningfully understand the
immigration consequences of the charges to which she pled, or
her ability to defend against those consequences or to knowingly
accept them. (§ 1473.7(a)(1); see Vivar, at p. 528.)
A. Hernandez Has Established Error
Hernandez contends that, in concluding that she had not
established error, the courts below gave undue weight to the
written record of her plea, particularly to the preprinted
immigration consequences advisement on her plea form. The
proper inquiry, she argues, considers the totality of the
circumstances and focuses on a defendant’s subjective
understanding. The Attorney General agrees with Hernandez
about the nature of the inquiry but argues that Hernandez has
not made the showing required to establish error. Exercising
our independent judgment and considering the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that Hernandez has made the
required showing.
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1. In Evaluating Error, Courts Consider All
Evidence Relevant to the Defendant’s Ability To
Meaningfully Understand, Defend Against, or
Knowingly Accept the Immigration Consequences of
a Conviction
In determining whether a defendant has established error
for purposes of section 1473.7(a)(1), we focus on the defendant’s
subjective understanding at the time they entered their guilty
plea. (People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 769
(Alatorre).) We ask whether the defendant has shown that they
were unable to “meaningfully understand” the immigration
consequences of their plea, or that their ability to “defend
against” or “knowingly accept” those consequences was
impaired. (§ 1473.7(a)(1); see People v. Manzanilla (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 891, 905–911 (Manzanilla).) “The key is the
mindset of the defendant and not what an objectively reasonable
person would have understood under the circumstances.”
(People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 16 (Carrillo).)
A defendant may establish error by showing that they
entered a plea without a meaningful understanding of the
“actual or potential adverse immigration consequences” of the
resulting conviction or sentence. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) For example,
a defendant may show that their attorney provided incomplete
or inaccurate advice about the plea’s immigration consequences
or did not effectively communicate the immigration
consequences, so the defendant entered the plea without a
meaningful understanding of them. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).)
Alternatively, a defendant may show error in the form of
subjective misunderstanding or ignorance that damaged their
ability to “defend against” these consequences. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).)
For example, a defendant may show that they were unaware of
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possible alternative approaches to their defense that could have
mitigated the immigration consequences or led to an
immigration-safe disposition. Such approaches may include
alternative pleas or sentences they could have attempted to
negotiate or defenses they could have raised at trial. (See Vivar,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 531–532; People v. Camacho (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1009 (Camacho).) Finally, a defendant may
establish error by showing that they did not “knowingly accept”
the consequences of their conviction. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) For
example, evidence that a defendant sought to withdraw their
plea when they learned of its consequences, that they applied
for an immigration benefit after entering their plea, or that they
contested their removal can support a showing that the
defendant did not knowingly accept the immigration
consequences of their conviction.
Because the error inquiry focuses on the defendant’s
subjective understanding, courts evaluating section 1473.7(a)(1)
motions must look beyond the record of the plea and consider
the totality of the circumstances bearing on the inquiry. (Cf.
People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 361 [going “beyond the
courtroom colloquy” and examining the “totality of
circumstances” to evaluate whether plea was knowing and
voluntary]; People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 898–899
(Patterson) [in deciding whether to permit withdrawal of guilty
plea under § 1018 based on defendant’s mistake or ignorance
courts consider “ ‘all factors necessary to bring about a just
result’ ”].) Courts must engage in a case-specific examination
that involves assessing credibility and weighing circumstantial
evidence. (See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320
[considering evidence of the court’s advisement, counsel’s
advice, and defendant’s statements and actions in determining
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that defendant had established that he “did not meaningfully
understand the immigration consequences of his plea”].) While
the focus of the error inquiry is on the defendant’s subjective
understanding, a defendant’s bare assertion that they did not
understand the immigration consequences or the options
available to them to defend against those consequences is
insufficient to establish error; the assertion must be
corroborated by objective evidence. (Cf. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 530 [requiring objective evidence to support assertion that
defendant would not have entered plea].)
Such evidence may include evidence related to the quality
of defense counsel’s representation of the defendant and the
nature of their interactions. (See People v. Benitez-Torres (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1266–1268 (Benitez-Torres).) This
evidence may be contained in the record of the plea, including
defense counsel’s written and oral representations to the court;
in the defendant’s case file; or in declarations or testimony by
the defendant, defense counsel, witnesses, or immigration law
experts. (See Espinoza, at p. 324; People v. Rodriguez (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 301, 322 (Rodriguez); Benitez-Torres, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1267–1268; Manzanilla, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 905–911.) Relevant evidence includes
evidence of whether counsel inquired about the defendant’s
current immigration status and plans to apply for immigration
benefits;2 whether counsel fully advised the defendant of
2
We use the term “immigration benefits” to refer generally
to any sort of legal authorization that allows a noncitizen to
lawfully enter the United States or remain here to live, work,
study, or travel, either temporarily or permanently. Such
benefits include immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, various
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definite and potential immigration consequences of the
conviction and sentence that would result from the plea;
whether counsel’s advice about the immigration consequences of
the plea was accurate; whether counsel informed defendant of
potential alternative pleas that would have eliminated or
mitigated the immigration consequences; whether counsel
attempted to negotiate such a plea with the prosecution; and
whether counsel discussed with the defendant the advantages
and disadvantages of going to trial, including possible defenses
to the charges. (See People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
1160, 1176–1177 (Curiel); Manzanilla, at pp. 905–911; People v.
Villalba (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 659, 671–673 (Villalba); Carrillo,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 17; § 1016.3, subds. (a) & (b).)
Evidence of whether the defendant or defense counsel consulted
with an immigration law expert about immigration
consequences and possible alternative pleas — either before or
after the plea — and if so, of the advice received, is also relevant.
(See Espinoza, at p. 324; Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1003, 1009.) A showing of ineffective assistance of counsel
may support a finding of error, but a defendant may establish
error without proving that counsel’s performance was
constitutionally deficient. (§ 1473.7(a)(1); Vivar, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 523; Camacho, at p. 1007.)
Relevant evidence also includes evidence of the trial
court’s efforts to confirm that the defendant understood the
forms of humanitarian relief, adjustment of status to permanent
residency, relief from removal, employment authorization,
family reunification, and naturalization. (See 8 C.F.R. § 1.1 et
seq. (2026).)
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immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea and had an
opportunity to discuss them with their attorney and tailor their
defense strategy accordingly. (See Manzanilla, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 899–900, 910–911.) Such evidence may
be found in the written record, including the advisements and
findings contained in the plea form, and the transcript of the
plea proceedings, including any discussion related to
immigration consequences in the plea colloquy. Evidence that
the trial court gave the defendant the generic advisement of
immigration consequences required by section 1016.5 is
relevant because it tends to show that the defendant was made
aware of the possibility that a conviction could have serious
immigration consequences and the need to consult with an
attorney about any immigration-related concerns; however,
such evidence does not alone show that the defendant received
complete and accurate advice and meaningfully understood that
advice. (See § 1016.5, subd. (d); Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 320; People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 962
(Padron); Manzanilla, at p. 906; § 1016.5, subd. (a); cf.
Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 897–898.) Evidence that the
trial court gave a confusing or inaccurate advisement would
tend to support a finding of error. (Villalba, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 671, 675; cf. S.B. No. 281 (2025–2026 Reg.
Sess.) [amending section 1016.5 to require courts to give
statutory advisement “verbatim”].) Evidence of whether the
court provided the defendant “additional time to consider the
appropriateness of the plea in light of the advisement” and
consult with counsel is also relevant. (§ 1016.5, subd. (b); see §
1016.3, subds. (a) & (b).)
And finally, relevant evidence includes evidence of the
defendant’s subjective understanding, or lack thereof, of the
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immigration consequences of the plea and their options for
avoiding or mitigating those consequences. The most direct
evidence of a defendant’s subjective understanding consists of
the defendant’s own statements to the court when entering the
plea and in declarations or testimony given in support of their
section 1473.7(a)(1) motion. (See Carrillo, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 17 [defendant “is the only one with direct
access to his state of mind”].) A defendant’s testimony that they
did not understand the immigration consequences or their
options for defending against those consequences may be
corroborated by evidence of the defendant’s priorities relevant
to the plea. This includes evidence of the defendant’s
immigration status and prospects of obtaining immigration
benefits; evidence of how long the defendant has lived in the
United States, at what age they came here, and the strength of
their ties to their country of origin; and evidence of the nature
and extent of the defendant’s ties to the United States and their
family and community in this country. (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 320; Padron, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 962;
Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1177.)
Evidence of the defendant’s personal characteristics may
also shed light on their ability to understand the plea, its
consequences, and their options. This includes evidence of the
defendant’s education level, occupation, intellectual capacity,
mental health, disability, literacy, age, and sophistication;
evidence of the defendant’s English language proficiency and
ability to understand the interpreter, if any; and evidence of the
defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system.
(People v. Diaz (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 102, 114–115; Padron, at
p. 961; Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 18; Manzanilla,
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 906.) Such evidence may be
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presented through documents and through declarations or
testimony of family members, friends, medical professionals,
defense counsel, and others.
Evidence of a defendant’s statements and conduct during
and after the plea proceedings may suggest understanding and
informed acceptance of immigration consequences or lack
thereof. This includes evidence that the defendant either
voluntarily brought themselves to the attention of immigration
authorities — for example, by presenting themselves for
admission at an airport or border crossing station or by applying
for an immigration benefit — or that the defendant avoided
contact with immigration authorities; evidence of whether or not
the defendant understood they would be placed in removal
proceedings or transferred to immigration custody after
completing their sentence; and evidence that the defendant
expressed concerns about potential immigration consequences
of their conviction either before or after entering their plea.
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320; Curiel, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1177; Alatorre, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
p. 770.) Evidence of the defendant’s concern about immigration
consequences (or lack of such concern) may be found in
interactions with friends, family members, the sentencing court,
the probation department, or attorneys. (See Vivar, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 522; People v. Diaz, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
p. 115; Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 899–900, 910–
911; Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009.)
Because the burden is on the defendant to establish error
and because courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether the defendant has
satisfied this burden, it will generally be in a defendant’s
interest to create a robust record. (See Espinoza, supra,
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14 Cal.5th at p. 325 [“The more robust and inclusive a record,
the greater the opportunity for effective persuasion and
meaningful judicial review”].) However, “no specific kind of
evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Ibid.)
2. The Preponderance of the Evidence Shows Error
As we have noted, Irigoyen died before Hernandez filed
her habeas corpus petition and her new attorney was not able to
obtain any records Irigoyen may have kept related to her case.3
The record here consists primarily of the court records from
Hernandez’s plea and sentencing and her testimony at the
evidentiary hearing on her section 1437.7(a)(1) motion. In our
independent review of this record, we give deference to the trial
court’s factual findings to the extent that they were based on the
court’s observations of Hernandez when testifying. (Vivar,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527–528; Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1174–1175.)
Although the trial court did not expressly rely on its
observations of Hernandez, its conclusion that Hernandez’s
claims were based on “post hoc assertions” implies that it did not
credit Hernandez’s testimony that she was “never” given the
immigration consequences advisement and that Irigoyen never
told her that she “could possibly be deported.” Our independent
review confirms that this testimony is “contradicted by the
3
When available, a declaration or testimony from plea
counsel can be very helpful in establishing eligibility for section
1473.7(a)(1) relief. (See, e.g., Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1002–1005 [defense counsel’s testimony established that
he had inadequately researched immigration consequences and
had given inaccurate advice].) However, “[a] party seeking relief
under section 1473.7 is not required to provide the declaration
of plea counsel.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 325.)
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PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
record of the plea”: The plea form indicates that Hernandez
received an immigration consequences advisement and that
Irigoyen discussed it with her. We therefore credit the trial
court’s implied finding that Hernandez’s testimony that she was
“never told” she could possibly be deported was not credible.
Other aspects of Hernandez’s testimony, however, are
credible and supported by the record of her criminal case.
Significantly, Hernandez testified that, although she answered
“yes” when the court asked her whether she understood
everything in the plea form, she “never thought that it would be
anything like that, like deportation.” Her testimony that she
did not understand she would be deported is corroborated, most
compellingly, by evidence that just two years after entering her
plea, she obtained permission from the probation department to
travel to Mexico and on her return, presented herself to
immigration authorities at the airport, triggering proceedings to
revoke her permanent residency and deport her. We found error
based on similar evidence in Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
page 320. Like Hernandez, Espinoza was a long-time
permanent resident who, after pleading guilty to an offense that
made him deportable and barred his reentry, “took an
international commercial flight to the United States.” (Ibid.)
We observed that doing so “predictably required subjecting
himself to the scrutiny of United States immigration officials.”
(Ibid.) We reasoned that voluntarily bringing oneself to the
attention of immigration authorities in this way “is not
consistent with the behavior of a person who understood that
his convictions effectively ended his lawful resident status.”
(Ibid.) Given Hernandez’s long-term residence in the United
States, her status as a lawful permanent resident, and her close
and extensive family ties in California, her decisions to seek and
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PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
obtain permission from the probation department to leave the
United States, to travel to Mexico, and to attempt to lawfully
reenter through a port of entry support an inference that she did
not “meaningfully understand” the immigration consequences of
her conviction. (§ 1473.7(a)(1); see Espinoza, at p. 320; Alatorre,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 770–771.)
Hernandez’s testimony about the circumstances in which
she entered her plea further supports her claim that she did not
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of
doing so. When asked to explain why she pled guilty, Hernandez
testified that Irigoyen told her that she “had to.” Hernandez
acknowledged that she signed the plea form and initialed the
immigration advisement on it, but she asserted that Irigoyen
had not explained the advisement to her. When asked why she
had signed the plea form without understanding it, she
explained: “if he’s my attorney and he’s telling me, ‘sign here,
initial here,’ I’m going to sign.” When asked why she answered
“yes” when the court asked her whether she understood the plea
form, she responded that she was “really nervous.”
Other evidence corroborates Hernandez’s account. The
record shows that Hernandez required a Spanish-language
interpreter for all her court appearances. Irigoyen did not speak
Spanish, and the only time she met with him with an interpreter
was at the court on the day she entered her plea. Irigoyen did
not request additional time from the court to counsel Hernandez
on the immigration consequences of pleading guilty or her
options for defending against them. (See § 1016.5, subd. (b).)
Hernandez, having no record of prior criminal conduct, had
never entered a plea before. And the plea colloquy was brief,
consisting of a series of yes/no questions with no direct reference
to immigration consequences.
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Moreover, the meaning of the form immigration
consequences advisement that Hernandez initialed is far from
clear. It begins: “I understand that if I am not a Citizen of the
United States, my guilty or no contest plea will result in my
deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, and
denial of naturalization under the laws of the United States.”
The seemingly unequivocal phrasing of this
acknowledgement (“will result”) is undermined by its
appearance on a standard, preprinted form presented to all
felony defendants regardless of their specific criminal charges
or their immigration status. Further ambiguity emerges from
what follows: a bold-print advisement that “[d]eportation is
mandatory for some offenses” and a preprinted attestation that
“I have fully discussed this matter with my attorney and
understand the serious immigration consequences of my plea.”
By observing that deportation is mandatory for “some” offenses
and suggesting that defendants should have discussed
immigration consequences with their attorneys, the advisement
conveys that it was not intended as personalized immigration
advice but instead was meant to warn defendants of potential
immigration consequences and to help ensure that they receive
complete and accurate immigration advice from their attorneys
before entering their pleas. (See § 1016.3.) Considering
Hernandez’s personal characteristics and background, the
record of the plea proceedings corroborates her testimony that
she pled guilty because her attorney told her to and that, despite
her signature and initials on the form advisement and her
testimony that she understood the form’s content, she did not
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of her
plea.
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The evidence in the record also shows error impairing
Hernandez’s ability to “defend against” the immigration
consequences of her plea. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) Hernandez testified
that she spoke with Irigoyen with the help of an interpreter for
the first time at her plea hearing and that she agreed to plead
guilty as charged on that day because Irigoyen told her to. The
record of the plea proceeding is consistent with Hernandez’s
account: It shows that Irigoyen appeared on Hernandez’s behalf
for the first time at her plea hearing and that he did not ask the
court for additional time to consult with her about possible
immigration consequences or to engage in plea bargaining. (See
§§ 1016.3, 1016.5, subd. (b); Rodriguez, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at
p. 326; Padron, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 960.) Taken
together, Hernandez’s testimony and the record of the plea show
that she was not informed, before entering her plea, about
possible alternative pleas, the risks and benefits of pleading
guilty as charged versus taking her case to trial, or possible
defenses she could pursue at trial.
Finally, the record shows impairment of Hernandez’s
ability to “knowingly accept” the immigration consequences of
her convictions. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) Hernandez testified that she
did not want to be “sent to Mexico.” Evidence of her extensive,
deep, and longstanding ties to the United States corroborates
this testimony. Indeed, the Attorney General acknowledges
that Hernandez’s deportation would be “devastating” for
Hernandez, her family, and her community. Her conduct also
corroborates her testimony: She obtained permission from
probation before traveling to Mexico, and when immigration
authorities detained her as she attempted to lawfully reenter
the country and confiscated her permanent resident card, she
did not consent to deportation. Instead, she contested the
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PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
immigration charges and retained an attorney to help her
attempt to withdraw her plea. All this suggests that Hernandez
did not knowingly accept the immigration consequences of her
plea.
In sum, considering the totality of the circumstances, a
preponderance of the evidence in the record shows error
impeding Hernandez’s ability to meaningfully understand the
immigration consequences of her plea and to defend against or
knowingly accept those consequences.4
4
The concurring and dissenting opinion suggests that we
have not identified the error here or specified whose error it was.
(Conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at pp. 1–2.) The opinion
seems to read section 1473.7(a)(1) as requiring a finding of a
specific legal error committed by counsel or by the court when
taking the plea. (Conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at pp. 1–
4, 7–10.) As we have explained, however, for purposes of section
1473.7(a)(1), the error determination turns on the defendant’s
state of mind as established by the defendant’s testimony about
their subjective understanding and corroborated by objective
evidence. (See p. 13, ante.) Error may take the form of the
defendant’s lack of a meaningful understanding of the “actual or
potential adverse immigration consequences” of their plea; the
defendant’s subjective misunderstanding or ignorance that
damaged their ability to “defend against” these consequences; or
the defendant’s failure to “knowingly accept” these
consequences. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) The record here shows all three
types of error on Hernandez’s part.
The concurring and dissenting opinion suggests that we
should provide guidance on “what courts and counsel must do
going forward to protect defendants and avoid error.” (Conc. &
dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at pp. 1–2.) We agree that such
guidance is useful. Some guidance on the steps courts and
counsel should take is implicit in our description of the evidence
a defendant may use to demonstrate error. (See pp. 13–15,
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PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
3. Evidence That Hernandez Received an
Immigration Consequences Advisement Does Not
Defeat Her Showing of Error
The Attorney General, echoing the reasoning of the Court
of Appeal, points to the trial court’s conclusion that Hernandez’s
claims were based on “post hoc assertions” that are “contradicted
by the record of the plea” to argue that she has not established
error. In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Court of Appeal
accorded “particular deference” to this conclusion,
characterizing it as an “implied finding” that Hernandez’s
testimony that she was never told that she could be deported
was not credible. Hernandez concedes that the record shows
that she was given the immigration consequences advisement
ante.) And other statutory provisions address the
responsibilities of courts and counsel. (See §§ 1016.5, 1016.3,
subd. (a).) Section 1473.7(a)(1), however, focuses on the
defendant’s misunderstanding or ignorance.
Finally, the concurring and dissenting opinion says that
we rely on “substantial speculation” and suggests that remand
to the trial court would be appropriate to afford Hernandez an
opportunity to further develop the record in light of our
guidance. (Conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 10.) To
be sure, remand to the trial court for further development of the
record will be appropriate in many appeals from denials of
section 1473.7(a)(1) motions that are pending when we issue our
decision. As the concurring and dissenting opinion observes,
remand would allow the defendant an opportunity to make a
fuller presentation of evidence with the guidance we have
provided in mind and would permit the trial court to make a new
ruling taking that additional evidence into account. (Conc. &
dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at pp. 10–11.) But remand is
unnecessary where, as here, the evidence in the record
establishes the defendant’s eligibility for relief.
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PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
contained in the plea form, but she argues that this does not
defeat her showing of error. We agree.
As we have explained, the error inquiry under section
1473.7(a)(1) does not turn solely on what Hernandez was told.
Although evidence of what a defendant was told is relevant to
the inquiry, its ultimate focus is on what the defendant
subjectively understood. The trial court’s orders reflect that it
misunderstood the inquiry as turning on whether Irigoyen
misadvised Hernandez. The court’s initial ruling purported to
deny Hernandez’s habeas corpus petition, in which she had
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, not her section
1473.7(a)(1) motion. Even after correcting that error, the court
denied Hernandez’s motion based on its conclusion that Irigoyen
had “properly advised” her, citing exclusively to habeas corpus
cases. That the trial court treated the section 1473.7(a)(1)
inquiry as an ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry is
unsurprising giving the timing of Hernandez’s motion and the
procedural history of her case. Hernandez initially made her
request to withdraw her plea in a habeas corpus petition, and
the focus of the evidentiary hearing was on whether Hernandez
had received accurate immigration advice. Moreover, it was not
until after Hernandez’s evidentiary hearing that section
1473.7(a)(1) was amended to clarify that a defendant need not
establish ineffective assistance of counsel to be eligible for
relief — a clarification prompted by early Court of Appeal
decisions that had interpreted the statute in the same way the
trial court appears to have interpreted it here. (See Assem. Bill
No. 2867 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) § 2; Camacho, supra,
32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1005–1008 [describing legislative history
of amendment].)
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PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Whatever the source of the trial court’s apparent
misunderstanding, the law is now clear that having received an
immigration consequences advisement does not preclude a
defendant from establishing that they did not meaningfully
understand the immigration consequences of their plea,
potential alternative pleas, or the relative risks of going to trial.
(See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320; Padron, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at pp. 961–962; Manzanilla, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 906.) The first sentence of the advisement
in Hernandez’s plea form is a modified version of the advisement
required by section 1016.5, subdivision (a), which directs courts
to inform defendants that a conviction “may have the
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization.” (Ibid.) We expect
that when defendants receive this advisement, they will seek
advice from counsel and rely on counsel’s evaluation of the
applicable law, the evidence, and possible alternative pleas or
defenses, considering the defendants’ personal backgrounds and
priorities. (See Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 896–897; In re
Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 240 (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.);
§ 1016.5, subds. (b), (d).) An advisement of the potential
immigration consequences that is given by the judge taking a
plea “is not designed, nor does it operate, as a substitute for such
advice.” (Patterson, at p. 898; Padron, at p. 962.)
Indeed, a judge in a plea-taking role is ill-suited to the task
of providing affirmative, concrete, specific advice about the
immigration consequences of convictions. While there are some
cases in which the application of immigration law to a
defendant’s circumstances and charges will be “truly clear,”
there are many others in which it will be “unclear or uncertain.”
(Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 369; see Patterson,
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PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 897–898.) “With only a small degree of
hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed ‘second only
to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.’ ” (Castro-O’Ryan
v. INS (9th Cir. 1987) 847 F.2d 1307, 1312.) The application of
immigration law to any individual defendant’s circumstances
requires not only familiarity with this complex legal labyrinth,
but also an assessment of information about a noncitizen’s
personal background.5 It is not a court’s duty to provide this
counseling when taking a plea. Courts are often unaware of the
immigration status of defendants appearing before them, much
less of the life circumstances relevant to a noncitizen
defendant’s eligibility for immigration benefits or relief from
deportation. (See § 1016.5, subd. (d) [providing that “at the time
of the plea no defendant shall be required to disclose their legal
status to the court”]; Evid. Code, § 351.4, subd. (a) [requiring in
camera hearing on admissibility before evidence of immigration
5
Personal details unrelated to the charges defendants face
can determine the effects of a conviction on the defendant’s
immigration status or eligibility for immigration benefits. (See,
e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) [providing for automatic acquisition of
U.S. citizenship by children born abroad in certain
circumstances]; id., § 1229b(b)(1)(D) [providing for cancellation
of removal for certain nonpermanent residents who can
establish that their deportation would cause “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” to a close relative]; id., §
1101(a)(15)(U) [providing path to lawful permanent residence
for certain crime victims]; id., § 1158 [providing asylum for
certain noncitizens who fear persecution if they return to their
home countries]; Padron, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 962
[noting that general advisement did not speak to defendant’s
“particular status as an asylee”].)
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PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
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status may be disclosed in open court].)6 That a court advised a
defendant, when taking their plea, that their offense could or
would have serious immigration consequences is therefore not
dispositive of the error determination. (See Curiel, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1175–1176; cf. Padron, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at pp. 961–962 [prosecutor’s advisement].)
That determination ultimately turns on whether the defendant
meaningfully understood the immigration consequences of the
plea and was able to defend against or knowingly accept those
consequences. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).)
The Attorney General acknowledges that an immigration
consequences advisement is not a substitute for the “accurate
and affirmative” advice of an attorney and that the receipt of
such an advisement does not prevent a defendant from
establishing the subjective error required to obtain relief under
section 1473.7(a)(1). (§ 1016.3, subd. (a).) He argues, however,
that to credit Hernandez’s testimony at her evidentiary hearing
6
With these limitations in mind, the Legislature recently
amended section 1016.5, subdivision (a) to clarify that the
advisement must be given “verbatim,” i.e., using the word “may”
rather than the more definitive language that many trial courts
were employing, including the court in this case. (See Sen. Rules
Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 281
(2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 15, 2025, p. 4 [quoting
sponsor’s arguments that giving a “will” advisement “runs afoul
of the clear judicial and legal doctrine that judges are not
allowed to dispense legal advice to those who appear before them
in court” and may dissuade defendants from seeking
immigration advice from qualified attorneys].) The Legislature
specified, however, that for pleas accepted prior to January 1,
2026 (including Hernandez’s) the amendment would not require
a court to grant a motion to vacate the judgment, withdraw the
plea, or otherwise find a conviction invalid where the court had
failed to provide a verbatim advisement. (§ 1016.5, subd. (e).)
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PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
that she did not understand that her plea could result in her
deportation would be to conclude that Irigoyen and the
interpreter misled the court by signing the statements on the
plea form and to discredit Hernandez’s own statements to the
court when entering her plea. To be sure, the signatures of
Irigoyen and the court interpreter on the preprinted statements
on Hernandez’s plea form suggest that the advisement was
translated and explained to her and that they believed she
understood it, and Hernandez’s answers to the court during the
plea colloquy suggest that she received the advisement and had
no questions about it. This is all relevant to the error inquiry.
Evidence that the form advisement was translated for
Hernandez is particularly probative on these facts, considering
Hernandez’s need for a Spanish interpreter. But when
considered in the context of the other evidence in the record, this
evidence does not necessarily indicate that Hernandez
meaningfully understood the immigration consequences of the
charges against her, much less that she understood her options
for defending against those consequences and knowingly
accepted them. (§ 1473.7(a)(1).)
While we defer to the trial court’s implied finding that
Hernandez received the immigration consequences advisement
in the plea form, we accord no deference to its legal conclusion
that Irigoyen “properly advised” Hernandez. (See Vivar, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 524 [adequacy of counsel’s advice is a
predominantly legal question, reviewed independently].)
Irigoyen’s signature on the preprinted statement on the plea
form saying that he “explained any possible immigration
consequences” supports an inference that he provided
Hernandez the advisement contained in the form. But the
statement sheds no light on whether Irigoyen knew the
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PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
immigration consequences of the charged offenses and provided
Hernandez complete and accurate advice about her options for
defending against them. (See § 1016.3, subd. (a); Camacho,
supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009.) If Irigoyen was ignorant of
the immigration consequences of the charged offenses, he could
have signed the plea form believing that the part about
explaining immigration consequences was inapplicable in
Hernandez’s case. (See, e.g., Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1002–1005; Benitez-Torres, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1268–1269.) Similarly, if Irigoyen only vaguely
referenced the plea’s immigration consequences, or if he merely
read Hernandez the immigration consequences advisement, he
could have believed that he had fulfilled his duty to explain “any
possible immigration consequences” while failing to inform
Hernandez of the immigration consequences in her case. (See,
e.g., Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 905; People v.
Lopez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 561, 578.) This case is somewhat
unusual in that Irigoyen died before Hernandez filed her
petition and Hernandez’s new counsel was unable to obtain
Irigoyen’s case file. (But see Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 324–325 [15 years had passed since defendant entered plea
and former defense counsel could not be contacted]; Vivar,
supra, 11 Cal.5th 519 [counsel declined to submit declaration].)
But the evidence that is available — including evidence of
Hernandez’s ties to the United States, that she voluntarily
presented herself to immigration authorities, that Irigoyen
appeared in court on Hernandez’s behalf for the first and only
time at her plea hearing, that Irigoyen did not ask the court for
more time for plea negotiations, and that Hernandez pled guilty
as charged, without any apparent effort to negotiate a plea with
less dire immigration consequences — strongly indicates that
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Irigoyen did not provide Hernandez complete and accurate
advice.
And ultimately, the error inquiry does not turn solely on
what Hernandez was told by Irigoyen or by the court. The focus
of the error inquiry is the defendant’s state of mind: what the
defendant subjectively understood — or did not understand —
when entering the challenged plea. Courts evaluating motions
to vacate a conviction under section 1473.7(a)(1) should consider
the totality of the circumstances and ask whether defendants
meaningfully understood the actual and potential immigration
consequences of their pleas and their options for defending
against those consequences and whether they knowingly
accepted those consequences when entering their pleas. The
purpose of the immigration consequences advisement is to
ensure that noncitizens are aware that there may be adverse
immigration consequences and to allow them an opportunity to
obtain personalized advice from counsel, consider the potential
immigration consequences, bargain, if possible, for an
immigration-safe plea (or one with less dire consequences), and
ultimately, to make an informed decision whether to knowingly
accept the immigration consequences of a conviction or to take
their cases to trial. (§ 1016.5, subds. (b), (d).) The record
demonstrates that Hernandez was deprived of this opportunity.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the fact that
Hernandez received the immigration consequences advisement
does not undermine her showing of error.
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B. Hernandez Has Established Prejudice
We further conclude Hernandez has established that these
errors were prejudicial.
A defendant establishes prejudice by showing that there
is a “reasonable probability” that they would not have entered
the plea if they had “correctly understood its actual or potential
immigration consequences” and their options for defending
against those consequences. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.)
“A reasonable probability does not mean more likely than not.
[Citation.] Instead, it means merely a reasonable chance, which
is more than an abstract possibility. [Citation.] In other words,
a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” (Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
p. 19.) Because immigration consequences may be more
important to a noncitizen defendant than any term of
incarceration, the focus of this inquiry is on “ ‘what the
defendant would have done, not whether the defendant’s
decision would have led to a more favorable result.’ ” (Vivar, at
pp. 528–529.)
In determining whether there is a reasonable probability
that Hernandez would not have entered the plea, we consider
the “totality of the circumstances.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 529.) A defendant’s assertion that they would not have
entered the plea had they meaningfully understood its
immigration consequences or their options for defending against
those consequences must be corroborated by objective evidence.
(Id. at p. 530.) Objective evidence may be presented through a
defendant’s declaration or testimony, declarations or testimony
of others, or documentary evidence, including the record of the
underlying criminal proceedings. (Id. at pp. 530–531.) It
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includes evidence of “the defendant’s ties to the United States,
the importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation,
the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether
the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral
negotiated disposition was possible.” (Id. at p. 530.) Also
relevant is “the defendant’s probability of obtaining a more
favorable outcome if [they] had rejected the plea,” and “the
difference between the bargained-for term and the likely term if
[they] were convicted at trial.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 320.) “These factors are not exhaustive” and “no single type
of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Id. at p. 321.) Evidence
relevant to the error inquiry will often also be relevant to the
prejudice inquiry.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Hernandez
has established a reasonable probability that, had she
meaningfully understood that her plea would result in the loss
of her permanent resident status and deportation to Mexico, she
would have attempted to negotiate an immigration-neutral plea
or taken her case to trial. Hernandez testified that if she had
known her conviction would subject her to mandatory
deportation, she would not have taken the plea because she did
not want to be “sent to Mexico.” This testimony was
corroborated by evidence of Hernandez’s strong ties to the
United States, which “provide compelling evidence in support of
a finding of prejudicial error.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 322.) She was 19 years old when she came to the United
States. When she entered her plea, she had been living in the
United States for 36 years and had been a permanent resident
for over two decades. Her “entire family” lived in the United
States, including her father, husband, five children, and 14
grandchildren, and she was regularly caring for two of her
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grandchildren. Hernandez’s testimony concerning these deep
and longstanding ties to the United States is “objective
evidence” that corroborates her assertion that she would not
have taken the plea had she been aware of the immigration
consequences of doing so. (Ibid.)
Hernandez’s assertion is further corroborated by evidence
of her behavior two years later, when she was apprehended at
the airport and placed in removal proceedings. Rather than
assenting to her removal from the United States, Hernandez
contested her case in immigration court and sought to withdraw
her guilty plea in state court.
Hernandez also has shown some reason to believe an
immigration-neutral disposition of her charges was possible.
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 323.) She had no prior
criminal record; as we have noted, “a defendant without an
extensive criminal record may persuasively contend that the
prosecutor might have been willing to offer an alternative plea
without immigration consequences.” (Id. at p. 324.) The record
of her sentencing also suggests the prosecutor may have been
open to negotiating: The probation department recommended
that Hernandez be sentenced to probation and determined that
if additional sanctions were required in the future, the low term
of two years would be warranted. (See id. at p. 324; Benitez-
Torres, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1269–1270.) The
prosecution agreed to a sentence of probation with local time
and to allow Hernandez to spend Christmas at home before
being sentenced. This all suggests that Hernandez “would have
had reason ‘to expect or hope’ that a plea deal without
immigration consequences ‘would or could have been
negotiated.’ ” (Espinoza, at p. 324.)
34
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Hernandez has also established that there is a reasonable
probability that she would have gone to trial had she been
unable to negotiate an immigration-neutral plea. Hernandez’s
testimony to that effect is corroborated by objective evidence.
Her lack of criminal history, the fact that she pled guilty to the
offenses as charged, and the relatively light potential sentence
she faced suggest that she could reasonably have concluded that
the risks of taking her case to trial were outweighed by the
possibility that she could successfully defend against the
charges and avoid mandatory deportation. (See People v.
Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 564 [observing that “a
defendant might decline to accept an offer if there is little to lose
by rejecting it, particularly if acceptance would have significant
adverse consequences”]; cf. In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274,
278–279 [due process principles preclude a court from imposing
a harsher sentence because a defendant exercises the right to a
trial].)7
Finally, the Attorney General did not contest prejudice in
the supplemental briefing filed in the Court of Appeal following
7
In her briefing, Hernandez raises the possibility that, had
she gone to trial, she could have asserted an entrapment
defense. She also cites federal cases that provide examples of
immigration-neutral dispositions that she argues may have
been possible in her case. (See People v. Martinez, supra,
57 Cal.4th at p. 564 [“[T]he strength of the prosecution’s case in
relation to his or her own case is often a factor” when considering
prejudice]; Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321 [a finding of
prejudice may be supported by a “declaration from an
immigration law expert explaining” whether the defendant
“could have pleaded to alternative, immigration-safe
dispositions”].) We do not consider these possibilities because
Hernandez has not made a record to support them and has
demonstrated prejudice with other evidence.
35
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
this Court’s prior remands after Vivar and Espinoza. And in
this Court, the Attorney General conceded that Hernandez has
established prejudice. While we are not required to accept this
concession, it provides further support for our conclusion that,
had Hernandez meaningfully understood the immigration
consequences of pleading guilty and the alternatives to doing so,
there is a reasonable probability that she would have rejected
the plea in the hope of obtaining “a more favorable outcome.”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.)
III. CONCLUSION
Reviewing the record independently, we conclude that
Hernandez has established “prejudicial error damaging [her]
ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or
knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration
consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7(a)(1).) She
has shown that she did not meaningfully understand that by
pleading guilty, she was subjecting herself to mandatory
deportation from the United States and triggering a bar to
reentering the country, and that she did not receive the advice
necessary to either meaningfully defend against or knowingly
accept those consequences. She has further shown that, were it
not for these errors, there is a reasonable probability that she
would have rejected the plea offer and either attempted to
negotiate a plea with less dire immigration consequences or
taken her case to trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
and direct the Court of Appeal to remand this case to the trial
court to enter an order granting Hernandez’s section 1473.7
motion, vacate her convictions, and conduct further proceedings
consistent with our opinion.
36
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
GROBAN, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
EVANS, J.
DANNER, J.*
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
37
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
S282186
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Corrigan
I agree that, in ruling on a Penal Code section 1473.7,
subdivision (a)(1) (section 1473.7(a)(1)) motion, the court must
consider the totality of the circumstances. The Legislature has
provided an avenue to vacate a conviction if the original plea
was legally invalid because prejudicial error damaged the
petitioner’s ability to understand, defend against, or knowingly
accept potentially adverse immigration consequences that
might arise following a guilty or no contest plea. The
Legislature and subsequent case law make clear that, in ruling
on such a motion, the court must determine not simply what a
defendant was told but whether they meaningfully understood
the immigration consequences that might flow from their
decision. (See People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 320
(Espinoza).)
Here we apply a relatively new and evolving statute on
which we have not had the opportunity to provide specific
guidance. It is important that we make clear not only what
constitutes prejudicial legal error, but also how trial and
appellate courts, as well as trial counsel, should approach their
responsibilities going forward. Clarity on these issues is
important for all concerned, and I suggest more is necessary
than that which can be culled from the majority opinion. The
majority concludes that “error” under section 1473.7(a)(1)
occurred here, but it does not articulate what the perceived legal
error was, who committed it, or what courts and counsel must
1
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting
do going forward to protect defendants and avoid error. The
majority opinion notes a petitioner cannot meet her burden by
simply urging that she did not truly understand the
immigration consequences of her plea, despite her direct
responses to the court that she was informed of and understood
them, realized she was telling the court she understood them,
and had no additional questions about them. (See maj. opn.,
ante, at p. 13.) Generally, when concluding that an error has
occurred, we are speaking in terms of legal error, not a litigant’s
later assertion that they, themselves, made an error in
judgment or made a later-regretted decision. The majority
opinion seems to refer to conduct unrelated to legal error by the
court or counsel as “subjective error.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.)
All courts should be vigilant to recognize, guard against, and
provide relief for legal error. However, an ill-defined “subjective
error” standard is unworkable and does little to protect a
defendant against legal error in the first place. It appears there
may have been legal error here. We should direct the trial court
to determine whether this is so, applying the guidance the
statute and our opinion provide. In doing so, we should also
articulate how courts and counsel should clarify whether a
defendant knowingly agrees to accept the immigration
consequences of her plea.
The statute itself calls for relief if the conviction is “legally
invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s
ability to meaningfully understand” the adverse immigration
consequences that may befall them should they enter the
proposed plea. (§ 1473.7(a)(1), italics added.) The plain
meaning of the statute provides relief if legal error caused a lack
of understanding. The factual record here is ambiguous on that
question and arguably supports different inferences. Part of our
2
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting
task here is to make plain what courts and counsel should do to
ensure a proper plea in the first instance, and how to resolve
subsequent questions in ruling on a section 1473.7(a)(1)
petition. Legal error may have occurred here and, in ruling on
the motion to vacate, the trial court failed to adequately consider
the totality of circumstances by focusing almost exclusively on
what Ms. Hernandez was told rather than more broadly
examining what she understood. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6–
8.) As a result, I would return this matter to the trial court for
it to consider Ms. Hernandez’s motion and determine the factual
and credibility questions it raises.
As we and the Courts of Appeal have pointed out, it is
certainly sufficient to show legal error if a defendant was
misinformed, not properly informed, or not given the assistance
of counsel who is aware of and adequately explains the
potentially life-altering immigration consequences of a plea.
(See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320; People v. Vivar (2021)
11 Cal.5th 510, 529 (Vivar).) Before adoption of section
1473.7(a)(1), courts in taking pleas often focused primarily on
what information was given, not whether it was understood.
But the new statute makes clear that such a truncated inquiry
may not be sufficient. When it comes to immigration
consequences, more is required of courts and counsel, and the
record must reflect that sufficient steps were taken to ensure
understanding. Courts taking a plea must now take care to
produce a record showing that a defendant actually understood
the proper advice they were given and took it into account when
entering their plea. Without such a record, a court ruling on a
later motion to vacate the plea is hobbled from the start. What
is required to secure relief is more than an assertion, sometimes
made years after a plea, that the petitioner just did not
3
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting
understand, no matter what they said at the time. What is
required is identification of a legal error on the part of the court
or counsel that prejudicially damaged the petitioner’s ability to
understand the immigration consequences to which they might
be exposed. All the relevant evidence on that question should
be taken into account, including the defendant’s circumstances
and events transpiring before, during, and after the plea. But,
without a workable standard to identify legal error, it is difficult
to imagine how a court or counsel can adequately protect a
defendant and ensure the plea was properly entered in the first
place.
At the time she entered her plea, Ms. Hernandez was
55 years old, having come to California at the age of 19. She
became a lawful permanent resident in approximately 1985,
nearly 30 years before this incident. She had five children, all
of whom are citizens or lawful residents, and 14 grandchildren.
There was no indication she had any exposure to the criminal
justice system. It appears her involvement in the events at issue
was motivated by a need to assist her son who suffered from a
grave mental disability. According to the record here, including
petitioner’s own statements, she was arrested outside a store in
Delano. Her car, in which she was the sole occupant, contained
five bags of marijuana, weighing over 100 pounds. She told
arresting officers she had gone to a vineyard where a man she
did not know placed the bags in her car. She did not sell the
marijuana. She was simply paid $2000 to deliver the bags to an
agreed-upon location.
In light of these stark facts, Ms. Hernandez found herself
in a difficult position. If she proceeded to trial and lost, she
would face exposure to substantially greater punishment. If she
entered a guilty or no contest plea, she faced a relatively brief
4
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting
period of confinement and probation versus far more daunting
potential consequences should she be convicted after a trial. For
many defendants considering a plea bargain, the alternatives
are much more clear and the discernable consequences much
more direct: Should I enter a plea that reduces my risk of
greater punishment or proceed to trial and hope to secure a
better outcome? But when immigration consequences are in
play, they may significantly alter a defendant’s consideration.
Immigration consequences can be particularly grave and may
only arise in a distant and unpredictable future. Some of those
consequences are beyond the ability of California’s courts to
control. The body of federal immigration law is complex and its
enforcement can fluctuate over time, as this case and recent
history make clear. These realities can greatly impact the way
in which a given defendant weighs her options in agreeing to a
plea. A defendant may be more willing to risk a negative trial
outcome if dire immigration impacts are involved. Making an
informed choice is more difficult for a defendant unfamiliar with
the justice system and dependent on the assistance of an
interpreter to communicate with both the court and her own
counsel. The statute was enacted to address these particular
challenges. It places a different and more demanding burden on
the court and counsel. It has made those new safeguards
retroactively available through the motion to vacate procedure.
As a result of her plea, Ms. Hernandez served a total of 27 days
in custody as a condition of probation which she successfully
completed. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 5–6.) Now, however, she
faces permanent deportation and separation from all her
immediate family.
The section 1473.7(a)(1) motion to vacate the conviction
turns on whether Ms. Hernandez’s plea was invalid because
5
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting
prejudicial legal error damaged her ability to meaningfully
understand the potential immigration consequences of her plea
when she entered it. By the time of her hearing, her lawyer had
died. The totality of circumstances bearing on her
understanding are mixed. She appeared before the court with a
lawyer of her own choosing. Her communications with counsel
and the court were done through an interpreter. She signed and
initialed forms that explicitly told her the plea “will result” in
deportation. The forms she signed and initialed represented
that she had discussed the serious immigration consequences
with counsel and understood them. Her lawyer signed a form
attesting that he had discussed the immigration consequences
with her, reviewed the form Ms. Hernandez had signed and
initialed, and was satisfied that she understood its contents.
The interpreter certified that she had translated the content of
the entire form into Spanish for Ms. Hernandez, who reported
that she understood the contents. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 3–
4.) The entire plea colloquy is contained in four pages of
transcript.
However, other circumstances could be understood to
suggest that, in reality, Ms. Hernandez did not understand the
immigration consequences she might face. The only time she
appeared with counsel and an interpreter to decide on a plea
bargain was at court on the day the plea was entered. She had
no experience with the criminal justice system. She was
dependent on an interpreter’s assistance to communicate with
both the court and her lawyer. After entering her plea, she
successfully completed probation. Before traveling to her home
country of Mexico, she sought and received her probation
officer’s permission for the trip. She returned through regular
air travel, using her own name, and presented herself and her
6
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting
residency card to immigration and customs agents. At her
motion hearing, she did not dispute that she signed and initialed
the forms mentioned, but emphatically testified that she did not
understand them and that they misrepresented what she was
actually told by counsel and the interpreter. She insisted that,
the signed form notwithstanding, she was never told that her
plea would result in deportation. She signed and initialed the
form because her lawyer instructed her to do so. She did not
recall the court or the interpreter asking if she understood the
forms she initialed and signed. If she had understood that her
plea would result in deportation, she would not have entered it.
Ruling on the motion required the court to determine
whether a legal error damaged Ms. Hernandez’s ability to
meaningfully understand the consequences of her plea when she
entered it. It also required the court to assess the credibility of
the petitioner’s testimony offered both as to what she was told
and whether she meaningfully understood the immigration
consequences her plea entailed. The documents and plea
colloquy reveal, and she does not dispute, that she signed and
initialed the forms and stated that she understood their
significance. But determining the adequacy of her
understanding must also take into account the brief
proceedings, both on and off the record, and the fact that they
were dependent upon accurate linguistic interpretation. The
determination is also informed by the undisputed facts that Ms.
Hernandez sought permission to leave the country, returned
through regular channels, and presented herself to immigration
scrutiny.
The record here could support a finding of two kinds of
errors. First, the initial plea colloquy itself was arguably
insufficient to support a subsequent finding that Ms. Hernandez
7
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting
meaningfully understood the immigration consequences she
might face. To survive a section 1473.7(a)(1) challenge, an
adequate inquiry should establish not only what a defendant
was told about possible immigration consequences, but also
whether the defendant was given a reasonable opportunity to
meaningfully understand that admonition and decide for
themselves whether to enter a plea. A written form provides
some significant evidence that adequate advisements were
given. Preparation of a plea form provides a formal structure
for counsel, and an interpreter if needed, to discuss the
advisements with the client. It also helps focus the defendant’s
attention and may identify any unanswered questions. But in
taking the plea, the better practice is for the court to do more
than just ask about the form. As the majority opinion observes:
“The most direct evidence of a defendant’s subjective
understanding consists of the defendant’s own statements to the
court when entering the plea.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.) A
more complete record is achieved if the court directly asks the
defendant whether they actually discussed immigration
consequences with counsel and whether they understand they
could be deported as Penal Code section 1016.5 provides. The
court should make clear that the decision to enter a plea belongs
to the defendant alone and not to counsel. It should also ask a
defendant whether they need more time to confer with counsel
or to further consider the plea decision. A subsequently
challenged plea may rise or fall, in large measure, on whether
the court made a clear and complete inquiry that anticipates
and reasonably resolves potential areas of confusion.
A second potential error may be urged to exist here
because the court, in ruling on the motion to vacate, did not
adequately consider all the relevant circumstances, including
8
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting
defendant’s individual characteristics and the subsequent
events shedding light on her previous understanding. While the
court placed great weight on the plea forms and transcript, it is
not clear from this record that it weighed that evidence against
the opposite inference that, while Ms. Hernandez said she had
been advised and understood her situation, in fact she did not.
It is at least possible that both can be true. It is for the ruling
court to decide whether meaningful understanding was
achieved or, conversely, whether misrecollection or a pressing
need to avoid difficult consequences accounts for less than
credible testimony in support of the motion. This inquiry
requires more than a mere document review. It also requires
more than an “implied finding” on the question of credibility.
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)
As the majority opinion properly points out, the burden is
on the petitioner to demonstrate a legal error damaged her
ability to meaningfully understand. Often this inquiry will
require credibility determinations to which we defer. (See maj.
opn., ante, at pp. 9–10.) But on appeal, we also test whether the
court properly considered all the relevant circumstances bearing
on the question. As the majority opinion observes, a defendant
may certainly meet the burden by showing they were given
incomplete or inaccurate advice about immigration
consequences and that a mere assertion that they did not
understand is not sufficient. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.) At
the motion hearing here, the court and parties were hampered
in deducing all the historical facts due to defense counsel’s
demise. This case highlights the importance of a full and
adequate inquiry by the court when it accepts the plea. Further,
as the majority opinion observes, in facing a totality of
circumstances review, it will generally be in a defendant’s best
9
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting
interest to create a robust record in support of the motion.
Indeed, the production of a robust record is in both parties’ best
interest and its creation is part of the trial court’s obligation
when accepting a plea.
I disagree with the majority opinion’s holding that we may
independently reweigh the evidence to conclude on our own that
Ms. Hernandez has established prejudicial legal error. (See maj.
opn., ante, at pp. 18–23.) First, the majority opinion does not
identify just what legal error occurred. Section 1473.7(a)(1)
requires a finding of reasonable probability that, due to
cognizable legal error, the petitioner did not meaningfully
understand the immigration consequences of her decision and,
had she done so, she would not have entered her plea. (See
Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 319–320; Vivar, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 529–530.) Those are, at the end of the day, both
factual and credibility determinations which should be made in
the first instance by a trial court applying the proper totality of
circumstances test. Here the majority opinion relies on
substantial speculation and assertions not urged by Ms.
Hernandez below.1 The remedy is for the matter to be remanded
1
In discussing its “subjective misunderstanding” test, the
majority opinion mentions as factors whether there may have
been possible defenses available or that an immigration-safe
disposition might have been reached. (See maj. opn., ante, at
pp. 11–12.) The admitted evidence contains no indication that
there were any viable trial defenses available or that a different
disposition was proposed by either side. In making a record at
the time of the plea, the court can inquire of both counsel
whether alternative dispositions were discussed between the
lawyers. It must be mindful, however, not to infringe on the
attorney-client privilege by probing the content of defense
counsel’s discussions about tactical decisions or defenses with
the client.
10
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting
so that Ms. Hernandez may make a fuller presentation and the
trial court can resolve factual and credibility issues, then make
a proper ruling considering all the relevant evidence. If the
record produced shows that legal error damaged her ability to
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of her
plea and accept them, the motion should be granted. That
ruling, whether favorable or otherwise, can be tested on review
to determine whether it is properly supported. I would reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeal with directions to remand
the matter to the trial court for a new hearing on the motion to
vacate.
CORRIGAN, J.
11
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Hernandez
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 9/8/23 – 5th Dist.
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion Nos. S282186
Date Filed: August 13, 2026
__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Kern
Commissioner: Steven M. Katz
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Law Office of Jacob M. Weisberg and Jacob M. Weisberg for Defendant
and Appellant.
Mehr & Soto, Michael Mehr; Christopher L. Haberman; Eda Katherine
Tinto; and Holly S. Cooper for the Immigration Legal Resource Center,
the Organization for the Legal Advancement of Raza, Inc., the
Criminal Justice Clinic at the University of California Irvine School of
Law and the University of California Davis School of Law Immigration
Law Clinic as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Ricardo Garcia, Public Defender (Los Angeles), Graciela Martinez,
Assistant Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster and Evan Franzel,
Deputy Public Defenders, Tracy Macuga, Public Defender (Santa
Barbara), Onyx M. Starrett, Deputy Public Defender, Claudia
Bautista, Public Defender (Ventura), Brooke Lautz, Deputy Public
Defender, David Joseph Sutton, Public Defender (Marin), and
Antoinette Therese Taillac, Public Defender (Fresno), for the Los
Angeles County Public Defender, the Santa Barbara County Public
Defender, the Ventura County Public Defender, the Marin County
Public Defender and the Fresno County Public Defender as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Michael J. Mongan,
State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney
General, Julie A. Hokans and Jeffrey A. White, Deputy Attorneys
General, and Aaron D. Pennekamp, Deputy State Solicitor General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Jacob M. Weisberg
Law Office of Jacob M. Weisberg
5740 N. Palm Avenue, Suite 103
Fresno, CA 93704
(559) 930-7193
Aaron D. Pennekamp
Deputy State Solicitor General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 210-6661